


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

Secret

November 14, 1975
No. 0774/75

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses

According to an official at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, party boss Brezhnev will attend the next congress of the Polish Communist Party which is scheduled to begin on December 8. Assuming he goes, it will be the 13th foreign party congress to his credit. He heads the list of full members of the Politburo performing this chore.

Since becoming General Secretary in 1964, Brezhnev has concentrated on the six East European members in more or less good standing of the "socialist commonwealth", leaving "less important" congresses to other members of the Politburo. He attended the Romanian Congress in 1965, but in 1974 left the job of representing the CPSU in Bucharest to Kirilenko. That same year, Kirilenko also attended the Yugoslav Congress, thus ending the long-standing Soviet practice of boycotting congresses of the Yugoslav party. Kirilenko and Pelshe each has six congresses under his belt.

Full members of the Politburo with highly visible government positions do not attend the congresses of foreign parties. Andropov, Grechko, Gromyko, Kosygin, Mazurov, and Podgorny have not attended a foreign party congress in the last 10 years. (Andropov and Mazurov each attended one congress during this period, but neither at the time was a full member of the CPSU Politburo.) Kulakov and Polyansky have also attended no foreign party congresses.

A list of Politburo members attending the congresses of foreign parties since October 1964 follows:

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Andropov--1965-Romania
(became full member Politburo 1973)

Brezhnev--1965--Romania
1966--Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
1967--East Germany
1968--Poland
1970--Hungary
1971--Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
East Germany
1975--Hungary

Grechko--none

Grishin--1968--Poland (with Brezhnev)
1972--Italy

Gromyko--None

Kirilenko--1965--Chile
1970--France
1971--Mongolian People's Republic
1974--Romania
Yugoslavia
1975--Italy

Kosygin--None

Kulakov--None

Kunayev--1971--India

Mazurov--1964--Belgium
(became full member Politburo 1965)

Pelshe--1965--Denmark

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1967--France
1968--India
1969--Finland
1972--Finland
1975--Finland

Podgorny--None

Polyansky--None

Shcherbitsky--1971--Bulgaria

Suslov--1966--Italy (CONFIDENTIAL)



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Yugoslavs to Take More Active
Role in Europe

1 - 2
Belgrade is preparing to take advantage of its position as host for the follow-up CSCE meeting in 1977 to press its views on post-Helsinki Europe.

Foreign Minister Minic, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Yugoslavia intends to assume a very active role in following the implementation of the Helsinki accords. Minic said Belgrade's preliminary view is that the East is showing a "restrictive tendency" regarding confidence-building measures, while the West is over-emphasizing the Basket III agreements. Minic indicated that Yugoslavia sees this as a perpetuation of the bloc-to-bloc mentality in Europe which is the greatest danger to the Helsinki agreement.

3
Belgrade has long envisioned itself as a spokesman for the interests of smaller European countries against bloc interests. If, as Minic claims, Yugoslavia assumes an activist role in CSCE implementation, it might cause some waves in Western Europe. These would be small, however, compared to the potential Soviet reaction if Yugoslavia pressed its case for CSCE implementation in Moscow's eastern buffer area. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit
Improves Tone of Relations

1 2
Sofia and Belgrade have apparently decided to try to come to grips with the seemingly omnipresent problems in their bilateral relations. Quick solutions are not likely, but, provided both sides abide by the new spirit of reasonableness, there could be a hiatus in the squabbling between the two Balkan rivals.

1
The new attitude emerged during Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov's visit to Belgrade from November 11 to 13. In talks with his Yugoslav counterpart Milos Minic, Mladenov apparently addressed major bilateral issues, including the sensitive Macedonian problem. Press announcements referred to the discussions as "friendly" and "frank," and described the atmosphere as one of "full openness and readiness" to discuss their difficulties.

1 2
Minic and Mladenov agreed on an eventual meeting of Presidents Tito and Zhivkov to discuss "ways and means" for resolving their disputes. The summit is, however, clearly dependent on an effort by the two sides to limit polemics.

1
During toasts at official dinners in Belgrade, both men recited their differences, but said the problems should not rule out future close cooperation in all spheres. The communique summarizing the talks accentuated a mutual desire to improve relations based on the principles of "equality, independence, respect for territorial integrity... and noninterference in internal affairs."

1 2
The communique attached "exceptional importance" to mutual efforts to harness "information activities" as a means of building an atmosphere of trust. This presumably means that vociferous

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
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Yugoslav press polemics and the occasional inflammatory publications appearing in Bulgaria will be held in check for a time.

2
Agreeing to discuss their differences is the most progress toward improving Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in several years. A number of factors could still undermine these good intentions. The most immediate threat is the Bulgarian census scheduled for December, which will, Belgrade fears, omit a category for Macedonians. Jointly claimed cultural heroes, the role of the Bulgarian military in "liberating" Yugoslavia during World War II, and Belgrade's wariness of Sofia as a stand-in for Soviet interests all offer hotheads on both sides of the border opportunities to scotch any progress.

1 2
On Balkan cooperation and the proposed Caranlis conference, the two seem to be moving closer together. Stressing the importance of bilateral cooperation, Minic and Mladenov supported multilateral efforts "only in those fields that are really acceptable and of interest to the Balkan countries." Sofia has declared it is against any multilateral activity of a political nature, and Belgrade has emphasized that it is premature even to consider ambitious inter-Balkan ties. (CONFIDENTIAL)



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Annex

Soviet Relations with Western Europe,
October to mid-November

CSCE/NATO

Controversy over CSCE implementation centered on the military-related "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) that NATO and the neutrals had succeeded in incorporating in the conference final act against the strenuous effort by the Warsaw Pact to curtail its application.

The initial reaction of the Soviets and their allies to CBMs, notably Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki, was at least superficially positive. In subsequent weeks, however, the Soviets seemed to be disconcerted by the scale of both the NATO exercises and the notifications preceding them. The NATO members had determined to adhere scrupulously to the text of the Helsinki accord and provided full advance notification not only of exercises meeting the numerical threshold (25,000 troops), but also some smaller ones.

Meanwhile, the Soviets launched an unusually voluminous and vehement propaganda attack on NATO's series of fall exercises, which it claimed were unprecedented in scope. Soviet media asserted that these exercises violated the spirit of Helsinki and, by reviving the specter of a Soviet threat, constituted a lame effort by Western militarists to neutralize the achievements of the conference. The NATO exercises may have seemed larger than usual to the Soviets because a number of exercises were integrated into a single program (Autumn Forge).

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Initially, CBMs were spared from criticism, but beginning on September 15 several articles charged that the advance notification of maneuvers was irrelevant and that notification did not obviate the deleterious effect of the maneuvers on detente.

Soviet criticism of CBMs tapered off in October and was not formalized by leadership endorsements. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not yet officially acknowledged Western notification of exercises, sent observers, or provided notification of their exercises. Using the argument that the presence of Warsaw Pact observers would undermine the position that the NATO exercises were inconsistent with detente, the Soviets reportedly advised their allies that they, too, should neither acknowledge receipt of notifications nor send observers to the exercises. All the Warsaw Pact members, including the Romanians, took the advice.

The Soviets are obviously uncomfortable with CBMs and their unresponsiveness to NATO notifications seems designed to make it easier for the Warsaw Pact not to invite observers to its exercises. The Soviets may also hope that their policy will encourage NATO to see the agreement as less stringent. There has been no evidence to date to confirm speculation that the Warsaw Pact has either failed to provide notification of an exercise meeting the parameters for notification, or revised its exercise format to keep from meeting the parameters.

Technically, the Soviets are on solid ground since, at their insistence, the Helsinki text covering the CBM's stipulates that they should be undertaken voluntarily. Still, if the Soviets flagrantly disregard the CBM provision, they will be held to account when the day of reckoning comes in Belgrade two years hence.

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France

The once-vaunted "special relationship" between the USSR and France seemed to have lost much of its remaining luster after Giscard's visit from October 14 to 18, his first to the Soviet Union since becoming president. In a sense, as some French observers pointed out, the visit merely helped bring appearances in line with reality, since Moscow's improved relations with the US and West Germany had made detente with France less important and Soviet-French relations had been cooling even under Pompidou.

Later reporting tended to discount speculation that an abrupt change in Giscard's schedule was meant as a snub by the Soviets or that Brezhnev improvised a harsh rebuttal to Giscard's remarks on "ideological disarmament" during their initial exchange of speeches. In the latter part of the visit, both leaders made studied efforts to convey an atmosphere of cordiality and accomplishment. Nevertheless, the visit left an unmistakable aftertaste of strain and unfulfillment.

Disagreements over CSCE implementation appeared to be the main source of discord, at least at the working level. Giscard was the first leader of a major Western country to visit Moscow since the Helsinki conference, and the Soviets may have used his visit to impress the West in general with their toughness on CSCE. The Soviets have taken the position that the Helsinki agreements on improved human contacts are not automatically self-implementing, but must be put into force via bilateral arrangements. The lesson of the Giscard visit is that even bilateral agreements will not be easy to obtain.

The Soviets made some effort to meet French concerns on Basket III matter by agreeing to issue multiple exit/entry visas for journalists. The Soviets, to the surprise of the French, quickly

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accepted the French proposal, probably because they had already reached a similar accord with the US. Moreover, the Helsinki text clearly obligates the Soviets to grant such visas. In return, the French said some favorable things about a world disarmament conference, which they probably regarded as a harmless gesture to Soviet interests.

The principal documents signed by Giscard and Brezhnev were a brief formal communique and a friendship declaration. The declaration speaks of the need to deepen bilateral consultations, but does not formally change the 1970 protocol on consultations. It stresses the importance of summit meetings and agrees to hold them on a "periodic basis," which may be a step toward formalizing the annual summit conclaves.

While the political atmosphere was clouded, economic relations progressed smoothly. Bilateral agreements were signed on cooperation in civil aviation, tourism, and energy. Most of these had been negotiated beforehand and were intended mainly to ensure some tangible results from the talks. Sizeable trade agreements were also signed, and Giscard said that the possibility of increasing French oil imports from the Soviet Union was discussed, but no agreements were reached. The Soviets apparently tried to convince the French to purchase more oil in order to reduce an embarrassing trade deficit.

West Germany

Helmut Kohl, chairman and chancellor-candidate of the Christian Democratic Union, was in the USSR September 22-30. His main purpose was to enhance his status on the domestic scene by showing that he could deal with the Soviets. In this he received an unexpected--and certainly unintended--boost from his hosts. During the trip *Pravda* published an

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article severely criticizing Christian Social Union leader Franz Josef Strauss, who was then in China. Kohl demonstrated his displeasure over the attack on his nominal political ally by canceling his appointments for the following day, but did not scuttle the trip, all of which earned him a good press back home.

The Soviets claimed to be nonplussed by Kohl's reaction, but it is not inconceivable that they intentionally ran the article to test Kohl's mettle. They did not hesitate to their antipathy to Strauss' political views. Indeed, Premier Kosygin told Kohl that he agreed with the anti-Strauss article 100 percent and would have worded it even more strongly.

Kohl and other CDU members who accompanied him described his conversation with Kosygin as frank, open, and constructive. Kohl and Kosygin discussed Berlin and East-West German relations, CSCE, MBFR, bilateral trade and economic cooperation, family reunification, and ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union. Kohl had not expected any breakthrough and none was achieved. Indeed, the day after Kohl left, *Pravda* published an article reiterating customary Soviet opposition to West German ties with West Berlin.

Foreign Ministers Genscher and Gromyko met in New York during the UNGA to discuss pending bilateral agreements that have been stymied by the problem of including West Berlin. Some progress was made, but problems remain. Discussion of these issues were also discussed during Genscher's recently finished visit with President Scheel, to the USSR. This visit is being billed as primarily a protocol exercise, but some substantive issues are bound to come up and both sides would like to have some tangible progress to show for their efforts. The early signs are that by at least outward appearances there will be no repetition of the Giscard contretemps. Genscher told the press that some progress had been made.

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Portugal

The Soviets continued to monitor events in Portugal closely, but their media approach was mainly reportorial and much less shrill than in the final weeks of the Goncalves regime. Criticism of Western "meddling" in Portugal continued, but it, also, was muted. Moscow's commentary focused on the danger of a rightist resurgence, always a safe theme.

The Soviet approach to Portuguese events seemed once again to follow the lead of the Portuguese Communist Party. Both criticized the Portuguese Socialists, but with more restraint than had been shown during the crisis days of August, and both declared open season on the Popular Democrats, expelling them from the "progressive" ranks. Both lauded the concept of leftist unity, but there was little evidence they were doing much in a concrete way to foster it.

No new information appeared this month about overt or covert Soviet intervention in Portugal.

Seeking the positive, Soviet commentary emphasized the underlying social changes, such as land redistribution, that have taken place--what Moscow has long described as the "unfinished business" of the revolution. By implication, these changes are irreversible, and so create a lasting potential for further leftward shifts, regardless of the day-to-day political balance in Lisbon.

Most of the Soviets are probably not altogether displeased about the present equilibrium in Portugal but it is entirely possible that the subject remains controversial and that an active minority may be unreconciled. The Portuguese Communist Party has received a setback, but is still influential

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out of proportion to its numbers, seemingly too well entrenched to be completely suppressed. Even after a partial retraction, the present Portuguese government is far to the left of Caetano, more open to the Soviets, and more of a problem to NATO. The Portuguese revolution has given the Soviets an opportunity to meddle in vast areas of Africa that are far more important economically than European Portugal.

Most important of all, as the situation has stabilized, Portugal has become less contentious in Soviet relations with the major Western powers. The Soviets have always placed maintenance of these relations ahead of gains in Portugal--although of course not rejecting such gains if they were "freebies."

Spain

It takes little imagination to perceive the potential the Soviets see for gains in Spain, but Soviet media conveyed only a suggestion of the importance with which they view the country. Developments in Spain were reported regularly, but the Soviets held their cards close to the vest, making no commitments and revealing little of their own attitude. Much of the Soviet commentary took the easy way out, condemning the execution of the Basque terrorists with fervent rhetoric. The only real judgment made was that "Francoism" was finished, but the Soviets left it unclear whether Franco's successor was also being written off. Similarly, the real Soviet attitude toward the independent-minded Spanish CP remained largely a mystery, although Moscow has said some relatively positive things about the PCE's leadership of the Democratic Junta and dutifully reports PCE statements, etc.

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Norway

The Soviets accepted a Norwegian proposal to resume talks on delimiting their continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea on November 24. The first round ended inconclusively late last year, and it is unlikely that much progress will be made at the forthcoming session.

This is the area into which the Soviets fired several SS-7 intercontinental ballistic missiles in the period beginning September 16. The flexing of missiles was probably intended to notify Norway, and possibly other interested parties, that the Soviets are concerned about protecting what they regard as special interests in the far northern waters and to disabuse the Norwegians of any idea that the forthcoming negotiations will be easy.

The impact area is now claimed by both sides as part of their continental shelf. It is within the "sector line" extending from a point on the extreme west of the USSR's Arctic coast to the North Pole which the Soviets claim as their boundary. It is, however, well west of the "median line," equidistant between neighboring land masses, which the Norwegians claim. The Norwegian concept is generally recognized in international law.

The Norwegians were given advance notification of the missile firings. They admit that the impact area is in international waters, but expressed concern to the Soviets because the firings endangered Norwegian navigation and fishing and because the area was the subject of negotiations.

The impact area is also extremely close to the sea boundary of Svalbard, and the missile firings may have been intended in part to indicate Soviet concern over developments in this area. Under the

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1920 Spitzbergen (Svalbard) treaty, the Norwegians have sovereignty over all the land areas within specified coordinates. The Soviets do not dispute this point, but contend that they have the right to exploit the continental shelf within the treaty limits, a claim the Norwegians do not accept.

While the Soviets wish to protect their own rights on the Svalbard shelf, which is thought to be rich in oil, they appear, conversely, to be worried that other foreign countries may do the same. The Soviets have expressed concern that oil-drilling rigs in the North Sea could be used for espionage purposes by NATO, or give NATO a pretext for extending its naval operations into new areas. They may entertain similar fears with respect to the Barents Sea.


Canada

A visit by Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 25-26 resulted in solution of the two countries' fishing dispute. Canada's Atlantic ports, which had been closed to the Soviet fishing fleet on July 23, were reopened effective September 29. Gromyko's visit and the ensuing agreement were apparently instigated by Prime Minister Trudeau's expression of concern to Brezhnev at the European security conference.

Finland

Soviet Chief of the General Staff Kulikov led a military delegation to Finland from October 13-18. He toured military facilities and observed Finnish military exercises, but the purpose of the visit was primarily political. Three more Finnish moose became casualties of Soviet-Finnish detente. (SECRET NOFORN)

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