


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM


Information as of 1600
14 October 1966

ARMY review(s) completed.

• NSA review completed

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PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010039-9

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010039-9

14 October 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

ARVN forces have captured a large enemy communications center near Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. The controversial issue of what the powers of the Constituent Assembly are is delaying progress even on procedural matters.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Allied forces participating in the major ground offensive in Binh Dinh Province--Operation IRVING--have located an extensive enemy communications center and medical facility (Para. 1). US Marines conducting Operation PRAIRIE continue to report light contact with enemy units northwest of Quang Tri city (Para. 2). South Vietnamese Regional Forces have reported a series of successful engagements with the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta, some 55 miles southwest of Saigon (Para. 3). Weekly South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 4).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The members of the council of the Buddhist Institute reportedly tendered their resignations to the supreme patriarch of the church on 11 October (Para. 1). Citizens of the Saigon area have been asked by the Viet Cong's Liberation News Agency to boycott South Vietnam's National Day celebrations on 1 November (Para. 2). The procedural work of the Constituent Assembly is proceeding with difficulty (Para. 3).

III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

VI. Other Major Aspects: Analysis of the recent fighting in Binh Dinh Province.

ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics from 1963

Through 2-8 October 1966

- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

To July 1966

- South Vietnamese Desertions


To 5 October 1966

- Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Returnees

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties
And Weapons Losses - 1962 to 30 Sept 1966:

- General Statistical Data
- Composite Annual Totals
- Viet Cong Incidents

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Elements of four ARVN battalions participating in the joint US/ROK/ARVN Operation IRVING in the coastal lowlands of Binh Dinh Province yesterday captured an enemy communications center located about 27 miles north-northwest of Qui Nhon. The complex, apparently deserted by enemy troops, contained three telephone switchboards, an electric power generator, two high-frequency radio sets, and two short-range transmitters which were tuned to ARVN unit frequencies. In addition, US forces of the 1st Air Cavalry Division operating about 35 miles north-northwest of Qui Nhon located a sizable enemy medical facility which had been partially evacuated.

2. In Operation PRAIRIE, US Marines continued to report light contact on 13 and 14 October with enemy units, ranging in size from platoon to company, in a tactical sweep area 16 to 25 miles northwest of Quang Tri city. Six marines were killed and 16 wounded in the series of engagements, in contrast to known Communist losses of 26 killed.

3. In the Mekong Delta, a South Vietnamese task force consisting of two Regional Force battalions and River Assault Group units operating in an area approximately 55 miles southwest of Saigon established contact with enemy units in 14 separate locations during 12-13 October. In the ensuing firefights, 28 Viet Cong were killed, six captured, and 45 enemy sampans sunk, as against friendly losses of one killed and nine wounded.

Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

4. The week of 2-10 October compared with the week of 25 September - 1 October.

I. Viet Cong Incidents

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>At-tacks</u>	<u>Regimental size</u>	<u>Battalion size</u>
25 Sep-1 Oct	14	0	0
2-10 Oct	17	0	0

I. Viet Cong Incidents (continued)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Company size</u>	<u>Harassment</u>	<u>Terrorism</u>
25 Sep-1 Oct	1	382	33
2-10 Oct	2	358	27

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Sabo-tage</u>	<u>Propa-ganda</u>	<u>Anti-Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Incidents</u>
25 Sep-1 Oct	8	26	116	579
2-10 Oct	13	12	238	665

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>
Killed	1,624	1,471	87	160
Wounded	-----	-----	268	425
Missing/ Captured	<u>388</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>18</u>
TOTALS	2,012	2,129	376	603

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>
Killed	99	91	16	24
Wounded	642	604	48	70
Missing/ Captured	<u>12</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	753	712	64	94

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III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>	<u>25 Sep-1 Oct</u>	<u>2-10 Oct</u>
Individual	Not	Not	65	133
Crew-Served	Reported	Reported	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS			65	134

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The disintegration of the Buddhist Institute, following its unsuccessful involvement in antigovernment dissidence last spring, appears to be continuing. According to Vietnamese newspaper articles summarized by FBIS, the ruling clerical council of the Buddhist Institute resigned "en bloc" at a meeting on 11 October presided over by Thich Thien Khiet, the supreme patriarch of the church and head of clerical affairs. Khiet reportedly accepted the resignations. One of the articles claimed that a new "steering committee" of the council would be elected at a national Buddhist congress on 21 October. Previous plans to hold the on again - off again national extraordinary congress reportedly dissolved when the militant bonzes learned that moderate bonze Tam Chau had accepted a government invitation to reoccupy the vacated national pagoda grounds. Another article said that Thich Tri Quang, who is not a council member, also resigned his position as the secretary general of clerical affairs. There have been no official US Embassy comments yet on these recent developments.

Viet Cong Call for Boycott of Vietnamese National Day

2. According to an intercepted message the Viet Cong Liberation News Agency requested "compatriots, police, soldiers, and government workers in the Saigon - Gia Dinh area to boycott" the celebrations scheduled for 1 November, the third anniversary of the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. The news agency cautioned these people to stay away from sites of the celebration "to avoid any damage that may occur," possibly referring to Viet Cong plans to terrorize those who assemble to watch the proceedings.

Constituent Assembly Developments

3. Four more of the Constituent Assembly deputies whose seats were contested have been validated by the credentials committee, raising the total

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working membership at present to 106 out of a possible 117. During the 12 October session of the assembly, the deputies narrowly endorsed the controversial article two of the procedural rules, which states that the purpose of the body is to draft and approve a constitution. In the session on 13 October, however, a stormy debate on article two occurred, and it was agreed to vote on whether discussion of the article should be reopened. The vote that followed, 71 against and 46 for reopening the discussion, was clearly irregular since only 103 deputies were present. In the reported confusion that followed the irregular tally, the acting president of the assembly called for a recess and later announced that article two would be discussed later. According to a press account of the 13 October meeting, one of the delegates called the assembly a "council of rats."

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTSAn Analysis of Recent Fighting in Binh Dinh Province

1. The long-term impact of the five-week-old allied campaign in Binh Dinh Province, highlighted by Operation IRVING, on the Communist military position in central Vietnam is not yet clear. The series of coordinated allied search-and-destroy operations conducted in northeastern Binh Dinh since early September do appear to have seriously weakened and disorganized elements of the 610th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division, local Viet Cong regular and paramilitary forces, and the Viet Cong infrastructure believed to be present in the area.

2. US military authorities report that the 8,300-man 610th NVA Division has been badly hurt and seriously disorganized. According to MACV, the combat strength of its 2,600-man 12th NVA Regiment has been reduced by 40 to 50 percent. Another of its principal subordinates, the 2,600-man 2nd Viet Cong Regiment, has reportedly been forced to disperse to at least three widely separated areas. The headquarters of the 610th NVA Division is believed to have been forced to deploy northward to an area west of Bong Son (Hoai Nhon) into the operational zone of its third major subordinate--the 22nd NVA Regiment. However, although the 610th Division may have temporarily lost its capability to conduct multiregimental operations, it still retains the capability to attack targets in northeastern Binh Dinh in up to reinforced regimental strength.

3. Despite the identification of major North Vietnamese units in Binh Dinh, the bulk of enemy troops captured thus far during the allied campaign have been primarily Viet Cong main force and guerrilla troops rather than North Vietnamese regulars.

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That only 35 NVA troops have been identified from among some 3,400 captives taken in IRVING and earlier related operations, coupled with the disproportionately low ratio between enemy personnel losses and weapons captured, further suggests that the guerrillas bore the brunt of the fighting. These forces may have engaged in a determined rear guard action to cover the withdrawal of the majority of NVA regulars from the combat zone.

4. A press release in early October alleging that 66 members of the 610th NVA Division had surrendered to ARVN forces participating in IRVING was erroneous. In actual fact, six, not 66 enemy troops--unidentified as to regular or irregular type--came into ARVN custody on that date bearing surrender leaflets. This erroneous report has been seized upon by at least one US commentator as evidence that entire North Vietnamese units are now beginning to surrender. That so few North Vietnamese regulars were captured, however, indicates either that their morale and battlefield discipline is excellent and/or that the North Vietnamese units were able to escape largely intact.

5. On balance, it would appear from available information that the heavy defeat suffered by the Communists stemmed not as much from a general, prior deterioration in the Communist military situation in Binh Dinh, as from the fact that the tactical situation forced upon the Communists by Operation IRVING placed them in an inordinately poor field position which allowed them to become encircled.

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6. Perhaps the real significance of Operation IRVING, aside from its dispersal of Viet Cong/NVA main force units in the area, lies in its uprooting of the local Viet Cong infrastructure in at least the heavily populated districts of Phu My and Phu Cat. The reported exodus of more than 16,000 refugees from the combat operational area gives some indication of the extent to which Communist control and influence over the local population has been shaken.

How the Fighting Developed

7. The allied campaign in Binh Dinh began on 8 September when elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment on an unnamed operation engaged a battalion of the 12th NVA Regiment (610th Division) in the vicinity of Phu Ly Bridge astride coastal Route 1. One hundred and forty-seven enemy troops were reported killed, as against ARVN losses of 20 killed, 23 wounded, and 13 missing.

8. On 13 September, five battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division initiated Operation THAYER in an area centered about 53 miles northwest of Qui Nhon. A sixth battalion was added on 14 September, and a seventh on 21 September; however, the operation was reduced to four battalions by 28 September and then temporarily suspended on 1 October when its forces were committed to Operation IRVING. In 18 days of moderate-to-heavy contact, THAYER inflicted enemy losses of 230 killed (mostly NVA troops from the 12th Regiment), 66 captured (mostly Viet Cong), 681 suspects apprehended, and 124 weapons seized or destroyed. US casualties totaled 32 killed, 243 wounded, and four missing.

9. From 14 to 27 September, elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment were tasked with road-clearing and blocking force missions in support of US 1st Air Cavalry Division forces. The ARVN operations --BINH PHU 36 and 27--were conducted in the southern tactical sweep area of Operation THAYER, inflicting enemy losses of 229 killed and seven captured, in contrast to friendly losses of eight killed and 38 wounded.

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10. On 23 September, in this same general area --about 15 miles northwest of Qui Nhon--four battalions of the South Korean (ROK) Capital Infantry Division launched Operation MAENG HO 6 with the mission of pushing into the Communist-infested Phu Cat Mountain area from the south. Although contact in this operation has been primarily with small-scale Viet Cong local and guerrilla forces, the enemy casualty toll has been, nonetheless, heavy. From 23 to 30 September, ROK forces killed 351 Viet Cong, captured 158, detained 267 suspects, and seized or destroyed 131 weapons.

11. Finally, on 1 October, US/ROK/ARVN forces operating in the Phu Cat Mountain area were combined into a single search-and-clear operation--IRVING--approximately 30 miles north of Qui Nhon. The joint allied operational forces included seven battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division (including those detached from THAYER), four ROK battalions (committed from MAENG HO 6), and four battalions of the 22nd ARVN Regiment.

12. The operational concept of IRVING called for a three-pronged offensive against the Phu Cat Mountain area, with the immediate enemy target objective being the 400-man Viet Cong 50th Local Force Battalion, in addition to any elements of the 610th NVA Division operating in the area. US and ARVN forces were to launch a coordinated drive southward and eastward toward the objective area, linking up with ROK forces driving northward, thus forming a cordon to encircle and compress enemy troop concentrations against the Hung Lac Peninsula which juts into the South China Sea.

13. Heavy fighting erupted during the opening phase of IRVING on 1-2 October when US forces, attempting to secure an area in which three US helicopters had been shot down, were engaged by a Viet Cong/NVA force initially estimated to number 300 men. This action, in which 110 Communists were killed against minimal US losses, established the pattern of generally heavy fighting which continued through 11 October.

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14. After the initial contact on 1-2 October, the enemy was forced out of the Phu Cat highland area, first into the coastal lowlands of northern Phu Cat and southern Phu My districts, and ultimately onto the Hung Lac Peninsula with their backs to the sea. It was here that much of the heavy fighting between US and Communist forces occurred, much of it in caves in the hills that fringe the western shore of the peninsula.

Identification of Major Enemy Units Contacted By IRVING

15. As of 10 October, the following major enemy units had been identified in Binh Dinh: two infantry battalions of the 12th NVA Regiment (610th NVA Division); an engineer company of the 610th NVA Division; recoilless rifle and mortar companies of the 2nd Viet Cong Regiment (610th NVA Division); and a company of the 200th Antiaircraft Battalion (610th NVA Division). The 610th Division's remaining subordinate regiment--the 22nd NVA--is not known to have been encountered during the operation.



16. The total casualties resulting from Operation IRVING as of 14 October were: enemy losses of 1,497 killed, the same number--1,497--captured, 3,502 suspects apprehended, and more than 400 weapons seized. Allied losses totaled 39 killed (ten US), 193 wounded (83 US), and two US missing. Fighting reportedly has eased off and almost ceased during the last several days.

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

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

Weapons Losses




Personnel Losses (Excluding Wounded)



US Casualties to Date: Killed 5,412 Wounded 30,977 Captured 76 Missing 338




South Vietnamese Desertions



64207
10-66 CIA

Chieu Hoi Returnees



Yearly Total 5,417
Military 2,171

11,124
8,173

13,452 through 5 Oct.

64206
10-66 CIA

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 September 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	-	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
	1966	3235	573	2818	1522	-	121	483	2216	3301	594	829
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
	1966	3566	661	4239	1454	-	196	652	2311	4891	493	1087
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
	1966	3359	860	4815	1800	-	183	752	2843	5567	735	3761
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882
	1966	2844	1592	5532	1800	-	196	444	3598	5976	744	1483

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
	1966	2401	722	5857	1491	-	209	924	2422	6781	654	1298
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
	1966	2864	566	4447	1554	-	185	839	2305	5286	426	-
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
**1966	28953	6942	40768	15072	-	2529	5794	24543	46562	7090	-

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 30 September 1966

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 September 1966

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Harassment & Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small- Scale	Co. Size	Bn. Size or Larger	Total					
Jan	1962	1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
	1963	927	242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
	1964	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
	1965	2206	57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
	1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
Feb	1962	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
	1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	-
	1965	1982	73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
	1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
Mar	1962	1961	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
	1963	1282	333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
	1964	2160	198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
	1966	3670	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
Apr	1962	1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
	1963	1331	371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
	1964	2284	211	6	3	220	1738	169	157	-
	1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
	1966	3235	61	7	9	77	2238	252	110	513
May	1962	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
	1963	1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	-
	1964	2143	170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
	1966	3566	37	9	7	53	2552	295	106	560
Jun	1962	1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
	1963	1311	398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
	1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172
	1966	3359	47	10	11	68	2382	211	110	588

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Harassment & Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa-ganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	Co. Size	Bn. Size and Larger	Total				
1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	-
Jul 1963	1368	398	8	1	407	698	80	183	-
1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965	2520	42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
1966	2844	91	0	0	91	1906	200	86	561
1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	-
Aug 1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	-
1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965	2498	38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
1966	2401	59	10	5	74	1752	113	87	385
1962	1375	382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
Sep 1963	1763	483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
1966	2864	86	6	0	86	1972	90	115	601
1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	-
Oct 1963	1422	359	6	0	365	802	105	150	-
1964	2827	75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
1965	3330	24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
Nov 1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
1962	1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	-
Dec 1963	1921	258	3	0	261	1298	111	251	-
1964	2504	81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
1965	4106	32	18	7	57	2572	442	317	718
Composite Annual Totals									
1962	19076	5247	212	6	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	121	15	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	60	41	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	31529	531	81	73	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
*1966	28953	505	67	74	630	19498	1886	1239	5700

*Through 30 September 1966

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