


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MORI/CDF

Intelligence Handbook

Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Military Capabilities

Secret

24

3 April 1967
No. 0630/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 April 1967

Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Military Capabilities

1. Although the Cyprus situation has been relatively quiescent in recent weeks, tempers continue to flare and acrimonious exchanges occasionally occur during the quarterly rotations of the Turkish military contingent on the island. The most recent rotation, on 30-31 March, passed without serious incident, but the possibility that the situation may escalate into a crisis is a continuing one. This handbook was prepared to provide data on current Greek and Turkish military capabilities, and updates a similar study done in January 1964.

2. If open conflict were to break out between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue, the advantage would lie with the Turkish side. With its larger socioeconomic base and more powerful armed forces, Turkey could defend its own territory and air space. If Ankara launched a limited offensive against Greek Thrace, it could possibly take Salonika. However, since they are organized and equipped primarily to fight a defensive war, the Turkish armed forces lack the sea and airlift capability necessary for a prolonged campaign against an island objective such as Cyprus. On the other hand, they could probably seize and hold the closer to shore Greek islands in the Aegean.

NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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3. The Turkish Army's advantages include good discipline and morale along with the excellent fighting quality of the troops. Its weapons and equipment are fairly modern, and the state of training is good. However, the army is handicapped, as are the other Turkish services, by a shortage of junior officers and NCOs. Most senior commanders are without combat experience. Lack of combined arms training would also limit the Turkish Army's effectiveness in large operations. The most serious materiel shortages are in armor, vehicles, communications equipment, and low-level antiaircraft weapons.

4. The Turkish Air Force enjoys a relatively high state of combat readiness. If challenged by the Greek Air Force, it could control Turkish air space and such adjacent areas as Cyprus and the offshore Greek islands. Its defensive capabilities are somewhat reduced by the lack of all-weather aircraft, gaps in the early warning and air defense communications systems, and the inadequacy of stocks of reserve equipment in the country.

5. Turkey's navy is unable to conduct large-scale operations. Its capability is confined to mine-laying and mine-sweeping operations in coastal waters and in the straits.

Greek Capabilities

6. In a military conflict with Turkey, the Greek armed forces could extend no aid to Cyprus or any of the Greek islands, but by falling back to a succession of prepared defensive positions, the Greek Army could probably hold back any Turkish advance somewhere in the vicinity of Salonika. The Greek Army is moderately well equipped and trained, and the troops are of good caliber. Its major weaknesses are shortages of armor and communications equipment.

7. The Greek Navy lacks modern ships and other equipment. It has a fair capability to perform escort, patrol, antisubmarine, and mine warfare operations.

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8. The Greek Air Force has a fair defense capability over mainland Greece, but it could conduct only very limited offensive operations outside this area. During an initial period of conflict, it could function effectively in close-in ground support missions, but this capability would fall off rapidly because of its poor logistical base. Its communications system is inadequate.

Capabilities in Cyprus

9. In Cyprus itself, the tactical superiority of the Greek Cypriot side is unquestioned. Greek Cypriot forces number about 31,000 including reserves, and there are 5,750 Greek Army troops on the island. Government--i.e., Greek Cypriot--military and paramilitary units are much better equipped than their Turkish Cypriot adversaries and are backed by a Greek force on the island which is far larger than the mainland Turkish contingent there. The Greek side also controls the more important population centers, including all major ports, as well as all movement on the island.

10. Although the Greek Cypriots have predominant strength on the local scene, they have several weaknesses. The most serious of these is the dichotomy of objectives and underlying mistrust between Cypriot officials and the Greek representatives on the island. This lessens the Makarios government's freedom of movement, as does the presence of British and United Nations forces on the island. The Greek side also lacks airpower over Cyprus and the surrounding waters. In the event of armed intervention by Turkey, the Turkish Air Force could soon establish control of the air. It could neutralize virtually any target on Cyprus within the first day or two of operations, but it could not prevent the overrunning of the Turkish Cypriot positions.

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11. Turkish Cypriot forces on the island consist of about 10,000 irregulars, badly armed, poorly trained, and with declining morale. They are supported by a force of about 650 regular Turkish troops. Turkish Cypriot forces are confined to a number of enclaves scattered throughout the island. Although considerable strength has been massed in several of these enclaves, these forces are for the most part in isolated villages and would be able to offer little resistance if subjected to a determined attack. Even the major Turkish strong points would not be able to hold out more than a few days unless Turkey intervened.

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3 April 1967

Talking Paper for Intelligence Handbook Cyprus: Greek
and Turkish Military Capabilities


1. This handbook was issued to come shortly after the quarterly rotation of the Turkish military contingent on Cyprus, completed on 30-31 March. Although this rotation passed without serious incident, heated exchanges occur occasionally during the rotations and tempers continue to flare over the Cyprus situation, which could escalate into a crisis at any time. The handbook was self-initiated and was prepared to provide data on current Greek and Turkish military capabilities, both overall and on Cyprus. [REDACTED]

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2. Routine external and internal dissemination is recommended.

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
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**GREECE AND TURKEY
Army Order of Battle
FEBRUARY 1967**


GREEK ARMY

- HMCI & I - Higher Military Command of the Interior and Islands
- HAGS - Hellenic Army General Staff
- HCG - Headquarters, Central Greece
- HAMC - Headquarters, Archipelago Military Command



GREECE AND TURKEY
Air Force and Naval Air Bases
FEBRUARY 1967

	Runway: 8000'+	Runway: 5000-7999'	Runway: 2000-4999'
GREEK	○	○	○
TURKISH	✕	✕	✕




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GREECE AND TURKEY
Naval Order of Battle
FEBRUARY 1967



- DD Destroyer
- DDE Destroyer Escort
- SS Submarine
- PC Patrol Craft
- PCE Patrol Escort
- PF Frigate
- PGM Motor Gunboat
- PTF Fast Patrol Boat
- MMC Coastal Mine Layer
- MSC Coastal Mine Sweeper
- MSCO Old Coastal Mine Sweeper
- YMP Mine Planter



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
**GREECE and TURKEY
Strength of Forces**



SURFACE-TO-AIR LAUNCHERS (NIKE)





NAVAL FORCES



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
GREECE and TURKEY
Basic Resources
 (1966 Estimates)



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Command and Liason of Hellenic/Cypriot Armed Forces FEBRUARY 1967

GREEK
 CYPRIOT



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


Turkish Cypriot machine gun position near Kokkina



Soviet-made T-34/85 Medium Tank in Cypriot Army Exercise

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