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Problem: To estimate Soviet and satellite reaction to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO. (Only Soviet reaction is considered here; it is taken for granted that the satellites will be guided in their attitudes by that of Moscow).

Conclusions:

(1) If the USSR were on the verge of unleashing a general war, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might provide the final impetus that would impel Moscow to take this action. Similarly, if the Kremlin has already made a decision to resort to general war, it might treat the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO as an excuse for embarking on this course.

(2) Assuming that neither of the foregoing possibilities represents the Kremlin's approach to the problem, we believe that the mere act of including Greece and Turkey in NATO, while it would probably be made the occasion for intense propaganda agitation, expressions of concern, and threatening gestures on the part of the USSR, would not be regarded by Moscow as fundamentally altering the current world power situation. Hence, it would probably not be regarded as a genuine casus belli.

(3) The fusion of Greece and Turkey into a "Mediterranean Bloc" with countries that are either members of NATO or otherwise, but even including the US, would probably provoke reactions on the part of the Kremlin similar to those envisaged in paragraph two.

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 It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S C
 It contains nothing of CIA interest

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(4) The Soviet reaction to tangible security arrangements (i.e., a specific military build-up) including Greece and Turkey, whether or not NATO were also involved, would depend on the scope and implementation of the arrangements. So long as Moscow did not regard them as of sufficient magnitude to pose a serious threat to Soviet security, we believe that these arrangements alone would not cause the USSR to resort to preventive war. However, we also believe that once the Kremlin became convinced that military developments in the Eastern Mediterranean area were of such magnitude as to threaten Soviet security immediately and directly, the USSR would probably take whatever action it deemed necessary to prevent their further fruition regardless of the consequent risks of general war.

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