

7 August 1967

This book contains relatively recent background on the six subjects suggested by Acting DDI for the Senatorial dinner 9 August. An up-to-date briefing on each subject will be inserted at opening of business Wednesday, 9 August.

OCI Presentations



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*Very good.  
Thanks,  
ed*

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HAITI

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8 August 1965

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

HAITI

I. Haiti has been in the news this summer with a government and army purge, a couple of invasion rumors, and a security forces alert, but the over-all picture in brief is this: the political and economic situations are deplorable, and there is very little prospect that either will improve in the near future.

A. Haiti is run by what can only be described as a ruthless dictatorship.

B. Its economy is stagnant. Per capita income--about \$70--is one of the lowest in the world. Literacy is only about 10 percent. Public health standards and services are minimal.

C. Even the insiders in the political and military power structure are apprehensive as a result of recent reshufflings, arrests, trials, and executions.

II. In most countries, and in many dictatorships, these conditions would be more than enough to touch off a coup or a revolution.

A. In Haiti, however, things have never been much

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better, so the missing ingredient is that conditions have not become sufficiently intolerable to make any group of Haitians undertake the extreme personal risks involved in any attempt to overthrow the regime.

B. President Duvalier's control at present appears to be as strong as ever.

1. Would-be conspirators have been cowed by the ruthlessness "Papa Doc" showed in dealing with suspected dissidents early in June, when he executed 19 army officers for plotting.

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3. Duvalier's principal control forces are his goon squads called the Ton-Ton-Macoutes-- Creole for "Boogeyman."

4. But the recent purges have even shaken up the leadership of these strong-arm gangs.

C. Duvalier's suspensions reach even into his own household. An ambitious son-in-law, Max Dominique, has been on shaky ground since June. In July, he left for Spain as Ambassador-designate,

1. No sooner was he out of the country than Duvalier charged him with conspiracy, and

ordered him to return in 30 days or face trial in absentia. Dominique prudently resigned and stayed in Spain.

2. This maneuvering is typical of Papa Doc. He obviously wanted to be rid of Dominique, but didn't want to execute his daughter's husband, or bring on the embarrassment of a son-in-law taking asylum in one of the local embassies, so he maneuvered him into exile.

III. The <sup>end July</sup> recent curfew and alert were ordered in response to another of the recurrent rumors, sometimes with some basis in fact, that a group of exiles were mounting an invasion.

- A. Actually the non-Communist Haitian exile groups have little capability for mounting any substantial operations against Duvalier at the present time.
- B. Communists, with Soviet and Cuban help, have some capability for infiltrating agitators, but once inside the country, the agitators would find little room for action in the politically oppressive atmosphere.

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the day when Duvalier passes or is pushed  
from the scene.

IV. The situation in Haiti is inherently fragile, but  
only because President Duvalier--in contrast to the  
impression he seeks to convey with his use of  
Voodoo--is a mortal man.

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PANAMA

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8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

PANAMA

- I. In Panama, an increasing groundswell of opposition to the new canal treaties may cause President Robles to defer ratification until after the Panamanian presidential election next May.
  - A. His original intention had been to stage a quick, intensive, promotional campaign for the proposed treaties and then push ratification through a special session of the assembly--before the regular opening date of October first, and before the issue could become intertwined with the election campaign.
  - B. Robles has been forced to reconsider this schedule by mounting criticism from cabinet members; from the Foreign Relations Council; from political parties not only of the opposition, but within the government coalition; and from a clique of key National Guard officers.
  - C. The Foreign Relations Council--an informal advisory group appointed by the president--

*is insisting on*  
~~has asked for~~ time for extended discussion,  
and an opportunity to negotiate changes.

1. Foreign Minister Eleta told the U.S. Ambassador that the Council has already come up with 28 proposed revisions for the treaty drafts.
2. Objections center on U.S. domination of<sup>5/4</sup> the joint canal administration, the proposed judicial system in the canal area, and what are referred to as certain "excessive" powers of the joint administration to make concessions to the U.S. armed forces.

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D. The chief negotiator for Panama, de la Rosa, has indicated that he is still displeased with some aspects of the treaties as they are now written. De la Rosa thinks that time will work in favor of Panama.

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- II. Most of the pro-government deputies in the assembly have indicated that they would prefer to postpone the ratification debate until the regular session

in October, or even until after the elections, to allow more time to study the drafts.

A. Robles will probably be reluctant to take his chances on a ratification vote during the supercharged pre-election atmosphere that will mark the regular assembly session.

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III. The perennial opposition presidential candidate, Arnulfo Arias, left the country for a European trip about the time that the proposed treaties became available for discussion. *He is now in the U.S. on a leisurely trip home.*

A. There was speculation that he did not want to risk a possible losing fight against the treaties. So far, his public stand has been that regardless of the treaty provisions, he was cheated out of the last election, and

that consequently any treaties negotiated with the Robles regime are illegal.

- B. Arias may feel that the governing coalition, with an election in sight, will break apart more easily without his unifying presence.
- C. Another recent report is that the Panamenistas, the party of Arias, want Robles to commit himself thoroughly to the treaties, by signing them or by submitting them for ratification, before they launch their attack.

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RUMANIA

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

RUMANIA

I. If terms like "the Soviet bloc," or "Russia and her satellites" are losing some of their validity in intelligence reporting today, a prime example is Rumania, which has placed its national interests ahead of solidarity with its Communist allies.

A. The Rumanian Communist Party has been edging toward its own brand of "national Communism" throughout the 1960's, and formally proclaimed this independent course in April, 1964, with the publication of what amounted to a declaration of independence.

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B. The 1964 declaration was the most forthright and thoroughly reasoned rejection of Soviet political and economic supremacy ever made by an ostensible supporter of the Soviet Union.

II. Since 1964, the Rumanian party and state leaderships have reaffirmed this independent course frequently-- most recently in last month's session of parliament--and in the process have broadened the domestic base of popular support.

III. The roots of Rumanian alienation from Moscow run across the board. They are not only political and economic, but historical in character.

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- A. Traditionally a highly nationalistic Latin nation, Rumania has an anti-pathy towards Russia dating back many years.
- B. Moscow's blatant economic exploitation of Rumania--through the Soviet-Rumanian joint stock companies (until their abolition in 1954) and oppressive war reparations--stalelated Bucharest's efforts to achieve economic progress.
- C. Until 1952, Moscow's "men" politically dominated the Rumanian party.
- D. Soviet efforts to achieve close economic and political control impinged on Rumania's concept of national sovereignty and equality.

IV. Rumania's nationalist leadership stresses independence of action in foreign and interparty affairs and a pragmatic interpretation of Communist doctrine.

- A. This drive for independence has, of course, had its greatest impact on relations with the USSR.

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1. The regime has resisted Soviet-  
sponsored supranational planning  
in the Council for Economic Mutual  
Assistance (CEMA), has called the  
Warsaw Pact and all military alliances  
"anachronistic," and has adopted  
a "neutral" stance in the Sino-  
Soviet dispute.
2. Rumania boycotted the Karlovly  
Vary Communist parties meeting  
last April.
3. The regime refused to sign the  
June declaration in Moscow which  
condemned Israeli "aggression."  
It failed to attend the subsequent  
meeting in Budapest, and did not  
go along with the Soviet Union at  
the recent United Nations meeting.

*Trade pact with  
Israel (April 67)  
67-70.*

- B. Rumania has expanded its politico-economic  
ties with the West, particularly Western  
Europe

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1. In 1966, approximately 40 percent of Rumania's foreign trade was with the Free World (as opposed to about 20% in 1955, 33% in 1964)
2. Rumania is the only Eastern European country which has granted full diplomatic recognition to West Germany (January 1967)
3. Rumanian-US relations have markedly improved since the first of this year, Vietnam notwithstanding, and Maurer is the only Eastern European Communist Premier to talk with a U.S. President.

*W. Germany, France,  
U.K., Italy.*

*24-25 July speech  
C. I. R. - US  
Increase of Trade,  
Econ. Cultural &  
Scientific.*

V. Rumania's independent course has already had a significant effect in the Communist world. It has:

- A. weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
- B. blocked economic integration within CEMA which from Moscow's point of view is a device to maintain Soviet economic-political control of Eastern Europe
- C. hindered Soviet efforts to make the Warsaw Pact into an instrument of

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greater political control over Eastern European countries.

- D. given a positive impetus to the spread of polycentrism--pragmatic Communism--elsewhere in the Communist world, especially in Eastern Europe

*Indicates to Alliance  
Balance between USSR & China.*

VI. Rumania's brand of national Communism can serve as an object lesson for other socialist countries.

- A. Bucharest has shown that it is possible to gain independence under unfavorable geographic conditions through deft maneuvering, courageous diplomacy, and skillful timing.
- B. Moscow's response thus far has been insufficiently strong to alter this independent course.

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*GNP 215 bill  
Pop = 19.5m  
6 Lic/11*

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ALGERIA:  
— BOUMEDIENE

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES FOR  
SENATORIAL DINNER

ALGERIA

- I. Algeria's present role as one of the most radical of the Arab governments, with President Boumediene insisting on a jihad or holy war against Israel, offers nothing that is completely new.
  - A. In the recent past, Algeria has had its moderate moments under Boumediene, and it has stressed its bid for African leadership when relations with other Arabs turned sour.
  - B. But Algeria was radical, revolutionary, Arab-oriented, pro-Soviet, and anti-U.S. under Ben Bella, before Boumediene overthrew him in 1963.
    1. And if any of these facets have been muted since then, it has been largely tactical, transient, and temporary.
    2. Boumediene's initial moderate course may have been dictated in part by coolness and suspicion on the part of Ben Bella's friends. By early this year, he and his country were back in the mainstream of extremism.

II. Houari Boumediene, by training a school-teacher, is president of the Algerian Revolutionary Council--the group of 24 or 25 men, with an army majority, which establishes Algerian policy.

A. He is President of the council of ministers, which administers the country.

B. He is also commander of all military forces, and minister of defense.

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III. Boumediene made his way to power through the army, and it is both the principal source, and the prime beneficiary, of his strength.

A. So far, whatever the political or economic problems, Boumediene has done his utmost to see to it that the army's needs and desires are satisfied.

B. The only political party, the National Liberation Front, is not a particularly



effective instrument. It was still in the process of post-independence re-organization when Boumediene's coup called for still further reorganization.

- C. Labor and student groups are potential opposition, but both enjoy privileged positions, after the army. Organized labor is particularly privileged in a country where nearly half the labor force is unemployed.
- D. There is considerable opposition, but it is uncoordinated, fragmented, leaderless, and as a result inactive. Many of the politicians who were prominent before independence appear to be marking time, hoping that when some other force ousts Boumediene, they will be called to power by popular acclamation.

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~~Boumediene's alleged preference for a~~  
number of French-trained officers who  
have had long experience in the French  
Army.

3. Security and stability are not such that  
you could rule out the elimination of  
Boumediene, but there does not appear to  
be anybody else available at present who  
can challenge his authority, rally equivalent  
backing, or--more to the point--who is  
willing to take over Boumediene's respon-  
sibilities.

IV. Since the Arab-Israeli war, the posture of Boumediene  
and his regime occasioned speculation that he is  
bidding to take over Nasir's mantle of Arab leadership--  
Uncompromising, inflexible, determined to carry on  
the war against the Infidel alone if necessary.

- A. Actually, before the fighting started Boumediene's  
inclination was to avoid involvement, although he  
was persuaded to pledge token forces and some  
equipment.

1. He sent Nasir some fighters, *(a dozen light bombers,)* and some tanks,  
which the Soviets are replacing, and there

are still apparently some Algerian troops within gunshot of the Israelis along the Suez Canal, but the actual Algerian participation on the battlefield never quite caught up with their propaganda.

- B. Boumediene might aspire to Arab leadership now despite his use of the "cult of personality" charge to overthrow Ben Bella, but it seems highly unlikely that the Middle Eastern Arabs would respond

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1. The Soviets do not appear to have given Boumediene any encouragement to bid for leadership.

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3. On the basis of past performance, Algeria has not demonstrated that it could take and hold the leadership of even the less advanced radical regimes of Africa.

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ALGERIA v.  
MOROCCO

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

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ALGERIA - MOROCCO

I. Relations between Algeria and Morocco are dominated by two elements of friction: Moroccan territorial claims to the potentially rich mineral resources around Tindouf in extreme southwestern Algeria; and Algeria's massive build-up of Soviet weapons since 1953, when Moroccan forces outfought the Algerian army in a brief border war. The two elements are, of course, simply opposite sides of the same issue.

A. Morocco has pursued its territorial claims in the United Nations and in the Organization of African Unity, but the Algerians justify their military build-up on the fear that Morocco will ultimately attempt to seize the disputed territory by force.

1. The Algerians assert--and are inclined to believe--that Morocco and Tunisia have secret alliances with the United States. Their line is that U.S. policy is to destroy all Socialist regimes.

No Foreign Dissem

2. Therefore, the Algerians argue, they must have enough military force to deter an attack on Algeria by Morocco and Tunisia with the support of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

B. The Moroccans for their part fear that the Algerians will attack them, either to put an end to Morocco's territorial claims, or as a deliberate move by Boumediene to divert Algerian attention from domestic difficulties.

1. The Moroccans are looking for modern arms, particularly aircraft and armor, to offset the Algerian build-up.

C. The disparity is huge.

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1. Most of Algeria's modern armaments come from the Soviet Union. Morocco would prefer arms from Free World sources, but has apparently been offered weapons by the Soviet Union.

II. Neither side appears to have made preparations for imminent attack along the border, despite the tension.

A. There is little military build-up on either side of the frontier.

B. Both have built new roads, however, which would be useful for military purposes.

1. The Algerians have taken over military



facilities vacated by the French at Bechar  
early this summer, and have built several  
airfields to support border action.



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NORTH KOREA

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8 August 1967

DDI BRIEFING NOTES  
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER

NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION

- I. In Korea this summer, armed harassment and agent infiltration by the North against South Korea is at an all-time high.
  - A. The Communist activity so far does not suggest an intention to open a diversionary "second front" for the Vietnamese war at this time.
  - B. It is, however, apparently intended to show support for Hanoi, and discourage the deployment of additional R.O.K. troops to South Vietnam, while expanding subversion and aggravating political tensions in South Korea.
- II. The armed incursions across the Demilitarized Line by North Koreans showed a sharp rise last October, but subsided into the usual midwinter lull when the snow and the lack of foliage made cover and concealment difficult.
  - A. With the first good spring weather, the North Korean forays rose sharply again.
  - B. By early August, there had been more than 280 incidents between United Nations Command troops


and the North Koreans--280 so far in 1967, compared to 44 all last year, 55 in 1965, and 32 in 1964.

1. In this year's incidents, the North Koreans have lost about 61 killed, the South Koreans 27, and the U.S. six.

C. Some of the increase in incidents reported may be attributable to increased patrolling along the DMZ, and greater alertness by the U.S. and South Korean troops.

1. Nevertheless, South Korean leaders are showing considerable concern over improving their capabilities to cope with infiltration, as a result of the Communist aggressiveness.

III. The North Koreans have also stepped up the infiltration of heavily armed agent teams into the interior of South Korea by sea.



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IV. The shift to more militant tactics probably comes from an assessment in Pyongyang that the effort to subvert South Korea--a priority objective since the war ended--has been failing.

- A. The North Koreans may also be apprehensive over the stronger U.S. presence in Asia.
- B. Pyongyang would expect that as long as the harassment is kept below the level which could provoke major retaliation, aggressive tactics will keep the South Koreans and U.S. forces there off balance; test our military capabilities and reactions; aggravate political instability in the South; and possibly disrupt economic progress.

1. North Korea's Gross National Product has increased by only 4 to 5 percent annually in recent years, compared to an 8 to 12 percent growth in the South. Border incidents could be useful to explain the need for belt-tightening at home, and evoke greater effort in defense industries.

- V. The South Koreans are adding a vigorous reaction to the advantages of a population which is basically unsympathetic to Communism, and a popular consensus that life in the South is getting better and better.

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By Jean M. White  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson told Congress yesterday that the need for a new canal across Central America to link the Atlantic and Pacific may develop sooner than the year 2000 suggested in past studies.

Sea-going traffic has picked up faster than foreseen in the earlier estimates, Mr. Johnson noted.

Mr. Johnson made his statement as he sent Congress the third annual report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. The study group has asked for a two-year extension and \$7.5 million more in funds to complete its investigations for a new sea-level canal.

The new canal would supplement the present lock-style Panama Canal built 80 feet above sea level.

One reason that the Commission study, originally set at \$17.5 million, is behind schedule is that the Atomic Energy Commission's program of Plowshare nuclear excavation experiments was postponed during negotiations on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Congress has appropriated money for the Plowshare tests this fiscal year.

Nuclear excavation might be employed in three of the four general routes being studied by the Commission—across the Darien region of Panama, near the Nicaragua-Costa Rica, and in extreme Northwest Colombia.

A route near the present Panama Canal could be excavated by conventional earth-moving means.

Cost estimates range from \$2.3 billion for the conventionally dug canal to \$747 million for nuclear excavation on the shortest Panama route.

In his statement to Congress, the President emphasized the need to "proceed as rapidly as possible" on the study since it will take up to 15 years for legislation, planning and construction.

Yesterday morning the President delivered a chalk-and-chart lecture on the Nation's finances to an assembly of 50 or 60 House Democrats summoned to the White House.

George Christian, the White House press secretary, said that the one-hour session was a general discussion and not a "sales campaign" to win support for Mr. Johnson's propos-

al for a 10 per cent surtax on income.

A group of Illinois donors gave the President an original bronze bust of Abraham Lincoln done by Augustus Saint-Gaudens. The gift was presented by Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner, who is chairman of the President's Special Commission on Civil Disorders.

In accepting the Lincoln bust, Mr. Johnson noted that the country has been "experiencing some of the same problems that Abraham Lincoln did 100 years ago." The President said he hoped he could handle them with the same "compassion and wisdom."

Yesterday the President also conferred with Chester Bowles, American Ambassador to India who is scheduled to return to New Delhi on Tuesday.

## Rumania Urges Controls On Superpowers' Arms

Special to The Washington Post

GENEVA, Aug. 8—Rumania strongly supported the non-aligned position on nuclear nonproliferation today and thus made a major advance in its efforts to establish itself as an independent voice in international affairs.

Dissociating his country from the broad policy line of the other four Communist bloc members in the 17-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Rumanian delegate, Dr. Nicolae Ecobesco, set these conditions for Rumania's support of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons:

The nuclear powers must commit themselves to halt the production of nuclear weapons, end underground testing for military purposes and eliminate existing nuclear arsenals.

Unless these conditions are met, the treaty, far from reducing the risk of thermonuclear war, will indefinitely perpetuate it, Ecobesco said.

In its present form, worked out by Russia and the United States, the draft treaty contains no such commitments. It seeks only to prevent nonnuclear countries from manufac-

turing or acquiring nuclear weapons and places no conditions on the present nuclear powers.

Quoting a recent statement of Rumanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Ceauseco, Dr. Ecobesco remarked that the idea that the fate of humanity lies exclusively in the hands of the superpowers no longer corresponds with new conditions of social development.

The Rumanian statement indirectly encouraged West German criticism of the proposed treaty based on the need for the unhampered development of a peaceful nuclear industry.

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