SECRET

25X1

25X1



FOREWORD

This handbook is designed to give the reader ready access to the salient facts about Communist China and its current problems. It is not a document intended to provide comprehensive basic intelligence on China or to speak with the authority of coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the best available as of the date at the top of each page.

Though issued by the Office of Current Intelligence, this handbook is actually the product of joint effort by a number of different offices, inside and outside of the Directorate of Intelligence. The Office of Research and Reports contributed Section III and parts of Sections I and VII.

tributed Section VI and part of Section VII. The Office of Basic Intelligence, through a number of different components, contributed to Sections I and VII, did extensive work in graphics, and made available material from the forthcoming NIS General Survey on Communist China. The Office of Scientific Intelligence of the Directorate of Science and Technology contributed Section V and part of Section VII.

Suggestions will be welcomed as to how such a quick reference document might be made more useful to the consumer; comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence.

i

SECRET

25X1 25X1

C O N T E N T S

		Page
FOREWO	ORD	i
I.	GENERAL DATA	I-1
	A. Land	I-1.
	B. PeopleC. Chronology	I-3 I-7
II.	POLITICAL	II-1
	A. Government Structure	11-1
	B. Communist Party	11-3
	C. National Policies	II-6
	D. Dissidence and Control	11-8
	E. Diplomatic Relations	II-9 II-14
	F. Border Disputes C. Significant International Commitm	
	G. Significant International Commitment. Relations with Foreign Communist	
III.	ECONOMIC	III-1
	A. Agriculture and Food Supply	111-1
	B. Industry	III-4
	C. Transportation and Communication	III-5
	D. Labor Force	III-7
	E. Trade and Foreign Aid	III-7
IV.	MILITARY	IV-1
	A. Key Military Officials	IV-1
	B. Ground Forces	IV-1
	C. Navy	IV-4
	D. Air Force	IV-5
V.	SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL	V-1
	A. Research Fields	V-1
	B. Scientific Resources	V-7
	C. Organization and Role	V-8

iii



I. GENERAL DATA

A. Land (area, topography, climate)

Communist China, slightly larger than the United States, is a country of great topographic and climatic diversity. It is characterized by virtually uninhabited gravel and sand deserts in the northwest, forested low mountains in the northeast, densely populated plains and river basins in the east, jungle-covered gorges and mountains in the south, and barren plateaus and high, rugged mountain ranges in the western interior. The climate ranges from polar in some of the high mountain and plateau regions to tropical in the south.

The main centers of agriculture and industry are isolated from one another by areas of mountainous terrain or by major rivers, most of which flow from west to east. These features have hindered development of the internal transportation networks and intensified the problems of developing political cohesion in this large country. The population, mainly agricultural, is concentrated on the plains in the east near the coast and along navigable rivers, where most of the arable land lies.

In the northeast, the gently undulating surface of the Manchurian Plain is interrupted only by low hills that form a divide between the northeastward-flowing Sungari River and the southward-flowing Liao. Except along the Gulf of Liaotung in the south, the plain is bordered by partly forested mountains, which are the chief source of minerals for the industrial cities along the eastern edge of the plain. Winters in the northeast are long, dry, and bitterly cold, and summers are short, hot, and moderately wet.

The great plain of North China, a vast flat bed of alluvial deposits of the Yellow River, forms a broad arc between Peking and Nanking. The plain is the heart of the wheat and dry grain region of China and is intensively cultivated. Diked streams

I-1

企業な

and drainage canals cross its surface, and large salt evaporators flank the coast in many places. Although the Yellow River--often referred to as "China's Sorrow" because of its destructive floods in the past--has been brought under some measure of control, the plain is still harassed by summer flood-waters from other rivers that flow across its surface. West of the plain is an extensive, treeless, and deeply eroded terraced plateau of very thick loess deposits which for centuries have blown in from the deserts of interior China and which now cover most of the hills and lower slopes of mountains in the area. North China has cold dry winters with strong northwest winds, usually dusty, and hot moderately wet summers.

South of the plain is the densely populated Yangtze Basin, where discontinuous fertile and intensively cultivated alluvial plains stretch along the lower course of the Yangtze River and its main tributaries. Upstream along the river and separated from the lower Yangtze Basin by a small chain of mountains is the Szechwan Basin, a mountain-rimmed depression of intensively cultivated plains and low The Yangtze is the main artery of the largest and most widely used inland waterway system of China. It links the delta region around Shanghai, the most important industrial city in the country, with other major industrial cities along its banks in the interior -- Nanking, Wu-han, and Chungking. The agricultural landscape of flooded terraced rice fields, diked canals, fishponds, and bamboo groves of the Yangtze Basin is typical of all South China. climate of the Yangtze Basin is transitional between the dry continental north and the wetter, milder The lower basin is subject to occasional serious flooding after periods of unusually heavy rainfall.

The mountains of South China are interspersed with intensively cultivated flat plains. The largest and most densely populated plains are along the coast. The largest one centers on Canton. Winters are mild and summers are oppressively bot with heavy rainfall, some of it from seasonal typhoons. In the southwest, the higher elevations of the Yunnan - Kweichow Plateau have a more temperate climate, with cooler winters and less oppressive summers.

1

SECRET

West China, including Sinkiang and the Tsinghai - Tibet Plateau, is a sparsely populated region characterized by a large, high, arid plateau and deserts that in many places are rimmed by mountains. The climate is very dry, with an annual rainfall of less than 10 inches and a light snow cover. Diurnal and seasonal temperature ranges are great, and exceedingly strong winds are common.

B. People

1. Population: With a population estimated at 763 million as of I January 1966, China accounts for nearly one quarter of the human race. It has more than three times as many people as the USSR, but less than half the area. Moreover, 95 percent of the Chinese people live in less than half of the country (Map). Approximately 85 percent of the population is rural. At the same time, China has one of the largest urban populations in the world, roughly equivalent to that of the vastly more industrialized United States or USSR.

The density of the population varies considerably. There are as many as 1,440 persons per square mile in the Yangtze Delta province of Kiangsu-far greater than any state in the US. In contrast, the four most sparsely populated administrative areas--Tibet, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia--have a density of about 11.5 per square mile.

Information on the age-sex structure of the Chinese population is fragmentary and inadequate. The population is predominatly young; about 52 percent of the population is under 20 years of age (Charts). The Chinese population is characterized by high birth and death rates; the rate of infant mortality has been extremely high. Life expectancy is estimated to be 42.7 years for men and 44.5 years for women. The estimated and projected population for selected years from 1938 to 1980 is shown below:

I-3

Estimated and projected population of Jommunist China, 1 January, selected years, 1938-80

(j.	n	mi	1	1	i	ons	()
---	----	---	----	---	---	---	-----	-----

Year	Jan	Year	Jan	Year	Jan
1938	474	1959	665	1966	763
1945	508	1960	681	1967	780
1950	542	1961	692	1968	797
1955	603	1962	703	1969	815
1956	618	1963	715	1970	833
195 7	633	1964	730	1975	933
1958	649	1965	746	1980	1049

Estimated by U.S. Bureau of Census


2. Culture

a. Ethnolinguistic regions of China: For its huge size, China's population is fairly homogeneous. Nearly 95 percent (over 700 million) are Han Chinese (ethnically Chinese), and another 3 or 4 million are Hui (Chinese Muslim, differing only in their religion). There are roughly 40 million minority peoples. The main groups are the Chuang and related groups (Southwest China), Tibetans, and Turkic Muslims (Sinkiang), and the Mongols (Map). These minorities are politically significant because they are largely concentrated on the Chinese frontiers and have certain cultural, ethnic, and religious bonds with related minority groups in neighboring


1 - 4

SECRET

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3



Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3



NOTE: Derived from data obtained from U.S. Bureau of Census.


ESTIMATED AGE-SEX DISTRIBUTION, COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 1965.


Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

25X1

COMMUNIST CHINA
POPULATION BY BROAD AGE GROUPS
1953 and 1957-64

Figure 1





Mountain peoples Yi or Lolo (west of Kuei-yang), Miao (Meo outside China) and Yao (east of K'un-ming); also Ching-p'o (Kachin), Li-su, Na-hsi, Pai, T'u-chia, and others. Most settlement areas scattered and non-continuous. *Classifications not ethnically exclusive Other Tungus (Northeast), Tadzhik (Sinkiang), Li (Hainan), Aborigines (Taiwan), and but suggestive by regional associations. **Many scattered areas of Chinese settlement not shown. Vietnamese

52824 12-65

countries. About 710 million speak Chinese, and only about 182 million of these speak mutually unintelligible Chinese dialects, mostly in the coastal region from Shanghai south to the Vietnamese border.

- b. Religion: Organized religion has never been as important in China as Christianity has been in the West or Islam in the Near East. China does, however, have a complex religious tradition based on a varying mixture of the ancient native ancestor veneration, plus elements of the Confucian and Taoist philosophies and of Mahayana Buddhism from India. There were about 15 million Muslims and 5 million Christians in 1949, but these were never in the mainstream of Chinese culture. The Communist regime officially tolerates religion, but systematically subverts, suppresses, and tightly controls all religious groups.
- c. <u>Literacy</u>: In 1949, when the Chinese Communists won control, about 80 percent of the population was illiterate. The regime has expended great efforts, especially in its first decade, in combating illiteracy, both in adult classes and in increased primary school enrollment. Considerable progress was made, but the current rate of literacy is not known. Because written Chinese is difficult to learn, the regime has attempted to simplify the characters, to standardize the spoken language, and to introduce the Latin alphabet, but with only limited results.
- d. Education: The Chinese Communist regime has mounted a major effort to expand China's educational system at all levels with three main goals: (1) to indoctrinate Chinese youth in communism; (2) to expand the supply of scientific and technical manpower; and (3) to broaden the social base of the educational system and raise general levels of literacy. The results, because of the emphasis on speed and quantity at the expense of quality--particularly during the disruptive drive for quantity of 1958-1961-- are poor. The regime has greatly expanded elementary education and made a dent in illiteracy. It has

I-5

11

at the same time, however, produced a huge number of half-educated youth (at least 40 million) for whom no appropriate jobs are available, and who must go back to farming or remain unemployed. It has also been unable to alleviate the critical shortage of highly qualified scientists, engineers, and professionals, and it has been largely unsuccessful in its political indoctrination efforts.

3. Health and welfare: Vital statistics in China are handled as classified information under firm Communist Party controls; even physicians are kept ignorant of them. Hence, independent estimates are handicapped. Current US estimates are that China's annual death rate dropped from 30 per 1,000 before 1949 to about 19 per 1,000 in 1958, then rose sharply because of acute food shortages from 1959 to 1961, and has since dropped again to about 20 to 25 per 1,000.

The Chinese Communist regime, by devoting about two percent of its annual state budget to public health and sanitation, has made some gains against China's historic epidemics, famines, and primitive sanitary conditions, but progress has been retarded by illiteracy and superstition, and by a shortage of doctors, hospitals, medical schools, and medications.

The principal infectious diseases which were responsible for most worker absenteeism in China from 1949 to 1958 were tuberculosis, schistosomiasis, malaria, Japanese B encephalitis, typhus, bacillary and amoebic dysentery, and hookworm. During the 1959-1961 food shortages, malnutrition and related ailments increased sharply, including liver ailments, peripheral edema, beriberi, and such infectious diseases as tuberculosis and dysentery. There were localized epidemics of bubonic plague and cholera, and a serious cholera outbreak in the winter of 1961-1962.

China now produces its own common antibiotics (penicillin, streptomycin, tetracycline, terramycin, and aureomycin) and vaccines (smallpox and cholera). Quantity and quality are doubtful.

I-6

China has 29 Western-style medical colleges graduating about 5,000 doctors a year. By mid-1965, China probably had about 80,000 doctors of Western medicine (plus half a million native practitioners-the so-called herb doctors), or about 1.1 per 10,000 people. Hospital beds had increased to about 700,000, or about 10 per 10,000 people. Both ratios are low by Western standards.

Since the early 1950s, China has had old age, survivors', disability, health, maternity, and accident insurance provided by social security, but only for industrial workers, perhaps 10 to 15 million altogether being so covered. Trade union membership dues contribute toward workers' sanatoriums, rest homes, day nurseries, and medical clinics. In the rural areas, social welfare services are spotty and generally of poor quality. Social welfare handled by central and local governments includes subsidized medical services, aid to veterans, emergency relief, and a network of employment offices.

C. Chronology

9 October

1 January 1949 Communists occupy Peking.

1 July Mao Tse-tung announces his "On People's Democratic Dictatorship."

21-30 September First plenary session of Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-

ference held.

27 September Organic Law of Central People's Government of People's Republic of

China announced.

1 October Establishment of Chinese People's

Republic declared in Peking.

First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference convenes; Mao Tse-tung elected chairman of its standing committee.

I-7

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

30 January 1950	Chinese People's Liberation Army headquarters declares liberation of all China except Tibet.
14 February	The USSR and Communist China sign friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance pact.
30 June	Promulgation of Agrarian Reform Law announced.
16 October	"Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea Movement" begins.
25 October	Chinese People's Volunteer Army leaves for Korean front.
26 October	Communists occupy Tibet.
23 May 1951	"Peaceful liberation" of Tibet com- pleted.
10 July	Korean armistice negotiations opened at Kaesong.
23 October-1 November	Third session of First National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
15 December	Agricultural cooperative movement begins.
29 December	Beginning of "Three_Anti" movement against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy.
December	Beginning of "Five-Anti" movement, aimed at the middle class, against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of state assets, and leakage of state economic secrets.
13 June 1952	"Five-Anti" movement officially ends.
17 July	Provisional Law for controlling anti- revolutionary elements promulgated.

I-8

Agrarian reform involving 400,000 December farmers practically completed. First Five Year Plan put into effect. January 1953 Fourth Session of First National 4-7 February Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Premier Chou En-lai proposes immedi-4 February ate negotiations for truce in Korean War. Chou En-lai heads delegation to Moscow 8 March for Stalin's funeral. Announcement of Sino-Soviet protocol 26 March to 1950 agreement expanding trade and Soviet assistance. Beginning of "Five-Too-Many" cam-23 April paign against interference in rural work by overzealous cadres. Korean armistice signed. 27 July Large privately owned plants incor-19 January 1954 porated into joint state and privately operated companies. Chinese delegation to Geneva con-20 April ference leaves Peking. Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed, 29 April providing for withdrawal of Indian troops and the cession of Indian control to China; in its preamble, "five principles of coexistence" are first enunciated: recognition of each

I-9

country's sovereignty and territorial integrity; nonaggression; mutual non-interference with each other's affairs; equality and mutual benefit;

and peaceful coexistence.

14 June	Chinese People's Government Council unanimously adopts draft constitution of Chinese People's Republic.
17 June	Great Britain and China exchange chargé d'affaires offices.
24-29 June	Chou En-lai visits India and stresses "five principles of coexistence."
21 July	Cease-fire agreement for Indochina reached, providing for international supervision by Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission composed of India, Poland, and Canada.
3 September	Heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy begins; more than 6,000 rounds fired in one day.
15-29 September	National People's Congress holds first session.
20 September	Adoption of constitution of Chinese People's Republic.
20-21 September	Adoption of organic laws of the National People's Congress, the State Council, the people's courts, the people's procurators' offices, and the local congresses.
27 September	Elections for top government posts and the National Defense Council; election of Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, Liu Shao-chi as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Chou En-lai as Premier of the State Council.
29-30 September	Top-level Soviet government delegation, including Khrushchev and Bul-

I - 10

SECRET

ganin, visits China to celebrate Chinese Communist National Day.

12 October

Sino-Soviet joint declaration on Soviet loans, withdrawal of armed forces from Port Arthur, transfer to China of Soviet shares in four joint-stock corporations, scientific cooperation, railway construction, and normalization of relations with Japan.

16-30 October

Nehru visits China, discusses Sino-Indian friendship, the "five principles," anticolonialism, and SEATO.

1 November

Conscription of 450,000 men for the People's Liberation Army begins. State Statistical Bureau announces results of China's first nationwide census: total population 601,938,035, including 12 million Overseas Chinese and 7 million Taiwanese.

9 March 1955

State Council creates preparatory committee headed by Dalai Lama to establish Tibet Autonomous Region.

31 March

Adoption of resolution accepting the central committee draft of First Five Year Plan, and resolution purging politburo member Kao Kang and central committee department head Jao Shu-shih for alliance against party and state.

7 April

Delegation headed by Chou En-lai leaves Peking to attend the Asian-African conference at Bandung 18-24

24 May .

Soviet troops withdrawn from Port Arthur and Soviet installations transferred to China.

25 June-7 July

North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh visits China and signs agreement on Chinese aid to North Vietnam.

I-11

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

5-30 July	Second meeting of National People's Congress.
30 July	First Five Year Plan formally adopted.
25 July	Announcement that Sino-American ambassadorial level talks in Geneva would begin 1 August; Chinese delegate to be Wang Ping-nan, ambassador to Poland.
31 July	Mao Tse-tung issues directive to Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on acceleration of agricultural cooperativization.
6 September	Twelve US citizens released; Wang Ping-nan says that if the US insists on repatriation of all citizens before discussing other items such as the embargo and high-level Sino-American talks, Geneva talks cannot be continued.
25 January 1956	Mao Tse-tung tells meeting of the Supreme State Conference, discussing agricultural development, that socialist revolution will be "basically" completed in three years.
5 April	First commentary on de-Stalinization in major official statement printed by People's Daily.
6-8 April	Mikoyan visits China; agreement on Soviet industrial aid to China signed.
2 May	Mao Tse-tung's speech at meeting of Supreme State Conference announces policy of "Let all flowers bloom to- gether and diverse schools of thought contend."
16-30 June	Third session of National People's Congress.

I-12

15-27 September	Eighth congress of Chinese Communist Party.
7-17 January 1957	Chou En-lai interrupts tour of Asian countries to visit USSR, Poland, and Hungary.
7 February	State Council accepts proposal for Second Five Year Plan (1958-1962).
27 February	Mao Tse-tung delivers speech to Su- preme State Conference on "correctly dealing with the question of contra- dictions within the ranks of the people." The text was not published.
12 March	Mao Tse-tung launches rectification campaign against "bureaucracy, sectarianism and subjectivism."
Mid-June	Attack on "rightist" critics of the Chinese party and government launched.
18 June	Edited text of Mao's speech on contradictions published. Speech spells out limits within which it is permissible to criticize regime.
23 September	Teng Hsiao-ping reports to party central committee on progress of rectification campaign, now merged with drive against "rightists" and made nationwide.
5 October	Peking hails launching of Sputnik I by USSR.
2 November	Mao Tse-tung departs for Moscow to attend celebration of 40th anniversary of "October Revolution."
April 1958	Communist China breaks off commer- cial relations with Japan and de- nounces Kishi government.

I-13

Мау

At 2nd session of 8th Party Congress Chinese Communist regime announces plans for a "leap forward" program designed to accelerate greatly economic development.

August

Communist regime begins nationwide, large-scale reorganization of agricultural population into new, large social units known as communes.

23 August

Chinese Communists precipitate Taiwan Strait crisis by heavy shelling of Nationalist-held Chin-men (Quemoy) offshore island complex.

25 October

Chinese Communists announce they will not fire on Chin-men complex on even-numbered days, thereby alleviating Taiwan Strait crisis.

March 1959

Rebellion in Tibet. Dalai Lama flees to India. Tibetan government dissolved, and administration turned over to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

April

Liu Shao-ch'i replaces Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of "People's Republic of China."

September

Chou En-lai letter to Nehru denies Indian claims to disputed China-India border areas but offers to negotiate "isolated places" on Chinese terms. Khrushchev in speech at Peking warns against testing capitalist system by force.

June 1960

Attempt by Khrushchev at Bucharest Conference to impose coexistence policy on all bloc countries opposed by Chinese Communists.

I - 14

July

Soviet technicians begin departure from Communist China.

1 October

At 11th Communist Chinese national anniversary celebration, bloc leaders are notably absent, except for A1-banian delegation.

November-December

Peking begins large-scale purchases of grain from nonbloc countries.

November

Conference of world Communist Party leaders on Sino-Soviet differences is held in Moscow. Liu Shao-ch'i heads Chinese delegation.

Premier Chou En-lai, at Albanian liberation day anniversary, praises Albanians as people who "fear no difficulties or crude pressures."

31 July 1961

In article commemorating 40th anniversary of the CCP, Liu Shao-ch'i acknowledges that during the past three years "quite a few shortcomings in our work" had, together with natural calamities, given rise to some "temporary difficulties."

October

Khrushchev, at 22nd Congress of the CPSU, attacks Albania, Stalin, and pro-Stalinists. Premier Chou Enlai rebukes Khrushchev and declares that public denunciation of Albania "does not contribute to cohesion of the socialist camp."

20 January 1962

Chou En-lai pledges China's "everlasting and unbreakable friendship" for Albania and Peking announces five new economic and technical cooperation agreements have been signed with Albania.

I-15

27 March-16 April S

Second session of 2nd National People's Congress, held in secrecy, reviewed nation's economic problems.

June

Chinese concentrate large force of troops and jet planes along Fukien coast opposite Quemoy and Matsu. Peking declares this is necessary because Nationalist China is planning an invasion with US support and encouragement.

23 July

China is one of 14 nations signing Declaration and Protocol on Neutrality of Laos.

20 October

China launches massive attack against India following outbreak of fighting in Northeast Frontier Agency in early October.

October-November

Peking criticizes Khrushchev's agreement to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba and pledges all-out Chinese support to Prime Minister Castro.

9 November

Chinese announce signing of fiveyear trade agreement for private barter exchange with Japanese following Japanese Government's agreement in August to recognize the Japan-China Export-Import Association.

21 November

Peking proclaims a unilateral ceasefire in war with India and declares that beginning 1 December its troops will be withdrawn to positions 12.5 miles behind line of actual control that existed on 7 November 1959.

2 March 1963

Pakistan signs border agreement with China.

I-16

Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

5-20 July

Chinese delegation headed by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen visits Moscow for angry confrontation with Soviets. Split widens.

15 August

Peking refuses to sign partial nuclear test-ban treaty and declares that attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to "monopolize nuclear weapons will be smashed in the not too distant future."

6 September

People's Daily article reveals that the Sino-Soviet ideological split had long affected state relations and lists as examples of Moscow's anti-Chinese activities the Soviet cancellation in 1959 of the 1957 agreement concerning assistance to Peking in producing atomic bombs; the Soviet unilateral decision in July 1960 to recall Soviet experts in China; and Soviet "plots" to overthrow the Ili regional government in Sinkiang-Uighur in 1962.

January 1964

Publication of ten of Mao Tse-tung's poems in the classical style marked the continuing buildup of the cult of Mao.

27 January

Joint announcement on diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors with France.

5 February

Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi return from seven-week tour of ten African countries in the course of which Tunisia established diplomatic relations with China.

February

Chou En-lai visits Pakistan, and China abandons previous neutral position on Kashmir and openly supports Pakistan's demand for a Kashmir plebiscite.

I - 17

31 July

Ties between China and Pakistan further strengthened as Pakistan announces acceptance of a \$60million interest-free Chinese credit.

16 October

China becomes fifth nation to detonate a nuclear device.

November

Chou En-lai attends Bolshevik Revolution ceremonies in Moscow. Chinese fail to respond to Soviet efforts to ameliorate Sino-Soviet dispute despite Soviet postponement of world conference of Communist parties from 15 December to 1 March.

Drive to revive the people's militia launched.

December

Third National People's Congress holds its first session. Premier Chou En-lai warns that "winds of capitalism" continue to blow and it will thus be necessary to intensify "socialist education campaigns."

January 1965

Chinese Embassy staff ousted and relations with China suspended by Burundi.

19 January

Peking announces decree to extend terms of military service by one year.

February

Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin stops in Peking for talks with Chinese leaders while visiting North Korea and North Vietnam.

25 March

People's Daily declares that "we are ready to send our own men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together...to annihilate the US aggressors."

I-18

10 May

Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing makes major announcement published in both People's Daily and Red Flag that nation's foremost task is to prepare against conventional or nuclear war which US might launch at any time.

14 May

Second Chinese nuclear device detonated.

1 June

Military ranks abolished, and pre-1955 system, which used positional ranks, such as company commander, to denote authority, restored.

17 September

China delivers ultimatum to India demanding Indians dismantle fortifications on Chinese side of China-Sikkim frontier within 72 hours.

24 September

After extending the time limit in the ultimatum by an additional three days, Peking sends a new note to New Delhi stating that the Indians have withdrawn their troops and dismantled the fortifications before the expiration of the ultimatum.

29 September

At a far-ranging press conference in Peking, Ch'en-Yi declares that the war in Vietnam is going well for the Viet Cong; asserts that China is ready for an invasion by the US and its henchmen, including the Soviet Union; promises material assistance for Pakistan if the war with India is continued; states that Peking has not received any request by other nations for assistance in developing a nuclear program; and raises Peking's price for UN membership by declaring that the UN will have to be reorganized, the UN condemnation of China as an aggressor in the Korean war withdrawn, and all "imperialist puppets ousted."

I-19

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

October

Peking launches successful campaign to obtain postponement of Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers following conclusion that USSR would gain admission to conference and that conference would fail to denounce US involvement in Vietnam along the lines sought by China.

October-November

After initially avoiding comment on the 1 October coup attempt in Indonesia, Peking strongly protests harassment of Chinese officials and personnel in Indonesia and in protest notes on 18 October, 25 October, and 4 November declares that the Indonesian Government is "condoning" anti-Chinese activities and that Indonesia's army authorities are attempting to "sabotage" Chinese-Indonesian relations.

17 November

Vote to grant Chinese seat in UN General Assembly fails but Peking receives largest number of votes to date (47 for, 47 against, with 20 abstentions).

I-20

II. POLITICAL

A. Government structure

- l. General: The structure of government outlined in Communist China's constitution of 1954 exists not as the organization of political authority in China but as one of the systems of political control created by the Communist regime. The locus of power and authority in China is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP makes all policy decisions; the government carries them out. The party directs the administration of government in China by staffing top government, including military, posts with its own men. (Map)
- 2. Legislative: The National People's Congress (NPC), an indirectly elected, one-house legislature, is theoretically the highest organ of state power in Communist China (Chart). It is empowered by the constitution to enact, execute, and interpret the laws, to amend the constitution, to elect the chairman of the People's Republic of China (chief of state), and to elect a Standing Committee to serve when the NPC is not in session. The Standing Committee has nominal responsibility over the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and has other formal legislative duties.

As in other Communist countries, the constitutional powers of the legislature are a facade. The NPC merely approves decisions already made by the Communist Party. The NPC, which has a statutory four-year term, is supposed to meet in annual sessions and in its early years received great publicity. In recent years, however, one session has been canceled and others have been held in secret. The third NPC which convened in December 1964 was one and a half years overdue.

Deputies to the NPC (roughly 3,000 at the Third NPC in December 1964) are elected to a four-year term by people's congresses at the provincial level.

II-1


- 3. Chief of state: The chairman of the People's Republic of China, China's chief of state, performs the same kind of ceremonial functions as the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He convenes and chairs two national advisory bodies—the National Defense Council and the Supreme State Conference—both of which have only nominal responsibilities. Liu Shao—ch'i has been China's chief of state since 1959, but his acknowledged power and status de—rive from his party role, not from his chief of state role.
- 4. Executive: The heart of the government structure in Communist China is the State Council, constitutionally the highest executive and administrative organ of the state. It is elected by the NPC Standing Committee in theory to serve as its agent and is responsible to it. In practice, it takes orders directly from the highest organs of the CCP and is the main implementing force for party policies.

Headed by Premier Chou En-lai since 1949, the State Council administers a huge bureaucracy of ministries, commissions, special agencies, and provincial-level governments, nearly 100 in all (Table II A). Through this extensive bureaucracy, it oversees all important aspects of government administration, draws up legislation, issues directives and decisions, directs the armed forces, conducts foreign affairs, maintains internal security, supervises preparation and implementation of national economic plans and state budgets, controls foreign and domestic trade . manages economic production and construction, administers scientific research and development, and directs national programs in the fields of culture, education, and public health.


Premier Chou, who also serves on the party's top body, the Politburo Standing Committee, derives considerable real power from his position as chief of government. There are also

I I -2

Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3



Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3



25X1

TABLE II A

Government Offices Subordinate to the State Council, 1965

	Top Administrator
Ministry of National Defense	Lin Fiao
General Staff Department, PLA	Lo Jui-ch'ing
Staff Office for Foreign Af- fairs	Ch'en Yi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ch'en Yi
Staff Office for Internal Af- fairs	Hsieh Fu-chih
Ministry of Public Security Ministry of Internal Affairs	Hsieh Fu-chih Tseng Shan
Staff Office for Industry and Communications	Po I-po
lst Ministry of Machine Building	Tuan Chun-i
2nd Ministry of Machine Building	Liu Chieh
3rd Ministry of Machine Building	Sun Chih-yuan
4th Ministry of Machine Building	Wang Cheng
5th Ministry of Machine Building	Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng
6th Ministry of Machine Building	Fang Ch'iang
7th Ministry of Machine Building	Wang Fing-chang
8th Ministry of Machine Building	Ch'en Cheng-jen
Darrang	on en oneng-jen

TABLE II A

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

Ministry of Petroleum Industry Ministry of Chemical Industry Ministry of Metallurgical Industry Ministry of Coal Industry 1st Ministry of Light Industry 2nd Ministry of Light Industry Ministry of Textile Industry Ministry of Building Construction Ministry of Building Materials Ministry of Allocation of Materials Ministry of Railways Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power Ministry of Communications Ministry of Labor Ministry of Geology Ministry of Posts and Tele-Communications

Yu Ch'iu-li
Kao Yang
Lu Tung
Chang Lin-chih
Li Chu-ch'en
Hsu Yun-pei
Chiang Kuang-nai
Liu Yu-min
Lai Chi-fa
Yuan Pao-hua

Lu Cheng-ts'ao Fu Tso-i

Sun Ta-kuang Ma Wen-jui Li Ssu-kuang Chu Hsueh-fan

Staff Office for Finance and Trade

Ministry of Finance Ministry of Food Ministry of Commerce Ministry of Foreign Trade Li Hsien-nien

Li Hsien-nien
Sha Ch'ien-li
Yao I-lin
Yeh Chi-chuang
(Lin Hai-yun, acting)

Staff Office for Agriculture and Forestry

Ministry of Agriculture

Ministry of State Farms and Land Reclamation Ministry of Aquatic Products Ministry of Forestry T'an Chen-lin

Liao Lu-yen (Chiang I-chen, acting) Wang Chen

Hsu Te-heng Liu Wen-hui

TABLE II A

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

Staff Office for Culture and Ed- Chang Chi-ch'un ucation

Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Public Health

Lu Ting-i
Chiang Nan-hsiang
Ho Wei
Ch'ien Hsin-chung

Commissions

State Flanning Commission Li Fu-ch'un State Economic Commission Po I-po Scientific and Technological Nieh Jung-chen Commission State Capital Construction Ku Mu Commission Commission for Economic Re-Fang I lations with Foreign Countries Commission for Cultural Rela-Chang Hsi-jo tions with Foreign Countries Commission for Overseas Chi-Liao Ch'eng-chih nese Affairs Nationalities Affairs Com-Wu Lan-fu (Ulanfu) mission Physical Cultural Sports Ho Lung

Bureaus and Special Agencies

Commission

Bureau of State Statistics
People's Bank of China
Agricultural Bank of China
Bank of China
Scientific and Technical
Cadres Bureau
Bureau of Foreign Experts
New China News Agency
Broadcasting Administration
Bureau
Civil Aviation General Administration Bureau
Bureau of Government Offices
Administration

Wang Ssu-hua

Hu Ching-yun

Yueh Chih-chien

Mi Yung Wu Leng-hsi Mei I

K'uang Jen-nung

Kao Teng-pang

TABLE II A

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

Bureau of State Housing Administration Religious Affairs Bureau Central Meteorological Bureau Committee for Reform of Chinese Written Language Central Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce State Bureau of Surveying and Cartography Office of Councillors China Travel and Tourism Administrative Bureau State Oceanography Bureau Bureau of State Archives Foreign Language Publication

and Distribution Bureau

Chao P'eng-fei

Hsiao Hsien-fa Jao Hsing

Wu Yu-chang

Hsu Ti-hsin

Ch'en Wai-ou

Tseng I-fan Yuan Ch'ao-chun

Ch'i Yung Tseng San Lo Chun

Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Special Municipalities Directly Under Control of the Central Government

> Anhwei Chekiang Fukien Heilungkiang Honan Hopeh Hunan Hupeh Kansu Kiangsi Kiangsu Kirin Kwangtung Kweichow Liaoning Shansi Shantung Shensi Szechwan Tsinghai Yunnan

Huang Yen
Chou Chien-jen
Wei Chin-shui
Li Fan-wu
Wen Min-sheng
Liu Tzu-hou
Ch'eng Ch'ien
Chang T'i-hsueh
Teng Pao-shan

Hui Yu-yu
Li Yu-wen
Ch'en Yu
Li Li
Huang Ou-tung
Wei Heng
Pai Ju-ping
Li Ch'i-ming
Li Ta-chang
Wang Chao
Chou Hsing

TABLE II A

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region
Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous
Region
Ningsia Hui Autonomous
Region
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous
Region
Tibet Autonomous Region
Peking Municipality
Shanghai Municipality

Wu Lan-fu (Ulanfu)
Wei Kuo-ch'ing

Yang Ching-jen

Sai Fu-ting (Saifudin)

Ngapo Ngawang Jigme P'eng Chen

15 vice premiers on the State Council, all with high party rank (Chart). Eleven are politburo members or alternates, and the remaining four are among the central committee members most likely to be advanced to the politburo at the next party congress. Eleven are also ministers, commission chairmen, or staff office directors.

- 5. Judicial: The two theoretically independent judicial bodies are also appointed by and responsible to the NPC Standing Committee. The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ of the state, supervising a system of provincial, local, and special courts. Investigation, law enforcement, and criminal prosecution are vested in the Supreme People's Procuratorate public prosecutor. Neither body is truly independent; both are coordinated with administrative bodies of the government by party direction.
- 6. Local government: Communist China is structurally a unitary, not a federal state. Executive bodies in the 28 provincial level units (21 provinces, 5 "autonomous regions," and 2 special municipalities—Peking and Shanghai—are directly subordinate to the State Council. There are two other major levels of local government: the hsien or county, subordinate to the province; and the hsiang or township, subordinate to the hsien.

B. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

1. General: All political power in China is concentrated in the CCP. Key posts in the government administration, the military, mass organizations, and economic enterprises at all levels are held by party members subject to strict party discipline. The party maintains a monopoly of news and information media and a tight control on the police and armed forces. The CCP is the largest Communist party in the world, with 18 million members in 1964 (about 2.5 percent of the population, compared to 11.5 million, or about 5 percent of the population, in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). More than 75 percent of

II -3

CCP's members have entered the party since it seized state power in 1949. About 60 percent of the members are of peasant background, only about 15 percent are from the proletariat. (The remainder are "intellectuals" or are from other unspecified groups.)

2. Party structure


Theoretical: The CCP is organized on the principle of "democratic centralism," with each level theoretically being elected by the next lower level (Chart). By the party constitution, basic-level general memberships are scheduled annually to elect basic-level party committees (executives) and delegates to the hsien (county) level party congresses. The hsien party congresses elect hsien party committees and, at least every three years, delegates to the provincial level party congresses. Finally, the provincial party congresses elect provincial party committees and delegates to the national party congress. The national party congress, which is elected for a five-year term and should meet annually, is theoretically the highest organ of party power. It elects top party officers and a central committee to act when the congress is not in session. The central committee in turn elects a smaller politburo to act when it is not in session, plus a politburo standing committee, a secretariat, and a central control commission.


b. Actual practice: Congress sessions are rarely held on schedule, and "elections" are all carefully controlled from above. The locus of power is in the standing committee of the politburo (currently seven men). Ultimate power is held by one man-Party Chairman Mao Tsetung-to a degree matched in other Communist regimes only by Stalin during his last decade of rule. The party congress and central committee have been rubber stamps, with all party policies and directives flowing from Mao, the standing committee, and the politburo, while the secretariat

II-4

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

Relationship of Chinese Communist Party to Government Structure





serves as traffic manager for their implementation at lower levels of the party or by the government. The secretariat is aided by the ten or move central departments, each of which handles a functional specialty (foreign intelligence, propaganda, party organization, ideological training, women's work, youth work, united front work, liaison with foreign Communist parties), and by the party regional bureaus, which supervise and direct the work of lower level party committees. Two commissions have separate, elite status: the control commission, which investigates loyalty and enforces discipline among party members, and the military affairs committee, which drafts and directs basic military pollcy for the party.

3. Party leadership and the succession problem

Present leadership: At the apex of Communist China's power structure is Mao Tsetung, tough, ruthless, egotistical, largely ignorant of the outside world, but shrewd and practical in Chinese politics. Just under Mao is a select inner circle -- the next five most powerful leaders -who help Mao to decide policy and see that it is carried out. Four are politburo standing committee members-Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Chou Enlai, and Lin Piao; the fifth -- P'eng Chen -- has probably been an actual, but unnamed, member since In the third rank are most of the other politburo members plus a small number of leaders, some of whom will be elected to the next politburo, altogether 20 to 30 men (Table II B). Second-echelon leaders -- those who man top posts in the party, government, and military bureaucracy just below the politburo--number about 800. Most of them went on the Long March with Mao in 1934-1935 when he was driven from Central China to Northwest China; as a group they are probably as dedicated and extreme as their superiors. Communist China's leadership ranks are remarkably stable, but aging. Mao has faced two serious factional challenges

II-5

since 1949, however. The second in 1959 involved Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai and other top military leaders who sought to modify Mao's views on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Likely successors to Mao: who was 72 on 26 December 1965 and who has a cardiovascular problem, has been arranging for a transfer of power. His designated heir is Liu Shao-ch'i, now chief of state and No. 2 man in the CCP. Liu has been Mao's chief lieutenant for decades, is capable, ideologically intransigent, but lacks Mao's prestige and is already 67 himself. Prospects for a power struggle after Liu goes are somewhat greater. Teng Hsiao-p'ing now appears to be second in line because he holds a strategic party position and is favored by Mao and Liu over the comparatively moderate Chou En-Among other contenders are P'eng Chen, Lin Piao, Lo Jui-ch'ing, and T'ao Chu (Table II C). When the "second generation" of Chinese leaders take over from Mao's Long March veterans, not likely before 1975, chances are good tha Peking's policies will become somewhat less militant, less doctrinaire, and more practical.

C. National Policies

General: National policy in Communist China is directed to building China in the shortest time possible into a strong, unified, modern nation restored to its "rightful" leading role in Asia and the world, respected for its military, political, and industrial power, honored for its culture, and turned to for its principled interpretation of Communist doctrine and as a model by the whole underdeveloped world for its economic organization. These aims are shaped both by the militant, anti-imperialist Communism of Mao and the CCP and by the nationalistic, antiforeign temper of a historically frustrated They are severely hindered by Chinese nation. China's tradition-bound rural society and by the pressure of the enormous and expanding population on its limited resources.

II-6

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

TABLE II B

Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (listed according to party rank)

Standing Committee

Full Members	Age, 1965	Top Posts		
Mao Tse-tung	72	Chairman, Central Committee of the CCP		
Liu Shao-ch'i	67	Chairman, Chinese People's Republic		
Chou En-lai	67	Premier, State Council		
Chu Te	79	Chairman, National People's Congress; inactive, old		
Ch'en Yun	60	Inactive, out of favor		
Lin Piao	57	Member, Military Affairs Committee; Minister of Na- tional Defense; chronically sick		
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	65	Secretary General, Central Committee		
Other Full Members				
Tung Pi'wu	79	Secretary, Control Commis- sion		
P'eng Chen	65	Member, Party Secretariat; First Secretary, Peking Municipal CCP Committee		
Ch'en Yi	64	Minister of Foreign Affairs		
Li Fu-ch'un	65	Chairman, State Planning Commission; Member, Party Secretariat		
P'eng Te-huai	66	Inactive, out of favor		
Liu Po-ch'eng	73	Member, Military Affairs Committee; Inactive, old		
Ho Lung	69	Member, Military Affairs Committee		
Li Hsien-nien	58	Minister of Finance; Member, Party Secretariat		
Li Ching-ch'uan	60	First Secretary, Southwest Regional Bureau of the CCP		
T'an Chen-lin	62	Member, Party Secretariat; Director, Agriculture and Forestry Staff Office,		

SECRET

State Council

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

TABLE II B

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

Alternate Members	Age, 1965	
Wu Lan-fu (Ulanfu)	61	Top Posts First Secretary A
Chang Wen-t'ien Lu Ting-i	67 64	First Secretary, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region CCP Committee Inactive, out of favor Director, Propaganda Department Deputy Director, Propaganda Department Member, Party Secretariat Chairman, State Economic Commission
Ch'en Po-ta	60	
K'ang Sheng Po I-po	66 58	

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

TABLE II C

Chinese Communist Leaders Who Are Not Politburo Members But Who Rank High in the Apparent Power Structure

	Age, 1965	Top Posts
Lo Jui-ch'ing	58	Chief, PLA General Staff; Member, Military Affairs Committee; Member, Sec- retariat
T'ao Chu	56	First Secretary, Central- South Regional Bureau of the CCP
Nieh Jung-chan	66	Member, Military Affairs Committee; Chairman, Scientific and Technolog- ical Commission, V.P.
Li Hsueh-feng	59	First Secretary, North China Regional Bureau of the CCP
Liu Lan-t'ao	61	First Secretary, Northwest Regional Bureau of the CCP
Yeh Chien-ying	67	Member, Military Affairs Committee
Hsieh Fu-chih	57 - 6 8	Director, Internal Affairs Staff Office, State Coun- cil; Minister of Public Security
Sung Jen-ch'iung	61	First Secretary, Northeast Regional Bureau of the CCP
Hsiao Hua	50	Director, General Political Department, PLA; Member, Military Affairs Committee
Liao Ch'eng-chih	57	Deputy Director, Foreign Af- fairs Staff Office, State Council; Chairman, Over- seas Chinese Affairs Com- mission
Yang Yung	59	Commander, Feking Military Region; Deputy Chief, FLA General Staff
Yang Shang-k'un	58	Alternate Member, Central Committee Secretariat, and Director of its Administra- tive Office
Wu Hsiu-ch'uan	·57	Director, International Liaison Department

Approved For Release 2009/04/23 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010001-3 \pmb{SECRET}

COMMUNIST CHINA January 1966

TABLE II C

	Age, 1965	Top Posts
Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien	63	Member, Military Affairs Com- mittee
Wang Shu-sheng	62	Vice Minister, National De- fense; Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff
Hsiao Ching-kuang	64	Navy Commander; Vice Minis- ter of National Defense
Yang Ch'eng-wu	61	Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff
Liu Ning-i	59	Chairman, All-China Federa- tion of Trade Unions; Dep- uty Director, Foreign Af- fairs Staff Office, State Council
An Tzu-wen	64	Director, Organization De- partment
Tseng Shan	61 - 75	Minister of Internal Affairs

- Domestic policy: The Communist regime has sought to create a large, modern industrial base, to increase agricultural production, and to attain economic self-sufficiency, all under centralized economic planning and control. Since the disasters of the "leap forward," the chief emphasis has been on the military industries, on agriculture, and on the industries supporting agriculture. The regime also intends to carry through revolutionary social changes in order to obtain a literate population completely responsive to the party's will. It has undertaken to organize the entire population into party-run collective units, to indoctrinate everybody in Mao's austere ideals, to eliminate all resistance to party direction through coercive and persuasive social controls, to expand education (especially higher education), and to assimilate gradually China's ethnic minorities.
- Foreign policy: Peking conceives of the US as the strongest capitalist and imperialist nation in the world, and therefore as the chief antagonist frustrating Communist China's international ambitions and the chief military threat to the Communist regime. Peking's first policy aim is to undermine the US position in Asia, to recover Taiwan, and to extend its influence throughout Southeast Asia. Second, within the Communist world, it seeks to discredit Soviet leadership and take the ideological helm itself by promoting "just wars of liberation" and Mao's guerrilla tactics in underdeveloped and newly independent countries. Third, it strives to undercut India, its chief rival in the developing world, and gain undisputed leadership of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Finally, it seeks broad international recognition, including entry into the UN on its own terms.
- 4. Military policy: Peking's chief military aim is to build a modern military establishment that includes a nuclear delivery capability. This entails strong emphasis on scientific research and development, priority development of the mili-

II-7

tary industries, and efforts to make its huge ground force effective, and to improve its air and naval arms. All of these efforts have been severely hampered since the termination of Soviet aid in mid-1960. Peking further intends to maintain complete party control over the military.

D. Dissidence and Control

- 1. Dissidence: The Chinese Communist regime appears to be strong and stable; its authority is unchallenged on the mainland of Since the failure of the "leap forward" (1959-1962), however, former strong popular support has given way to disillusionment, discontent, and apathy in all segments of the population. Particularly serious over the long range is the cynical attitude of China's youth toward the regime's programs. Open resistance since 1949 has been limited to a few instances: Tibetan rebellion of 1959; spontaneous, sporadic armed disturbances in Honan Province and elsewhere during food shortages in 1960; mass exoduses from western Sinkiang and Kwangtung Province in 1962; and other, localized uprisings in the northwestern minority areas in the 1950s. All these incidents were rapidly contained and terminated.
- 2. Social controls: Major factors of continued regime control include: (1) a cohesive, stable CCP leadership; (2) a large, disciplined party organization; (3) a strong military establishment under tight party control; (4) an extensive police and public security network, backed up by a large militia force; (5) an elaborate system of organizational controls (in party, government, and mass organizations) which links the party and government with the mass of the populace and greatly enhances the ability of the party leaders to coerce and indoctrinate key social groups; and (6) a party and government monopoly of all public information media.

II-8