

SECRET

*CS/Pres file cgr
w/corrections*


*White House,
for President's Advisory Council on Vietnam*

BRIEFING NOTES
FOR DCI

1 November 1967

Because I have been concentrating in these remarks exclusively on the Vietnam question, I would like to take a couple of minutes for a very brief and quick swing around the rest of the world, to give you some idea of other problems which continue to demand their fair share of our attention:

25X1



SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000090001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000090001-7

SECRET

25X1



Middle East

- I. In the Middle East, we see little prospect for any progress toward solution of Arab-Israeli differences.
- A. The Israelis are approaching the point where they ^{may} ~~will~~ consider it necessary to take military reprisals--against Syria, or ^{even} Jordan, or both--for the resumption of ^{the Syrian-directed} ~~Arab~~ terrorism and sabotage in Israel and in occupied Arab territory.

25X6



SECRET

SECRET

25X6



B. The Israelis continue to insist that the Arabs must agree to direct negotiations, and bring an end to the state of belligerency.

II. Even the more moderate Arabs, however, insist that direct negotiations are out of the question.

A. They hope that the United Nations, or ^{other} ~~third~~ ^{mediators} country mediation, can work out some solution which ^{would provide} will bring about Israeli withdrawal ^{and a tacit} ~~end to the state of belligerency,~~ without requiring the Arabs to recognize the existence of Israel.


B. Nasir, for once, is a relative moderate, but this means little more than that he recognizes what a beating he took, and how unrealistic it would be to resume the fighting at present.

1. He is in deep financial trouble, although he has persuaded the richer Arab oil states to give him a subsidy of ~~almost~~ ²⁶⁶ \$300 million a year so that he can keep the Suez Canal closed without financial collapse. ^{loss.}

2. He has also agreed to pull his troops out of Yemen, and this time he has actually begun to implement the agreement.

SECRET

This will probably lead to the defeat
or collapse of his puppet regime there.



A. The present situation in South Arabia is
chaotic enough without any further meddling
by Nasir.

1. The British are determined to declare
Aden and the associated states inde-
pendent, and pull out *by December 9th* ~~this month~~.

2. The government which the British had
established collapsed; the local army
has so far refused to take over; and the
two rival nationalist groups causing the
unrest--both originally established by
Nasir--are feuding bitterly about who
will take over when the British leave.

IV. When the Arab-Israeli fighting stopped, the Arabs
felt that the Soviets had let them down, but
Russia now has apparently emerged with stronger
influence than ever.

A. The Soviets began replacing the aircraft,
tanks and guns the Arabs had lost with a
dramatic, showy air lift.

SECRET

1. Military shipments have now slowed down to the level which prevailed before the fighting in June, and it will take another year to replace the Arab inventories.
2. The Soviets have reaped considerable credit from the airlift and from their ~~new~~ ^{increased} naval presence in the Mediterranean, however.
3. They have also increased the number of Soviet technicians and advisers in the Arab countries.

Communist China

- I. In Communist China, the evidence is that Mao ^{Peking} ~~Tse-tung~~ has been forced to moderate ^{the} ~~his~~ Cultural Revolution, at least temporarily.
 - A. The major emphasis now is on getting in an adequate harvest and distributing it--and on getting the unruly Red Guards back into their classrooms for the first time in more than a year.
 - B. If the purge and the fighting had continued, China would quite probably have wound up in

SECRET

a state of paralysis, or gone back to the old fragmented "warlord" days.

- C. It remains to be seen whether Mao and Marshal Lin Piao will try to resume the Cultural Revolution at some later date.

- D. *No matter*
in the struggle
~~The question of who wins out~~ *who succeeds*
for power and influence,
Mao ~~could conceivably have an effect on the~~
~~course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but what-~~
~~ever the outcome,~~ we see no reason to expect any reduction in the implacable Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States.

Southeast Asia

- I. In Southeast Asia, the war in Vietnam tends to obscure the fact that fighting persists in Laos, where about half of the country is in Communist hands, and that there is a spreading Communist guerrilla campaign in Thailand.
- II. In Indonesia, General Suharto has just about completed the sidelining of former President Sukarno, but he faces a long hard task of establishing political and economic stability.
- A. The country owes about 2.7 billion dollars as a result of Sukarno's military purchases and grandiose projects, and lacks even such

SECRET

rudimentary elements as a working transport system for getting back on its feet.

- B. Sound new political parties are slow in development, and the survivors of the Communist Party are beginning to work with left-wing nationalists in opposition to Suharto, especially in central Java.

Africa

- I. The new nations in Africa are going to continue to present us with a succession of crises. There is only a thin veneer of capable leadership. So-called nations are an unworkable conglomeration of hostile tribes. Russians, Chinese, and even Cubans are at work wherever they find openings, to some extent against each other, but in any case against the West.

- A. Nigeria is a case in point. It was the most populous country in Africa, with as good a chance as any for economic viability, a competent administration trained


SECRET

SECRET

by the British--and some 250 tribes--
Muslim, Christian, and Animist.

1. Nigeria needed no Communist instigation to explode into the present civil war.
2. The Eastern Region--so-called Biafra--appears to have lost its bid to break away, and the British are trying to arrange a settlement, but I cannot hold out any great hope for the future unity of a country where feuds are so bitter that few prisoners are taken, and victory may end in massacre.

- B. In the Congo, prospects appear to be getting dimmer for peaceful settlement.



25X1

25X1

- C. Sanctions are not going to solve the Rhodesian problem, and so the new African nations will increasingly insist that it is the duty of the United States and Britain to end white rule in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese Africa.

SECRET

Elsewhere

- I. I do not have time even to thumbnail all of the active and potential trouble spots.
- A. India, for example, is going to need ^{large} ~~massive~~ food imports for the next several years at least. The ruling Congress Party controls less than half of the state governments. No solution is in sight for Kashmir, and there are recurrent border clashes with China, so India, with all its other problems, arms against both Pakistan and China.
- B. Or we could spend a day on Latin America, where Castro, despite the Bolivian setback and the death of Che Guevara, is determined to bring about new revolutions. He still supports insurgency in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala, and is working to establish assets for rebellion in Haiti, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and other countries where he sees the opportunity.
- II. There are still Korea, Cyprus, Greece, De Gaulle, Britain and the Common Market, the Panama Canal problem, possible Latin American arms races--but

I feel I have given you enough of a sampling
to establish that we are in no danger of running
out of problems.