

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director

13 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Mr. William G. Hyland
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Dr. Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : South Asian Military Handbook

1. A revision and updating of the South Asian Military Handbook is contemplated again this year. It was the opinion of representatives from the various agencies participating in the major expansion of the handbook in 1974 that an annual revision would be desirable. Comments from consumers support this belief. The present edition of the handbook is looseleaf and, hopefully, revisions this year can be limited to selected pages. [redacted] of CIA's Office of Current Intelligence will again be the project officer, working under the general supervision of the National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia.

25X1

2. [redacted] will transmit detailed instructions and proposals directly to representatives of the various agencies and offices concerned by 16 June. A cutoff date for information used in the revision has been set at 1 July. Drafts will be due to [redacted] by 10 July and an interagency coordinating meeting will be held at CIA Headquarters on 25 July.


25X1

3. It is proposed that State/INR update Section I, "Background." Section II, "Relative Military Capabilities," will be drafted by DIA.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CIA/OER is expected to revise and submit Section III, "Military Expenditures," and Section V, "Foreign Sources of Supply." Section IV, "Domestic Military Production," and the Glossary will again be prepared by CIA/OSR. Finally, CIA/OCI will update the Annexes, working with CIA/OSI on "South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capability," and with CIA/CRS on the "Biographic Sketches of Military Leaders." Tables, maps, and charts will be prepared, as in the past, by CIA and DIA.



25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

SECRET

Working File

Secret



25X1

**Interagency
Intelligence
Memorandum**

The South Asian Military Handbook

Secret

July 1975

Copy **Nº 247**

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/02/14 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1

Approved For Release 2005/02/14 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1

SECRET

25X1

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
I. BACKGROUND 1947-1975	
A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary	I-1
B. Pushtunistan	I-3
C. South Asia and the Great Powers	I-4
D. Threats to Internal Stability	I-7
II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES	
A. India	II-1
B. Pakistan	II-5
C. Bangladesh	II-9
D. Afghanistan	II-10
E. Nepal	II-12
F. Sri Lanka	II-13
Tables:	
1. Selected Armaments and Forces	II-17
2. Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border	II-20
3. Military Advisers in Foreign Countries	II-21
Maps:	
1. India—Internal Administration	
2. India—Army Order of Battle	
3. India—Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle	
4. India—Naval Order of Battle	
5. Ground Forces on Indo-Pakistani Border	
6. Jammu/Kashmir Area	
7. Pakistan—Internal Administration	
8. Pakistan—Army Order of Battle	
9. Pakistan—Fighter/Bomber Order of Battle	
10. Pakistan—Naval Order of Battle	
11. Ground Forces on Afghan-Pakistani Border	
12. Bangladesh—Internal Administration	
13. Bangladesh—Order of Battle	
14. Afghanistan—Internal Administration	
15. Afghanistan—Order of Battle	
16. Nepal—Internal Administration	
17. Nepal—Order of Battle	
18. Sri Lanka—Internal Administration	
19. Sri Lanka—Order of Battle	
III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES	
A. India	III-1
B. Pakistan	III-1
C. Bangladesh	III-2

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

	<i>Page</i>
D. Afghanistan	III-2
E. Nepal	III-2
F. Sri Lanka	III-2
Tables: 1. Military Expenditures, South Asian Countries	III-3
2. India: Gross Defense Expenditures	III-3
3. India: Distribution of Defense Expenditures	III-4
4. India: Percentage Distribution of Defense Expenditures	III-4
5. India: Functional Distribution of Defense Expenditures	III-5
6. India: Percentage Distribution of Defense Expenditures	III-6
7. Pakistan: Military Expenditures	III-7
8. Bangladesh: Military Expenditures	III-7
9. Afghanistan: Military Expenditures	III-8
10. Nepal: Military Expenditures	III-8
11. Sri Lanka: Military Expenditures	III-8

IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION


A. India	IV-1
B. Pakistan	IV-4
C. Bangladesh	IV-5
D. Afghanistan	IV-5
E. Nepal	IV-5
F. Sri Lanka	IV-5
Tables: 1. India: Defense Production	IV-6
2. India: Aircraft Production	IV-7

V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY

A. India	V-1
B. Pakistan	V-4
C. Bangladesh	V-6
D. Afghanistan	V-7
E. Nepal	V-8
F. Sri Lanka	V-9
Tables: 1. India: Foreign Military Imports	V-10
2. India: Soviet Military Supply Agreements	V-11
3. Pakistan: Foreign Military Imports	V-12
4. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with China	V-12
5. Pakistan: Military Supply Agreements with France	V-13
6. Bangladesh: Foreign Military Imports	V-13
7. Afghanistan: Foreign Military Imports	V-14
8. Afghanistan: Soviet Military Supply Agreements	V-14
9. Nepal: Foreign Military Imports	V-15
10. Sri Lanka: Foreign Military Imports	V-15

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

Page

ANNEXES



25X1

C. Chronology of Major Events in South Asia 1940-1975 C-1


GLOSSARY

Performance Characteristics of Selected South Asian

Military Equipment Glos-1

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

I. BACKGROUND 1947-1975

A. INDIA VS. PAKISTAN: AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY

Partition and Kashmir

In August 1947, following years of agitation by the Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same time, as a result of Muslim agitation for a separate Muslim state, Britain partitioned India, creating Pakistan from two widely separated and predominantly Muslim areas.

The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India, and millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistan—almost all in East Pakistan.

Large parts of the British Indian Empire had been ruled by theoretically sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous to Pakistan. Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into India.

In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this point—on October 27—the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale.

Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. A cease-fire line was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the de facto boundary until 1971.

I-1

SECRET

SECRET

Kutch and Kashmir

For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965, however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Kutch, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims. Both sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a decision was announced that was generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.

In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-held Kashmir. India moved quickly to seal off the access routes, making incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On September 1, Pakistan launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting India's communications with its forces farther north in the state. Five days later, India began a full-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The Pakistanis held the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or no resistance captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement there was virtually no fighting along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an agreement in January 1966 at Tashkent that restored the border to that existing before the war.

Bangladesh and Kashmir

In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, the Awami League, which advocated provincial autonomy, won enough seats in East Pakistan to ensure an absolute majority in the projected Pakistan National Assembly. The assembly was to write a new constitution, and the leaders of the league refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would eventually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League in effect took over the administration of the province, and on March 25, the army moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their independence.

The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan. About 10 million Bengalees eventually fled to India, creating major economic problems and potentially serious political and social ones.

Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they never became more than a long-term potential threat to the moderates in the freedom movement.

India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan.

On December 3, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on December 4, India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of fighting,

and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakistani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, there was relatively little fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western border effective as of December 17, and the Pakistanis concurred.

In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control" was established. The agreement commits the parties to a process of negotiations designed to normalize relations.

In August 1973, India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangladesh, agreed to a three-way repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war from India, Bengalees from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and Pakistanis and some non-Bengalee Muslims from Bangladesh to Pakistan. Pakistan and India withdrew troops from occupied territory in December 1973. By February 1974, Pakistan was willing to extend official recognition to Bangladesh, and at a tripartite meeting in New Delhi in April, Bangladesh gave up all plans for holding war crimes trials of captured Pakistanis. The repatriation of the prisoners of war was completed by May 1. Pakistan and India agreed to re-establish mail, travel and telecommunication links in September 1974, agreed to the resumption of shipping in January 1975, and signed a formal trade agreement on January 23, 1975.

A new factor in Indo-Pakistani relations emerged with the explosion of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974. New Delhi's public assurances that the test was only for peaceful purposes did little to calm the strongly negative reaction in Pakistan. Moves toward normalization of relations between the two governments were expected to be more difficult in the aftermath of the nuclear explosion because the government of Pakistan could not afford to appear to be negotiating new agreements with India under the threat of nuclear blackmail. On February 24, 1975, the US announced the lifting of the ban on the sale of lethal military equipment to South Asia. Indian leaders expressed disapproval of the decision, claiming it could slow down the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan.

B. PUSHTUNISTAN

Pushtunistan is a Afghan term that generally refers to the two eastern provinces of Pakistan: Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier. Sparsely populated by tribesmen speaking Pushtu, Baluchi, or Brahui, the two provinces comprise more than half of the land area of Pakistan and have an extended Arabian Sea coastline.

The Pushtu-speaking tribesmen were separated from their fellow tribes in Afghanistan in 1893 when a British-Afghan agreement established the Durand Line as the international boundary between British India and Afghanistan. This boundary was confirmed in a treaty between the two countries in 1919.

When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Afghanistan stated that it considered the 1893 treaty invalid because it had been signed under duress, and further asserted that it did not recognize the line as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Continuing at varying levels over the years, the dispute reached

SECRET

its peak in 1960 and 1961 with border clashes, restrictions on the seasonal migration of Afghan nomads into Pakistan, and Afghanistan's refusal to use its only railway link to the Indian Ocean at Karachi. Relations improved after the resignation of prime minister Mohammad Daoud in 1963.

In July 1973, when a military coup returned Daoud to the presidency, he immediately reactivated the dispute and has since pursued it by diplomacy and propaganda. In response, Pakistan instituted an aggressive policy that included an increased military and official civilian presence in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, and a firm refusal to discuss its policies and programs in the two provinces.

Afghanistan has never publicly gone further than demands for self-determination for the people of Pushtunistan, but most Pakistanis are convinced that incorporation is the Afghan goal. The Soviet Union has backed the Afghan position since 1955, while the US recognizes the Durand Line as an international boundary.

C. SOUTH ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS

Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in South Asia. In the 1950s US-Soviet tensions played an important part in determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emergence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact.

The 1950s

Washington's policy of containment during the 1950s put the US at odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:

- India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary, led to serious strains between Washington and New Delhi;
- US efforts to contain the USSR resulted in the inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, and in bilateral defense agreements with the US in 1954 and 1959.

Moscow, after Stalin's death in 1953, placed a high priority on developing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.

In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, principally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid, enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute.

China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the same time, India emphasized its own nonalignment and acted as a leader of the Third World.

The 1960s

Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing power of China began to change relationships in the sub-continent:

- China and India began to see each other as rivals for leadership in Asia and in the Third World;
- Sino-Soviet rivalry encouraged close Indo-Soviet relations;
- Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a border agreement, which was finally signed in 1963;
- The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward improving relations with New Delhi.

The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends to a head. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a Communist and a non-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms shipments began arriving the following year.

The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was replaced by China.

Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in South Asia:

- Both sought to contain China;
- Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;
- In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly contributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual Soviet mediation at Tashkent;
- Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan. Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India.

The 1970s

In the early 1970s, there was some swing back toward the relations existing in the 1950s. The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest in India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major complication in Pakistan's foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain relations with one of its Great Power allies without offending the other. US and Chinese policy toward the subcontinent began to coincide. For example, the policies of the two countries during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were roughly

SECRET


parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between New Delhi and Moscow—symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

The Indians, however, have consistently refused to participate in Moscow's proposed Asian Collective Security Scheme, have turned down Soviet requests for port facilities and have refused to mesh their planning process with that of the Soviet Union. As Indo-US relations have thawed, since 1971-72, India has sought to balance its ties with Moscow through increased aid, trade and technological assistance from the US. The resumption of arms sales to Pakistan has clouded the US-Indian relationship, but it has not significantly diminished India's appreciation of the advantages of diversified sources of economic assistance.

The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid from the U.S. Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by Soviet reluctance to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China originally refused to have any dealings with the new nation but was expected to extend recognition itself following Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh in early 1974 and abandonment by Dacca of all plans to place Pakistani POWs on trial for war crimes.

The Future

The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power-South Asian relationship are already visible. By May 1974, there were hints that China and India had begun moving toward rapprochement. Indo-US relations, badly hurt during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, were improving. The USSR was once again seeking better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan, for its part, seemed to want a more amicable relationship with Moscow. The effect on Indian and Pakistani relations with the Great Powers of New Delhi's decision to detonate a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 was not yet clear as this edition of the handbook went to press.



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/02/14 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1

Next 139 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/02/14 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700090002-1