


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OCI No. 0505/66


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BIWEEKLY REPORT

COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

28 February 1966

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.
28 February 1966

MEMORANDUM

Attached is a compilation of Communist statements on possible direct military intervention in the Vietnam situation, and on possible negotiations toward a settlement, received since our biweekly report (OCI No. 0504/66) issued 15 February 1966.

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SUMMARY

NEGOTIATIONS

INTERVENTION

USSR Moscow's position on the subject of negotiations has not changed in the last two weeks.


The Soviet Union's public expressions of support for the DRV have given no indication of any shift in Moscow's position.

China The Chinese continue to underscore their opposition to any negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict except on the Communist terms.

Peking appears to have embarked on a campaign to stir up fears of a general war in Asia by spreading the word through private channels. Public Chinese statements, however, continue to imply that the Chinese will not take the lead in provoking a war with the US.


DRV Recent DRV statements on the possibility of bringing the Vietnam war to a negotiated conclusion have continued to insist that the US must recognize Hanoi's four-point stand before a political settlement of the war can be envisaged. Hanoi has given special emphasis to US acceptance of point number three--that of dealing with the Liberation Front. Hanoi has insisted that this is in essence the "most important" of all its points.

The North Vietnamese have continued to reiterate their intention of giving all-out support to the South Vietnamese insurgents but have made no specific reference to the possibility of actual intervention in the war.



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NEGOTIATIONS

INTERVENTION

NFLSV During the past two weeks the Front officials have offered only the standard reiteration of their position on bringing the war to a negotiated conclusion.

There have been no significant statements by the Liberation Front on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention

Selected Soviet
Public Statements

Selected Soviet
Private Statements

Comments

11 February 1966: A TASS Statement which attacked the agreement of the Honolulu Conference routinely reiterated Soviet determination to continue rendering the DRV "all comprehensive assistance and support."

The Soviet Union's public expressions of support for the DRV have given no indication of change in Moscow's position.

18 February 1966: In reply to a question at a press conference, General Batitiskiy, the first deputy chief of staff of the Soviet army, stated that the USSR had helped and would continue to help the fighting people of Vietnam. He said, "the US aggressors are already coming to feel the Soviet peoples' aid to fighting Vietnam."

23 February 1966: A Pravda commentary which assessed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings spoke of the increased importance for all anti-imperialist forces to "multiply one hundred fold" their efforts against US aggression in South East Asia.

This very vague and general statement adds nothing to the strength of previous Soviet statements.

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Intervention

Selected Chinese Public Statements

Selected Chinese Private Statements

Comments

20 February 1966: The People's Daily declared that "should US imperialism dare to attack China, it will be courting its doom." [redacted]

A repetition of Peking's standard line implying that China will not provoke a war with the US. [redacted]

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[Large redacted block]

This appears to be part of a current Chinese campaign to stir up fears of a general war in Asia by spreading the word through private channels. While Peking has made general public statements of support for Laos and Cambodia in the face of an alleged impending US attack on those countries, the Chinese are very unlikely to fulfill these pledges by sending troops except as part of a larger decision to increase the Chinese involvement in Vietnam or as part of a general Sino-US war involving all of Southeast Asia. [redacted]

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations

Selected Soviet
Public Statements

Selected Soviet
Private Statements

Comments

2 February 1966: An Indian Em-
bassy official [redacted]

[redacted] that since
Shelepin's return from Hanoi,
Soviet officials including
Premier Kosygin have been em-
phasizing to the Indians that
the US should talk directly to
the National Liberation Front
about a Vietnam settlement.

Such statements by Soviet
officials underscore Moscow's
appreciation of the limita-
tions on its maneuverability.
The USSR is still unwilling
to act out of concert with the
DRV.

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Selected Soviet
Public Statements

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Private Statements

Comments

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5 February 1966: When queried [redacted] about the role non-aligned countries might play in easing the tension in Vietnam, Foreign Minister Gromyko commented, "the situation in Vietnam is complicated and delicate. We cannot give you any concrete advice... We cannot act as some sort of intermediary or as advisors and we have not been authorized by the DRV Government to do so."

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11 February 1966: The TASS statement on the US-South Vietnam Conference in Honolulu repeated Moscow's standard public position that a "genuine solution" can be reached on the basis of the "just" position of the DRV and the NFLSV.

Moscow's public position in support of the DRV's stand on a Vietnamese settlement remains unchanged.

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Negotiations

Selected Chinese
Public Statements

Selected Chinese
Private Statements

Comments

18 February 1966: In an article attacking British support for US policy in Vietnam, the People's Daily asserts that Prime Minister Wilson "took the lead in very warmly welcoming Lyndon Johnson's unconditional discussions swindle." It adds "As soon as the US recklessly resumed its bombing of North Vietnam after the failure of its pause-in-bombing trick, Wilson declared that his government had an obligation to support this aggressive action" and declares "not reconciled with the failure of one peace talks hoax after another, Washington declared that it would go on with its maneuvers for peace talks."

Peking is reiterating its standard hard line on negotiations.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

18 February 1966: Vice Premier Po I-po declared that "The Vietnam question must be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Vietnamese people, namely, the four point stand of the DRV and the five-part statement of the Liberation Front. The heart of the matter is that all US armed forces must be

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Selected Chinese
Public Statements

Selected Chinese
Private Statements

Comments

18 February 1966 Cont'd: with-
drawn from South Vietnam and
that the US must recognize
the Liberation Front as the
sole lawful representative of
the South Vietnamese people.
There is no other alterna-
tive." [redacted]

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24 February 1966: NCNA re-
ported that at a Peking ban-
quet honoring the visiting
Ghanaian President, Liu Shao-
chi declared that the US
"only gave lip service to
peace but actually acted
to expand the war. Under
such a condition, whatever
the peace proposal may be...
its objective result can
only be helping the US in
achieving its purpose of
continuous occupation of
South Vietnam and of per-
petual division of Vietnam."

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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations

Selected DRV
Public Statements

Selected DRV
Private Statements

Comments

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[Redacted]

Premier Pham Van Dong claimed that the only genuine political party in the South was the NFLSV. Negotiations therefore, he stated, mean negotiations with the Front. "If the Americans do not want to negotiate with the Front, there will be no negotiations. This is considered the most important point of the "four-points."

One recent element in the DRV's position on settling the war has been the insistence that the US must deal directly with the Liberation Front. While this is no different from the original DRV position it does lay specific emphasis on what has evolved as a key issue in the negotiations controversy.

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[Redacted]

12 February 1966: An article in the party daily by "Chien Si" --fighter--stated in part that "One cannot negotiate with murderers; the only way to end the Vietnam war is for the US aggressors to get out of South Vietnam."

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The main purpose of articles by "Chien Si" is to get across to the cadres the latest trend in party lines on the war. "Chien Si" is a pseudonym for an unknown author, but he is probably a party propagandist associated with the party daily, Nhan Dan. Articles by this writer are periodic features of the DRV press and are usually heavily exhortative.

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Selected DRV
Public Statements

Selected DRV
Private Statements

Comments

12 February 1966: Hanoi Radio in an international broadcast reiterated the stand of the committee on Vietnam of the tricontinental congress. Hanoi repeated that the committee had called upon the world's peoples "to support the five-point statement of the NFLSV and the four-point stand of the DRV."

Hanoi has continued to give publicity to any group that offers support for the DRV position on settling the war. It has been part of Hanoi's propaganda campaign to demonstrate that there is ever-growing world support for the Vietnamese Communists.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] if the US wanted the war in Vietnam to end "it will have to recognize the NFLSV as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, stop bombing the North, and accept the DRV four-points for a settlement, which are the expression of the Geneva agreements."

16 February 1966: In an interview with a Danish Communist correspondent DRV Premier Pham Van Dong stated in part that "Peace in Vietnam need not be searched for anywhere. It lies in the

From recent private and public statements it appears that Hanoi views Ho Chi Minh's letter of 24 January as the latest official DRV pronouncement of its position on settling the war. This position differs

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Selected DRV
Public Statements

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Private Statements

Comments

16 February 1966 Cont'd: in the four-point stand of the DRV which is an expression of the main principle of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and in the 22 March 1965 statement by the NFLSV.

in no significant way from the original pronouncement of the four-points in April of last year.

In his 24 January 1966 letter to the heads of state of many countries, President Ho Chi Minh pointed out the only correct path to peace: If the US Government really wants a peaceful settlement, it must recognize the four-point stand of the DRV Government and prove this by actual deeds; it must end unconditionally and for good the bombing raids and all other war acts against the DRV. Only in this way can a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem be envisaged." [redacted]

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18 February 1966: An article by Quang Loi in the Hanoi weekly Vietnam Courier stated in part, "To settle the Vietnam question, the Government of the DRV has put forward the four-point stand which is an expression of the essential provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. This is a stand of peace.

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Selected DRV
Public Statements

Selected DRV
Private Statements

Comments

18 February 1966 Cont'd: Having gone through over 20 years of war, the Vietnamese people desire peace more eagerly than any one else to build their life. But real peace can by no means be dissociated from genuine independence. So long as the US army of aggression still remains on our soil, our people will resolutely fight against it." [redacted]

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18 February 1966: An article by "Chien Si"--fighter--in the party daily Nhan Dan stated in part that "Life sometimes is full of things which are as clear as broad daylight but which certain persons do not see, do not want to see, or pretend not to see. The problem of war and peace in Vietnam, for one, is as clear as broad daylight; US imperialism is the aggressor; Vietnam, victim of aggression must fight to the end in self-defense. The United States must end its war of aggression, then peace will immediately be restored in Vietnam." [redacted]

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Selected National Liberation Front References to Negotiations

Selected Liberation
Front Public Statements

Selected Liberation
Front Private Statements

Comments

14 February 1966: In an interview with a correspondent of the London Daily Worker Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Liberation Front asserted that "the US imperialists must stop their aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw from there all troops and weapons of the US and its satellites, abolish the US military bases in South Vietnam, effectively respect the independence, sovereignty, and basic national rights of the Vietnamese people as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam; the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves without foreign interference. The NFLSV, the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, must have its role and decisive voice in the settlement of the South Vietnam issue."

This statement amounts to a reiteration of the Fronts five-point stand on settling the war set forward in March of last year.

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