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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Prepared Weekly

for the

SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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1. USSR-CHINA

Moscow has taken advantage of the indefensible position in which the Chinese have placed them-selves in the world view to resume the political offensive against Peking.

Soviet propaganda in the last few weeks has abandoned the restraint that had marked its comments on Chinese affairs since Khrushchev's fall. Moscow is making the most of the condemnation of Peking now issuing from most of the other Communist capitals. Within the past few days, the USSR has also published calls by the Sudanese and Ecuadorean parties for an all-party conference.

Moscow is obviously encouraging foreign parties to join the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in this concert of condemnation. The publication of the Sudanese and Ecuadorean declarations almost certainly was a trial balloon. A speech by North Korea's Kim Il-sung on 5 October, however, points up the opposition Moscow can expect from other "neutralists"--including Rumania, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and probably Poland--if it pushes for any formal rupture with the Chinese.

The Soviets also seem to be making points against the Chinese on the Vietnam front. Soviet persuasion must have had much to do with the recent flurry of
bloc promises and missions to Hanoi.

In sum, the Soviets are carrying the attack to the Chinese with as much support from the other Communists as they can reasonably muster. Whether they are actually planning some kind of joint and formal anti-Chinese action in the near future is unclear, but they are obviously taking soundings and preparing for that eventuality.

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3. EGYPT

The Nasir regime has instituted a strident propaganda campaign via press and radio in what seems to be an effort to demonstrate Egypt's ability to embarrass the US on a wide front.

For the most part, the campaign consists of disseminating "news" of US activities outside of Egypt. On the Vietnam issue Cairo radio has featured the Bertrand Russell plan to "try American war criminals." A government-run peasants' conference in late September formally accused the US of bombing Vietnamese peasants.

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On a subject closer to Nasir's immediate interests, the Cairo propaganda machine has widely disseminated charges of US plotting made by the Egyptian puppet regime in Yemen. For some time Cairo has claimed that the US supports King Faysal's "Islamic Solidarity Pact," which Nasir feels is aimed at him. The latest and most virulent attack is a "conspiracy against Syria" campaign, which alleges US, Saudi, and Jordanian collusion in subversive schemes. The major government—owned papers have given the charge front—page, banner headlines, and Cairo radio has devoted considerable time to it.

So far there has been no mention of the US position at Wheelus Air Base in Libya, which served as a target two years ago. Nasir may be holding this issue in reserve for a time when he wishes to step up the pressure.

No particular reason is known by the US intelligence community for this propaganda campaign.

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4. EGYPT-YEMEN

Nasir's problems with the Yemeni Arab Republic appear to be approaching a climax. During the past month Egyptian dominance has become increasingly blatant, and there are signs that it may become even more complete. By so doing, Nasir may undermine the very basis of his position, the tolerance of the republican tribes.

The tribes are the only effective political force in the country. By liberal use of gold and guns Nasir has generally succeeded in controlling those not in league with Imam Badr and the royal family. The tribes have viewed the Egyptians as a means of regaining political prerogatives for themselves which had been lost under recent imams.

The pervasiveness of Egyptian control has offended them more and more, however. They supported the ousted al-Amri government and initially backed its ill-fated attempt to face down the Egyptians last month. The al-Amri cabinet has been under arrest in Cairo since it "resigned," and Cairo appears to have dictated most of Sallal's new cabinet.

Nasir's next moves will hit the tribal leaders even harder. The trial of the followers of al-Amri apparently is to be completed soon. The Sallal government is purging most remaining republican leaders with independent strength. Nearly 100 top military officers have been dismissed and the paramount chief of Hashid, the most powerful tribe in Yemen, is reported under house arrest.

The imprisonment of these figures, especially the chief of Hashid, would probably drive many of the tribes into open rebellion. This would in turn almost certainly bring the royalist tribes to the side of their countrymen against the "foreign invaders," and might bring Saudi Arabia and the British in Aden to resume a more active role against Nasir.

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5. GUATEMALA

Following the accidental death of Communist guerrilla leader Luis Turcios, newly appointed FAR chief Cesar Montes held a mountain press conference in which he restated the guerrillas' commitment to revolution.

Montes denounced a major army counterinsurgent offensive now in progress and warned that continued military "provocation" would incite the FAR to step up its activities until the revolution was won. Montes also warned that the FAR was being provoked by extreme rightists who are plotting against the Mendez government and who have set out on a counterterrorist program directed against the Communists and other leftists.

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