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19 May 1961
TS No. 104558/61

Copy No.
22

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES
(November 1960)

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600040002-8

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SUMMARY

Most of the leaders of the world Communist movement gathered in Moscow in November 1960 to discuss questions of world Communist strategy and of authority and discipline in the movement itself--and, if possible, to paper over the Sino-Soviet dispute on the basis of an uncompleted draft declaration prepared by a multiparty committee in October. There were delegations from 81 Communist parties, of the 87 claimed to exist; but they did not include Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il-sung.

As the delegates arrived in early November, they were reportedly given a copy of the draft declaration, plus a copy or summary of the Soviet party's letter of 5 November to the Chinese party, plus a briefing in which the Soviet party asked for their support. In circulating the 5 November letter, the Soviet party made clear to everyone that it had not abandoned or appreciably modified its positions, i.e., that the agreements reached thus far were nominal agreements. Beyond this, the Soviet party, in reviewing the entire case against the Chinese, seemed to be soliciting massive support for an effort to get at least one hard agreement--on the principle of majority rule for the world Communist movement.

The preparatory committee in October had devised acceptable language, in the draft declaration, for almost all questions of Communist strategy--by stating both the Soviet and Chinese positions or by evading the issues. The committee had been unable to find acceptable language, however, on several issues relating to authority and discipline in the movement: the "cult of the individual," relevant to de-Stalinization and the status of both Khrushchev and Mao; endorsement of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses, entailing the issue of whether the Soviet party could speak for the world Communist movement; and of greatest importance, "unity" and "factionalism" in the movement, these being the terms in which the Soviet party sought to establish the principle of majority rule. At the meetings of the 26-party preparatory committee in October, the Chinese had led the dissidents on each of these questions, supported on almost all points by the Albanians and on others by various combinations of the delegations of Australia, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam. As the November conference developed, the

Chinese also objected strongly, with some support, to certain of the passages in the draft referring to "nationalism" or "national Communism"--passages which the Chinese correctly regarded as being aimed at them.

On 10 November, the first day of the conference, Khrushchev opened the discussion with a systematic defense of Soviet positions, including all of the Soviet positions compromised in the draft declaration. (An authorized version of this speech, although not presented as that, was to appear as Khrushchev's 6 January report on the conference.) On 14 November, after some 18 speeches in support of the Soviet party and only one speech (the North Korean) stating an equivocal position, Teng Hsiao-ping of the Chinese delegation spoke for four hours, replying both to the Soviet party's 5 November letter and to Khrushchev's 10 November speech.

Khrushchev had begun by expressing a hope of resolving differences. He had then reaffirmed the Soviet assessment of the balance of power, contending that the balance was "in favor of" socialism but that the West was still strong. He had reiterated his belief in the bloc's increasing (not absolute) ability to deter the West from initiating either a world war or local wars which might lead to world war, and he had contended that "peaceful coexistence" would favor socialism.

In reply, Teng began by rebuking the Soviet party for bringing up all of the issues again. He then defended Mao's formulation of the balance of power in terms of the East Wind prevailing--a figure used by the Chinese to imply a greater degree of bloc superiority than asserted by Moscow. Teng criticized the Soviet party for curbing "revolutionary struggles" at the same time that it proclaimed bloc superiority, and he defended Mao's concept of the Western "paper tiger"--long used to disparage Western strength--as one necessary to maintain revolutionary will. Teng recognized the possibility of averting a world war, but he wanted equal emphasis on the continuing danger of a Western-initiated world war. He objected to the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," contending that this concept should include the building up of the entire bloc as rapidly as possible and the provision of the utmost possible support to revolutionary struggles all over the world. Teng argued at one point that such struggles would not increase the possibility of world war, and at

another point that even if they did lead to world war the imperialists would be wiped out in such a war.

Khrushchev had enlarged on the Soviet position on types of wars--world war, local wars, and "liberation" wars. He had given some detail on the disastrous consequences of nuclear war. He had stated his opposition to a world war--a war necessarily involving the United States and the Soviet Union--and his belief that the West would be wary of initiating such a war. As for local wars, i.e., small-scale wars between states, wars also Western-initiated (e.g., the Suez crisis), he had spoken of these as a diminishing prospect, and he had said that the Communist objective should be to deter such wars or to halt them before they could expand. As for "liberation" wars, i.e., wars by indigenous forces against colonial powers or against their own independent governments (he specified Algeria and Cuba), he had agreed that such wars were "inevitable" and he had affirmed an intention to support them, but he had evaded the questions of the kind and degree of support.

In reply, Teng denied that Peiping envisaged the triumph of socialism through general war, but he reiterated that it was a mistake to emphasize the dreadful consequences of nuclear war; he reaffirmed Mao's view that half the world's population would survive a world war. He dissented strongly from Soviet views on local and liberation wars. Reaffirming the inevitability of Western-initiated local wars, he pointed to the Korean war again as a "just" local war which had been not halted but fought, to the bloc's advantage. He cited various liberation wars as having also been advantageous; he was critical of Soviet evasiveness on the question of support for liberation wars and uprisings, and he called for much greater support.

In discussing the consequences of nuclear war, Khrushchev had reaffirmed the value of the effort toward disarmament and toward negotiations with "sober" forces in the West. Teng was scornful of these views. He called for the bloc--including China--to develop superiority in nuclear weapons, and he contended that the "hope of peace" rested not on talks with the West but on the progress of the revolutionary struggle everywhere.

With respect to the national liberation movement (colonial areas and underdeveloped states), Khrushchev had contended--contrary to Peiping--that the West was increasingly deterred from military intervention and that its other coercive devices were generally ineffectual, a line related to the Soviet position on the decreasing importance (despite their inevitability) of liberation wars. He had emphasized the importance--minimized by Peiping--of bloc aid to underdeveloped states and he had invited attention to the new Soviet concept of "national democracy" as a transitional stage to socialism for these states. He had reaffirmed that Communist parties in both underdeveloped states and developed Western countries might sometimes come to power by non-violent means.

In reply, Teng emphasized the importance of armed struggle in colonial areas and Western successes in preventing the independent countries from achieving true independence. Contrary to the earlier Soviet emphasis on protracted cooperation with bourgeois nationalist leaders in the independent countries and the reflection of that line in the new concept of "national democracy," Teng reaffirmed the Chinese line on the importance of striving for early Communist domination of independent governments, and he indirectly criticized the concept of "national democracy" on grounds of ambiguity. He reiterated that the Soviet party had grossly exaggerated the prospects for peaceful accession of the Communist parties to power, in both underdeveloped and developed countries, and, referring to the Soviet formulation about not exporting revolution, he again charged the Soviet party with failing to give adequate support to revolutionary movements.

Early in his 10 November speech, clearly aiming at the Chinese, Khrushchev had reviewed Soviet principles for building socialism and Communism and had called for better coordination of bloc economies. In reply, Teng defended the Chinese practice of emphasizing "ideology and morality" rather than material incentives, denied that Peiping was trying to find a shortcut to Communism, praised the "leap forward" and commune programs, and, reaffirming the Chinese aim of autarky, observed that each country should develop its own economy and could later cooperate on a voluntary basis.

Discussing the critical questions of authority and discipline in the movement--i.e., the most important of the uncompleted portions of the draft declaration--Khrushchev had related the two offenses of "revisionism" and "nationalism," in effect turning the Chinese charge of Soviet revisionism into a Soviet charge of Chinese nationalism. He had reiterated the Soviet party's abjuration of leadership of the world Communist movement, but he had strongly reaffirmed the Soviet party's support of the principle of majority rule in the movement, including the reflection of this principle in the draft declaration's passages on unity and factionalism.

In reply Teng protested the Soviet effort to find a "nationalist deviation" in Chinese policy, denied a relationship between nationalism and revisionism, noted that the campaign against "sectarianism" had been aimed at the Chinese party and led by Moscow, contended that Sino-Soviet differences were a reflection of Soviet unconcern with revisionism, reaffirmed Peiping's poor opinion of the Soviet handling of de-Stalinization, and denied that the "cult of the individual" was a concept applicable to Mao. With respect to achieving unity, Teng expressed suspicion that the Soviet party had not genuinely renounced leadership of the movement; he said that Peiping recognized the Soviet party as the center, but that there could be "no leaders and no led," no father-son relationship, no interference in other parties, and no imposition of views--such as the Soviet effort to make the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses binding on other parties, and Soviet statements of support for leaders opposed to the dominant leaders in the Chinese and Albanian parties. Teng contended that unity must be achieved through consultations, prolonged to unanimity; decisions could not be taken by majority vote. While the principle of majority rule was applicable to the central committees of individual parties, Teng said, it was not applicable to the world Communist movement which had no such central committee; this being so, it was improper to pose the question of factionalism.

Teng in his 14 November speech also took up issues between the Soviet and Chinese governments, as the CPSU's 5 November letter had done but which Khrushchev in his 10 November speech apparently had not done. Teng observed that Sino-Soviet differences had become more serious after Khrushchev became the Soviet leader, and that the relationship had deteriorated considerably in autumn 1957 when the USSR

attempted to establish Soviet-controlled radio and radar stations in China and made other unspecified demands (reportedly for Soviet naval bases in China and/or a Sino-Soviet navy or naval component). Teng gave a long list of instances of unacceptable Soviet behavior in the period from autumn 1959 to the current conference, including Khrushchev's criticism of Chinese policies and programs, Khrushchev's attribution of decent motives to Western leaders, Soviet attacks on the Chinese at the Bucharest conference and Soviet threats against Peiping in the public press, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and a Soviet protest of Chinese border encroachment. Teng contended that past Soviet aid, while helpful, was only to be expected, had been repaid by Chinese sacrifices in the Korean war, and was no greater than Chinese aid to other countries. He held that Chinese criticism of Soviet "great-nation chauvinism" was justified.

Almost all of the delegations which had not spoken prior to Teng's 14 November speech were drawn into the dispute in the next seven sessions of the conference. The most interesting of the speeches reported were: the Albanian (Hoxha's) speech of 16 November, supporting virtually all Chinese positions and making some strong charges against the Soviet party; the Polish (Gomulka's) speech and the Italian (Longo's) speech of 17 November, both strongly supporting the Soviet party; the North Vietnamese (Ho Chi Minh's) speech of 17 November, a masterpiece of evasion and conciliation, but leaning to the Chinese on the key question of majority rule; and the Indonesian (Lukman's) speech of 19 November, generally in support of the Chinese. Although the great majority of the delegations had put themselves on record, by the end of the 22 November session, as Soviet supporters, those parties which had expressed themselves as favoring majority rule apparently did not yet constitute a majority.

Khrushchev spoke again on 23 November in reply to Teng's speech on 14 November and Hoxha's of 16 November. He again defended the Soviet positions relating to world Communist strategy--as he was again to defend them strongly in his 6 January report--which he had been forced to compromise or qualify in the draft declaration. He chose to emphasize the importance of the assessment of the balance of power and the conclusion that the prevention of a world war was the "main task." Rejecting Chinese charges, he affirmed that this task would not entail surrender, submission to blackmail,

failure to be vigilant or to build military strength, or renunciation of armed struggle. He also gave considerable attention to the liberation movement, insisting that Soviet gradualist policies were correct and that the Chinese were foolishly militant.

Khrushchev in this second speech emphatically reaffirmed Soviet favor for the principle of majority rule. Further, citing the majorities which had developed at Bucharest, and in the preparatory meetings in October, and now in this conference, he strongly implied that concessions to the Chinese--concessions made in the interest of unanimity--were now at an end. He asked the Chinese to reconsider their "dangerous" course and apparently asked them and their supporters to sign the draft declaration as it stood. The Chinese, the Albanians, and the North Koreans reportedly remained seated during the standing ovation for Khrushchev's speech.

Teng Hsiao-ping replied on the following day (24 November). With respect to questions of world Communist strategy, he stated the essentials of the Chinese position as these: the balance of power would permit an arduous struggle; such a struggle could be waged within the terms of peaceful coexistence; there was a possibility of avoiding world war but it was neither possible nor desirable to avoid other types of war; and peaceful accession to power was very rare. He went on to defend Chinese actions during 1960 in publicly criticizing Soviet actions. He stated that no Chinese errors had as yet been revealed, and he defended Chinese and Albanian behavior at this conference.

In this second speech, Teng reiterated that the Soviet party could not expect other parties to support Soviet actions taken unilaterally, that the road to unity was through consultation, and that consultation must lead to unanimity and not to the imposition of majority will. As for those portions of the draft which reflected these questions of authority and discipline, Teng replied to Khrushchev's ultimatum by stating flatly that the Chinese party would "never" agree to an explicit endorsement of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses or to the references to "nationalism" and "factionalism." If these passages were excised, the Chinese would sign the document and the world movement would "once again" be united.

Led by the French delegate (Thorez), some 23 delegations called upon the Chinese to submit to the will of the majority. Some 13 of these apparently had not previously declared their favor for the principle of majority rule, and these 13 brought the total to at least 43 parties which had so declared--a majority of the 81 parties represented. However, the next step was apparently not that of a majority demand for an immediate vote on whether the draft was to be signed as it stood. The conference decided to refer those portions of the draft still in dispute to a committee for a final effort to find acceptable language. The conference adjourned to 1 December.

At the time of the conference's adjournment on 24 November, there were at least 62 delegations in the Soviet camp, in terms of supporting Soviet positions--on questions of world Communist strategy and/or on questions of authority and discipline--either strongly or on balance. The only strong supporter of the Chinese party had been the Albanian delegation, but those who seem on balance to have been Chinese supporters were the delegations of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya, plus possibly Ghana. Several others had been too evasive to permit a judgment or had represented split parties. In terms of areas: of the 12 countries of the bloc, eight were in the Soviet camp, four were in the Chinese camp (China, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam); of the parties of the European community, 21 were in the Soviet camp, none was in the Chinese, and four were apparently neutral; of the parties of non-bloc Far Eastern countries, two were in the Soviet camp (India--the dominant wing--and Ceylon); three were in the Chinese camp (Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya); and three were neutral (Japan, Nepal, and Thailand); of the parties of the Near East and Africa, 12 were in the Soviet camp and one reportedly in the Chinese (Ghana); of the countries of Latin America, 19 were in the Soviet camp, none was in the Chinese camp, and two were neutral (Panama and Peru).

Ho Chi Minh led the forces of conciliation after 24 November. He and like-minded figures arranged a conference between Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi on or about 25 November. Soon thereafter, evidently with new instructions from Khrushchev and Liu, Soviet and Chinese representatives worked out some new formulations for the draft declaration.

The 6 December declaration made pretty clear what took place in the meeting between Khrushchev and Liu, at least with respect to the draft declaration. In the critical final section, relating to authority and discipline, the parties compromised on the question of endorsing the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses--the 6 December declaration in effect endorses those of the 20th but not of the 21st, while nodding to the unspecified contributions of other parties; and the Chinese won their case completely with respect to omitting the references to "nationalism" in this context and to "factionalism" in any context. With respect to the latter point, the Chinese held out for, and got, language which can be plausibly presented by the Chinese as establishing the principle of unanimity.

The 6 December declaration also gave an ironical cast to the question of what concessions Khrushchev made to the Chinese to induce them to agree to sign the declaration. That is, it was primarily Khrushchev, not Liu, who was induced to compromise. Nevertheless, there are unconfirmed reports that the Soviet party had to make yet more concessions--e.g., promising to hold another world Communist conference within a year or two, and to return or to discuss returning the Soviet technicians.

25X1A

The Khrushchev-Liu meeting answered the question, posed [redacted] in terms of the two parties playing "chicken," of whether either party would be willing to swerve at the last moment. In fact both swerved, but the Soviet party swerved much more.

We cannot be sure why Khrushchev swerved, after so heavily committing his personal prestige against swerving, on these key questions of authority and discipline, expecially that of majority rule. There are at least four considerations: that there seemed no prospect of Chinese agreement to the principle of majority rule, no matter how long the conference continued; that the Chinese were not isolated, their camp consisting of seven or eight parties, possibly with additional supporters on the question of majority rule; that there was a significant amount of neutralist sentiment; and that almost all of the parties hoped to avoid the kind of showdown that would be expressed in a vote, then revealed in the failure of the minority to sign the declaration, which would formalize and tend to perpetuate

the split in the movement. There is the possible fifth factor--about which nothing is known--of pressure on Khrushchev by other Soviet party leaders. We think that Khrushchev, having done his best, finally acted on his recognition of a situation which, in general, he had anticipated.

When the conference reconvened on 1 December, Liu made his only reported speech, expressing particular satisfaction with the provision for further conferences of this type. Khrushchev made the concluding remarks of the conference, saying, in effect, that the conference had at least succeeded in preventing an open split in the movement but that he did not know whether Sino-Soviet relations would improve. As both the Soviet and Chinese parties had made clear during the conference, and as both of them were to make clear in their very different presentations of the 6 December declaration, the agreements were nominal agreements and the dispute would continue.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

The Issues

Most of the leaders of the world Communist movement gathered in Moscow in November 1960 to discuss questions of world Communist strategy and of authority and discipline in the movement itself--and, if possible, to paper over the Sino-Soviet dispute on the basis of an uncompleted draft declaration prepared by a multiparty committee in October.

There were delegations from 81 Communist parties,* of the 87 claimed to exist. The Chinese delegation was headed by Liu Shao-chi, and included Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. Mao Tse-tung, who had attended the similar conference in November 1957, on this occasion chose to underline his disagreement with and dislike for Khrushchev, and his unwillingness to associate himself personally with any compromise with Khrushchev, by staying home. Kim Il-sung was the only other bloc party leader who did not attend.

As the delegates arrived in early November, they were reportedly given a copy of the draft declaration which had been

*The Soviet press identified 78 of the 81 parties which sent delegations to the conference. These were the Communist parties of: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Communist China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eire, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, North Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaya, Martinique, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Reunion, Rumania, El Salvador, San Marino, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Spain, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, and North Vietnam. Delegations of the parties of Ghana and the United States were reported by other sources as present. The 81st party has not been identified.

left uncompleted by the preparatory committee when it broke off its work on 22 October, plus a copy or summary of the Soviet party's letter of 5 November to the Chinese party, plus a Soviet briefing in which the Soviet party asked for their support at the conference.

The Soviet party letter of 5 November had reviewed the record of Chinese misbehavior and Soviet propriety, had reaffirmed Soviet substantive positions in the dispute in strong terms, and had demanded that the Chinese party respect majority opinion.* It has sometimes been asked why the Soviet party, in circulating this letter before the conference began, brought up again the entire list of issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute when there were only four or five passages in the draft declaration yet to be worked out. One part of the answer is easy: the Soviet party wanted to make clear to everyone that it had not abandoned or appreciably modified its positions, that the agreements reached thus far were nominal agreements. The other part of the answer is uncertain, but seems to be this: that the Soviet party was working for at least one hard agreement within the welter of nominal agreements. That is, the Soviet party, while recognizing that it would have to settle for nominal agreements on most questions of authority and discipline as well as on questions of strategy, wanted badly to establish the principle of majority rule--the need for which principle was emphasized in the 5 November letter and in speeches by Soviet delegates at the conference. By reviewing the entire case against Peiping, Moscow might reasonably have hoped for massive support for its effort to establish the principle of majority rule--a principle which would be much less susceptible to subversion than were the equivocal and evasive formulations on strategy, and which, while not obliging the Chinese to change their minds on questions of strategy, would oblige them to refrain from public attacks on Soviet policy and from other forms of "factional" activity. The record indicates that the Soviet party did indeed have a hope of establishing this principle until the final days of the conference, when, finding that a majority of parties supported the principle of majority rule itself but a significant minority (led by the Chinese) did not, Moscow retreated from it.

25X1C [redacted]

The preparatory committee had made remarkable progress in finding acceptable language for the draft declaration with respect to questions of world Communist strategy. It had done this, as the declaration issued on 6 December was to make apparent, by stating both the Soviet and Chinese positions on the issue or by offering evasive formulations. As of 10 November, the only such substantive question for which acceptable language had not been found related to the slogan of a world without arms and without wars as a Communist objective--a slogan opposed by the Chinese, Albanian, and Indonesian parties, and perhaps also by the North Vietnamese.

The preparatory committee had been unable to find acceptable language, however, on several critical questions relating to authority and discipline in the world Communist movement. One of these was the declaration's treatment of the "cult of the individual"--no language yet proposed had been acceptable to the Chinese, Albanians and Indonesians. Further, the Chinese and Indonesians had opposed the proposal that the declaration endorse the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses--a proposal more revelant to the question of authority in the movement than to questions of strategy, as the theses had already been endorsed, with Chinese qualifiers, in discussions of particular questions in the draft declaration. Finally, and of greatest importance, the Chinese party had opposed any discussion of "factionalism" in the draft; the Chinese had been supported in this by the Albanians, while the North Korean, North Vietnamese, Japanese and Australian parties had wanted a different treatment of this concept. The question behind this question was clearly that of whether the world Communist movement was to operate on the principle of majority rule, and a Cuban-Brazilian amendment to the draft may have put it in just those terms--i.e., may have proposed that the declaration explicitly endorse the principle of majority rule and condemn factionalism. However, the weight of evidence indicates that the draft as of 10 November did not contain an explicit endorsement of a majority rule but rather made this point indirectly in discussing "unity" and condemning "factionalism."

The record shows that the Chinese, in the course of the conference, objected strongly also to certain passages in the draft concerned with "nationalism" or "national Communism." The reporting of Khrushchev's 10 November speech indicates that there were references to "nationalism" in the draft

declaration at that time (just as there were in the declaration issued on 6 December) in the section on relations among bloc countries, and also further references to "nationalism" or "national Communism" in the final section of the draft declaration (which did not appear in the 6 December declaration), the section dealing with authority and discipline in the movement. Teng Hsiao-ping's speech of 14 November referred to "nationalism" in discussing this latter section, but the Chinese had apparently not put on record their objection to this discussion as of 10 November.

Khrushchev's 10 November Speech

The conference opened on 10 November with a welcoming address by Khrushchev. The meeting was apparently scheduled to occupy no more than 10 days, as several of the delegates (including Soviet leaders) had important engagements beginning on 20 November. As it developed, the conference ran through 1 December.

Following Khrushchev on 10 November, Suslov reported on the work of the preparatory (drafting) committee. He reviewed the draft declaration, which seems to have been organized much as the 6 December declaration turned out to be, discussing the nature of the epoch, the building of Communism and the development of the bloc, questions of war and peace, the national liberation movement (the colonial areas and the underdeveloped states), the prospects for peaceful accession to power, and question of authority and discipline in the movement.

Suslov also reviewed the issues on which, as summarized above, the preparatory committee had been unable to find acceptable language--relating to a world without war, the "cult of the individual," the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses, and "factionalism" in the movement. Of the 26 parties represented on the preparatory committee, the CCP had led the opposition on all these points, supported by the Albanians on three of the four, by the Indonesians on three, by the North Vietnamese on either one or two, and by the North Koreans, Japanese, and Australians on one. As the conference proceeded, as issues were re-examined and other parties were heard from, these Chinese supporters turned out to support the Chinese position on other issues as well, and

the Chinese and their supporters picked up additional supporters on various issues.

Khrushchev then returned to open the discussion. He began by expressing his satisfaction with the assemblage and his hope that differences could be resolved. He described the draft declaration as a sound Marxist document, and he went on to offer comment on all parts of it.*

As for the Soviet assessment of the balance of power,** Khrushchev reaffirmed the Soviet position that socialism was gaining and the West declining, that the balance of forces was "in favor of" socialism, but that imperialism was still strong and in particular still possessed a powerful military establishment. One source has reported that Khrushchev at this point reiterated, for Peiping's benefit, that the West was not a "paper tiger."

Khrushchev went on to reaffirm the bloc's increasing ability--deriving from its increasing strength--to deter the West from initiating either a world war or local wars which might lead to a world war. He argued again that the absence

*Khrushchev's 6 January report is an authorized version of this 10 November speech, although not presented as that; the report and the speech are very similar in both structure and detail. However, the 10 November speech, made to a generally qualified audience, contains a number of things Khrushchev was unwilling to state publicly.

**The question of assessing the balance of power has been argued by Moscow and Peiping in terms of defining the nature of the "epoch," terms which often tend to obscure the question: cf. the Soviet formulation that this is a new epoch, an epoch of the disintegration of imperialism and the transition from capitalism to socialism, versus the (occasional) Chinese formulation that this is still the epoch of imperialism, wars, and proletarian revolution. Such formulations might suggest that the Soviets regard the West as weak and the Chinese regard the West as strong; in fact it is the Soviets who have emphasized continuing Western strength. The question which derives from the basic assessment, and which is not stated clearly in the formulations just given, is whether the balance of power commends a strategy of steady progress primarily by non-military means (the Soviet view) or of attempting to make spectacular gains primarily through violence (the Chinese view.)

of wars was not to the West's advantage, or, in positive terms, that peaceful coexistence favored socialism, and not, as "some" /the Chinese/ said, capitalism. In this connection and in connection with his second topic, he reaffirmed the importance of long-range economic competition with the West.

Khrushchev reviewed Soviet positions on principles of building socialism and Communism, reportedly rejecting certain Chinese principles embodied in the "leap forward" and commune programs. He evidently called for better coordination of bloc economies, in contrast to the Chinese aim of autarky.

Khrushchev then offered a fairly full discussion of wars --world war, local wars, and liberation wars--along the lines of the Soviet party's 5 November letter and even closer to the lines which were to appear two months later in his long 6 January report.* As for world war, necessarily involving the

*It is necessary here to offer a tedious recapitulation of Soviet and Chinese past positions on wars, because the issue of attitudes and policies toward different types of war is so important in the dispute. Although we do not have a full account of the Soviet party letter of 21 June, what we do know of that letter indicates that the Soviet party tended to avoid making a sharp distinction between "local" wars and "liberation" wars. While Moscow affirmed its intention to support "just" wars in both categories, it tended to emphasize the bloc's ability to deter the West from "war" in general (not simply from world war), and, while affirming its intention to support "just" wars among local wars and liberation wars, it suggested a fear that wars of all kinds could get out of control and a reluctance to become substantially involved in wars of any kind. The Chinese apparently interpreted Soviet pronouncements in much the same way: the Chinese party's 10 September letter emphasized the need to distinguish between types of war, insisted on the inevitability of local wars and liberation wars, and called upon Moscow to adopt an appropriate revolutionary attitude toward all types of war; the letter was very scornful of what it took to be Soviet advice to the "people" everywhere not to undertake actions which might develop into liberation wars or local wars which might in turn develop into a world war. In that letter and in the October preparatory meeting for the November conference, the Chinese contended that some "local" wars and all "liberation" wars were positively to be welcomed, and that there should be a less evasive statement of bloc support for these "just" wars. Thus pushed into a corner, the Soviet party in its 5 November letter agreed that it was necessary to distinguish types of war, and it described liberation wars in colonial areas as both admissible and inevitable; however, the letter did not concede that local wars were inevitable, it apparently emphasized the bloc's ability to deter the West from local wars and from a maximum effort in liberation wars, and it continued to evade the question of the kind and degree of bloc support for "just" wars in both categories.

United States and the Soviet Union, Communists must absolutely oppose world war, he said, and he reiterated that the West would be wary of initiating a world war. As for local wars, defined as small-scale wars between states, wars also initiated by imperialism, Khrushchev said that Communists must also be opposed (he may have said "equally opposed") to local wars, owing to the danger of their expansion; he conceded that the West might undertaken such wars, but he did not concede that they were "inevitable," and indeed he contended that such wars would occur less frequently than in the past; citing the Soviet action in the Suez crisis of 1956, he affirmed the objective of deterring or halting local wars before they could expand.* As for the third category, wars of "national liberation" such as (he specified) the Algerian war--i.e., wars by indigenous forces against colonial powers on their own independent governments --Khrushchev agreed that such wars were "inevitable" as long as imperialism existed; he apparently described these wars, as he did in his 6 January report, as beginning in "popular uprisings" (he specified Cuba) and he reportedly went on, as in the 6 January report, to observe that such wars must not be equated (the verb used by Pravda is otozhdestvlyat') with wars between states (i.e., local wars); and finally, he described these wars, both in their early stages as "popular

*The implication remained that the Soviet party would engage in local wars if necessary, e.g., to protect an independent government against a Western power if warnings proved ineffectual; Khrushchev in his 6 January report also left room for such intervention, noting that Communists were "in general" opposed to local wars, i.e., wars between states.

uprisings" and their later stages as full-blown "liberation" wars, as "just" wars to which the bloc would give substantial assistance, including material assistance.*

At this point, as in his 6 January report, Khrushchev reportedly reaffirmed the Soviet position on the disastrous consequences of general war, citing a Western scientist to the effect that up to 700 million people would die within two months of the first nuclear attack in a world war. He reiterated that Communists had no right to put in jeopardy the bloc and the world's working-class. In this connection, he reaffirmed the importance of "peaceful coexistence" (envisaging all forms of struggle except initiation of war) and of the effort toward disarmament. He reportedly criticized those (the Chinese and others) who rejected the "slogan" of a world without arms and without wars. He also reaffirmed the Soviet position that there were sober as well as irrational forces in the West and that it was worth while to meet with representatives of these sober forces--a position he reiterated in his 6 January report.

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* [redacted] in our discussion (pages 22-24) of the passages on war in Khrushchev's 6 January report, we treated "popular uprisings" as a fourth category of wars, i.e,. as civil wars, wars by indigenous forces against their independent non-Communist governments. However, re-examination of the 6 January report, of the Soviet party's letter of 5 November, and of Khrushchev's 10 November speech, indicates that he has tended to describe these wars also as "liberation" wars and to employ the term "popular uprising" to designate the earliest stage of a "liberation" war, whether in a colonial country like Algeria or in a country like Cuba regarded (until Castro's accession to power) as a semi-colonial country, one indirectly controlled by the imperialists. Perhaps Khrushchev will eventually make, in the interest of clarity, the kind of distinction--a distinction of type rather than one of degree of advance--which we originally thought he was making. We cannot tell whether Khrushchev means the concepts of "popular uprising" and "liberation" wars to apply also to civil wars in developed Western countries, countries not (not thus far, at least) regarded as a part of the "national liberation movement"; a distinction for the sake of clarity would seem proper here too.

Turning then to the national liberation movement, Khrushchev, as in his 6 January report, did not discuss here the importance of armed struggle in the colonial areas; he had said what he had to say in the earlier discussion of "liberation" wars--namely, that such wars were inevitable and would be supported. He made indirectly here his point that military action was less important than other forms of action in gaining independence, by contending that the West was increasingly deterred from military intervention in the liberation movement as a whole--i.e., in both colonial areas and the underdeveloped states--and that its other methods of seeking to maintain domination were in general ineffectual. Giving most of his attention in this section of the speech to the independent states, he reportedly emphasized the importance (minimized by Peiping) of bloc aid to these states, contending inter alia that such aid helped to develop the proletariat there. He invited attention to the concept of "national democracy" as a transitional phase for the underdeveloped states, and, pre-empting Chinese criticism of excessive cooperation with and flattery of bourgeois nationalist leaders, he called for "exposing" bourgeois leaders who progressive talk was only talk.*

Taking up the question of prospects for peaceful accession to power in both underdeveloped and developed countries, relating this question particularly to the question of tactics for Communists in developed Western countries,** Khrushchev reaffirmed that the road to power might be either peaceful, which was desirable, or non-peaceful if the imperialists resisted by force.*** He went on to make the points, as he did

*Soviet party letters to the Chinese party had insisted that Soviet policies toward bourgeois nationalist leaders had been successful, that these leaders were serving the objectives of bloc foreign policy, that they were not backsliding toward imperialism, and that the world Communist movement should not attempt to effect their early overthrow.

**This is also an issue as regards the underdeveloped countries; Peiping holds that it is always necessary to "smash" the bourgeois state machine.

***He is not reported to have maintained in this speech, as the Soviet party had earlier, that there were increasing possibilities for peaceful accession to power; but he reaffirmed the latter position in his 6 January report.

in his 6 January report, that the Communist parties in the West faced great difficulties* and that these parties themselves were the best judges of what tactics to employ, although he would advise them all to put more effort into attracting youth.

Khrushchev then discussed "revisionism and dogmatism." "Yugoslav revisionism" was presented as a continuing danger (not, apparently, as the "main" danger), while "dogmatism" and "sectarianism" /Chinese, Albanian and other/ could become /as the Moscow declaration of November 1957 had said/ the "main danger" at one time or another. As in his 6 January report, Khrushchev related, through Yugoslavia, the two offenses of "revisionism" and "nationalism," observing here that the Yugoslav revisionists were using "national Communism" to separate themselves from the bloc.**

Khrushchev gave most attention and emphasis to the need for "unity" in the movement. He criticized those (the Chinese and others) who objected to the emphasis on "unity" in the draft declaration. He reaffirmed the Soviet party's support of the Cuban-Brazilian proposal on "factionalism" (no report has made clear how this proposal was stated), which he immediately linked to the need for majority rule in the world Communist movement, a principle which the Soviet party had been advocating strongly since the Bucharest conference in June; the principle of majority rule was certainly the point, if not the manifest content, of the Cuban-Brazilian proposal.***

*Earlier Soviet statements had emphasized that there were not now revolutionary situations in the West, that the masses must participate in "democratic" movements before being willing to join the Communist parties in revolutions.

**It was the discussion of nationalism in this context that the Chinese later objected to, believing that it was clearly directed at themselves.

***Khrushchev did not directly discuss majority rule--an issue on which he had been defeated--in his 6 January report.

Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet party's abjuration of leadership of the movement,* specifying that the parties were equal and independent, responsible to the movement as a whole --an indirect and rather ineffectual way of reaffirming the principle of majority rule. He reportedly made this point again indirectly in answering the question of how disputes between the parties were to be decided; he said that such decisions would be reached by discussions and exchanges of opinions, after which the parties must abide by the decisions.** He reportedly made the point yet again in declaring that the parties must synchronize their watches (a figure he had used twice before in similar contexts, and was to use again in his 6 January report), and that they must set them according to the draft declaration which had been accepted by the majority of parties.

*The Soviet party had first stated its wish to eliminate the concept of Soviet "leadership"--for tactical reasons--during a meeting with other parties before the 21st CPSU congress in February 1959; Khrushchev had reaffirmed this position in the preparatory meetings in October 1960.

25X1A **It may have been at this point that Khrushchev made his reported reference to Lenin on the principle of "unity in absentia," later (13 January) quoted by Red Star (see [redacted] p. 33). Lenin's point, in the original, was that Soviet party decisions were to have binding force on other parties if they reflected the majority will of the world movement, even if the Soviet party could not again consult with those parties. The Soviet party at the November conference presumably used this quotation in the absence of any statement by Lenin asserting more flatly that the world Communist movement should operate on the principle of majority rule, just as the Soviet party had used Lenin's statements on the need for democratic centralism in individual parties to support the contention that democratic centralism applied to the world movement as well. The Red Star presentation of the Lenin quotation, in the context of discussion of the Moscow conference and the need for unity in the movement, made it quite clear that the Soviet party continued to favor the principle of majority rule, the principle it was unable to establish in the 6 December declaration.

The Chinese Response

The conference resumed on 11 November with a pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese speech by the Canadian delegate (Buck), followed by similar speeches (praising the Soviet party, criticizing the Chinese, with occasional reservations) by the Argentine delegate (Ghioldi), the Bulgarian (Zhivkov), the Iraqi (Douri), the Cypriot (Papaionnou), the Lebanese (Shawi), the Swiss (Vincent), the Uruguayan (unknown), the Danish (Norlund), the Mexican (unknown), and the Dutch (De Groot).

The pattern on 12 November was much the same, with all of the speakers supporting Soviet positions in general and most of them cirticizing the Chinese. Those speaking were the Hungarian (Kadar), the Colombian (White), the Luxembourger (Urbany), the Greek (Koligiannis), the Nepalese (Raimajhi), the South African (?Khama?), and the Venezuelan (Faria). There was apparently no meeting on 13 November, a Sunday.

On 14 November the first speaker was the North Korean (Kim Il), whose speech was the first which could not be counted as one in support of Soviet positions; Kim was carefully balanced, praising both the Soviet and Chinese parties, suggesting favor for one on some points and the other on other points, and emphasizing the need for unity.* Kim was followed by Teng Hsiao-ping of the CCP, with a hard-hitting speech in his usual style.

Teng reportedly spoke for four hours, replying both to the Soviet party's 5 November letter and Khrushchev's 10 November speech. After echoing Khrushchev's hope for eventual agreement on a draft declaration, he observed that he would be speaking in the name of the CCP central committee and Mao Tse-tung, and he said that the Soviet party's action in distributing a 127-page document--the 5 November letter--on the eve of the meeting, a document which he described as a "violent attack" on the CCP and Mao, had made it more difficult to achieve unity. He added that the Soviet party was abusing the circumstance that the conference was being held in Moscow.

*An assessment of the positions of all of the delegations whose speeches have been reported--79 of the 81 delegations--will be offered later in this paper, in a discussion of the situation which obtained at the conclusion of the debate on 24 November, at which time the conference adjourned to permit the principals to try to work out an agreed declaration.

Turning to the first substantive issue, the balance of power, Teng defended Mao's past assessments of the world situation, protesting that the views attributed to Mao in the 5 November letter were not correct.* It was perhaps at this point that the Chinese delegation distributed extracts from Mao's speech to the Moscow conference of November 1957.**

Teng denied that the CCP looked on the epoch simplistically, i.e., "merely" as an epoch of wars and revolutions. He reportedly said that Mao had "taught us" neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the enemy, that Mao had agreed that world war was not inevitable and had "taught us" how to prevent war. (He went on to make clear that Mao's teaching was the exhortation to struggle.)

*The 5 November letter had charged the CCP, rather than Mao personally, with "erroneous views" on the nature of the epoch (i.e., the balance of power), views deriving from failure to recognize the strength of the camp, the profound changes in the balance of power, etc., so that the CCP put forth such mistaken theses as the thesis that war was inevitable so long as capitalism existed; this section of the 5 November letter had charged Mao personally with offering a useless definition of the epoch in his concept of the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind.

**The principal points made in the extracts circulated by the Chinese were reportedly these: there was a "new turning-point" in the international situation (as of November 1957); the West was in a "state of panic" over Soviet successes in military technology; Peiping desired 15 years of peace, after which the bloc would be invincible; general war should be avoided if possible; however, half the people of the world would survive a general war, and one must not be "afraid" of war; revolutionary movements were justified in regarding the enemy as a "paper tiger," considered strategically over the long-term. (Other sources have reported that Mao did indeed make these points in his November 1957 speech.)

Teng then listed a number of developments favorable to the Communist cause since 1957, among them events in Iraq, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Algeria and elsewhere in Africa, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Vietnam, Argentina, India, Western Europe and the United States. This was preliminary to defending Mao's concept of the East wind prevailing, a concept criticized on several grounds in the 5 November letter.

Teng derided the Soviet party for curbing "revolutionary struggles" out of fear of a world war, a fear which he apparently dismissed as baseless.* He went on to defend Mao's concept of the "paper tiger." In reply to Soviet criticism of this concept in the 5 November letter, Teng reaffirmed the CCP view that it was necessary to have such a concept if revolutionary will were to be maintained. He said that the CCP still held, as Mao had said in 1957, that the bloc should

*This is the real point of the Sino-Soviet dispute about the nature of the epoch (balance of power). The Chinese had previously argued, and may have argued again here, that there is not a new epoch but a new situation, a situation of decisive Communist superiority, a situation "unprecedentedly favorable" for proletarian revolutions; that the struggle must not be renounced under cover of "prattle" about a new epoch; and that an aggressive prosecution of the struggle, in view of bloc superiority, will not lead to world war. The Soviet party had not seemed to see a situation of decisive superiority, and for this reason its discussions of the "epoch" (balance of power) had contended both that (a) Soviet deterrent power permits the world Communist program to advance and prosper, and (b) the West is still strong enough so that the bloc does have to fear the consequences of a world war.

strive for 15 years of peace,* and he denied the charge that Peiping envisaged the triumph of socialism through war. However, Teng continued, it was wrong to emphasize the dreadful consequences of nuclear war, because the effect would be to advocate surrender. Teng reportedly reaffirmed Mao's assessment that half the population of the world would survive a world war.**

Teng contended that it was necessary in the declaration to point out the continuing danger of a world war, in the light of continued Western preparations for war.*** He reportedly reiterated the CCP's view that the bloc must increase its vigilance, strengthen its defenses, and refrain from encouraging a fear of war.

Teng dissented strongly from the treatment of local and liberation wars in the Soviet party letter of 5 November and

*One source reports that both Mao and Teng said "at least ten more...."

**Mao has offered this calculation several times since 1957. He has also spoken sometimes of the survival capabilities of China specifically, reportedly stating that two or three or four hundred million Chinese would survive.

***Peiping had previously argued, and may have again here, that the West might launch a world war despite its weakness--or even despite recognition of its weakness, as an act of desperation. This argument is consistent, in the Chinese view, with the concurrent argument that a much more aggressive bloc strategy will not lead to world war: the Chinese contend that the possibility of world war derives from the nature of imperialism, not from the degree to which imperialism is "provoked," so that an aggressive program does not increase the existing possibility of world war.

in Khrushchev's speech of 10 November. He denied that these wars could lead to world war. Reaffirming the inevitability (not just the possibility) of further local wars, Teng reiterated that it was wrong to state an unqualified opposition to local wars and to affirm the objective of deterring or halting all such wars; he apparently cited again the Korean war as an example of a "just" local war which had been not halted but fought, to the subsequent advantage of the bloc.* As for "liberation" wars, Teng apparently reaffirmed the entire Chinese case, welcoming the Soviet agreement that wars of this type were inevitable, pointing to the Chinese, Indochinese, and Cuban wars as having turned out very much to the advantage of the bloc, criticizing Soviet evasiveness on the question of the kind and degree of bloc support of such wars, and calling for a much more ambitious program of bloc support of such wars.

Turning to Khrushchev's point that it was worth while to try to negotiate with the West, Teng said that Communists should rely for "peace" chiefly on the world revolutionary movement (the bloc, the colonial and underdeveloped countries, Communist parties and sympathizers elsewhere), not on a "few bourgeois statesmen." He reaffirmed that while exchanges or visits were acceptable, the "hope of peace" rested not on negotiations** but on the positive progress of the revolutionary struggle everywhere, a struggle which would finally "impose" peace. In this connection, protracted struggles might lead to "some" disarmament,*** but the bloc must develop

*He may have gone on to state, as Red Flag was soon to contend publicly, that the Soviet party was much exaggerating the dangers involved in participation in a local war, as such wars could be contained in the geographical area in which they began and the danger of expansion would become operative only if the West were permitted to win such wars.

**The Chinese view of negotiations had been stated publicly: that the only legitimate use of negotiations with the West was to play "revolutionary tricks."

***This was a slight advance on the earlier Chinese position that Soviet disarmament proposals were useful only as a stratagem to isolate the United States.

superiority in nuclear weapons,* and in any case the slogan of a world without arms or wars prior to the complete triumph of socialism was nonsensical.

As for "peaceful coexistence," Teng went on, the Soviet concept of it as a state of coexistence between countries with different social systems was simply one of three principal features of coexistence: the concept also entailed building up the strength of the entire bloc as rapidly as possible and providing (as Peiping had long contended) the utmost possible support to revolutionary struggles all over the world. Teng reiterated that a "cold war" had in fact existed since World War II, and he pointed out that any conceivable coexistence with the West would be "war of a sort." Whereas Teng had earlier dealt with the Soviet caveat that such struggles should not lead to world war by reaffirming the Chinese view that such a struggle could not lead to world war, at this point he apparently argued that even if an aggressive program were to incite imperialism to war, the imperialists would be wiped out in such a war; and he applauded the inclusion of this point in the draft declaration.**

*As the CCP had long contended that the USSR itself already had superiority in nuclear weapons, Teng's formulation implied that other bloc countries--especially China--must develop such superiority.

**Some of these points were made publicly in a People's Daily commentary of 21 November on the November 1957 meeting of the Communist parties. The editorial, illuminatingly entitled "Give Full Play to the Revolutionary Spirit of the 1957 Moscow Declaration," observed inter alia that the "famous dictum of Comrade Mao Tse-tung three years ago--that 'the East Wind prevails over the West Wind'--is perfectly correct"; that "any view that overestimates the strength of imperialism and underestimates the strength of the people. . . is completely incorrect"; that peace can be safeguarded only by "incessantly strengthening the socialist camp, the national liberation movement, the people's struggles in the capitalist countries,. . .and by waging a joint struggle"; that "views which set in opposition the revolutionary struggles of the various peoples to the struggle for defending world peace are. . .very wrong"; that "revisionists of different hues always make use of a certain /supposed?/ new situation to distort and adulterate Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory so as to lure the working class away from the correct path of revolutionary class struggle"; and so on. Pravda replied to some of these points on 23 November.

Turning to the national liberation movement, Teng reportedly contended that if the Communist parties in both colonial areas and underdeveloped countries could reach the masses, they would be able to set up "people's regimes" there. As for the colonial countries, he reaffirmed the importance of "armed struggle" in those countries, although he did not deny that other forms of action could be effective. As for the politically independent countries, Teng apparently chose to emphasize (contrary to the Soviet emphasis) Western success in preventing these countries from achieving true independence. Again, although he did not assert that Communist cooperation with bourgeois nationalist leaders was a mistake, he reaffirmed the Chinese line on the importance of striving for early Communist domination of the movement in this "democratic" stage.* In this connection, while he is not reported to have explicitly criticized the ambiguous concept of "national democracy," he reiterated the Chinese emphasis on the unreliability of the national bourgeoisie, and he sought a clear distinction between progressive and reactionary bourgeoisie /at any stage/ and between Communist alliance with the bourgeoisie in early stages and organization of an alliance against the bourgeoisie later. Further, he apparently cited the Indonesian Communist party as having the right attitude toward the bourgeois nationalist Sukarno government (i.e., the party was participating in a united front with the national bouregoisie while "exposing" the reactionary bourgeoisie and supporting solidarity with Communist China), and he specified the Soviet party

*The Chinese have also held that the Communists should if possible attain hegemony of the movement even before political independence is achieved, and, indeed, have emphasized the importance of armed struggle in achieving independence in part because such struggle affords the Communists the best opportunity to take over the movement; the reporting of Teng's 14 November speech does not indicate that he reaffirmed this position here, although he might have touched on it in his early remarks on Communist prospects for setting up "people's regimes" in colonial areas.

and Indian party as having the wrong attitude toward the bourgeois nationalist Nehru government, which was anti-Communist and anti-Chinese and had regrettably been supported by the Soviet and Indian parties in the border dispute with Peiping.

Taking up the question of prospects for peaceful accession to power and the related question of tactics for Communists in the West, Teng conceded that the circumstances of the parties in the West were difficult, and he apparently retreated from the Chinese call for revolutionary overthrow of Western governments. He stated the CCP's favor, however, for a more aggressive effort within the united fronts to advance Communist goals and to educate the proletariat for the coming struggle. In this connection, he said, the Soviet party had grossly exaggerated the prospects for peaceful accession to power, prospects which if anything were diminishing.

The Soviet letter of 5 November at this point had linked the prospects for peaceful accession to power with the assertions that bloc power would increasingly deter imperialist "export" of counter-revolution and that Communists for their part had no need to export revolution. Teng at this point charged the Soviet party with taking refuge in the formula of not exporting revolution and, consequently, with failing to give adequate support to revolutionary movements everywhere.

Teng then turned his attention to an earlier portion of Khrushchev's 10 November speech in which the Soviet leader, discussing the balance of power, had offered some remarks on principles of building Communism and socialism and had criticized some Chinese views. Teng defended the Chinese practice of emphasizing "ideology and morality" rather than material incentives, denied that Peiping was "skipping stages" in its program, defended the "leap forward" and commune programs, and demanded that the Chinese not be regarded as if they had the "plague." Replying to Khrushchev's call for bettern coordination of bloc economies, Teng observed that each country must develop its own economy* and could later cooperate on a "voluntary basis."

*One source reports that Teng said: "We will continue to count on ourselves."

Teng began his discussion of authority and discipline in the movement with a protest against Soviet efforts to find a "nationalist deviation" in Chinese policy. This remark apparently reflected passages in the draft declaration to which Teng later was to make strong objection.

Moving from the denial of Chinese "nationalism" to an attack on "revisionism," Teng derided those who tried to "prove that Marxism-Leninism is outmoded," and he maintained that "any ambiguity" on these principles was dangerous. Taking note again of an effort by "some" to turn the Chinese charge of Soviet revisionism into a Soviet charge of Chinese nationalism, Teng denied that nationalism was a feature of revisionism; revisionism, he said, was simply the effort to disarm the proletariat and conciliate imperialism.*

Teng conceded that the movement must also combat dogmatism and sectarianism, took note that campaigns against sectarianism were actually aimed at the Chinese party, alleged that the Soviet party had led this anti-Chinese "struggle," and contended that Sino-Soviet differences had in fact arisen when the Soviet party eased its struggle against revisionism. Teng went on to review Mao's long struggle against dogmatism in the Chinese party, and he apparently replied to the charge in the 5 November letter of "Chinese Marxism" by contending that Mao had creatively adapted Marxism-Leninism to China, in line with Lenin's own observation that Marxism had not been completed.** As for Mao himself, the Chinese opposed the "cult of the individual" but continued to believe that the Soviet party had handled its re-evaluation of Stalin poorly, that it was only proper to recognize the merit of leaders, and that parties needed leaders with prestige.

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*The CCP's 10 September letter had observed that revisionism was still important in the bloc, in the form of bourgeois influence in internal affairs and fear of imperialism in foreign affairs.

**The Chinese had sometimes gone beyond this to assert that Mao's thought was Marxism-Leninism in its "most fully developed" form.

Finally, Teng had a good deal to say, as had the Soviet party in its 5 November letter and Khrushchev in his 10 November speech, on the question of achieving and maintaining "unity." Unity was to be achieved, Teng said, through consultations, prolonged until unanimity could be reached; decisions could not be taken by a majority vote. The Soviet party was mistaken, Teng went on, in regarding Chinese criticism of Soviet positions and actions as a threat to unity; such criticism aimed at strengthening unity.*

Returning to the question of majority rule, the question given the greatest emphasis in bothethe 5 November letter and Khrushchev's 10 November speech, Teng observed that the principle of majority rule was correct for individual parties, as the parties operated by democratic centralism and the inferior organs must obey the central committee, which could reach its decisions by majority vote. However, the world Communist movement was not hierarchical, all parties were equal, there was no central committee for the movement. In this connection, Teng pointed out, the Soviet party's 5 November letter had falsely attributed to Lenin the view that the principles for the conduct of intraparty affairs applied also to the world movement.** Teng said that the Soviet party should criticize itself for this distortion.

Teng reiterated that, if the parties could not reach agreement at this conference, they could leave the verdict to history. In the meantime, while history was in the process of vindicating the righteous, the parties should continue to consult, and perhaps within a "few months" the movement could affirm a new program. In this connection, consultations should be conducted like the November 1957 Moscow conference, not like the vicious and rude" Bucharest conference.

*This was a somewhat more polite way of reaffirming the Chinese position that unity could be achieved if the Soviet party would renounce its erroneous views.

**Teng was correct in this charge; however, Teng ignored the text from Lenin which Khrushchev had used on 10 November, one which did imply Lenin's favor for majority rule in the world movement; moreover, the Comintern in its early years apparently did operate on the principle of majority rule.

The Chinese party had agreed to the (uncompleted) draft declaration produced by the preparatory committee in October because the movement seemed to be approaching "unity," but then the Soviet party had launched another "vicious attack" on the Chinese party (in the 5 November letter and subsequently).

Reaffirming other positions taken in the CCP's 10 September letter, Teng said, that no party could be permitted to impose its views on another, and there could be no father-son relationship, no interference in other parties. As an instance of Soviet violation of the rights of other parties, the Soviet party, rather than propagating the Moscow Declaration of 1957 which had been arrived at jointly, had attempted to replace the declaration with the unilaterally-conceived theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses. Not even what was correct in those theses was binding on the other parties, Teng said, let alone what was in error.

As other instances of Soviet efforts to impose their opinions on others, Teng again cited Khrushchev's declared support for the "former" Marshal Peng Te-huai, an "anti-party" element*. He cited similar Soviet support for "anti-party elements" in Albania and other forms of Soviet pressure and interference there.

Teng reiterated the Chinese view that in the world Communist movement there were "no leaders and no led," and that the movement could not operate by majority rule. He asked whether the Soviet party, despite its abjuration of leadership, still considered itself to be the leader. He asked further whether the Soviet party thought of itself as the head of a committee for the world movement, and, if so, what committee? Since there was no such committee, and since the proper procedure

[illegible] unanimity of views through consultation,

*Peng was replaced as Minister of Defense in or before September 1959, evidently for objecting to certain features of Mao's programs which the Soviet party also disapproved and perhaps also for seeking Soviet support for his position: he had been in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and had apparently talked with Khrushchev, just prior to his fall. He has not appeared since May 1960 and is presumed to be entirely without power.

was that of reaching unanimity of views through consultation, it was improper to pose the question of factionalism.*

The Chinese party, Teng went on, did not withhold recognition of the Soviet party as the "center" of the movement. This concept, Teng insisted, was not incompatible with the concept of the "equality" of the parties. The CPSU was the center in the sense that it had the longest experience, it directed the strongest state in the bloc, and it led the struggle for socialism and against imperialism all over the world. These considerations, Teng apparently argued, did not give the Soviet party the right to impose its views.

Turning then to the final section of the Soviet party's 5 November letter (a section apparently not reviewed in Khrushchev's 10 November speech), that section concerned with issues between the Soviet and Chinese governments, Teng observed that Sino-Soviet differences, present even in Stalin's time, had become more serious after Khrushchev became the Soviet leader and in particular after the 20th CPSU congress of February 1956. Relations were still generally good, Teng went on, until autumn 1957, at which time

*There is an unconfirmed report that Teng, rather than contending that the issue of factionalism was irrelevant, insisted that the CCP had a right to try to split the movement, just as Lenin in preparing to split the Russian SDP into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had formed what was at first a minority in order to achieve later a majority.

the USSR attempted to establish Soviet controlled radio and radar stations in China and made other unspecified demands.*

As additional instances of unacceptable Soviet behavior, along the lines of the CCP's 10 September letter but in more detail, Teng cited: The September 1959 Soviet comment on the Sino-Indian border dispute; Khrushchev's criticism of China in talks with "bourgeois" leaders during his trip to the United States in the same period; Khrushchev's "enlogizing" of President Eisenhower and other "imperialists" at the same time; Khrushchev's public criticism of the Chinese "leap forward" and commune program in December 1959; Soviet assertions that disarmament would free funds for social welfare in capitalist countries; the Soviet departure, at the WFTU conference in June 1960, from the positions of the November 1957 declaration; Khrushchev's attack on the CCP at the Bucharest conference that some month, and his description of the Chinese as Trotskyists; the appearance in summer 1960 of "hundreds" of anti-Chinese articles in the Soviet press, some of which openly threatened China with sanctions; the Soviet stoppage of Chinese publications in the USSR; the withdrawal of Soviet technicians; the Soviet demand for the recall of one or more of the Chinese information officers at Peiping's embassy in Moscow; and a Soviet protest of August 1960 against Chinese encroachment on Soviet borders.

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[redacted] two of these demands (or proposals) were for Soviet naval bases in China and for a Sino-Soviet navy (or naval component?) under Soviet command; Teng later in his speech referred to the Soviet demand for a joint fleet, terminology which might encompass both demands. There is no report that the Chinese at the November 1960 conference reiterated the charge--reportedly made at the Bucharest conference in June 1960--of Soviet failure to give the Chinese nuclear weapons or to help the Chinese adequately to achieve a nuclear capability; the Soviets at Bucharest were reported to have said that the Chinese were too untrustworthy to be given such weapons. A possible explanation of the Chinese failure to state this particular grievance at the November conference is a Chinese calculation that this issue was not so useful as others in attracting sympathy to Peiping as a victim of great-nation chauvinism; presumably few of the parties care whether the Chinese are given nuclear weapons, but many might be concerned by a Soviet demand for control over another state's armed forces.

Further, Teng said, the Chinese party was indeed grateful for past Soviet aid (a point dwelt on in the Soviet party's 5 November letter), but such aid was only to be expected, and, moreover, aid was not to be measured only in terms of money; the Chinese had suffered 400,000 casualties in the Korean war. Moreover, Peiping had made loans and grants to other countries equal to the entire amount of Soviet loans to China. In this connection and in others, Teng went on, the Chinese would continue to make the charge of "great-nation chauvinism" against the USSR. The Soviet party would do well, he said, to meditate on its demands for a "joint fleet," its support of Peng Te-huai, and its conduct at Bucharest.

Teng reiterated that the Chinese party would "never" accept a father-son relationship, would insist on equality and on adherence to the Moscow Declaration of November 1957,* and would insist too that the draft declaration omit the slogan of a world without war and without arms. In other words, the CCP position remained as it had been on 22 October and at the opening of the conference.

*In these passages, Teng was implying the CCP's intransigent opposition to endorsement in the declaration of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses and to any reference to "factionalism" or to any other formulation which stated or implied endorsement of the principle of majority rule in the movement; Teng in a second speech made this intransigence explicit. It is not reported that Teng at this point in his 14 November speech stated or implied that the Chinese party would never accept the drafts passages on "nationalism" in this context; he stated this clearly in his second speech.

Teng concluded on a comparatively amiable note, observing that Sino-Soviet differences were "only partial," that open arguments should be replaced by consultations, that relations could be improved even if differences persisted, that a widening of the split in the movement would be a "catastrophe," and that the parties should join hands to confound the imperialists.

Speeches by Others

Teng Hsiao-ping's speech had closed the proceedings on 14 November. The 15 November session opened with a speech by the Swedish delegate (Hagberg) reported to have been mildly critical of the Chinese. The East German delegate(Ulbricht) followed with a speech strongly supporting Soviet positions and Khrushchev personally and sharply criticizing Chinese positions and Teng personally (as well as Mao personally for not coming). The Syrian delegate (Bakhdash) followed with an even more strongly pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese speech, in which, inter alia, he accused the Chinese of lobbying among the Arab parties in attempting to transform a minority into a majority; and he posed the question of whether the Chinese party still had a place in the Communist movement. There were similar, although less sharp, speeches supporting the Soviet party and criticizing the Chinese by the Chilean delegate (Gonzalez), the American delegate (Jackson), and the Brazilian (Prestes). There were followed by sharp speeches (of the Ulbricht-Bakhdash type) by the Czech delegate (Novotny) and the French delegate (Thorez).

By the close of business on 15 November, none of the 27 parties (in addition to the Soviet and Chinese parties) which had in effect declared themselves in the dispute could be entered on balance as a supporter of the Chinese. Only one delegate, the North Korean, had given a speech so balanced that his party could not yet be entered on balance as a supporter or opponent of either party.

The 16 November session reportedly began with a speech by the Cuban delegate (Escalante), who supported Soviet positions while offering some conciliatory remarks to the Chinese. The following speeches by the Irani delegate (Radmanesh) and the Israeli delegate (Mikunis) were more critical of the Chinese; the Norwegian (Lippe) supported Soviet positions without criticizing the Chinese.

The next speaker on 16 November was the Albanian delegate (Hoxha), who seems to have supported virtually all Chinese positions, going so far as to accuse the Soviet party of blindness and/or treachery in its attitude toward Western preparations for war and of "surrender" in its conduct of the world revolution. He went on to charge the Soviet party with trying to isolate and condemn the Chinese at the Bucharest conference without proper discussion, of conducting "factional"

activities of its own in the world Communist movement, of collusion with certain (purged) Albanian leaders, of inciting uprisings in the Albanian armed forces, of withholding arms, of threatening to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact, of putting economic pressure on Albania in a time of starvation, of succoring enemies of Albania, and so on. Hoxha, even more than the Chinese, concentrated his fire on Khrushchev personally.

Hoxha was followed by the Spanish delegate (Ibarruri). In a fiery speech, she denounced both the Chinese and the Albanian parties and stated her support of "all" Soviet positions and the Spanish party's intention to continue to recognize the Soviet party as leader of the movement. Following Ibarruri, there were reportedly less fiery speeches, supporting the Soviet party and criticizing the Chinese, by the Portuguese delegate (name unknown) and the Austrian delegate (Koplenig).

The Polish delegate (Gomulka) was the first speaker on 17 November. He was sharply critical of Teng's 14 November speech and he strongly supported Soviet positions in the dispute. He was especially harsh in discussing the Albanian party, and he observed that the Albanian attack on Khrushchev was one consequence--not the only one--of Chinese "factional" activity. The Tunisian delegate (Ennafas) reportedly followed with a speech criticizing the Chinese. The Italian (Longo) followed with a strong speech in support of the Soviet party and Khrushchev personally, dismissing Chinese and Albanian charges.

Next to appear on 17 November was the North Vietnamese delegate (Ho Chi Minh), whose speech was a small masterpiece of evasion and conciliation. He praised those portions of the draft declaration for which acceptable language had been found, and he observed mildly that it only remained to reach a few further agreements and the draft could be unanimously adopted. He reviewed the agreed portions of the draft in bland terms, endorsing both those passages representing Soviet emphases and those representing Chinese emphases--arguing in effect that sometimes one type of emphasis would be correct and sometimes another, so that both parties were correct. As for the unresolved questions of whether, or how, the draft resolution was to discuss the "cult of the individual" and to endorse the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses, Ho apparently evaded these questions. However,

on the key question, that of whether the draft was to discuss factionalism in the movement, Ho came down, in a very polite way, on the Chinese side. He observed that the question of factionalism deserved close examination, that disagreements among the fraternal parties should be expected, that no party should attempt to coerce another party, that unanimity could be achieved through democratic discussion, and that the draft declaration should emphasize the question of strengthening unity and should not encourage a "mistaken" belief that one or another party was guilty of factionalism. He offered further remarks on the importance of unity, especially between the Soviet and Chinese parties, to both of which parties he said, the Viet Minh was much indebted.

Ho was followed by the British delegate (Gollan) and the Moroccan (Yata). Both reportedly supported Soviet positions and spoke strongly against the Chinese.

There were nine or ten speakers on 18 November (it is not clear whether the delegation from Jordan spoke once or twice). The first three, the Rumanian (Gheorghiu-Dej), the Belgian (Burnelle), and the Paraguayan (name unknown), all spoke in support of Soviet positions and criticized the Chinese. The fourth and fifth, the Turkish (Belen) and the Guatemalan (name unknown), reportedly took the same line but with some reservations. The sixth and perhaps tenth, the Jordanian delegate or delegates (Nasser and/or Hammudah), supported the Soviet party and/or were critical of the Chinese. The seventh, the Outer Mongolian (Tsedenbal), was reportedly strongly critical of the Chinese; he is said to have charged Peiping, inter alia, with having tried to induce the Mongolian regime to take a position of "independence" of Moscow (whether in general, or simply in this dispute, is not clear). The West German (Reimann) supported the Soviet party and criticized the Chinese.

By the close of business on 18 November, about 50 delegations (in addition to the Soviets and Chinese) had spoken. Of these, only one (Albania) had been a strong supporter of the Chinese party; another (North Vietnam) had been on delicate balance a Chinese supporter, and a third (North Korea) had been evenly-balanced. There was a higher proportion of Chinese supporters and neutrals in subsequent sessions.

The first speaker on 19 November was the Panamanian delegate (Victor), who reportedly supported Soviet positions in general but the Chinese position on majority rule. He was

followed by the Indonesian (Lukman), whose speech was the third to qualify, on balance, as one in support of the Chinese party. Lukman stated his support of Chinese emphases on questions relating to peaceful coexistence, disarmament, the liberation movement, and accession to power; he was not satisfied with the treatment of "nationalism" and "factionalism" in the draft, although he did not quite ask for the elimination of these terms; he opposed endorsement of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses; and he proposed (for some reason which is not clear) that the draft carry only the signature of the bloc parties.

The Finnish delegate (name unknown) followed with a speech which reportedly condemned the Chinese. The delegate from San Marino (Fabri) followed with an evasive speech; the delegate from Northern Ireland (name unknown) was critical of the Chinese; and the delegate from Guadeloupe was reportedly more strong in his support of the Soviet party and Khrushchev and his criticism of the Chinese. The last speaker on 19 November was the delegate from Honduras (name unknown), whose speech seems to have been evasive and conciliatory in some respects but on balance a speech in support of Soviet positions.

There was apparently no session on 20 November (Sunday). The first speaker on 21 November, the Bolivian delegate (name unknown), supported Soviet positions and criticized the Chinese. The second speaker, however, the Burmese (name unknown), reportedly spoke in opposition to Soviet positions and in support of the Chinese. The third, the Costa Rican (Mora), reportedly criticized the Chinese. The fourth, however, the Malayan (Ahmad), while expressing respect for both the Soviets and the Chinese, reportedly opposed Soviet positions.

The fifth speaker on 21 November was the Indian (Ghosh), a representative of the pro-Soviet wing of the Indian party, who praised Khrushchev, criticized Chinese behavior in the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Chinese party's failure to answer certain letters from the Indian party, and praised Soviet policy in the border dispute. As for the still unresolved questions in the draft declaration, Ghosh supported the Soviet party with respect to the passages on the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses and "national Communism," but supported the Chinese in asking omission of the passage on "factionalism." The Algerian delegate (Bouhali) followed

with a speech supporting Soviet positions and criticizing the Chinese. The speech of the Thai delegate (name unknown) was reportedly evasive on the unresolved questions, expressing the hope of avoiding a vote which would create a majority and a minority. The final speaker of 21 November, the Ecuadorian (name unknown), reportedly supported Soviet positions and was critical of the Chinese.

The first speaker on 22 November, the Japanese delegate (Hakamada), was evasive and conciliatory. The delegate from the Dominican Republic (name unknown) supported Soviet positions and criticized the Chinese. The Ceylonese delegate (Wickremashinghe) seems to have spoken, on balance, in support of Soviet positions. The Australian (Sharkey) was reportedly evasive, criticizing the Albanians but not the Chinese. The speech of the Nicaraguan (name unknown), also evasive in part, seems to have been on balance in support of Soviet positions. The Haitian delegate (name unknown) spoke in support of Soviet positions and criticized the Chinese. The speech of the delegate from Reunion (Verges), evasive in some respects, was on balance in support of Soviet positions. The Peruvian (name unknown) was apparently evasive on the critical questions. The delegate from Martinique (Sylvestre) supported Soviet positions and criticized the Chinese.

By the close of business on 22 November, about 76 of the delegations (in addition to the Soviets and Chinese) had spoken. Of these, more than 60 qualified as Soviets supporters, either strongly so or on balance. However, there was one strong Chinese supporter (Albania); there were four Chinese supporters on balance (North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya); and there seem to have been at least seven evenly balanced or evasive (North Korea, Panama, San Marino, Thailand, Japan, Australia, and Peru). On the key question of majority rule, some 25 parties had stated their favor for this principle, either explicitly or in terms of support for the passage on factionalism in the draft declaration; nine additional parties had stated their favor for majority rule in principle, but had failed to state their favor for, or had stated their opposition to, an endorsement of this principle in the declaration (whether explicitly or in terms of condemning factionalism); six parties (China, Albania, North Vietnam, Japan, Burma, Malaya) had stated their opposition to the principle of majority rule; and some 36 parties had apparently failed to declare their positions on this question, either deliberately or through oversight. In short, as of 22

November, those parties which had expressed themselves as favoring majority rule did not as yet constitute a majority. This latter consideration, as well as his declared reason, was almost certainly one of those that animated Khrushchev to deliver a second address to the conference, on the following day.

Another Sino-Soviet Exchange

Khrushchev began this 23 November speech by remarking that the speeches of Teng Hsiao-ping and Hoxha compelled him to speak again. He reportedly added that many things had been said in the heat of discussion which would better have not been said, and that he would refrain from adding to such material.

Although acceptable language had already been devised for virtually all questions relating to world Communist strategy, Khrushchev again defended the Soviet positions which he had been forced to compromise or qualify in the draft. He chose to emphasize the questions related to the definition of the epoch: it was essential to recognize, he said, that the great and growing strength of the bloc had deterred and would deter the West from general war, that the prevention of war was the "main task," and that for this task the people must be given the "facts" about Western military strength. Such an attitude was not, as the Chinese charged, an underestimation of the workers or preparation for "surrender" or for submission to blackmail.

The Soviet party could not agree with the Chinese line, Khrushchev went on, that war could be prevented only after the global triumph of socialism. Peace /absence of world war/ and disarmament /at least partial disarmament/ were not simply slogans, but real possibilities. He reiterated, in this connection, that "peaceful coexistence" was to the advantage of the bloc, and that the concept did not imply that the bloc would cease its vigilance or cease building its military strength or that Communist movements would renounce armed struggle.

Khrushchev reviewed the Soviet position on accession to power. He reiterated that the Soviet party did not envisage only a non-violent road, that Moscow simply saw the possibility of peaceful accession in some countries. He reminded

the Chinese that the various Communist parties, rather than Peiping, were the best judges of their tactics.

Khrushchev insisted that the further development of the national liberation movement was of great concern. He spoke of the successes of colonial areas in gaining independence, and he observed that the politically independent states needed peace for their development--in the course of which they could be "tied" to the bloc. Continuing his criticism of Chinese advocacy of greater Communist militancy, he reportedly said that he would like to see these countries "developing socially" /toward Communist forms/ but that it was of greater importance to win them "for peace" /induce changes in their foreign policy/. In this connection, it was a serious /Chinese/ mistake to tend to equate bourgeois nationalist leaders like Nehru, Sukarno and Nasir with Western leaders;* in defending Soviet aid to such leaders, he observed that these leaders would eventually depart but Soviet aid projects like the Aswan Dam would remain as symbols of and incentive to socialism. Khrushchev spoke warmly of anticipated successes in colonial and semi-colonial areas and spoke the bloc's duty to "help," but he apparently did not take up the question of material support of liberation wars.

Khrushchev went on to discuss the building of Communism in bloc countries, clearly aiming some of his remarks at Mao Tse-tung. He derided those who sat in offices and contrived theories, and who let a "cult of the individual" be build around them. Khrushchev defended the Soviet party's handling of de-Stalinization and observed that the "cult" had not been confined to the USSR.

Using the concept of the "cult of the individual" for a transition to the most important part of his speech, his discussion of authority and discipline in the movement, Khrushchev remarked that the concept of Soviet leadership of the camp was similar to cultism and he reaffirmed that the draft declaration should eliminate it. This led him into an emphatic reaffirmation of that part of the draft which was concerned with the "unity" of the movement and which, in terms of condemning factionalism, endorsed the principle of majority rule. Such majorities had developed, he said, at the Bucharest conference in June, at the preparatory meeting in October, and now at the Moscow conference--and the will of the majority must be respected. Concessions

*There is an unconfirmed report that Teng described Soviet aid to Nehru and Nasir as an "opportunistic mistake," as Chinese pronouncements had in effect done.

could be made, he said, in an effort to achieve unanimity, but such concessions must not be so great as to distort the will of the majority and thus lead to more discord. He seems to have argued that "factionalism" was precisely the failure to accede to the majority will, and he reportedly reaffirmed that the principle of democratic centralism in the conduct of individual parties was applicable to the world Communist movement in the sense of acceptance by all parties of the majority position.

Speaking directly to the Chinese, Khrushchev reportedly asked the Chinese to reconsider their "dangerous" course. The elite of the world Communist movement, he said, had gathered here in Moscow and had clearly expressed its will. It was necessary to stop debating, while recognizing that differences remained, and to express unity in action. (This seems to have been a way of asking the Chinese and their supporters to sign the draft declaration as it stood).

Khrushchev was reportedly given a long standing ovation by the delegates. However, the Chinese delegates, their strong supporters the Albanians, and the North Koreans who had previously been on the fence, reportedly remained seated.*

Teng Hsiao-ping spoke again the following day, 24 November. He said he recognized that the majority of the parties did not agree with the positions he had taken in his first speech (14 November), but, in addition to the disagreements on matters of principle, there were misunderstandings and slanders, aggravated by Khrushchev's 23 November speech.

Teng denied that the Chinese party had departed from the positions agreed to in the November 1957 declaration. On the contrary, Teng said, the CCP was able to agree with most of the current draft declaration because the draft in most respects had remained faithful, as had the CCP itself in all respects, to the 1957 declaration. The remaining Chinese objections to the draft declaration, he said, were concerned with just those respects in which the draft departed from the 1957 declaration.

Teng also denied, as he had in his 14 November speech, that the CCP failed to understand the balance of power, opposed "peaceful coexistence," and insisted on the inevitability

*This action by the North Koreans is regarded as tipping the balance, making the North Korean delegation a Chinese supporter.

of general war. The Chinese party simply contended, Teng said, summarizing the essentials of the Chinese position, that the balance of power would permit an arduous struggle, that such a struggle could be waged within the terms of peaceful coexistence,* that there was a possibility of avoiding world war but that it was neither possible nor desirable to avoid other types of wars and, further, that peaceful accession to power was very rare.

Teng went on to deny that the Chinese party's militant "Long Live Leninism" articles in the spring of 1960 were directed against Khrushchev's visit to the United States. He contended that the articles instead were aimed at certain features of that visit and of comment surrounding it, such as the description of President Eisenhower as "sincere," the attribution of decent motives to the West, references to the "spirit of Camp David," and so on. Such errors had weakened the struggle against imperialism, as witness the warm reception of Eisenhower in India and even by Communists in France. The Chinese party had been correct, Teng said, in publishing its articles--without first consulting other parties--to check this tendency to depart from the 1957 declaration.

As for the draft declaration itself, Teng went on, the preparatory committee in October had done a good job in finding acceptable language, and unanimity could be achieved with continued discussion. The Soviet party, he said, was still mistakenly insisting on the slogan of a world without arms and wars. He observed with satisfaction that the draft, rather than stating as "some" held that nuclear war would destroy the world, affirmed that only imperialism would be destroyed--a progressive formulation that "contradicted" the Soviet position.

As for the discussion of "unity" in the draft declaration, Teng began by denying again that it was the CCP which threatened the unity of the movement; on the contrary, his 14 November speech had been simply a retort to attacks by others, and some of those others had made fresh attacks and had thus made the achievement of unity more difficult. Conceding that the Chinese party was not immune to error, Teng said that the other parties must point out to the CCP its real rather than imaginary errors. He defended Chinese and

*The Chinese had called publicly for a "life-and-death" struggle within the terms of coexistence.

Albanian behavior at the conference, and he reproached the Soviet and Polish parties for slandering and insulting Albania.*

Teng then took up the key question of majority rule, discussed in the draft in terms of condemning factionalism. "Some" argued, Teng said, that unity could be achieved only by following the Soviet lead, "right or wrong." However, he went on, the Soviet party could not reasonably expect other parties to support Soviet actions undertaken unilaterally.** The road to unity was through consultation, and consultation must lead to unanimity, not to the imposition of the majority will. Teng reportedly reiterated that the principle of democratic centralism was not applicable to the world Communist movement.

As for those portions of the draft related to authority and discipline in the movement for which acceptable language had not yet been found, Teng stated flatly the Chinese party's position. The CCP would "never" agree, he said, to the explicit endorsement of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses or to the references to "nationalism" (also reported as "national Communism") and to "factionalism."***

*Chou En-lai, probably the Soviet party's favorite among the principal leaders of the Chinese party, publicly praised the Albanian party in strong terms on 29 November, before the Moscow conference had ended.

**Teng at this point, rather out of context, rejected the derisive remarks aimed by Khrushchev the previous day at Mao tse-tung. Teng denied that Mao sat in his study divorced from reality. Peiping Radio on 27 November broadcast a long article about Mao's working methods--methods diametrically opposed to those who "fail to associate theory with reality," who sit in offices and issue "subjective" orders, etc.

***As previously noted, there was at least one more unresolved question, namely whether to include in the declaration, as the Soviets wished, the slogan of a world without arms and without wars. However, Teng evidently regarded this question--as do we--as being of much less importance than the other three: he did not state that he would "never" agree to the inclusion of this slogan. As it turned out, the Chinese got their way on this point, the phrase does not appear in the 6 December declaration. Khrushchev in his 6 January report again defended the slogan.

Teng asked that these passages be excised from the document, after which, he implied, the Chinese would sign it and the world movement would "once again" be united against the common enemy.

At this point the British delegate (Gollan) presumably thinking that he was making a proposal favored by the USSR, suggested that discussion be ended. Thorez of the French delegation disagreed, and Khrushchev supported Thorez. Thorez returned to assert that the assembled parties were "almost unanimously" (an overstatement) in opposition to the Chinese and that the Chinese should back down. Some 22 delegations reportedly followed the French (those of Italy, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Outer Mongolia, Cuba, Finland, Syria, the United States, Lebanon, Uruguay, Iraq, Argentina, Canada, Poland, South Africa, Bolivia, Austria, Sweden, Brazil, Rumania, and Cyprus in order of appearance), in asking the Chinese to submit to the will of the majority; some 13 of these delegations apparently had not previously declared their favor for the principle of majority rule, and these 13 brought the total to at least 43 parties who had so declared--a majority of the 81 parties represented. The Indonesian delegate, however, in the 24 November discussion reaffirmed his support of the Chinese in opposing the principle of majority rule and in seeking to delete the draft's reference to "factionalism;" he suggested that the conference adopt two resolutions, one representing unanimous positions and one concerned with matters still in dispute.

The next step was evidently not that of a majority demand for an immediate vote on whether the draft was to be signed as it stood. The conference apparently acted instead on a Canadian proposal that those portions of the draft still in dispute be referred to a committee for a final effort to find acceptable languague, language which would permit all of the parties to sign the declaration. The conference adjourned to 1 December.

The Line-up of the Parties

At the time of the conference's adjournment on 24 November, the Soviet party did indeed command a strong majority, but the majority did not represent, as some had said, "almost all" the parties. The strong Soviet supporters seem to have been the parties of Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, East Germany, Iraq, Italy, Lebanon, Outer Mongolia, Paraguay, Poland, Rumania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States--a total of 26, in addition to the Soviet party itself.

Those which seem to have qualified, on balance,* as Soviet supporters, were the parties of Algeria, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eire, West Germany, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India,** Iran, Northern Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Luxembourg, Martinique, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Reunion, the Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela--a total of 35 parties, making a grand total of at least 62 parties in the Soviet camp.

The only strong supporter of the Chinese party was the Albanian party. However, those who seem to have been, on balance (in two cases, delicate balance), Chinese supporters were the parties of North Korea***, North Vietnam***, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya; the delegation from Ghana is less reliably reported to have been also in this group. Thus the Chinese camp totalled seven or eight.

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*No doubt some of these delegations were just as strongly pro-Soviet as those listed above: the judgment "on balance" refers to their reported speeches.

**While the Indian party is split, the stronger wing is pro-Soviet, so the generally pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese speech of the Indian delegate on 21 November is taken as reflecting the party's view.

***Other analysts who have read the accounts of the behavior of the North Korean and North Vietnamese delegations at the conference think that the balance was so delicate as to be meaningless and that both parties should be listed as neutral; we see them as having tipped sufficiently toward the Chinese to be regarded--at least tentatively--as Chinese supporters.

About nine parties seem to have been so evasive or split that they could not be counted in either camp; those of Australia, Japan, Nepal, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, San Marino, Switzerland, and Thailand. The positions of two parties were unreported by any source: that of El Salvador and the still-unidentified 81st party.

In terms of geographical areas: of the 12 countries of the bloc, eight were in the Soviet camp, four were in the Chinese camp (China, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam); of the parties of the European community (including in this category Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey and the United States), 21 were in the Soviet camp, none was in the Chinese camp, and four were neutral (Australia, New Zealand, San Marino, Switzerland); of the parties of the Far Eastern non-bloc countries, two were in the Soviet camp (India and Ceylon), three were in the Chinese camp (Burma, Indonesia, Malaya), and three were neutral or split (Japan, Nepal, Thailand); of the parties of the Near East and Africa, 12 were in the Soviet camp and one reportedly in the Chinese (Ghana); of the countries of Latin America, 19 were in the Soviet camp, none was in the Chinese camp, two were neutral (Panama and Peru), and one (El Salvador) was not reported.*

On the key question of majority rule, by the close of business on 24 November some 43 of the parties--a majority of the 81 represented--had gone on record in support of this principle, although several of them had opposed--or had not stated their support for--a reflection of this principle in the document itself. These parties, including all those listed above as strong Soviet supporters and half of those listed as being on balance Soviet supporters, were

*It should be recognized that this account is based in some instances on fragmentary reporting, and that some of delegations which solidly supported the Soviet party in their speeches may in fact have represented split parties. This may apply particularly to the Latin American delegations.

the parties of the USSR, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Ceylon, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lebanon, Martinique, Mexico, Outer Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Poland, Reunion, Rumania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It is presumed that others of the group listed above as being on balance Soviet supporters would have spoken in support of the principle of majority rule if Khrushchev had wished it. Those which clearly rejected, or are reliably reported to have rejected, the principle of majority rule were China, Albania, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and North Vietnam; of the others named above as being in the Chinese camp, the reported remarks of the delegate of North Korea were not entirely clear on this point but suggested a disposition to support the Chinese on the point if pressed, while the position of Ghana was not reported. There were some other parties--including a few of those listed above as being on balance Soviet supporters--whose reported remarks on various questions suggested that they might have supported the Chinese on the question of majority rule if pressed; this may have been true, for example, of the 'neutral' Australian, Japanese, Panamanian and Thai parties, and of the generally pro-Soviet Indian delegation.

Conciliation

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[redacted] Ho Chi Minh, acting on his own expressed hope of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, began at this point (after the unproductive 24 November session) to take practical steps.*

*Ho had been reliably reported, after the Bucharest conference in June, to be trying to arrange a meeting between Khrushchev and Mao, whose last known meeting was in October 1959; a trip to North Korea scheduled by Khrushchev for early autumn was said to be the occasion for this meeting, but Khrushchev had cancelled this trip at the last moment, possibly on word from Peiping that Mao was not coming. Ho had also stopped in Peiping on the way to the Moscow conference in November.

On or about 25 November he gathered some like-minded leaders of other parties; the group sent letters to Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi and then met with them separately, appealing to their better natures. The next day Khrushchev agreed to meet Liu, Liu was at first evasive but finally agreed, and the two met for several hours. Soon thereafter, evidently with new instructions from Khrushchev and Liu, Soviet and Chinese representatives on the new or reactivated drafting committee--which was to make a final effort to find acceptable language on the points still in dispute--had a bilateral meeting and worked out some new formulations.

The 6 December declaration makes pretty clear what took place in the meeting between Khrushchev and Liu, at least with respect to the draft declaration.* Teng Hsiao-ping had stated before all the 81 delegations on 24 November that the Chinese party would "never" agree to those passages in the draft which explicitly endorsed the theses of the 20th and 21st congresses and which referred (aiming at the Chinese) to "nationalism" (or "national Communism") and "factionalism."

In the concluding section of the 6 December declaration, the section concerned with questions of authority and discipline in the world Communist movement, it is stated that

> The historic decisions of the 20th CPSU congress are not only of great significance for the CPSU and for Communist construction in the USSR, but they also started a new stage in the world Communist movement and contributed to its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. . .

Although the language of the draft as of 24 November--the text considered by Khrushchev and Liu--is not known, it is evident that Peiping compromised on this passage, as it does constitute an endorsement of the theses of the 20th CPSU Congress. Moreover, it was almost certainly more important to Khrushchev to get an endorsement of the 20th congress than of the 21st--as it was the former which

*Our treatment of the results of the Khrushchev-Liu talk reaches the same general conclusions as those expressed in the ONE memorandum of 28 February 1961, "The Issue of Discipline at the Moscow Conference."

introduced the theses on the non-inevitability of war, on peaceful coexistence, and on peaceful accession to power. However, Khrushchev also compromised, as the passage does not endorse the theses of the 21st CPSU congress, and even the endorsement of the "decisions" of the 20th congress (the passage quoted above) is simply a verbatim repetition of a part of the November 1957 declaration--the declaration to which the Chinese had proclaimed their fidelity all along. Moreover, this passage in the 6 December declaration is immediately followed by the assertion that other "Communist and workers' parties are making their contribution to the cause of the development of the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism"--a formulation which was not in the November 1957 declaration and which goes well beyond it in permitting other parties (the Chinese, say), to offer their own theses as contributions (the Lenin Anniversary articles, say).*

As for the passages on "nationalism" and "factionalism" in the draft declaration as of 24 November, the Chinese won their case completely. The passages on revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism in the concluding section of the 6 December declaration--the passages in which the offensive formulations on "nationalism" were presumably

*There is another reference in the 6 December declaration to the 20th CPSU congress, which cites the 21st congress as well. In an earlier section concerned with "peaceful coexistence," this concept is said to have originated with Lenin and to have been elaborated in the Moscow Declaration of November 1957 and the decisions of the 20th CPSU congress (1956) and of the 21st CPSU congress (1959). There is a similar passage in the Moscow declaration of November 1957--except for the lack of reference to the 21st congress not held until 1959. There is nothing to suggest that the Chinese objected at any time to this part of the draft declaration: the Chinese too have favored "peaceful coexistence" as a slogan; the issue in the declaration was that of blanket endorsement of the theses of the 20th and 21st congresses, i.e., an endorsement of certain theses which Peiping did not in fact accept and an endorsement which would imply recognition of a Soviet right to make pronouncements binding on other parties.

contained* as of 24 November--make no reference whatever to the concept of nationalism.** Of greatest importance, this concluding section of the 6 December declaration (the section concerned with authority and discipline) makes no reference whatever to "factionalism," and it fails to establish the principle of majority rule in any other way. The declaration says simply:

> The interests of the Communist movement demand that every Communist party display solidarity by observing assessments and conclusions jointly worked out by the fraternal parties at their conferences. . .

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*As noted earlier, the 6 December declaration does refer to "manifestations of nationalism and narrow-mindedness" in the second section, dealing with intrabloc relations. The phrase would presumably be recognized, in the context of a discussion of division of labor in the bloc, as an implicit rebuke to the Chinese party for its objective of autarky; and presumably the Chinese were not pleased to see the phrase appear anywhere in the declaration. However, the Chinese had apparently agreed, during the preparatory meeting in October, to have the phrase employed in that second part of the draft which discussed intrabloc relations; and there is no evidence that the Chinese, during the November conference, objected to the use of the phrase in that second section. The Chinese objections during the November meeting apparently related entirely to the inclusion of the concept of "nationalism" or "national Communism" in the concluding section of the declaration, concerned with questions of authority and discipline.

**Khrushchev's 6 January report is illuminating in this connection. In reviewing the 6 December declaration, Khrushchev in discussing revisionism again related the two offenses of revisionism and nationalism, preparing the ground for a public effort in the future to turn the Chinese charge of Soviet revisionism into a Soviet charge of Chinese nationalism. See [redacted] 17 March 1961.

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> Every party is responsible to the working class and working peoples of its country, and to the entire international workers and Communist movement. When necessary, Communist and workers' parties hold conferences to discuss topical issues, to exchange experience, to gain firsthand knowledge of each other's views and positions, to work out unified views by means of consultation and agreement on joint action in the struggle for common aims. . .

The language is ambiguous and would not necessarily deter the Soviet party from contending that the minority should be bound by the "unified views" reached "jointly" by the majority; it would not be the first time that Moscow had attempted to obscure the difference between unamimity and a majority, sometimes even employing the farcical phrase "by the unanimous will of the majority." In our view, however, the above language would permit the Chinese to insist, with much more plausibility, that the declaration establishes the principle of unanimity, that views cannot be said to be "unified" unless all participating parties share them and that no party can be committed to "joint action" unless it in fact shares the stated "common aims." Far from establishing the principle of majority rule, the above language would tend if anything to encourage the activity denounced by the Soviet party as "factionalism."

The 6 December declaration, in the light of the issues known to have been unresolved as of 24 November, gives an ironical cast to the often-posed question of what concessions--economic and/or military or whatever--Khrushchev made to the Chinese in order to induce them to agree to sign the declaration. That is, on the three issues still in dispute--which had remained in dispute from the first week of October to the last week of November--it was primarily Khrushchev, not Liu, who was induced to compromise. The Soviet party got a draw, or a narrow victory, on one of these issues--whether to endorse the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU congresses--but was defeated absolutely on the other two issues still in dispute. If the Soviet party had to make additional concessions to these, in order to get a Chinese signature, the Chinese victory would be massive indeed. There are only unconfirmed reports to this effect--that the

Chinese extracted a promise from Khrushchev that there would be another world Communist conference within a year or at most two years, and another promise that the Soviet party would return to China (or at least would discuss returning) the Soviet technicians withdrawn in summer 1960.

In the concluding portion of [redacted] (The Sino-Soviet Dispute: June-November 1960), it was noted that both the Soviet and Chinese parties had encouraged the view that neither would back down at the Moscow conference with respect to the issues still in dispute--the same issues taken up by Khrushchev and Liu after 24 November: that, to put it a bit differently, the two parties were playing "chicken," and that it was not known whether either would be willing to swerve at the last moment. At the last moment--i.e., in the final meeting between Khrushchev and Liu--both parties proved willing to swerve, but the Soviet party swerved much more. Liu swerved six inches (the matter of the 20th congress), but Khrushchev swerved two-and-a-half feet (the issues of the 21st congress, nationalism, and, above all, factionalism). 25X1A

It has been asked why Khrushchev swerved--why, after so heavily committing his personal prestige to induce the Chinese to swerve on the key questions of authority and discipline, in particular on the principle of majority rule, was it Khrushchev who swerved far more?* The Soviet party, after all, had been insisting since the Bucharest conference in June on the need for majority rule; it had emphasized this point in the preparatory meetings in October, and again in its 5 November letter; one of its motives in reviewing the entire case against the Chinese in that letter was very probably that of securing general support for the principle of majority rule; Khrushchev in his 10 November speech had strongly reaffirmed the Soviet party's support of this

*We do not agree with the view that Khrushchev's effort to establish the principle of majority rule was an "extreme" demand. Compared with Stalin's insistence on absolute obedience, Khrushchev's position was a modest one. This made his retreat all the more embarrassing.

principle; and he had done so again in his speech of 23 November, implying strongly in this speech that concessions to the Chinese were at an end and apparently calling on all parties to sign the declaration as it stood. Yet the Soviet party on 24 November had agreed to a final effort to find acceptable language on the three unresolved issues of authority and discipline, of which the principle of majority rule was much the most important; and then, in the talks with Liu Shao-chi, Khrushchev had given in.

There seem to have been at least four considerations. First, the conference had already gone on for an embarrassingly long time, and there seemed to be no prospect that the Chinese would agree to majority rule, no matter how long the conference continued. Second, the Chinese were not isolated: the Chinese camp consisted of seven or eight parties, including, most distressingly for the Soviet party, three members of the bloc (Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea) in addition to China; and perhaps as many as a dozen parties would have supported the Chinese in a vote on whether the majority will was to be binding, and would have refused--with the Chinese--to sign the draft declaration as it stood on 24 November. Third, there was a significant amount of neutralist sentiment, i.e., several delegations had avoided or tried to avoid taking sides in the dispute. Fourth, several sources have reported that almost all of the parties represented at the conference, including the Soviet party, hoped to avoid the kind of showdown that would be expressed in formal vote--and would then be revealed in the signing of the declaration by a majority but the non-signing by a minority--which would formalize and tend to perpetuate the split in the movement. There is a possible fifth factor of pressure on Khrushchev by other leaders of the Soviet party--pressure on him to avoid a showdown despite the embarrassment to him personally.

We doubt that Khrushchev genuinely expected the Chinese to accede eventually to the majority; we think it more likely that Khrushchev, who had had considerable experience of the Chinese, had only a small hope of this and that he was doing his best to realize this small hope. Similarly, we think it likely that Khrushchev had a rough idea of the degree of support the Chinese would get and of the extent of neutralist sentiment, as there was enough evidence at hand before the conference to permit even Western observers to predict that several parties would support the Chinese on balance, that

several more would support Peiping on various specific issues, and that neutralist sentiment would be significant. Similarly, we think that Khrushchev knew that most other parties would prefer to avoid an open split in the movement, for the same reasons that the Soviet party preferred to avoid this. As for the remaining possible factor, pressure by other Soviet party leaders, there is simply no information on this; in the discussions with the Chinese, other Soviet leaders, as might be expected, resisted Chinese efforts to split them from Khrushchev's positions. The largest imponderable, right up to the final week of the conference, was whether Khrushchev would judge that he could afford to swerve--in other words, whether the Soviet party's prestige and his personal prestige had not been so heavily committed that it would be better for him to accept and to formalize a split in the movement and in the Sino-Soviet relationship (although not necessarily to the same degree as the Soviet-Yugoslav split) rather than to swerve. In the event, finally acting on his recognition of a situation which in our view he expected but which (we concede) he may not have expected, he swerved--but without, of course, changing his mind.

When the conference reconvened on 1 December, Suslov, who had apparently acted as chairman of the new or reactivated drafting committee, read the revised and completed draft to the delegations. Liu Shao-chi made his only reported speech of the conference at this point; Liu wore his triumph modestly, expressing the Chinese party's satisfaction with the declaration, in particular its provisions on further conferences of the parties of the November 1957 and November 1960 model, and asserting that the Chinese would faithfully fulfill their commitments.

Khrushchev then offered some concluding remarks. He praised the declaration as a "common platform," called for implementation of these "collective decisions," and expressed confidence that the declaration would be "accepted by all the parties." He also offered the best summary comment on the results of the conference and the prospects for the future. The imperialists would be "bitterly disappointed," he said, by the fact that an open split in the movement had been avoided--the conference had at least accomplished that. And the USSR's relations with Communist China, he said, would be "as good as in the past and maybe even better"--that is,

might continue to be poor, or might improve: hardly a resounding expression of confidence. As the Soviet party had made clear in its 5 November letter and in Khrushchev's speeches during the conference, as the Chinese party had made clear in Teng Hsiao-ping's speeches during the conferences, and as both parties were to make clear in their presentations of the 6 December declaration [redacted] the agreements were nominal agreements and the dispute would continue. 25X1A

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