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**ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

**THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATIONS INTO AND OUT  
OF EAST GERMANY ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS  
IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY**



CIA/RR 30

15 March 1954

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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(ORR Project 45.267)

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THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATIONS INTO AND OUT OF EAST GERMANY  
ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

Summary

The area of Germany at present occupied by the USSR has been the scene of large population movements which are still continuing. Numerous persons have been moving out of this area to both the West and the East, and a substantial number of people have been moving into it from the West and the East. The total number of refugees who by the end of 1953 had moved into West Germany and West Berlin and had not returned to East Germany may be estimated to have been roughly 2.1 million. Between 1950 and 1952 a total of 110,464 persons, including a large percentage of returning refugees, moved from West to East Germany. Adequate data on the West-East migration prior to 1950 are not available, but it is conceivable that it was as large as twice the number of migrants between 1950 and 1952 or even larger.

In most of the postwar years, migration out of East Germany has been largely male. Moreover, the proportion of people belonging to age groups representing the most productive periods of life has been large. In recent times the flow of refugees has been made up increasingly of young people. It can be assumed that little more than 37 percent of the total net migrants to West Germany came from the economically inactive part of the East German population. In the economically active part of the East German refugees the largest occupational group consists of persons who, prior to defection, were active in industry and handicraft (nearly 22 percent). The next groups in order of size are refugees belonging to occupations in the fields of commerce and transportation (approximately 17 percent), and agriculture, forestry, and husbandry (almost 9 percent). Members of intellectual and artistic and of technical occupations form the smallest groups (about 2.5 percent each).

The majority of migrants from West Germany to East Germany have been females. Although adequate and detailed information on the occupational composition of the West-East migrants is not available, it can be assumed that the majority of at least the male migrants

\* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 January 1954.

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have been either employed persons who were dissatisfied with their jobs or persons able and willing to work who could not find employment.

Movements from East Germany to other countries of the Soviet Bloc have been due to the deportation of large numbers of specialists to the USSR, "voluntary" recruitment of such persons for work in the USSR, transfer of prisoners to the USSR, and possibly repatriations to Satellite countries. Persons moving into East Germany from other Satellite countries have been primarily expellees or prisoners of war, deportees, and contract workers returning from the USSR. The latter two categories have consisted of scientists, technical experts, highly skilled workers, and family members.

In 1950, 4,442,318 expellees resided in East Germany: 1,874,736 male and 2,567,582 female. Only a few expellees have entered in subsequent years. Although the previous occupations of these expellees are not precisely known, there can be little doubt that they were a cross section of all kinds of occupations, with a large percentage representing farm families.

No statistical data are available regarding the total number of deportees, repatriates, or contract workers who have left East Germany or regarding the total number of deportees and contract workers who have returned. The net manpower loss caused by forced and "voluntary" out-movements obviously has been large. According to some estimates, it was as high as 50,000 persons in 1947 and 1948 alone. Available information indicates that considerably fewer people have returned than have been taken to the USSR.

Despite the influx of about 4.5 million expellees shortly after the end of hostilities, the various movements into and out of East Germany have resulted in a large net loss in manpower for East Germany and East Berlin. The in-migration of the expellees did not much more than make up for the great manpower loss of the region during World War II. Without it, the Soviet area would have entered into its postwar era with a substantially smaller population. The net loss suffered during this era consists primarily of the roughly 2.1 million refugees who did not return, plus uncounted large numbers of deportees and contract workers who are still in the USSR, minus perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 in-migrating regular citizens of West Germany. This bloodletting has led to a generally tight manpower situation which is making the accomplishment of East German

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economic plans with the available East German labor force difficult but as yet not impossible.

Movements out of East Germany, however, have not only reduced the total number of available workers. Simultaneous defections, deportations, and moves of "voluntary" contract workers to the USSR have also intensified the shortages of specialized and skilled personnel. The scarcity of scientists, specialists, and trained workers has made it difficult to expand the technical and scientific labor force to the extent and with the speed necessary to fulfill East Germany's ambitious economic plans. In addition, these shortages have impeded the achievement of intended improvements in the volume and quality of output. The quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in scientific and expert manpower hamper the execution of economic plans more seriously than does the general labor shortage.

At the moment, East German manpower difficulties are great, but not really critical. Should defections, however, increase again from their present low of less than half the rate which prevailed in the first half of 1953, East German officials looking for additional civilian and military manpower may soon scrape the bottom of the barrel. If in the future, many more specialized and skilled persons leave the area than can be replaced by returning deportees, prisoners of war, and people graduating from the vocational schools and the numerous training courses, the breaking point may therefore be reached. If this crisis materializes and the over-all planners in Moscow so desire, the worst, however, could be avoided by the transfer of common labor or badly needed specialists from other parts of the Soviet Bloc.

Manpower difficulties in East Germany necessarily affect the Soviet economy as a whole, but these effects have been relatively slight, and, even in the event of a further deterioration of the East German labor situation, would probably be embarrassing but hardly critical.

As contrasted with the effects upon East Germany, Soviet Zone transborder movements have led to a large manpower increase in West Germany and West Berlin. Although possibly between 50,000 and 100,000 regular citizens of West Germany have moved to East Germany, more than 1.8 million refugees from East Germany and East Berlin now reside in West Germany. In the first postwar years the refugees,

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entering West Germany in the wake of the mass in-migration of expellees, were a large economic and social burden. Even after the currency reform of 1948, when demand for labor of various types gradually increased, they still continued to be, by and large, an economic liability rather than an asset. Because of the large expansion of the West German economy in recent years, however, about 35 percent of the expellees and refugees may now be considered to be economically integrated, and approximately 45 percent to be employed though not fully integrated. About 20 percent are still either partially or totally unemployed. This is largely because so many of them were sent on their arrival to predominantly agricultural regions of West Germany, where demand for additional labor has been rather limited. Moreover, a large-scale transfer to industrial districts with rising demand for labor has as yet proved impossible because of the continuing housing shortage in these areas. Lack of living accommodations in industrial areas rather than insufficient demand for labor is thus becoming more and more the principal factor obstructing the exploitation of the refugee labor pool. Accordingly, it will probably take much more time to integrate all refugees economically. As the economy continues to expand and total unemployment to decline and as the extensive housing programs go forward, refugee manpower probably will, however, be increasingly needed and used by West German industry and other branches of the economy.

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I. Migrations between East Germany and West Germany.\*

Migration out of East Germany has surpassed in-migration, at least in recent years. Although a sizable number of out-migrants

\* In conformity with current usage, the terms "East Germany" will be used in this report to designate the Soviet Zone of Occupation; "West Germany," the German Federal Republic; and "West Berlin," the US, British, and French Sectors of Berlin. The term "East Berlin," which is used interchangeably with "Soviet Sector of Berlin," will be treated as a separate entity and will not be considered for statistical purposes a part of East Germany unless so specifically designated.

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have gone to Scandinavian or other non-Soviet countries, the chief areas to which residents of Soviet-occupied Germany have moved -- or have been moved, respectively -- have been West Germany, West Berlin, and the USSR. East Germany virtually sealed its western borders in mid-1952 and imposed new security measures along the Baltic coast, with the result that Berlin became the chief point of exit for refugees to non-Soviet countries. Before the tightening of the border controls, approximately 50 percent of the total refugee stream from East Germany crossed the zonal borders at many other points and were received in West German reception centers at Uelzen and Giessen. Until the second half of 1953, only a small trickle (about 10 percent of the total) still managed to seep through the zonal borders at points other than Berlin. Registration of refugees in Uelzen and Giessen did not go up again until July-August 1953. This recent increase has been attributed to a more generous issuance of regular interzonal passes and the use of these passes as a means of fleeing from the Soviet-dominated area of the country.

A. Definition and Status of East German Refugees.

The term East German refugees as used in this report is applied to former residents of East Germany or the Soviet Sector of Berlin who moved to West Germany or West Berlin after the war, including expellees\* who had been "settled" in East Germany or the Soviet Sector of Berlin after the war and who came into West Germany or West Berlin after October 1946.

The legal status of East German refugees has been regulated by the Law Pertaining to the Emergency Acceptance of Germans in the Federal Territory, dated 22 August 1950 2/; the Order for the Execution of the Law Pertaining to the Emergency Acceptance of Germans in the Federal Territory, dated 11 June 1951 3/; and the

\* German nationals or ethnic Germans who, as a direct or indirect consequence of World War II, were expelled from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line or from territories outside the borders of the former Reich as they existed on 31 December 1937. According to Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1/ about 400,000 persons who, before World War II, lived in Western Germany or east of the Oder-Neisse line or in foreign countries migrated from East Germany and East Berlin to West Germany between 1946 and 1950.

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Order Pertaining to the Provisional Accommodation of Refugees from the Soviet Zone of Occupation and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, dated 12 August 1952. <sup>4/</sup> These enactments of the Federal Republic have been applicable in West Berlin since February 1952. On 24 April 1953 the Bundesrat approved the Law on Matters Pertaining to Expellees and Refugees (Federal Expellee Law), <sup>5/</sup> which is to supersede the divergent pertinent statutes of the Lands (states) and to adjust Federal legislation on the subject.

The 1953 law grants special rights and privileges to persons recognized as East German refugees in order to integrate them into the West German economy. Only those German nationals and ethnic Germans are eligible for recognition who have or did have their residence in East Germany or East Berlin and who were compelled to flee from there to escape from a special pressure situation attributable exclusively to the political conditions, and who, furthermore, did not violate the principles of humanity or rule of law. The law recognizes as a special pressure situation, above all, immediate danger to life and limb or to personal liberty. Persons who fled for purely economic reasons are not eligible for recognition as East German refugees. The most important measures to aid refugees provided by the Federal Expellee Law are as follows: fair and reasonable distribution over the Lands of West Germany and West Berlin; integration of farmers into agriculture by allocating farmland and by granting financial assistance for rural settlement; preferential treatment with respect to the granting of permits to carry on certain trades, professions, or handicrafts; financial and other assistance to self-employed persons; preferential treatment of manual and white-collar workers by the public employment service; and preferential allocation of living accommodations. Apart from such special privileges, recognized refugees have been legally accepted on a par with regular citizens of West Germany. The numerous German nationals and ethnic Germans not considered eligible for recognition under the law have, in practice, been permitted to remain in West Germany or West Berlin on a quasi-illegal basis. They are not eligible for the special assistance provided by the refugee legislation but may obtain housing or employment by their own action. In case of dire need they receive benefits under general public assistance systems. Non-German refugees have the legal status of foreigners. Although the immediate postwar period was marked by the presence in West Germany of large numbers of displaced persons of many nationalities, the number of non-Germans among the migrants coming out of East Germany under duress has steadily decreased. Few

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refugees from other Iron Curtain countries have been able recently to flee through East Germany to reach West Berlin or West Germany. Moreover, many non-German in-migrants have been going from West Germany to other countries.

B. Reasons for Migrations.

1. From East Germany to West Germany.

It is difficult and sometimes even impossible to draw a clear line of demarcation between cases of flight from the Soviet area because of direct danger to life and limb or personal liberty, and other cases. Moreover, not only non-Communists but also active Communists have sought and found refuge in West Germany, and the number of Communists among the refugees, including high East German politicians and civil servants, has been increasing in recent months. In most cases the only basis available for appraising the reasons for the flight from East to West Germany has been the refugee's own statements. A number of the escapees, unquestionably, migrated to the West because they felt that they could no longer live in the political atmosphere of East Germany. Others fled because they were persecuted on account of their political attitude. According to many statements of refugees, differences with Communists, imminent arrest for alleged economic offenses or espionage, refusal to act as informer, former membership in the Social Democratic Party, or involvement in political purges were the motives for leaving Soviet-occupied territory. During the period of marked anti-Jewish policy in the beginning of 1953, substantial numbers of refugees also declared that they felt in danger because they were Jews. Among the refugees who fled for what might be called political reasons have also been Communist and non-Communist politicians, judges, state attorneys, other civil servants, and public employees who had trouble or were afraid of potential trouble with the East German regime. Relatively few, however, of the persons who have escaped from East Germany or East Berlin have come to the West for genuinely political reasons. Despite liberal interpretation of the legal provisions, probably not more than about 1 out of every 3 applicants was granted official recognition as a refugee between 1949 and 1952. 6/

Interrogation of "non-political" refugees indicates that many left East Germany or the Soviet Sector of Berlin because they hoped for higher wages and living standards in the West, or because they were eliminated as independent businessmen, or because they

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were classified as socially non-productive, or for other economic reasons. In this category also may be counted the farmers who stated that they fled because they feared prosecution or confiscation of their farms for not having met crop production or delivery quotas, or that they wanted to avoid collectivization or prosecution for opposing it, or that they lost their farms through land reform or the creation of a no man's land along the zonal border, or that they faced liability for shortcomings in their capacity as officers of rural cooperatives.

A considerable number of refugees did not leave their homes for either political or economic reasons. Some, for example, emigrated because close relatives were leaving or because they wished to join family members in West Germany. Others gave up their residence in a spirit of opportunism or merely in quest of adventure. In many recent cases the motive was fear that the Berlin border -- the "only hole in the Iron Curtain" left open -- would be closed in the near future. These latter motives apply especially to the rising number of young refugees. In 1952, 17.2 percent of the registered refugees (19,523) were boys between 14 and 24 years of age, and 9.8 percent (11,123) were girls of the same age group. 7/ A large number of these juveniles obviously were not motivated by the desire to move to the West because of its liberal political system or primarily because of its more favorable economic conditions. Most of them declared that they wished to avoid being placed under contract in the uranium mines or that they wanted to evade service in the People's Police, the Free German Youth, the Service for Germany, or the new army. Among these young people were a number of girls who stated that they did not want to be subjected to the military training planned for the girls' units in the Free German Youth. A substantial portion of the young refugees were members of the People's Police, deserting, according to their statements, because they had been forced to enlist against their will or because they disliked their assignments, the long hours of political indoctrination, the poor living conditions, the strict discipline, the excessive rank privileges, or merely the Soviet-type uniform. Between the beginning of 1949 and the end of May 1953, 9,366 members of the People's Police applied for recognition under the Emergency Acceptance Law. 8/

Information obtained through the refugee screening process therefore indicates that the mass movement from East Germany and East Berlin to West Germany and West Berlin has been primarily

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because of economic or personal reasons and that opposition to the Soviet system as such has played a relatively minor role. These facts warrant the conclusion that the relative economic situation of the two parts of Germany has been the main factor determining the scope of transborder movements and that it probably will continue to be the chief determinant if, and as long as, it is possible to cross the border. Improvements in East German or deterioration of West German economic conditions will tend to reduce flights and, unless the zonal border is hermetically sealed, improvements in West German and deterioration of East German economic conditions will tend to increase them. In either case, the difference between the basic social, ideological, and political systems of the two parts of Germany will be less significant.

2. From West Germany to East Germany.

Movements from West to East Germany have also been due preponderantly to economic reasons. West Berlin officials have announced, for example, that nearly one-fourth of the numerous people who registered as refugees in January and February 1953 did not formally apply for asylum. In the opinion of the officials, most of these people returned to East Germany, preferring life under Soviet rule to the uncertainties of life as refugees. This high estimate of the number of returning refugees apparently was based on the fact that only 1 out of every 3 of these persons qualified for economic aid under the refugee legislation and for transportation to West Germany. 9/ Announcement in mid-1953 of a new policy of moderation by the East German authorities coupled with promises to give position and property back to returnees, as well as the belief that the June 1953 upheaval was an indication of the imminent collapse of the Soviet regime, have also in recent months caused a number of refugees to return to their homes.

Most of the indigenous West Germans who have moved to East Germany have apparently been people who were either unable to find employment in their accustomed occupations or unable to find any employment at all, and who believed reports that their chances for suitable employment would be better in East Germany. Among them, possibly, were trained doctors and engineers who, though not Communists, migrated because they had lost their savings and could get only jobs which they considered inferior. 10/ To stimulate immigration of persons of this occupational type, the Soviet regime

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recently established a comprehensive program for the recruitment of West German scientists, physicians, specialists, and skilled workers for employment in East Germany. ll/

C. Magnitude of Migrations.

To appraise the significance of the movements between the Soviet and non-Soviet parts of Germany in regard to the manpower situation in the two areas it is necessary to know, above all, the number of persons involved. Neither the East German nor the West German authorities, however, have published total figures of migrants in either direction. There is every reason to believe that these figures are unknown and that, owing to the uncontrolled and irregular manner in which people have moved, they cannot be computed accurately.\*

The same factors that make precise computation impossible render the making of an estimate difficult. However, while adequate East German data on migration to or from West Germany and West Berlin are not available, West German authorities have published statistical information regarding migration into and out of the non-Soviet areas of Germany which can be used to get some picture of the magnitude of the movements in both directions. The East German government has vehemently denied the accuracy of the West German and West Berlin data and has maintained that the figures on refugees are too high and the figures on migrants to the Soviet area too low.\*\* No comprehensive East German figures have been published, however, to support the denials or to prove the alleged inaccuracy of pertinent West German statistics. The latter, accordingly, form the only available basis for estimates.

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\* No information, for example, is available as to how many persons of East German or East Berlin origin in addition to those who can be tabulated have remained in West Germany or West Berlin as rejected refugees working "black" and making no claim for social welfare payments or as persons who have never applied for recognition as refugees.

\*\* Examination of the few comparable data on movements from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin published in the two sections of the country shows that the East German figures are not inconsiderably higher. According to East German information, the number of persons moving from West Germany and West Berlin to the Soviet area between 1 January 1951 and 30 June 1952, for example, amounted to 38,832, while it was only 34,000 according to the West German government.

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Data obtained from the West German censuses of October 1946 and September 1950 can be used to determine the number of persons living in West Germany and West Berlin whose residence on 1 September 1939 was in the Soviet Zone and Berlin. The census results are presented in Table 1.\* They do not, however, furnish the information needed for the purposes of this report, since the data, on the one hand, include persons who came from West Berlin, persons who migrated during the war, and the natural increase of the refugee population and, on the other hand, exclude the expellees who were originally resettled in East Germany and East Berlin and subsequently migrated to West Germany and West Berlin. Police and reception center registration data, another available source of information, do not cover the whole postwar period, nor do they include the unknown but substantial number of refugees who have entered non-Soviet Germany and remained there without completing registration at a reception center or the police, and similar cases. Tables 2\*\* and 3\*\*\* present the existing data on migrants who did register at the proper places. They show the deficiencies in information as to time and area covered. Data on the number of refugees who have been registering at the emergency reception camps at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen are available only for the period beginning in 1949, when these camps were first established. Figures on migration based on the general, compulsory police registration cover only the time period beginning in 1949 for migration between East and West Germany, from 1948 for migration between East Germany and West Berlin, and from 1950 for migration between East and West Berlin.

By using both existing registration and census figures on migration between East and West Germany as a basis, and by filling gaps in available information by a number of assumptions which are explained in Appendix A, the total number of refugees who, by the end of March 1953, had moved into West Germany and had not returned to East Germany may be estimated to have been approximately 1.9 million.\*\*\*\* A number of these refugees, after staying for some time,

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\* Table 1 follows on p. 12.

\*\* Table 2 follows on p. 12.

\*\*\* Table 3 follows on p. 14.

\*\*\*\* Data received after this report was prepared indicate that the number of refugees who arrived during the last 9 months of 1953 may be estimated to have been roughly 220,000, so that the total number of refugee-residents amounted to about 2,120,000 by 31 December 1953.

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Table 1

Population of West Germany and West Berlin in 1946  
and 1950 by Place of Residence on 1 September 1939

<u>Residence of Indicated Date</u>	<u>Residence on 1 September 1939</u>	
	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>East Germany</u>
West Germany <u>12/</u>		
29 October 1946	439,000	582,000
13 September 1950	518,000	1,037,000
West Berlin <u>13/</u>		
29 October 1946	1,879,000	36,000
13 September 1950	1,888,000	80,000

Table 2

Number of Migrants Registering at the Emergency Reception Camps  
at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen 14/  
1949-53

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>Giessen</u>	<u>Uelzen</u>	<u>Total</u>
1949	70,000 <u>a/*</u>	22,487	36,758	129,245 <u>a/</u>
1950	60,397	60,518	78,583	199,498
1951	59,269 <u>b/</u>	45,621	60,758	165,648 <u>b/</u>
1952				
1st Quarter	9,641 <u>b/</u>	5,534	9,392	24,567 <u>b/</u>
2d Quarter	16,189	8,092	8,697	32,978
3d Quarter	41,657	6,533	6,589	54,779

\* Footnotes for Table 2 follow on p. 13.

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Table 2

Number of Migrants Registering at the Emergency Reception Camps  
at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen 14/  
1949-53  
(Continued)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>Giessen</u>	<u>Uelzen</u>	<u>Total</u>
4th Quarter	45,924	3,246	3,750	52,920
Total 1952	<u>113,411</u> b/	<u>23,405</u>	<u>28,428</u>	<u>165,244</u> b/
1953				
1st Quarter	109,338	1,340	1,936	112,614

a. Approximate.

b.  the January figure for Berlin is included with the 1951 total. The 1951 total is, therefore, too high by this unknown number, and the 1952 total and the 1952 first quarter are too low by the same number.

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moved to other Western countries. Migrants from West Germany in the calendar year 1952, for example, included 6,914 East German refugees moving to new homes in the free world: 3,488 males and 3,426 females. 15/ Statistical data on the total number of such migrants from West Germany are, however, not available for earlier years. Taking the migration of former refugees to other Western areas into consideration, the total number of refugees still residing in West Germany and West Berlin early in 1953 may be estimated to have amounted to approximately 1,810,000.\*

\* This estimate, though arrived at by independent methods, is close to the estimate of 1.8 million made by Federal Refugee Minister Lukaschek on 10 September 1952, 16/ and an unpublished estimate of 1.8 million made on 23 January 1953 by the official of the Federal Statistical Office in charge of refugee statistics, the estimate of 1.86 million made by Professor Hans Harmsen in Staedtehygiene, 17/ and the German DPA estimate of 1,857,100 published on 11 February 1953. 18/ US reports repeatedly have estimated the number of refugees from the Soviet Zone to be 2 million. 19/

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Table 3

Number of Migrants between West Germany and East Germany, between West Berlin and East Germany, and between West Berlin and East Berlin by Time Period a/\* 20/ 1948-52

Time Period	Number of Persons Migrating			Number of Persons Migrating			Number of Persons Migrating		
	Net Migration to West Germany from East Germany	To West Germany from East Germany	From West Germany to East Germany	Net Migration to West Berlin from East Germany	To West Berlin from East Germany	From West Berlin to East Germany	Net Migration to West Berlin from East Berlin	To West Berlin from East Berlin	From West Berlin to East Berlin
1948									
March	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1,351	2,539	1,188	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2d Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	6,011	9,829	3,818	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3d Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3,751	7,264	3,513	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4th Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	5,359	8,329	2,970	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total (March-December)	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>16,472</u>	<u>27,961</u>	<u>11,489</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
1949									
1st Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	4,255	7,074	2,819	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2d Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	7,287	9,696	2,409	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3d Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	8,795	11,292	2,497	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4th Quarter	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	12,742	15,049	2,307	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total	<u>220,000</u>	<u>255,000</u>	<u>35,000</u>	<u>33,079</u>	<u>43,111</u>	<u>10,032</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
1950									
1st Quarter	41,943	49,740	7,797	9,552	11,689	2,137	2,810	5,095	2,285
2d Quarter	48,344	56,848	8,504	11,911	13,771	1,860	3,272	5,467	2,195
3d Quarter	57,781 b/	65,287 b/	7,526 b/	12,141	14,270	2,129	3,865	6,041	2,176
4th Quarter	65,779 c/	73,849 c/	8,070 c/	12,181	13,835	1,654	4,402	6,653	2,251
Total	<u>214,704 d/</u>	<u>246,792 d/</u>	<u>32,088 d/</u>	<u>45,785</u>	<u>53,565</u>	<u>7,780</u>	<u>14,349</u>	<u>23,256</u>	<u>8,907</u>

\* Footnotes for Table 3 follow on p. 15.

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Table 3

Number of Migrants between West Germany and East Germany, between West Berlin and East Germany,  
and between West Berlin and East Berlin by Time Period <sup>a</sup>/<sub>\* 20</sub>/  
1948-52  
(Continued)

Time Period	Number of Persons Migrating			Number of Persons Migrating			Number of Persons Migrating		
	Net Migration to West Germany from East Germany	To West Germany from East Germany	From West Germany to East Germany	Net Migration to West Berlin from East Germany	To West Berlin from East Germany	From West Berlin to East Germany	Net Migration to West Berlin from East Berlin	To West Berlin from East Berlin	From West Berlin to East Berlin
1951									
1st Quarter	44,934	49,902	4,968	9,605	11,068	1,463	1,054	5,918	4,864
2d Quarter	40,445	45,976	5,531	12,233	13,547	1,314	5,109	6,159	2,046
3d Quarter	44,449	51,748	7,299	13,873	15,575	1,702	4,458	5,507	1,049
4th Quarter	42,046	47,761	5,715	13,476	14,804	1,328	3,727	4,548	821
Total	<u>171,874</u>	<u>195,387</u>	<u>23,513</u>	<u>49,187</u>	<u>54,994</u>	<u>5,807</u>	<u>14,348</u>	<u>22,128</u>	<u>7,780</u>
1952									
1st Quarter	25,447	30,009	4,562	8,398	9,980	1,582	2,794	3,628	834
2d Quarter	27,426	32,047	4,621	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	2,509	3,260	751
3d Quarter	24,828	27,765	2,937	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3,323	4,134	811
4th Quarter	20,529	22,864	2,341	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	4,732	5,550	818
Total	<u>98,224</u>	<u>112,685</u>	<u>14,461</u>	<u>74,218</u>	<u>81,132</u>	<u>6,914</u>	<u>13,358</u>	<u>16,572</u>	<u>3,214</u>

a. Based on [redacted] arrivals and departures.  
b. Period from 1 July to 13 September 1950.  
c. Period from 14 September to 31 December 1950.

50X1

50X1

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Table 4\* indicates that, excluding migrants from West Germany to East Berlin, a total of 110,464 persons migrated from the non-Soviet to the Soviet area in 1950, 1951, and 1952. This figure includes returning East German refugees, other people coming originally from Berlin and areas now occupied by Eastern armies, people who were originally expellees, and indigenous West Germans. A statistical breakdown of West-East migrants is available only with respect to migration from West Germany to the Soviet area in 1952 and in terms of expellees and others (Zugewanderte). 21/ It indicates that, in that year, about 30 percent of these migrants probably were West Germans of long standing. Whether or not this percentage distribution can be applied to the 110,464 migrants included in Table 4 -- which would give as a result that about 33,000 indigenous West Germans migrated to the Soviet area during the period -- is doubtful.

Adequate data on total migration from the non-Soviet to the Soviet area of Germany prior to 1950 are not available. It is conceivable that the total number of postwar migrants of this kind may have been as large as twice the number of migrants between 1950 and 1952, or even larger.\*\*

D. Characteristics of Migrants.

1. Sex.

In most of the postwar years, migration out of Soviet-occupied Germany has been largely male. The proportion of males among the refugees has been estimated to have been 55 percent prior

\* Table 4 follows on p. 17.

\*\*  reception camps for migrants into East Germany coming from non-Soviet Germany -- for example, in the provinces of Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg, and other places. The existence of such camps has been interpreted as indicating that the number of returning refugees and other in-migrants from the West must have been substantial. Data on the total number of camps are, however, not available, and it appears that they have been established and closed according to the real or anticipated requirements of the moment. No permanent system seems to exist which would be comparable to the West German reception centers. 22/

50X1

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Table 4

Number of Migrants from West Germany and West Berlin  
to East Germany and East Berlin by Sex a/  
1950-52 b/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Migrants <sup>23/</sup></u>			<u>Percent Distribution</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Both Sexes</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
1950	24,019	24,756	48,775	49.2	50.8
1951	17,578	19,522	37,100	47.4	52.6
1952	12,181	12,408	24,589	49.5	50.5
Total	<u>53,778</u>	<u>56,686</u>	<u>110,464</u>	<u>48.7</u>	<u>51.3</u>

a. Based on  arrivals and departures.

b. Excludes migrants from West Germany to East Berlin. Data are available for these persons only for 1952, during which time there were 671 migrants, of whom 363 were males.

50X1

to 1950, 24/ and it may be assumed that it was not much smaller than 50 percent in 1950 and 1951.\* As shown in Table 5,\*\* the percentage of males among the persons passing through the emergency acceptance procedure in West Berlin was a little higher than 55 in 1952 and nearly 50 in the first half of 1953.

2. Age.

The proportion of people of working age has been relatively large. According to West German estimates, nearly 64 percent of the arrivals prior to 1950 belonged to the age group 20 to 44. 25/ Table 6\*\*\* indicates that in 1950, also, a high percentage of the refugees probably fell into age groups representing the most productive periods of life. As indicated in Table 5, persons between 14 and 45 years of age amounted to more than 58 percent of

\* See Appendix A, Methodology.

\*\* Table 5 follows on p. 18.

\*\*\* Table 6 follows on p. 19.

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Table 5

Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance Procedure in West Berlin by Age and Sex  
January 1952-June 1953 26/

Age Groups	1952			1953 1st Quarter			April 1953			May 1953			June 1953		
	Total	Percent	Male	Total	Percent	Male	Total	Percent	Male	Total	Percent	Male	Total	Percent	Male
Under 6	9,356	8.2	4,813	10,138	9.3	5,206	3,104	8.8	1,601	3,401	9.9	1,761	3,655	9.4	1,911
6 through 13	14,633	12.9	7,519	16,346	15.0	8,425	5,107	14.5	2,631	4,943	14.5	2,541	4,900	12.6	2,526
14 through 17	10,479	9.2	6,650	10,408	9.5	6,053	3,999	11.4	2,292	3,883	11.4	2,147	5,050	12.9	3,017
18 through 20	10,981	9.7	7,333	7,318	6.7	4,049	2,503	7.1	1,411	2,366	6.9	1,307	3,300	8.5	1,982
21 through 24	9,186	8.1	5,540	6,203	5.7	3,163	2,024	5.8	1,007	2,036	6.0	1,015	2,610	6.7	1,427
25 through 45	35,622	31.4	17,801	33,357	30.5	14,145	10,431	29.6	4,463	9,927	29.1	4,373	11,302	29.0	5,187
45 through 64	21,411	18.9	12,390	22,999	21.0	11,147	7,146	20.3	3,593	6,769	19.8	3,410	7,320	18.8	3,797
65 and over	1,751	1.6	957	2,569	2.3	1,215	873	2.5	425	819	2.4	405	832	2.1	397
All Ages	<u>113,419</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>63,003</u>	<u>109,338</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>53,403</u>	<u>35,187</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>17,423</u>	<u>34,144</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>16,959</u>	<u>38,969</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>20,244</u>

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Table 6

Number of Migrants from East Germany to West Germany by Age and Sex a/  
1950 27/

<u>Age in Years</u> <sup>b/</sup>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Percentage Distribution</u>		
				<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
Under 5	10,027	3,590	6,437	4.7	4.0	5.2
5 through 9	14,280	5,155	9,125	6.7	5.7	7.3
10 through 14	12,976	4,998	7,978	6.1	5.5	6.4
15 through 19	16,528	7,546	8,982	7.7	8.4	7.2
20 through 24	22,081	11,614	10,467	10.3	12.9	8.4
25 through 29	24,479	11,374	13,105	11.4	12.6	10.5
30 through 34	14,392	6,940	7,452	6.7	7.7	6.0
35 through 39	19,812	9,710	10,102	9.2	10.8	8.1
40 through 44	18,254	8,419	9,835	8.5	9.3	7.9
45 through 49	15,302	6,274	9,028	7.1	6.9	7.3
50 through 54	13,177	4,843	8,334	6.1	5.4	6.7
55 through 59	10,327	3,371	6,956	4.8	3.7	5.6
60 through 64	8,233	2,338	5,895	3.8	2.6	4.7
65 and over	14,836	4,046	10,790	6.9	4.5	8.7
<u>All Ages</u>	<u>214,704</u>	<u>90,218</u>	<u>124,486</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a. Reported net migration from East Germany by sex, distributed by the year of birth reported for net migration from all areas. These figures exclude illegal migrants who did not report their arrival or departure to the police.

b. This report shows the distribution of the net migration from East Germany, assuming the same distribution as for all migrants. The actual age distribution of the net migrants from East Germany may have differed in some degree, inasmuch as the 53,000 returned prisoners of war were almost certainly concentrated in the younger ages and the 67,000 displaced persons who came under German authority during the year were probably concentrated in the older ages.

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all refugees processed in Berlin in 1952 and they amounted to between 52 and 57 percent of all refugees in the first half of 1953, the bulk being in the age group of 25 to 45. These age groups represent only about 45 percent of the population of West Germany. The percentage of refugees over 65 years, on the other hand, was only 1.6 in 1952 and between 2.1 and 2.5 in the first half of 1953, while it is almost 10 in the fixed population of West Germany. 28/

In recent times the flow of refugees has been made up increasingly of young people. Mounting pressure to join the East German armed forces, the Service for Germany, and similar paramilitary organizations probably accounted largely for the sudden rise in the number of juveniles fleeing to West Berlin in 1952. The number of refugees between 16 and 24 years of age grew from a monthly average of 825 between January and May to 1,490 in June, was 3,407 in August and 3,139 in September of 1952. 29/ Almost 25 percent of the total recognized refugees processed during the first 6 months of 1952 were unaccompanied youths aged 14 to 24. Although their percentage dropped somewhat in July and August, it increased in September to more than 25 percent. 30/

### 3. Occupation.

The occupational composition of the refugees has not necessarily been the same in each postwar month and year. It has tended to change as the Soviet regime increased or decreased economic, social, or political pressure upon individual groups. Comparable and detailed data on the occupational distribution of the refugees are, however, not available for each period. Tables 7,\* 8,\*\* and 9\*\*\* shed some light on the situation. Table 7 shows, for example, the occupational grouping prior to migration of the refugees who passed through the emergency acceptance procedure in West Berlin between the beginning of 1952 and mid-1953. Industrial workers and artisans formed the largest group during the whole period. The 1953 peak for this group was reached in June and reflects the rising pressure on its members which in the same month led to riots against the Soviet regime. The rise in 1953 in the number of refugees with unspecified occupations to approximately 11 percent in June also would seem to mirror this pressure. The size of the second largest group, persons

\* Table 7 follows on p. 21.

\*\* Table 8 follows on p. 22.

\*\*\* Table 9 follows on p. 24.

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Table 7

Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance Procedure in West Berlin by Major Occupational Group 31/  
January 1952-June 1953

Major Occupational Group	1952		1953 1st Quarter		April 1953		May 1953		June 1953	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry (of these, Agriculture)	8,097 (3,998)	7.1 (3.5)	17,163 (11,499)	15.7 (10.5)	5,126 (3,010)	14.6 (8.6)	4,960 (3,762)	14.5 (11.0)	5,156 (3,726)	13.2 (9.6)
Industry, Handicraft	20,157	17.8	12,778	11.7	4,518	12.8	4,493	13.2	6,215	16.0
Technical Occupations	1,409	1.2	1,379	1.3	414	1.2	589	1.7	689	1.8
Commerce, Transportation	16,549	14.6	12,231	11.2	3,931	11.2	4,065	11.9	4,528	11.6
Health Service, Social Welfare	4,986	4.4	5,658	5.2	1,931	5.5	1,405	4.1	1,648	4.2
Public Administration, Administration of Justice	3,639	3.2	2,183	2.0	707	2.0	461	1.4	601	1.6
Intellectual and Artistic Professions	2,129	1.9	1,591	1.4	475	1.3	394	1.2	363	0.9
Occupation Unspecified	10,236	9.0	8,042	7.3	3,442	9.8	3,231	9.5	4,212	10.8
Unemployed	2,604	2.3	3,388	3.1	933	2.6	469	1.4	389	1.0
<b>Total Members of the Labor Force</b>	<b>69,806</b>	<b>61.5</b>	<b>64,413</b>	<b>58.9</b>	<b>21,477</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>20,067</b>	<b>58.9</b>	<b>23,801</b>	<b>61.1</b>
Pensioners and Annuitants	1,883	1.7	3,403	3.1	1,156	3.3	1,037	3.0	1,260	3.2
Housewives	15,296	13.5	14,105	12.9	4,343	12.4	4,250	12.4	4,532	11.6
Children	26,434	23.3	27,417	25.1	8,211	23.3	8,790	25.7	9,376	24.1
<b>Total Persons</b>	<b>113,419</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>109,338</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>35,187</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>34,144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>38,969</b>	<b>100.0</b>

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Table 8

Number of Migrants to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group a/\*  
Selected Time Periods, 1949-53 32/

Major Occupational Group	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Refugees in Nordrhein- Westfalen March 1949 <u>b/</u>	To West Berlin from East Berlin during 1950 <u>c/</u>	To West Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen 1st Half 1952	To West Berlin				To Giessen		Total
				2d Half 1952	January 1953	February 1953	March 1953	January 1953	February 1953	Columns 1-9
<b>Economically Active</b>										
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry	1,167	99	4,446	6,628	2,517	5,882	8,764	37	48	29,588
Industry, Handicraft	4,033	3,180	12,963	14,670	2,709	3,713	6,356	159	167	47,950
Technical Occupations	940	604	1,572	968	277	389	713	20	17	5,500
Trade, Transportation	3,016	3,779	9,045	11,663	2,227	3,378	6,626	153	183	40,070
Household, Health, Welfare	698	871	2,725	3,994	1,091	1,607	2,960	70	59	14,075
Administration, Justice	2,263	2,249	1,715	2,577	380	561	1,242	6	3	10,996
Intellectual and Artistic Occupa- tions	747	626	1,362	1,415	356	419	816	6	13	5,760
Unknown	1,507	652	8,264	8,112	1,922	2,093	4,027	360	229	32,892
Unemployed	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	2,338	605	713	2,070	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>
Total Economically Active	<u>14,371</u>	<u>12,060</u>	<u>42,092</u>	<u>52,365</u>	<u>12,084</u>	<u>18,755</u>	<u>33,574</u>	<u>811</u>	<u>719</u>	<u>186,831</u>
<b>Not Economically Active</b>										
Independent, Retired	N.A.	1,397	N.A.	1,608	489	938	1,976	39	46	N.A.
Housewives	N.A.	9,286	N.A.	12,358	3,345	2,907	7,853	186	165	N.A.
Children	N.A.	513	N.A.	21,250	5,523	8,058	13,836	139	153	N.A.
Unknown	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Total Not Economically Active	<u>8,391 e/</u>	<u>11,196</u>	<u>20,054</u>	<u>35,216</u>	<u>9,357</u>	<u>11,903</u>	<u>23,665</u>	<u>364</u>	<u>364</u>	<u>120,510</u>
Total Population	<u>22,762 e/</u>	<u>23,256</u>	<u>64,146</u>	<u>87,581</u>	<u>21,441</u>	<u>30,658</u>	<u>57,239</u>	<u>1,175</u>	<u>1,083</u>	<u>307,341</u>

\* Footnotes for Table 8 follow on p. 23.

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Table 8

Number of Migrants to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group a/  
 Selected Time Periods, 1949-53 32/  
 (Continued)

Percent Distribution of the Economically Active Population	1	2	3	4				5		10
	Refugees in Nordrhein-Westfalen, March 1949 <u>b/</u>	To West Berlin from East Berlin, during 1950 <u>c/</u>	To West Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen, 1st Half 1952	To West Berlin				To Giessen		Total Columns 1-9
				2d Half 1952	January 1953	February 1953	March 1953	January 1953	February 1953	
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry	8	1	11	13	21	31	26	4	7	16
Industry, Handicraft	28	26	31	27	23	20	19	20	23	26
Technical Occupations	7	5	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
Trade, Transportation	21	32	21	22	18	18	20	19	25	21
Household, Health, Welfare	5	7	6	8	9	9	9	9	8	7
Administration, Justice	16	19	4	5	3	3	4	1	1	6
Intellectual and Artistic Occupations	5	5	3	3	3	2	2	1	2	3
Unknown	10	5	20	15	16	11	12	44	32	18
Unemployed	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	5	5	4	6	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>	<u>d/</u>

a. Except for columns 1 and 2, these data were collected at the emergency reception camp in West Berlin, and at Giessen and Uelzen in West Germany.

b. Classification of refugees from East Germany and East Berlin by occupational or industrial group prior to migration.

c. Based on police registration of arrivals from East Berlin. Since the source classifies the total immigrants into two groups -- (1) those from East Berlin, and (2) those from all other areas -- it appears that this distribution represents persons whose permanent residence was in East Berlin prior to migration.

d. No breakdown is given for the unknowns and the unemployed. The number of unemployed is included in the figure for the unknown.

e. Assumes the same ratio of economically active population to total population as in columns 3 and 4 combined: that is, 94,457: 149,727 :: 14,371: x.

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Table 9

Net Migration to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group  
End of War through March 1953 a/

Major Occupational Group	Migrants From East Berlin End of War to 1 April 1952	Migrants to West Germany 1 January 1953 to 31 March 1953	Migrants to West Berlin 1 April 1952 to 31 March 1953	Migrants to West Germany 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952	Other Migrants	Total Migrants
<b>Economically Active</b>						
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry	505	183	25,996	9,660	130,239	166,583
Industry, Handicraft	14,645	705	37,248	24,150	336,825	413,573
Technical Occupations	2,727	81	3,686	2,205	37,425	46,124
Trade, Transportation	17,372	723	30,458	18,165	252,993	319,711
Household, Health, Welfare	4,040	280	11,446	5,880	79,341	100,987
Administration, Justice	10,302	21	6,014	3,780	70,359	90,476
Intellectual and Artistic Occupations	2,828	42	4,074	2,415	37,425	46,784
Total Economically Active	<u>52,419</u>	<u>2,035</u>	<u>118,922</u>	<u>66,255</u>	<u>944,607</u>	<u>1,184,238</u>
Total Not Economically Active	<u>48,581</u>	<u>965</u>	<u>75,078</u>	<u>38,745</u>	<u>552,393</u>	<u>715,762</u>
Total Population	<u>101,000</u>	<u>3,000</u>	<u>194,000</u>	<u>105,000</u>	<u>1,497,000</u>	<u>1,900,000</u>

a. This table was derived from Table 4 by distributing the unemployed and unknowns proportionately to the remaining categories and combining the distributions in the manner discussed in the text.

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Table 9

Net Migration to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group  
End of War through March 1953 <sup>a/</sup>  
(Continued)

Major Occupational Group	Percent Distribution					Other Migrants	Total Migrants
	Migrants From East Berlin End of War to 1 April 1952	Migrants to West Germany 1 January 1953 to 31 March 1953	Migrants to West Berlin 1 April 1953 to 31 March 1953	Migrants to West Germany 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952			
<b>Economically Active</b>							
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry =	0.5	6.1	13.4	9.2	8.7	8.8	
Industry, Handicraft	14.5	23.5	19.2	23.0	22.5	21.8	
Technical Occupations	2.7	2.7	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.4	
Trade, Transportations	17.2	24.1	15.7	17.3	16.9	16.8	
Household, Health, Welfare	4.0	9.3	5.9	5.6	5.3	5.3	
Administration, Justice	10.2	0.7	3.1	3.6	4.7	4.7	
Intellectual and Artistic Occupations	2.8	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.5	
<b>Total Economically Active</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>67.8</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>62.3</b>	
<b>Total Not Economically Active</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>32.2</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>37.7</b>	

a. This table was derived from Table 4 by distributing the unemployed and unknowns proportionately to the remaining categories and combining the distributions in the manner discussed in the text.

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who had been active in commerce and transportation, changed relatively little over the period, indicating the steady pressure especially on merchants. The relatively large proportion of civil servants (health services, social welfare, public administration, administration of justice) and attorneys also reflects measures initiated by the Soviet regime. Especially striking is the hectic rise in the percentage of farmers, foresters, horticulturists, and cattle breeders, which, owing to the rapid decline in their economic situation, increased from an average of 7.1 percent in 1952 to between 13.2 (June 1953) and 19.2 percent (February 1953).

For the purposes of this report, it is, however, more important to know the occupational pre-migration distribution of the total of postwar refugees than to ascertain the occupational composition of groups arriving during any one period of time. Such a statistical breakdown, covering all the refugees, is not available. Two main sources of data exist which may be used to estimate their distribution at least among the major occupational and industrial groups: (a) police registration of migrants over the borders of the Lands of West Germany and over the boundary of West Berlin and (b) statistics gathered at the emergency reception camps. For reasons explained in Appendix A, the data available on refugees applying for admission to the three emergency reception camps at West Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen must be considered the more reliable ones, although they still leave much to be desired with respect to coverage (only 317,000 refugees, or 17 percent of the estimated total) and although they may not be representative of the total number. It appears, therefore, that the best method of arriving at an estimate of the total occupational distribution is: to select certain of the nine refugee groups, whose occupational distributions are shown in Table 8, to represent various subgroups; and to find the distribution of all refugees by adding the distributions for the subgroups, distributing simultaneously the unemployed and persons of unknown occupation to the other occupational categories. The result of this calculation is presented in Table 9. It represents the estimate of the occupational characteristics of the five groups of migrants which were differentiated and the occupational characteristics of the total postwar refugee group as well.

According to this estimate, a little more than 37 percent of the total number of refugees came from the economically inactive Soviet German population. Among the economically active refugees the largest occupational group consists of persons who were engaged

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in industry and handicraft (nearly 22 percent). The next groups, in order of size, are refugees belonging to occupations in the fields of commerce and transportation (approximately 17 percent), and of agriculture, forestry, and husbandry (almost 9 percent). Members of intellectual and artistic and of technical occupations form the smallest groups (about 2.5 percent each).

As mentioned above, most migrants from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin probably did not originally reside in the area which is now non-Soviet Germany. Only a minority have been West Germans of long standing. Table 4, above, indicates that, unlike the migration from East to West, the majority of the migrants from West to East have been females.

Adequate and detailed information on the occupational composition of the West to East migrants is not available.\* It can be assumed, however, that the vast majority of at least the male migrants have been either dissatisfied employed persons or persons able and willing to work who could not find employment in West Germany. The relatively large percentage of females among the migrants, on the other hand, would seem to indicate that the number of family members and individuals moving for personal reasons has not been small.

Table 10\*\* shows the distribution, according to major occupational groups, of migrants who moved from West Berlin to East Berlin in 1950. Inasmuch as this distribution, however, was probably due to the particular situation in Berlin at that time, it does not appear advisable to draw conclusions from it concerning the occupational distribution of migrants moving in other years or from or to other areas.

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\* Data on the occupational distribution of migrants, published by West Germany, include all persons who migrate across the borders of the individual West German states. Because migrants from one state to another within West Germany form the bulk of the migrants, the data cannot be used to estimate the occupational distribution of persons who migrate from West Germany to East Germany.

\*\* Table 10 follows on p. 28.

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Table 10

Number of Migrants from West Berlin to East Berlin  
by Major Occupational Group and Sex a/ 33/  
1950

<u>Major Occupational Group</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Economically Active			
Agriculture	29	7	36
Industry and Handicraft	651	239	890
Technical Occupations	213	29	242
Commerce and Transportation	676	255	931
Household, Health, and Welfare	80	234	314
Public Administration and Law	668	433	1,101
Religion and Culture	255	173	428
Not Specified	191	129	320
Total Economically Active	<u>2,763</u>	<u>1,499</u>	<u>4,262</u>
No Occupation and Dependents	1,289	3,050	4,339
Not Reported	166	140	306
Total	<u>4,218</u>	<u>4,689</u>	<u>8,907</u>

Percent Distribution

Economically Active			
Agriculture	0.7	0.2	0.4
Industry and Handicraft	15.4	5.1	10.0
Technical Occupations	5.1	0.6	2.7
Commerce and Transportation	16.0	5.4	10.5
Household, Health, and Welfare	1.9	5.0	3.5
Public Administration and Law	15.8	9.2	12.4
Religion and Culture	6.1	3.7	4.8
Not Specified	4.5	2.8	3.6
Total Economically Active	<u>65.5</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>47.9</u>
No Occupation and Dependents	30.6	65.0	48.7
Not Reported	3.9	3.0	3.4

a. Based on  arrivals and departures.

50X1

S-E-C-R-E-TII. Migrations between Soviet-Occupied Germany and Other Soviet Bloc Countries.A. Reasons for Migrations.1. From Soviet-Occupied Germany to the Satellites and the USSR.

Few of the Germans who, during the postwar period, went from Soviet-occupied Germany to the USSR and the Satellites did so of their own free will. A relatively large number of specialists, such as scientists, technicians, mechanics, and experts, and of other useful members of the labor force were deported to the USSR, especially during the initial period of the occupation. Many political and criminal prisoners were taken to the USSR from jails and camps. In addition to these deportees, a sizable number of specialists, mostly scientists and technicians, went to the USSR under contracts to work there for a specified time. Many of these contracts were signed under duress, and in many cases it is doubtful whether the persons concerned were deported or contracted. A large number of deportees are still in the USSR, and not all the scientists and technicians who left the East Zone "voluntarily" have returned after the expiration of their original contracts.

[redacted] additional  
East German skilled workers, technicians, and mechanics, who shortly after the war were expelled from Poland, the Polish-occupied territories, Czechoslovakia, and possibly also Hungary and Rumania, are being repatriated to their former countries of residence.

50X1

[redacted] such returns of ethnic Germans to  
Satellite countries have in most cases taken place under direct or indirect pressure. [redacted] the return  
of these ethnic Germans has been opposed by both the East German government and the other countries affected but that the USSR has insisted on carrying out the repatriations in order to relieve labor shortages in economies engaged in supplying the Soviet Bloc with essential materials. 34/

50X1

50X1

In contrast to the migration from East Germany to the West, migration from East Germany to the USSR and the Satellites has thus been due primarily to outright deportation or decisions forced upon the persons concerned. Considerations of personal economic advantage or ideological convictions appear to have been the guiding

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motive for migration in only relatively few cases. The chief factor, therefore, determining the scope of migration to other areas behind the Iron Curtain has been, and probably will continue to be, the population and manpower policy of East Germany and the USSR.

2. From the Satellites and the USSR to Soviet-Occupied Germany.

Persons moving into East Germany and East Berlin from countries of the Soviet Bloc have been primarily expellees or prisoners of war, deportees, and contract workers returning from the USSR. Expellees, called "resettlers," streamed into East Germany in great numbers, especially in the first postwar years. Although no data showing their previous occupations are available, it can be assumed that they represented a cross section of all kinds of occupations with a large percentage of farm families. <sup>35/</sup> Most reports agree that nearly all resettlers who were able to work were integrated into the expanding East German economy.

The persons returning from deportation and contract work were scientists, technical experts, highly skilled workers, and the members of their families. They were sent back probably because the exploitation of their knowledge and "know-how" was completed and because the Soviet authorities believed that better use could now be made of them in the restoration and expansion of the German sector of the Soviet Bloc economy, where they would somewhat alleviate the scarcity of scientific and technical manpower and also be helpful in the application of Soviet methods of production.

B. Magnitude of Migrations.

According to East German statistics, 4,442,318 expellees resided in East Germany in 1950: 1,874,736 male and 2,567,582 female. <sup>36/</sup> They therefore constituted roughly one-quarter of the population of East Germany, which at that time totaled 17,635,000. <sup>37/</sup> Relatively few have entered in subsequent years. These figures show again that, although migration out of East Germany was preponderantly male, migration into the country was preponderantly female. The composition of the incoming expellees according to sex was about as abnormal as that of the total population of the Zone.\*

\* See III, A, 2, p. 35.

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Statistical data are not available either on the total number of deportees, repatriates, or contract workers who have left East Germany or on the total number of deportees and contract workers who have returned. The only estimates available concern certain groups of migrants. The names of 3,070 East German specialists (men with technical skills) are known. These men were moved either forcibly or with their consent to the USSR between 1945 and 1952. About 200 more such specialists went to the USSR during the same period, probably under contract. To these figures might be added 1,071 specialists about whom sufficient information does not exist to determine whether they were taken to the USSR on contract after 1945 or as prisoners of war before the end of hostilities. 38/ There is no doubt, however, that many more specialists and skilled workers whose names are not available moved, or were moved, to the USSR. An inkling of the true size of the total number of East Germans who were deported may be gained from the 1946 East German census figures, which show that, although 3,640,000 expellees had migrated into East Germany by 1946, the total increase in population was only 2,150,000. 39/ Even though, according to the same census, 581,687 refugees already had left East Germany by that time, these figures indicate a considerable loss of manpower by deportation (in addition to the known war losses). To these losses must also be added the loss through forced and "voluntary" out-movements in subsequent years which, according to some estimates, was as high as 50,000 persons in 1947 and 1948 alone. 40/

A sizable number of deportees and contractees have returned to East Germany. It is impossible to determine the total number of the returning deportees and prisoners of war or the total number of people in these categories who chose to move on to West Germany. Names are known of only 1,412 returned contractee specialists and 793 additional specialists whose contract status is undetermined. 41/  
 considerably fewer people have returned from the USSR than were taken to the USSR and that the percentage of released prisoners of war who moved on to West Germany has been large.

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S-E-C-R-E-TIII. Effects of Migrations on Manpower.A. East German Manpower Situation.1. General Situation.

According to documents allegedly based on East German census data and records in the State Planning Commission, <sup>42/</sup> the population of Soviet-occupied Germany in 1950 was as follows:

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Soviet Zone	7,885,000	9,750,000	17,635,000
East Berlin	503,000	676,000	1,179,000
Total	<u>8,388,000</u>	<u>10,426,000</u>	<u>18,814,000</u>

According to a running count kept by the East German Ministry of Labor, the population of East Germany, exclusive of East Berlin, amounted in May 1952 to 17,345,000. The population has been declining since 1950. The distribution according to age and sex groups was as follows:

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Up to 14 Years	2,115,000	1,980,000	4,095,000
14 to 65	5,258,000	7,126,000	12,384,000
Over 65	1,015,000	1,320,000	2,335,000
Total	<u>8,388,000</u>	<u>10,426,000</u>	<u>18,814,000</u>

Persons gainfully employed in East Germany, exclusive of East Berlin, on 1 February 1952 totaled 7,855,000 persons, of whom 1.5 million were self-employed including family helpers. Thus 6,355,000 people were active in the "People's Economy" (Volkswirtschaft). because according to general Soviet planning terminology, self-employed persons and members of their families who are helping them are not included in the People's Economy. The distribution of persons active in the People's Economy according to economic branches is as follows:

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	February 1952			1955 Plan		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Industry	1,525,000	928,000	2,453,000	1,685,000	1,185,000	2,870,000
Building						
Trade	211,000	143,000	354,000	245,000	180,000	425,000
Agriculture and Forestry <sup>a/</sup>	1,106,000	1,018,000	2,124,000	1,200,000	1,100,000	2,300,000
Transporta- tion	431,000	104,000	535,000	450,000	130,000	580,000
Public and Private Employees	714,000	175,000	889,000	750,000	175,000	925,000
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>3,987,000</u></b>	<b><u>2,368,000</u></b>	<b><u>6,355,000</u></b>	<b><u>4,330,000</u></b>	<b><u>2,770,000</u></b>	<b><u>7,100,000</u></b>

a. Probably includes farmers and agricultural workers.

The current Five Year Plan <sup>43/</sup> sets as its goal for 1955 the employment of 13 percent more workers than in 1950 in the People's Economy, a total of 7.1 million persons. Of these, 2,770,000 will be women and 4,330,000, men. To reach this goal, the Plan calls for the addition of 797,400 new workers during the 5-year period.

The total number of wage and salary earners rose from 6,032,000 in the beginning of 1950 <sup>44/</sup> to 6,355,000 early in 1952, <sup>45/</sup> an increase of 323,000 persons. In the first half of 1952, therefore, total employment in the People's Economy was still 745,000 persons short of the Plan goal for 1955.

271,500 persons were still officially unemployed in May 1952 in the whole of Soviet-occupied Germany, including the Soviet Sector of Berlin. <sup>46/</sup> To the number of "officially" unemployed, however, must be added the number of those unemployed individuals whom the East German authorities do not recognize as unemployed because they refused to accept jobs that were offered to them. There must be a sizable number of such persons, since many job-seekers have refused to accept employment in such occupations as the People's Police and uranium mining.

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According to East German criteria, large labor reserves are available, in addition to the unemployed, which may be used in efforts to reach the manpower goal of the current Five Year Plan. In February 1952, 10,650,000 persons, 5,195,000 men and 5,455,000 women, were registered under the regulation requiring the registration of persons between ages 14 and 65 who are able to work, whether or not they are gainfully employed. 47/

Because only 6,355,000 of these registrants were at that time active in the People's Economy (employed as wage or salary earners), the manpower balance sheet showed an official reserve of 4,295,000 persons who, according to East German standards, were available to make additions to the labor force of the People's Economy. This labor reserve included, apart from the existing 1.5 million self-employed, mostly women and unskilled persons.

2. Effects of Migrations.

The above estimates show that about 4.5 million expellees; plus probably more than 220,000 persons migrating from or returning from West Germany; plus several thousand deportees, contract workers, and prisoners of war returning from the USSR may have moved into East Germany since the end of World War II. On the other hand, about 2 million refugees left for West Germany. In addition, substantially more deportees and contract workers moved out of East Germany than came in during the same period.

In this report, expellees are treated as a special category. Without them, East Germany entered the postwar era with a substantially smaller population because of severe losses of manpower in World War II. The influx of expellees (and returning prisoners of war) did not much more than make up for this loss. It therefore appears advisable to use the 1946 population of 18,355,000, which already included the vast majority of the in-migrating expellees, 48/ as the point of departure in evaluating the effects of the postwar movements. In doing so, we find that, according to the above estimates, East Germany suffered a very large net loss, consisting primarily of the roughly 2,100,000 refugees who did not return to East Germany from West Germany, plus uncounted, large numbers of deportees and contract workers. This gradual loss, in addition to the excess of deaths over births, explains why the population of the area increased only slightly from 18,355,000 in 1946 to around 18.8 million in 1950, and then dropped to approximately 18.5 million in May 1952, 49/ and probably to approximately 18.2 million in January 1953. 50/



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The large loss in population, obviously, has deprived East Germany of a relatively large portion of its existing and potential labor force. This is especially true because a large number of the out-migrants belonged to the most productive age groups. Nevertheless, the existence of a labor reserve of officially more than 4 million potential workers as late as 1952 still makes it appear not impossible that, barring fundamental changes in the present situation, the East German regime might be able to achieve the addition of 745,000 East Germans to the labor force as planned for 1955. Even in purely numerical respects, however, the East German manpower situation must be regarded as very tight, because only a fraction of this labor pool will actually be available to eliminate the gap between present employment and the 1955 goal of the Plan. Many of the potential workers fled to West Germany after February 1952. A substantial number of the remaining potential workers are probably unemployable or frictionally unemployed.

The achievement of the 1955 goal will depend, moreover, upon developments of the next 2 years. The prospects of transferring self-employed persons to the labor pool of the People's Economy will be limited as long as the present "new course" of more moderate Sovietization is maintained by East Germany. Continued recruitment for the national army and police forces constitutes a drain on manpower reserves sufficiently severe to strain the East German economy to the breaking point if the armed forces were expanded beyond 300,000 men. 51/ Last but not least, if defections increase again from their present low of less than one-half the rate which prevailed earlier in 1953, East German officials looking for additional manpower may soon scrape the bottom of the barrel. They are already compelled to make increasing use of convict labor and to allow prisoners to work off their sentences in certain critical industries. 52/

The postwar movements have also aggravated unfavorable demographic features of East Germany which have greatly contributed to its manpower difficulties, such as the abnormal ratio of females to males which had increased from 103.4:100 in 1939 to 134.6:100 in 1946. The fact that migration out of the area has been preponderantly male and in-migration preponderantly female has not improved the situation. According to the 1950 census, there were still about 2 million more women than men in East Germany. The authors of the Five Year Plan therefore gave increased employment of women (addition of 2,770,000 female workers) a prominent place

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among the means of achieving the planned expansion of the labor force of the People's Economy, despite the fact that the percentage of women employed in East Germany was already considerably above the percentage employed in West Germany. Although women do form a large part of the official labor reserve, however, their recruitment is likely to become more and more difficult since their increased employment in industry has been meeting with ever-growing opposition because it runs counter to social and cultural custom. This opposition and the obstacles encountered in recruiting additional male labor apparently account for the increasing stress that has been laid on raising labor productivity as a means of meeting production targets under the Plan.

The efforts to bring about a rapid increase in labor productivity through high-pressure methods, however, have irritated labor to such a degree that defections and general unrest increased so much as to force the regime in mid-1953 somewhat to modify its pertinent policies. Should the subsequent lull in defections come to an end and people again migrate to West Germany at the previous rate, the East German manpower situation would deteriorate even more.

Not only have migrations out of East Germany reduced the number of available workers, but also they have intensified existing undersupply of specialized and highly skilled personnel -- a shortcoming which is continuing to hamper the execution of economic plans in the most critical segments of industry and science. East German authorities attribute this scarcity in part to fast industrial expansion and in part to previous inadequate vocational education of young people ready to enter the labor force. It is for this reason that the Five Year Plan is stressing expansion of present facilities and creation of new facilities for technical vocational schools and training. The relatively large number of defections of scientists, specialists, and other badly needed trained individuals, however, is likely to hinder seriously the successful execution of this program because these defections have reduced the number of available instructors and students. In addition, the numerous escapes have in some measure offset the results of the intensified training programs. These defections and escapes have thus not only rendered it more difficult to increase the size of the technical and scientific labor force, but they have also impeded the achievement of such qualitative objectives as the improvement of labor productivity and of quality of output because the fleeing members of this section of the labor force, although constituting only a relatively

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small portion of the total refugees, have included (and still do include) a high percentage of the most expert and experienced scientists and technicians, while the remaining labor reserve is composed chiefly of unskilled workers and women. The same, of course, applies to the deportees and contract workers who have been sent to the USSR. In many instances, research and development personnel have been removed together with the research and development apparatus in captured German institutions, and sometimes not only the key personnel but the whole staff of important establishments has been taken to the USSR. These more or less compulsory out-movements, occurring simultaneously with the numerous defections of experienced and professionally outstanding individuals to the West, have aggravated the existing shortage of all grades of technical personnel such as scientists, engineers, managers, foremen, and skilled workers. The number of such persons returning from work in the USSR, obviously, has not been large enough to remedy the damage caused by the deportations and other out-movements under duress.

Owing to the unprecedented growth of the refugee movement during 1952 and the first part of 1953, manpower difficulties also have arisen in occupational fields which in earlier years had not been appreciably affected. As examples may be cited the legal and administrative occupations and, above all, agriculture. The number of defecting agriculturists rose sharply between January 1952 and June 1953 and reached a total of nearly 26,000 during this period. This development caused increasing trouble in East German agriculture, and in turn has seriously affected the food situation. The White Book, published by the West Berlin Senate early in 1953, reported that at that time 652,344 acres of land lay fallow in East Germany 53/ because there was no one to cultivate them. This meant that probably more than 5 percent of the total cultivated land (roughly about 12 million acres 54/) had been abandoned. 50X1  
50X1  
 cattle on deserted farms could not be looked after, that cows and other animals had to be slaughtered, that milk deliveries declined, and harvest difficulties were greatly aggravated.

That the movements to West Germany have had the serious effects here discussed is also borne out by the development of East German public policy regarding escapees. For a long time the

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regime's reaction to the defections was surprisingly restrained, obviously for general political reasons. Apparently it relied heavily on counterpropaganda. During 1952, however, the loss of manpower began to hurt the East German economy to such a degree that the taking of more drastic countermeasures obviously was considered imperative, political risks notwithstanding. In the middle of the year the western borders were virtually sealed. In Berlin, too, many crossing points were closed and other measures taken to make the crossing for would-be refugees more difficult. The control of passenger traffic to West Berlin was intensified. Moreover, new decrees were issued which provided for severe punishment of defectors, would-be defectors, and persons supporting escapes; for confiscation of all property of persons who have left East Germany since the end of the war without having cleared their departure with the police; and even for reprisals against relatives of refugees who stayed behind.

When it was realized, however, that these harsh measures increased rather than curbed the flow of defectors, the regime modified its policies in several important respects. Although maintaining strict control of all borders and other protective measures, it turned to new propaganda and legislative tactics designed to prevent more escapes, especially of members of the labor force, and to induce persons with scarce skills to return to or migrate to East Germany. Propaganda campaigns against defections were initiated, especially in the factories, and new decrees issued which promise returning escapees freedom from punishment, return of property, reinstatement in the economic and social life according to special qualification, restoration of civil rights, and the right to take up residence again without being first processed through returnee camps. 55/

Returning farmers, in particular, have been promised that they would get their holdings back. A subsequent limitation of this provision to farmers returning by 15 October 1953 shows clearly how badly they are needed. Great efforts also have been made to prevent further defections of scientists and technicians, to induce those who left the country to come back, and, beyond that, to lure additional West German workers in these categories to East Germany. The enactment of a series of statutes in 1952, providing for increases in the remuneration of scientists, engineers, technicians, masters, and qualified workers, as well as the initiation of a new program designed to improve the professional and social status of

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the "technical intelligentsia," were doubtless a part of the implementation of this policy. Another approach to the problem has been the establishment of a new, comprehensive plan for the recruitment of West German scientists, physicians, specialists, and skilled workers for employment in East Germany. 56/ Continuing features of this campaign to reduce critical manpower shortages have been the granting of especially good housing facilities and other privileges to new immigrants and returnees from the East and West, and the prompt placement of these persons in suitable employment.

It is thus evident that the migrations out of East Germany, and especially the defections to West Germany, have deprived East Germany of a large number of actual and potential workers. In addition, they have led to a shortage in scientific, engineering, and skilled industrial and agricultural manpower. The loss in numbers of workers available has hampered East German economic efforts considerably, but it has not been catastrophic. If there were a resumption of the now relatively small refugee movement that would bring the situation nearer to the breaking point, the over-all planners in Moscow, if they so desire, still could avoid the worst by seeing to it that labor is imported from other parts of the Soviet Bloc. The quantitative and qualitative deficiency in scientific and expert manpower, however, is already hampering the execution of economic plans more seriously than the general shortage of workers. Yet, harmful as this deficiency is, there is no cogent reason at present to believe that it must necessarily lead to a collapse of East German industries, unless in the future many more workers of this type leave the area than can be replaced by returning deportees, prisoners of war, and people graduating from the vocational schools and the numerous training courses.

The effects of movements out of East Germany and East Berlin upon East Germany's capacity to produce are also of potential significance for the economy of the Soviet Bloc. East Germany contains a large concentration of essential industries and, together with Czechoslovakia, accounts, in particular, for a large part of the Bloc's capacity to produce steel, electric power, machine tools, and antifriction bearings. Moreover, the decline in agricultural production, because of the defection of many farmers within a relatively short period, has compelled the USSR and other Bloc countries to ship to East Germany substantial quantities of food and other consumer goods that are scarce in their own areas. All

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this shows that manpower difficulties in East Germany necessarily affect the economy of the Soviet Bloc as a whole. These effects so far, however, have been relatively slight and, even in the event of a further deterioration of the East German labor situation, would probably at most be embarrassing but hardly critical. As already mentioned, the manpower pool of the Soviet Bloc is large enough to eliminate, in case of need, general labor shortages in East Germany and, if the East German supply of certain badly needed skills ever reaches the danger point, it can, under present circumstances, be assumed that ensuing difficulties for the Bloc economy likewise could be minimized by the over-all planners in Moscow.

B. West German Manpower Situation.

1. General Situation.

The manpower development in West Germany, as shown in Table 11,\* was characterized from 1949 to 1953 by a considerable increase in the economically active population as well as in the number of employed persons. The economically active population increased at a higher rate than the total population. Between 1949 and 1953, the economically active population grew by 2,260,000 (yearly average) while the total population increased by 2,140,000. The number of dependently employed persons rose substantially, especially in industry. According to official statements, the total number of working places newly created during the period by far exceeds 2 million. 57/ The number of unemployed was greatly reduced despite the increasing population and the influx of refugees.

In spite of the continued existence of unemployment, the government of West Germany has complained about a lack of skilled workers of the 30-through-40 age group, especially in the metallurgical and building occupations, and about the advanced age of most foremen and chief operators. Although large-scale measures are being taken to reduce these shortcomings by improving vocational education and training and by retraining workers for skilled work, fear has been expressed that the expected further increases in demand for industrial labor and manpower contributions to a European army may exhaust existing labor reserves

\* Table 11 follows on p. 41. .

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Table 11

West German Manpower 58/  
1950-53

	<u>1950 a/</u>	<u>1951 a/</u>	<u>1952 a/</u>	<u>1953 b/</u>
Population				
West Germany	47,848,000	48,306,000	48,708,000	48,994,000
West Berlin	2,155,000	2,172,000	2,187,000	2,228,000
Total Population	<u>50,003,000</u>	<u>50,478,000</u>	<u>50,895,000</u>	<u>51,222,000</u>
Dependent Labor Force <u>c/</u>				
West Germany	15,853,064	16,236,847	16,641,005	16,879,099
West Berlin	1,024,016	1,034,685	1,018,250	1,002,498
Total Labor Force	<u>16,877,080</u>	<u>17,271,532</u>	<u>17,659,255</u>	<u>17,881,597</u>
Employed Workers				
West Germany	14,163,075	14,583,294	14,953,286	15,805,827
West Berlin	737,544	757,236	750,334	753,569
Total Employed	<u>14,900,619</u>	<u>15,340,530</u>	<u>15,703,620</u>	<u>16,559,396</u>
Unemployed Workers				
West Germany	1,689,989	1,653,553	1,687,719	1,073,272
West Berlin	286,472	277,449	267,916	238,929
Total Unemployed	<u>1,976,461</u>	<u>1,931,002</u>	<u>1,955,635</u>	<u>1,312,201</u>

a. December.

b. June.

c. Includes roughly same categories of workers as "People's Economy" in East Germany (all workers except self-employed and their families).

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and, aggravate the problem of spot labor shortages as well as the problem of skilled labor. 59/\*

2. Effects of Migrations.

West German authorities as well as numerous private citizens have tended to regard the millions of refugees who entered the country in the wake of the mass influx of expellees as an economic liability. Many leading statesmen even have been firmly convinced that the Communists have been stimulating the movement to create additional difficulties for the West in addition to getting rid of undesired elements. The government of West Germany has, therefore, refused at all times to encourage defections. It has repeatedly issued appeals to the East Germans to refrain from leaving their homes except in cases of real emergency and has considered various plans designed to reduce the number of refugee-residents. The policy of granting asylum to any refugee, whether officially recognized as such or not, has been due entirely to noneconomic considerations.

In the first postwar years, when West Germany was politically, financially, and economically extremely weak, and when more than a quarter of its housing facilities were still totally or partially destroyed, the large number of in-migrants did indeed constitute a great economic and social burden, the more so because most of the migrants were destitute. It is true that a number of refugees were, at least temporarily, welcome hands on German farms because most of them were accommodated in rural areas at a time when the numerous foreign agricultural workers had left and many German farm workers were still in prisoner-of-war camps. It is equally true that refugees also were more willing than the average West German to accept low-paid jobs, especially in the building construction and mining industries. The bulk of them, however, were not needed in the labor market. When, after the currency reform of 1948, demand for labor of many types gradually increased, the chances of refugees in the labor market also began to improve somewhat, although they still did not become an important factor in West Germany's economic restoration.

West Berlin's great economic and social difficulties resulting from its position as an isolated Western enclave in East Germany have at all times been considerably aggravated by the influx of refugees. The latter have continuously increased the

\* The statements of the West German government regarding the adequacy of the general labor supply have been regarded as overpessimistic by MSA observers. 60/

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number of job-seeking wage and salary earners and thus have prevented any major change in the local unemployment situation. The concentration of the refugee movement on the city after the virtual closing of all other parts of the East-West boundary threatened to make conditions in Berlin truly critical. A variety of emergency measures taken by the Berlin Senate, the West German government, and US agencies have, however, made it possible to maintain and develop the economic life of the city state. It was, of course, impossible to provide housing and employment to all the numerous persons fleeing to West Berlin between mid-1952 and mid-1953 in addition to those who had already come in; therefore an air lift program was initiated under which recognized refugees are flown to West Germany. The lull in the refugee movement after the middle of 1953 offered a much needed opportunity to move out large parts of the backlog of in-migrants waiting for transportation to the West.

In the territory of West Germany proper, efforts have been made to further the integration of expellees and refugees into the economy by retraining programs, resettlement in industrial areas, and similar methods. Circumstances such as the steady decline in the number of refugees until mid-1952, a sharp drop in the net gain in immigration, and above all, the great expansion of production in recent years have afforded some advantages for the execution of these programs. The refugees have, in particular, had their share in the more than 22 percent increase of the total number of employed persons. By mid-1953, approximately 35 percent of the refugees could be considered to be economically integrated and 45 percent to be employed though not fully integrated. Among the latter must be counted the numerous persons who cannot make full use of their previous training and experience and the large numbers of former professionals or self-employed who are forced to make a living as manual workers. The sharp increase in refugees, which set in toward the end of 1952, threatened to interfere seriously with this process of growing integration; but the subsequent drop in defections, beginning in mid-1953, saved the situation.

About 20 percent of the expellees and refugees are still either partially or totally unemployed even though their place in the total number of unemployed persons fell from 37 percent to about 29.5 percent between 1948 and 1952 61/, and was down to 28.7 percent by June 1953. 62/ This situation is largely due to the continuation of structural unemployment in the eastern and northern agricultural regions of West Germany, where so many expellees and refugees have

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been placed that the job-seekers far outnumber available working places. Fast, large-scale transfer of the in-migrants to the industrial areas where demand for labor has been increasing, however, has as yet been prevented by the continuing housing shortage in West Germany. Accordingly, structural unemployment among the in-migrants, with an average quota of 20 percent, still amounts to more than twice the annual unemployment of the total West German area, which in 1952-53 was only 8.3 percent. 63/ Despite the extensive housing programs of the past few years, the housing shortage in industrial areas, rather than insufficient demand for workers, has become the chief factor obstructing full use of the large refugee labor pool which could otherwise satisfy growing manpower requirements of the expanding West German economy. It has increasingly led to situations in which employees have been needed but in which suitable expellees and refugees could not be brought in because of the lack of living accommodations in the localities concerned. HICOG, accordingly, has considered housing the principal key to the solution of the refugee and unemployment problem in West Germany. 64/

In view of these circumstances, full economic integration of the refugees probably will take much more time. The economy is continuing to expand and total unemployment to decline, however, and, as more housing space is becoming available in the industrial areas, refugee manpower probably will be increasingly needed and made use of by the West German industrial machine and other branches of the economy. The refugee labor pool will become more and more useful in efforts to prevent spot shortages which have already appeared.

Although it may be anticipated, therefore, that economic developments in the next few years will bring about regular employment of many more refugees whose training and willingness to work are not yet exploited in the most expedient manner, it is also likely that the demand for the skills of some classes of refugees will remain relatively small in the future. Farmers and agricultural workers may be cited as an example. As mentioned above, their mass exodus in the beginning of 1953 has had very harmful effects upon conditions in East Germany. Their chances, however, of finding a place in West German agriculture are apparently very limited. Only 35,000 refugee families reportedly have settled on farms since 1949. Over 90 percent of them were placed on heirless farms and the remainder on reclaimed land or land divided under land reform. Most of these farms are inefficient

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and part-time and provide only a temporary solution. [redacted] 50X1  
 [redacted] about 130,000 settlement applications for farm 50X1  
 families were still unsatisfied in March 1953 and the authorities  
 estimated that active interest still existed in about 90,000 of  
 them. <sup>65/</sup> Chancellor Adenauer, in trying to explain to Secretary  
 of State Dulles during recent discussions in Bonn that the refugee  
 problem could not be solved by German efforts alone, maintained that,  
 even before the increased influx, 250,000 refugee farmers had not yet  
 been integrated into the economy of West Germany. <sup>66/</sup> Even if, as  
 the West German Minister of Labor stated at about the same time,  
 42,000 vacancies on farms could not be filled in 1952, <sup>67/</sup>  
 it is still unlikely that the refugee agriculturists can be  
 absorbed by the West German agriculture. It may be true that this  
 fact is indeed inducing a substantial number of farmers to return  
 to East Germany, as asserted by the East German authorities. Unless  
 the much debated plans to stimulate migration to other free  
 countries materialize, the transformation of these farmers into  
 industrial workers appears to be the only solution.

With the industrial specialists the situation is  
 different. Shortages of labor exist in certain skilled categories  
 in many West German industries such as the iron and steel,  
 the chemical, and the building construction industries. Moreover,  
 as mentioned above, there is a considerable demand for younger  
 specialists who are qualified to replace, when the need arises,  
 the considerable number of foremen and chief operators of advanced  
 age. Finally, the shortage of miners in the coal districts of the  
 Ruhr has long plagued German authorities. There are undoubtedly  
 a number of refugees who because of their skills will be used to  
 fill such gaps once the housing shortage is sufficiently reduced  
 to make their resettlement in industrial areas possible.

Defections to West Germany of highly qualified  
 specialists with certain rare skills have been considered beneficial  
 to the West because they are depriving East Germany of precisely the  
 types of manpower which she needs especially badly, and because they  
 are satisfying important economic requirements not only of West  
 Germany but also of other Western countries.

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## APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY1. Estimate of Total Postwar Net Migration of Refugees from East Germany and East Berlin to West Germany and West Berlin.

As explained in the text, both registration and census figures have been used. This approach made it necessary to make a number of assumptions, some of which necessarily were rather arbitrary or had to be based on rather poor evidence. Examples of the latter kind are (a) the estimate of the number of persons in West Germany and West Berlin at the end of the war who had been evacuated during the war from the area which is now the Soviet Zone and East Berlin, (b) the estimate of the number of expellees who migrated from East Germany between the 1946 and 1950 censuses, and (c) the estimate of the number of migrants who have not registered either with the police authorities or with the emergency reception camps.

The method by which the figure of 1.9 million postwar refugees was arrived at is outlined in Table 12.\*

It is difficult to tell how accurate this estimate of 1.9 million refugees is. The fact that it is quite close to the estimates prepared by Dr. Harmsen of the University of Hamburg and by Dr. Reichling of the Federal Statistical Office indicates that the reliability of the estimate is rather high.

Dr. Harmsen estimated that the net migration from East Germany and East Berlin between the end of the war and the end of 1952 numbered 2 million. In line with our definition of a refugee, however, 330,000 returning West Germans who were evacuated to East Germany during the war must be subtracted from the total. Since the estimate presented here is for net refugee migration and not net migration per se, a revision is necessary in order to approximate Harmsen's definition. This revised estimate is 1,810,000. A downward adjustment of this estimate by 95,000 to allow for net migration during the first quarter of 1953 results in an estimate of 1,715,000 net migrants by the end of 1952 -- a figure only 45,000 higher than Harmsen's equivalent figure of 1,670,000.

\* Table 12 follows on p. 48.

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953

From East Germany to West Germany	Intermediate Number	Migrants
1. Persons whose 1939 residence was Berlin, enumerated in West Germany on 29 October 1946	439,000 <u>a</u> / <sup>*</sup>	
2. Persons whose 1939 residence was East Berlin, enumerated in West Germany on 29 October 1946	163,000 <u>b</u> /	
3. Of persons listed in 2, above who were evacuees during the war	143,000 <u>c</u> /	
4. Of persons listed in 2, above, those who were not evacuees during the war, that is, net migrants between the end of the war and 29 October 1946 (line 2 minus line 3)		20,000
5. Persons whose 1939 residence was East Germany, enumerated in West Germany on 29 October 1946	582,000 <u>d</u> /	
6. Of persons listed in 5, above, those who were evacuees during the war	512,000 <u>c</u> /	

\* Footnotes for Table 12 follow on p. 50.

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
 from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
 to West Berlin  
 End of War through March 1953  
 (Continued)

<u>From East Germany to West Germany</u>	<u>Intermediate Number</u>	<u>Migrants</u>
7. Of persons listed in 5, above, those who were not evacuees during the war, that is, net migrants between the end of the war and 29 October 1946 (line 5 minus line 6)		70,000
8. In-migration from East Germany, 29 October 1946 to 13 September 1950		752,000 <u>e/</u>
9. Net migration from East Berlin, 29 October 1946 to 13 September 1950		0 <u>f/</u>
10. Net migration from East Germany, 13 September 1950 through end of 1952		359,000 <u>g/</u>
11. Net migration from East Germany, 1st quarter 1953		3,000 <u>h/</u>
12. Number of unregistered refugees (Fluechtlinge), March 1953		100,000 <u>i/</u>
<u>From East Germany to West Berlin</u>		
13. Net migration from East Germany, end of war to 29 October 1946		36,000 <u>j/</u>

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953  
(Continued)

<u>From East Germany to West Germany</u>	<u>Intermediate Number</u>	<u>Migrants</u>
14. Net migration from East Germany, 29 October 1946 through 1st quarter 1952		199,000 <u>k/</u>
15. Net migration from East Berlin, end of war through 1st quarter 1952		67,000 <u>l/</u>
16. In-migration from East Germany and East Berlin, 1 April 1952 through 1st quarter 1953	213,000 <u>m/</u>	
17. Out-migration from West Berlin to West Germany, 1 April 1952 through 1st quarter 1953	19,000 <u>n/</u>	
18. Net migration (line 16 minus line 17)		194,000
19. Number of unregistered refugees (Fluechtlinge), March 1953		100,000 <u>o/</u>

a. See Table 1, p. 12, above.

b. It is assumed that 37 percent of the residents of Berlin enumerated were from East Berlin (the percentage that the population of East Berlin was of the population of Greater Berlin in 1939). 68/

c. It is assumed that of the 439,000 listed in line 1 and of the 582,000 listed in line 5, 900,000 were evacuees during the war. This was the estimated number present as of 1 April 1947, as determined by a survey of West Germany by the Statistisch-Soziallogische

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953  
(Continued)

Arbeitsgruppe der Landesfluechtlings-Verwaltung (the Statistical and Sociological Working Group of the Administration for Refugees). <sup>69/</sup>  
This estimate was also used by Dr. Kurt Horstmann in his book, Die Wanderung im Bundesgebiet, 1950. <sup>70/</sup> In order to determine how many of these 900,000 war evacuees came from East Berlin and how many came from East Germany, it is assumed that the percentage of the total persons enumerated who were war evacuees (88 percent) would apply equally to the separate categories of persons from East Germany and East Berlin. The calculation is as follows:

(1) Number present in West Germany in 1946 whose 1939 residence was in Berlin or East Germany	1,021,000
(2) War evacuees	900,000
(3) Difference (line (2) from line (1))	<u>121,000</u>
(4) Percentage of evacuees (line (2) as percent of line (1))	88 percent
(5) War evacuees from East Berlin (88 percent of 163,000)	143,000
(6) War evacuees from East Germany (88 percent of 582,000)	512,000

d. See Table 1.

e. It is known from the censuses of 29 October 1946 and 13 September 1950 that the number of persons whose residence in 1939 was in East Germany increased from 582,000 at the earlier date to 1,037,000 at the later date, or an increase of 455,000 (Table 1). Assuming that the rate of natural increase for the "refugee" population was the same as for the West German population, about 16,000 of this increase was due to natural increase, and 439,000 was due to net migration.



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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953  
(Continued)

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This was not the total migration during the intercensal period, however, because it does not account for the movement of expellees who had "settled" in East Germany. During 1950 there were 62.4 percent as many expellee migrants to West Germany from East Germany as there were other migrants. During 1951 the proportion had declined to 50.7 percent. 71/ Although these data are very limited, they seem to indicate that the earlier the period, the larger the proportion of net migrants from East Germany who were expellee migrants. If it is assumed that the increase of 11.7 percentage points in the ratio of expellee to other migrants can be carried back to 1948, the middle point of the intercensal period, at one half this increase per year ( $5.9 + 62.4 = 68.3$  percent for 1949;  $3.0 + 68.3 = 71.3$  percent for 1948), and, assuming that the volume of migration was the same for each year, then the expellees who migrated during this period constituted a group about 71 percent as large as the 439,000 migrants whose 1939 residence was in East Germany, or 313,000. The total migration from East Germany for the intercensal period, therefore, may be estimated at 752,000.

It should be noted that an official of the Federal Statistical Office in charge of refugee statistics (see source 17/) assumed that 400,000 expellees migrated from East Germany between the end of 1946 and the end of 1951. In view of the fact that 83,000 expellees migrated in the period from the 13 September 1950 census to the end of 1951, 72/ 317,000 people must have migrated in the intercensal period, a figure close to that estimated above.

f. It is assumed that all migrants from East Berlin since 29 October 1946 entered West Germany by way of West Berlin. The number of migrants is therefore estimated more accurately when West Berlin is considered as the receiving area (see entries for West Berlin).

g. See Table 3, p.14, above. It is assumed that half of the migrants from West Germany to East Germany were returnees. This assumption is based on data for 1952 which indicated that during that year, 45 percent of the West to East migrants were refugees (Zugewanderte), and 24 percent were expellees. It is probable that

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953  
(Continued)

part of these expellees entered West Germany after October 1946 and should be counted as refugees in the sense that the term is used here. h. See Table 2, p. 12, above. It is assumed (1) that all migrants from East Germany during the period registered at the reception camps at Giessen and Uelzen, and (2) that all migrants who registered at these camps were from East Germany. It is further assumed that the total return migration was the same proportion of in-migration as it was during the period September 1950 to December 1952 -- 12 percent or 393 persons. Return migration of refugees was assumed to be only half this number, or 196 persons.

i. It is assumed that this number is approximately the same as the estimated number of unregistered refugees in West Berlin as of 1952. (See e, above.)

j. See Table 1, p. 12, above. It is assumed that all persons enumerated in West Berlin on 29 October 1946 whose 1939 residence was in East Germany migrated after the end of the war.

k. See Table 3, p. 14, above. Direct data are available for this migration only since the beginning of 1948. It is necessary, therefore, to estimate the in- and out-migration for the 14 months before the beginning of 1948. In estimating this earlier migration, it is assumed that the rate of migration of persons to and from East Germany and West Berlin was the same as during 1948. On this assumption, in-migration amounted to about 33,000 and out-migration, about 13,000. The further assumption that half of the out-migrants during the 14 months were refugees leads to an estimate of 27,000 net migration of refugees. For periods for which data are available (see Table 3), it is assumed that half of the out-migrants were refugees.

l. See Table 3, p. 14, above. It is assumed that there were no East Berlin war evacuees present in West Berlin at the end of the war. Data on net migration between East Berlin and West Berlin must be estimated for the period between the end of the war and the beginning of 1950. In making the estimate for this time period, it is assumed that the in-migration from East Berlin was about 44 percent as great as the in-migration from East Germany during the same period. This was the same proportion as during 1950. The rate of

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
 from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
 to West Berlin  
 End of War through March 1953  
 (Continued)

out-migration was assumed to have been the same as it was for out-migration to East Germany during the period October 1946 to December 1949. Details of the calculation follow:

	<u>In-Migration</u>	<u>Out-Migration</u>
(1) Migration from East Germany		
(a) October 1946 to December 1947	33,000	13,000
(b) 1948 and 1949 (Table 3)	71,000	22,000
(c) Total	<u>104,000</u>	<u>35,000</u>
(2) Assume 44 percent of 104,000	45,000	
(3) Assume 100 percent of 35,000		35,000
(4) Migration: 1950, 1951, 1st quarter of 1952 (Table 3)	49,000	18,000
Total West Berlin net migration	<u>94,000</u>	<u>53,000</u>

Since, however, it was assumed that all in-migrants and half of the out-migrants were refugees, the net migration of refugees is estimated to be 67,000.

m. See Table 2, p. 12, above. It is assumed (1) that all migrants during the period registered at the emergency reception camp, and (2) that all migrants who registered at this camp were from East Germany or East Berlin.

n. It is assumed that the proportion that return migration to East Germany and East Berlin was of in-migration from these areas remained

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Table 12

Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants  
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany  
to West Berlin  
End of War through March 1953  
(Continued)

the same as it was during the last three quarters of 1952 for migration to and from East Berlin. This proportion was 18 percent, and the total return migration for the period was therefore 18 percent of 213,000, or 38,000. It is assumed, however, that only half of these returnees were refugees, and these persons, therefore, numbered about 19,000.

o. As reported by US High Commissioner for Germany. 73/

Dr. Reichling, in his estimate prepared in January 1953, states that from 1 January 1945 to 31 December 1951 there were 1.8 million in-migrants from East Germany and East Berlin. Of these, there were 300,000 returning West Germans (excluded in this report) and 700,000 expellees. Of the latter group, 300,000 entered West Germany before October 1946 (also excluded in this report on the premise that they had not been "settled"). Reichling's estimate of the population in which we are interested is, therefore, 1.2 million.

Reichling estimated in-migration in two steps: from 1 January 1945 to 31 December 1946, and from 1 January 1947 to 31 December 1951. For the former period he uses essentially the method used in this report. The estimated 900,000 evacuees from East Germany and East Berlin were subtracted from the number present as of the 1946 census whose 1939 residence was in East Germany and East Berlin. For the latter period, Reichling estimated that 700,000 former residents of East Germany and East Berlin and 400,000 expellees who had settled in these areas migrated to West Germany. The only statement given as to the method used in making this estimate is that "a sample of the available statistics on the former residence of the in-migrants was used to determine the migration statistics for these years."

By adjusting the estimate to cover the period from the end of the war to the end of 1951, to change "net migration" to "in-migration," and to eliminate migration of refugees to West Berlin

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who remained there, this report yields an equivalent figure of about 1.2 million. Although it is not possible to determine exactly how Reichling's estimate was made, his methods and the methods of this report are probably sufficiently independent that it may be concluded that our estimate has been verified by Reichling.

2. Estimate of the Occupational Characteristics of Refugees before Migration.

There are two main sources of data which may form the basis of estimating the occupational distribution of refugees prior to migration: (a) police registration of migrants over the Land (state) borders of West Germany and over the boundary of West Berlin, and (b) statistics gathered at the emergency reception camps.

An estimate based solely on police registration would be a very poor one because, in the case of West Germany, internal migrants form the bulk of the group for which data are presented, and, in the case of West Berlin, in-migrants from areas other than East Germany and East Berlin are included. Internal migrants and migrants from places other than East Germany and East Berlin probably would have a different occupational structure from those coming from the two areas relevant to this report, and the extent of this difference cannot be evaluated. Except for migrants from East Berlin to West Berlin during 1950 (column 2 of Table 8, p.22, above), police registration statistics, therefore, were not used.

Much greater use was made of data on refugees registering at the three emergency reception camps at West Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen. Although the available data of this type, presented in Table 4 (p.17, above), form a more reliable basis for estimating the occupational characteristics of all refugees, they still leave much to be desired as far as coverage and representativeness are concerned. Coverage is limited to 317,000 refugees, or 17 percent of the total number. The main difficulty, however, is not the size but the representativeness of the sample. The validity of the estimate shown in Table 9 (p.24, above) is largely determined by the degree of similarity of the occupational structure of refugees migrating in 1952 to those migrating before the year. Certain inconclusive evidence is available which indicates that these groups are sufficiently similar to allow this inductive leap. This evidence is the occupational distribution, before migration, of refugees living in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1949 (column 1 of Table 8).

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It is noted that, occupation-wise, these refugees were not much dissimilar to those applying at emergency reception camps during 1952.

To estimate the occupational structure of the 1.9 million refugees, many choices are open. One could take any one or a combination of the distributions shown in Table 8 and assume that it represents the distribution for all refugees. On the other hand, one could consider that the distribution for all refugees for which data are available (column 10) represents all refugees. These approaches do not seem valid, however, because of the dissimilarity of the distributions. In-migrants from East Berlin to West Berlin during 1950, for example, had a distribution different from that of any of the other eight subgroups of refugees. Also, the occupational structure of the migrants after 1952 appears to have shifted to a larger proportion in agricultural, household, health, and welfare occupations, and to a smaller proportion in the other occupation-industry groups. It would appear, therefore, that the best estimate for the 1.9 million refugees would be obtained if one selected certain of the nine distributions to represent different subgroups. One could then arrive at a distribution for the total by adding the distributions for the subgroups. This was the procedure adopted in this report. The basic decisions that had to be made as to which distribution in Table 8 should represent which subgroup of refugees are discussed below:

a. The distribution of refugees from East Berlin to West Berlin during 1950, shown in column 2, was used to represent the distribution for all migrants from East Berlin to West Berlin and West Germany until April 1952. The size of this group is estimated at 101,000, which number was arrived at as follows:

(1) Refugees listed in items 4 and 15 of Table 12 totaled 87,000.

(2) The number of the unregistered refugees who were from East Berlin is estimated to be 14,000. This estimate was derived as follows:

(a) Of the 194,000 net migrants to West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany from 1 April 1952

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to 31 March 1953 (line 18 of Table 12), 19 percent, or 37,000, were assumed to have come from East Berlin. This was the same percentage that East Berliners were of all applicants to the emergency reception camp in West Berlin during 1952 and the first quarter of 1953. 74/

(b) If 37,000 is added to the 87,000 in (1), above, the result is in an estimate of 124,000 refugees from East Berlin. This number amounts to 7 percent of the total of 1.7 million refugees after the estimated 200,000 unregistered refugees are excluded. Assuming that the proportion of unregistered refugees from East Berlin was the same as East Berliners were of the total refugee population, 7 percent of the 200,000 unregistered refugees, or 14,000, were from East Berlin. (It should be noted that the 37,000 East Berliners referred to above are included in the distribution in columns 3 through 7 (Table 8), and, therefore, column 2 (Table 8) is not used to distribute them.)

b. The distributions of refugees registered at the Giessen camp in January and February 1953 (columns 8 and 9 of Table 8) were taken to represent the estimated 3,000 migrants to West Germany during the first quarter of 1953 (line 11 of Table 12).

c. The occupation-industry distributions of those who registered at the camps at Giessen, Uelzen, and West Berlin during the first half of 1952, and of those who registered at the camp at West Berlin during the second half of 1952 and the first quarter of 1953 (columns 3 through 7 of Table 8) were used to distribute the estimated 194,000 net migrants to West Berlin during the period from 1 April 1952 to 31 March 1953 (line 18 of Table 12).

d. Of the 359,000 net migrants to West Germany from September 1950 through the end of 1952, listed on line 10 of Table 12, 105,000 were added to the population during 1952 (see Table 3). The occupation-industry distribution of these refugees was assumed to have been represented by columns 3 and 4 of Table 8.

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e. The occupational distribution prior to migration of refugees present in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1949 (column 1 of Table 8), and the distribution of those who migrated during 1952 (columns 3 and 4 of Table 8) were employed in Table 13 to distribute the remaining 1,497,000 refugees.

Table 13

Comparative Occupational Distribution of Migrants  
Based on Table 8

<u>Occupation-Industry Group</u>	Percent	
	<u>Columns 1, 3, and 4</u>	<u>Columns 3 and 4</u>
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry	8.7	9.2
Industry, Handicraft	22.5	23.1
Technical Occupations	2.5	2.1
Trade, Transportation	16.9	17.2
Household, Health, Welfare	5.3	5.6
Administration, Justice	4.7	3.6
Intellectual, Artistic	2.5	2.3
Total Economically Active	<u>63.1</u>	<u>63.1</u>
Not Economically Active	36.9	36.9
Total Population	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

This large group includes: (1) those who migrated from East Germany to West Germany from the end of the war until the end of 1951, (2) those who migrated from East Germany to West Berlin until the second quarter of 1952, and (3) the estimated 186,000 unregistered refugees who migrated from East Germany. The distribution shown in column 1 of Table 8 was used in combination with columns 3 and 4 because it was assumed that it better represented the actual occupation-industry characteristics of the earlier migrants than did the distribution of this characteristic for persons who migrated during 1952. Because of the relatively heavy weights of the 1952 distributions, it makes only a small difference if column 1 is excluded from the weighted average of the distributions shown in columns 3 and 4, as may be noted in Table 13.

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Without information regarding the occupational characteristics of refugees who migrated before 1952, it is not known, of course, whether or not, in Table 8, column 1 should have been included with columns 3 and 4. It is also not known to what extent columns 1, 3, or 4 are representative of this large migrant group. The largest amount of data available has been used in the hope that they do in fact represent what it is assumed that they represent.

Table 9 presents the estimate of the occupational characteristics of the five groups of migrants which were differentiated, as well as of the total refugee group. Of the total group, 1.2 million were economically active at the time of their migration and 700,000 were dependents. The largest group consisted of those who had been working in industry and handicraft (21.8 percent), followed by those in trade and transportation (16.8 percent), and agriculture, forestry, and husbandry (8.8 percent). The data do not permit us to allot the dependent population to the occupation-industry group on which they were dependent. It should be noted that the distribution for the total refugee population is very close to that for the large subgroup of 1,497,000, indicating the tremendous weight this subgroup had in the final figures.

A comparison of the occupational distribution of the economically active segment of the total refugee group with the range of the nine subgroups shown in Table 8, and with the economically active population in East Germany in 1946 and in West Germany in 1950 is shown in Table 14.\* The comparison in Table 13 indicates that each cell of the estimated distribution for the total refugee group lies fairly close to the middle of the range of the nine subgroups of refugees for which information is available. This was due to the fact that the distributions shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8, which formed the main basis of the estimate, generally were not at the extreme of the nine distributions.

An unavoidable shortcoming of the estimate is the lack of detail within the seven occupation-industry groups. Only a few of the distributions shown in Table 4 were given in more detail in the sources. The most important among these breakdowns is that given for the

\* Table 14 follows on p. 61.

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Table 14

Comparative Occupational Distribution  
of the Economically Active Population:  
Total East German Refugees, Nine Subgroups of East German Refugees,  
East Germany (1946), and West Germany (1950) 75/

Major Occupational Group	Total Refugees	Range of Nine Subgroups of Refugees <sup>a/</sup>	Percent	
			East Germany 1946	West Germany 1950
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry	14	1 to 36	31	26
Industry, Handicraft	35	23 to 39	37	38
Technical Occupations	4	2 to 8	2	3
Trade, Transportation	27	21 to 37	14	18
Household, Health, Welfare	8	5 to 16	7	6
Administration, Justice	8	1 to 20	7	7
Intellectual, Artistic	4	2 to 5	2	2
Total Economically Active	<u>100</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

a. The percentage distribution of the economically active population for each subgroup in Table 8 was adjusted to eliminate the unknowns and the unemployed.

42,000 economically active refugees registering at the 3 emergency reception camps during the first half of 1952 (column 3 of Table 8). A rough estimate of more detailed occupation-industry characteristics of the total refugee group may be made if one assumes that the proportion of workers within a major occupation group belonging to a specific occupation or industry group was the same as it was for refugees during the first 6 months of 1952. The details of the extrapolation, and the estimate of a more detailed occupation-industry breakdown of the total refugee group are tabulated in Table 15.\*

\* Table 15 follows on p. 62.

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Table 15

Estimated Number of East German Refugees Who Have Specific Occupations  
or Who Work in Specific Industries 76/

Major Occupational Group	1 Persons Registering at Camps, 1st Half of 1952	2 Distribution after Adjusting for Unknowns in Column 1 a/*	3 Percent That Each Subgroup Is of Major Group	4 Total Refugees
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry				
Independent Farmers	1,410	1,754	31.7	52,800
Gardeners	214	266	4.8	8,000
Total	<u>4,446</u>	<u>5,532</u>		<u>166,600</u>
Industry, Handicraft				
Mining	1,040	1,294	8.0	33,100
Construction	3,360	4,181	25.9	107,100
Metal Production and Processing	4,972	6,187	38.4	158,800
Textile Production and Processing	2,040	2,538	15.7	64,900
Food and Stimulants	1,551	1,930	12.0	49,600
Total	<u>12,963</u>	<u>16,130</u>		<u>413,600</u>
Technical Occupations	<u>1,572</u>	<u>1,956</u>		<u>46,100</u>
Trade, Transportation				
Clerical, Sales, etc.	4,553	5,665	50.3	160,800
Total	<u>9,045</u>	<u>11,254</u>		<u>319,700</u>
Household, Health, Welfare				
Physicians	57	71	2.1	2,000
Dentists	38	47	1.4	1,400

\* Footnote for Table 15 follows on p. 63.

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Table 15

Estimated Number of East German Refugees Who Have Specific Occupations  
or Who Work in Specific Industries 76/  
(Continued)

Major Occupational Group	1 Persons Registering at Camps, 1st Half of 1952	2 Distribution after Adjusting for Unknowns in Column 1	3 Percent That Each Subgroup Is of Major Group	4 Total Refugees
Household, Health, Welfare (Continued)				
Veterinarians	14	17	0.5	500
Pharmacists	41	51	1.5	1,500
Total	<u>2,725</u>	<u>3,391</u>		<u>101,000</u>
Administration, Justice				
Judges	7	9	0.4	400
Lawyers	41	51	2.4	2,200
Total	<u>1,715</u>	<u>2,134</u>		<u>90,500</u>
Intellectual, Artistic	<u>1,362</u>	<u>1,695</u>		<u>46,800</u>
Unknown	8,264			
Total Economically Active	<u>42,092</u>	<u>42,092</u>		<u>1,184,300</u>

a. In making this adjustment, it is assumed that the unknown had the same occupation-industry distribution as had those whose occupations were known.

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It would appear that the 3 largest groups among the refugees were made up of clerical and sales persons (161,000), persons who worked in metal production and processing (159,000), and construction workers (107,000). Textile workers (65,000), farmers (53,000), those working in the food and stimulants group (50,000), and miners (33,000) composed other large groups which have migrated to the West since the end of the war. Among the migrants who practiced professions are included about 2,000 medical doctors and 2,000 lawyers.

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