Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000300040017-5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 31 January 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

T: Soviet Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles in Cuba

1. We have confirmed three operational Soviet coastal defense cruise missile units in Cuba. They are located in prepared sites at Santa Cruz del Norte, Banes, and Siguanea on the Isle of Pines. We believe that there is a fourth operational unit which was briefly deployed to the south coast (La Sierra) in November 1962 and then returned to Campo Florido where it occupies what may be a stand-by and training site. In addition to these four units, there are two other cruise missile installations, at Mayari Arriba and Guerra.

2. The four known operational units are each 25X1B equipped with at least 8 cruise missiles and possibly 10, making for a total of 32-40 operational cruise missiles.

3. We believe that each cruise missile unit (probably a battalion) normally has 8 missiles--4 for each of its two launchers. The 94 probable cruise missile crates stored at Mayari Arriba in the east and Guerra in the west suggests that the original program called for the deployment of 12 more cruise missile units on the coasts of Cuba. The coasts east and west of Havana, east of Banes, east and west of Santiago de Cuba, and the central southern coasts are likely areas for such deployments.

4. It seems likely that the USSR intended to deploy more than the four operational cruise missile units which have been identified in Cuba. The three

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000300040017-5

25X1B

SECRET Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000300040017-5

operational sites now occupied by units give only scant defense to key areas and possible invasion points. The long stretch of coast to the east and west of Santiago de Cuba, and the coast in the south-central area from the Bay of Pigs east, are both uncovered, although one unit was deployed temporarily to the latter in early November. The deployment of cruise missile equipment may have been interrupted by the Cuban crisis, which prevented the Soviets (or Cubans) from placing in operation more than the four units we have seen. The Soviets may now feel sufficiently confident of the US attitude toward cruise missiles to resume the deployment program. However, there is no evidence of any immediate intent to place these weapons beyond the appearance of the crates at Guerra.

5. New units may in time be manned by Cuban personnel. Several reports have alleged that the Cuban military eventually were to be trained in and take control of the coastal defense cruise missiles.

25X1C