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Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600060002-6

Security Information

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23 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Inter-Agency Views on SE-25: Military Indications of a Possible Large-Scale Communist Attack in Korea in the Immediate Future

Noted by DCI
24 Apr

Noted by D/DCI
24 Apr

Noted by DB/I
24 Apr

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was scheduled on a "crash" basis pursuant to IAC action on 15 April. The IAC decided that in view of the urgent nature of the estimate, the report of the Watch Committee for the week ending 16 April would be used in lieu of agency contributions.

SUBSTANCE

2. The representatives were agreed that the military indications were completely inconclusive.

3. This estimate covers the same ground and is consistent with the Watch Committee report covering the period 10 April to 16 April. Because of its limited scope, SE-25 adds essentially nothing to this Watch Committee report. Some of the representatives suggested, in one part of the estimate or another, that political factors should be considered. It was agreed, however, that a fragmentary and superficial examination of political factors would not be useful, and that a thorough examination of the Korean problem in the context of Communist global intentions should be reserved for the forthcoming NIE-64, Part II: Probable Soviet Courses of Action through Mid-1953.

4. Colonel Hodgson has asked that this estimate be shown to [redacted]. The Board believes that there is nothing in the estimate which is not suitable [redacted]. The IAC representatives indicated general agreement, but were not in a position to make a final judgment.

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[redacted]

DOCUMENT NO. 2

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011

AUTH: HR 10-2

DATE: 25 FEB 81 REVIEWER: 018557

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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Assistant Director
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