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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP

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Annex

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Annex

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 Political Development  
of the Central Military Components


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THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (MAC)

Politics and Development

The Military Affairs Committee (MAC) of the Central Committee (sometimes translated as the Central Military Commission), has been the key organ of Party control over the military ever since the early days of the Chinese revolution. Although its name, composition and duties have varied over time, it is now clearly the supreme organ responsible for the control, deployment and development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Organizationally, the MAC is subordinate only to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was in no way responsible to the Party Secretariat during the time when that body exercised supervisory control within the CCP. During the Cultural Revolution, there were times when it appeared that the MAC was to some degree responsible to the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) of the Central Committee, but that degree is open to some question. Since the dismantling of the CRG, no overall supervisory Party organ has been formally established, but even if, as some have speculated, the Secretariat has been revived in some form, it is likely that the MAC will retain its independence, and will remain responsible only to the highest levels of Party authority.

Although the past three Ministers of National Defense have wielded considerable influence within the MAC, there are no structural lines subordinating it to the MND, which is an organ of the State Council. If anything, the reverse is more likely the case, that is, that the MND is a "paper" organization, at best a low-level administrative body, subordinate in all military or substantive matters to the MAC rather than to the State Council. (See below for a further discussion of the Ministry of National Defense.)

Under Politburo direction, the MAC has authority over the entire Chinese military establishment, and may send orders directly to any component, though it ordinarily transmits these through the General Staff. The MAC apparently serves in an advisory capacity for Politburo discussions of military-related matters. It interprets, sometimes reformulates, and transmits doctrines, policies and programs for the PLA; it



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
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supervises implementation of these policies and programs, as well as the overall work of subordinate organs. At least once a year, and more often if necessary, it convenes conferences on military or politico-military problems. (The MAC has apparently met more frequently during the recent political crisis.)

The MAC has the ability to penetrate to any level of the PLA hierarchy, and has frequently involved itself in what might be considered inconsequential problems, as well as major policy issues. It has the authority to establish or abolish military and politico-military organs and offices, and to reorganize military region commands and service arms. The MAC investigates, evaluates, appoints or removes, promotes or demotes high-ranking officers, probably from army-level on up; it also investigates and confers "model" unit or soldier titles for emulation by the rest of the PLA. The MAC, through the General Political Department (GPD) and the political security apparatus of the PLA, keeps watch on the political indoctrination process and on the political behavior of Chinese soldiers. At the direction of the Politburo, the MAC is probably the overall coordinating body for PLA participation in the organizing, equipping and training of local militia units.




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the MAC is a decision-making authority, dependent largely upon subordinate organs both for the information required to render effective decisions, and for the apparatus to implement those decisions.



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


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THE GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT (GSD)

Politics and Development

There is no component of the PLA that was hit earlier or harder by the Lin Piao Affair purges than the General Staff Department (GSD). The primary reason for this appears to be the fact that Lin had packed the GSD with his proteges and was attempting to use it as a means for his own personal domination of the PLA.



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The general staff concept was probably introduced to China in the early 1920s through the successive influence of the Japanese (through returned students), the Russians (in the Whampoa Military Academy) and the Germans (Nationalist advisers, somewhat later). Owing to the Whampoa influence, Chinese Communist armies seem to have adopted the staff concept without question ever since they became more than guerrilla bands in the late 1920s. It was not until the late 1930s, however, when the Chinese Communists had established a firm base area and had recruited a large army, that the staff concept moved beyond the army-level of organization and became a centralized function.



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THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (GPD)

Politics and Development


It would appear that, after a long period of being in a sort of bureaucratic limbo, the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA has been restored to fulfill its traditional functions. There are now increasing numbers of personnel publicly associated with the GPD, and the department has again begun to issue public directives, sponsor conferences, etc.

The GPD, which has rightly been called the most important peacetime organ of the PLA, has traditionally been responsible for maintaining the political awareness, ideological orthodoxy and loyalty to the regime that Mao has often stated to be an absolute requisite for the success of socialism in China.\* In this regard, the GPD has been the most important organ dealing with what is ordinarily referred to as "political security" in the military, which includes such matters as surveillance, enforcing political discipline, and controlling promotions and demotions.

Organizationally, the GPD has been subordinate only to the MAC or its equivalent ever since its inception in 1931. It is generally considered to be co-equal in authority with the GSD, co-ordinating with it when necessary, but in no way subordinate. Up until the Cultural Revolution, its leadership remained comparatively stable, though strains must have begun to appear in the early 1960s, when Mao and Lin began their effort to make the PLA a political show ase by heightening the intensity of ideological education in the PLA.



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purges in the military got underway in 1967, the GPD was hit early and hard, with virtually the entire leadership, including the Director and his deputies as well as many sub-department directors and deputies, eventually removed and heavily criticized. By August of 1967, the GPD had virtually ceased to exist, its functions having been taken over by the CRG of the PLA and a military "Support-the-Left" group, both essentially under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the MAC. In late 1967, this structure underwent a further change with the dissolution of the PLA/CRG, and responsibility for political indoctrination and security work was divided among several MAC organs (See under MAC), particularly the Political Work Group, and later the Administrative Office.

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THE GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT (GLD)

Politics and Development

The General Logistics Department (also known as the General Rear Services Department /GRSD/) is responsible for overall logistical planning and support for all components of the PLA. Aside from the expected responsibility for quartermaster, ordnance and transportation, GLD functions include administration of all PLA hospitals, control of finances for the PLA, some administrative control over military barracks, academies and factories, and responsibility for veterinary work in the army. Not surprisingly, such a wide range of activities entails a rather large staff organization, and the GLD leadership group is the largest of the headquarters departments, with ten known Deputy Directors and several political officers who appear regularly in public.

Organizationally, the GLD is, on paper at least, co-equal with the GSD and GPD, subordinate only to the Military Commission. In practice, however, it is more likely that the GLD is subordinate in some fashion or another to the General Staff, since Logistics is such a key factor in operational planning. The exact nature of this relationship, however, is unknown.

The GLD coordinates its work through the logistics sections of the various service headquarters, military region and district commands and field armies in the PRC. It is also organized into several functional departments and bureaus, which handle the various aspects of logistics work. Unlike the GSD and GPD, it would appear that the various Deputy Directors of the GLD have specific responsibility over these functional departments. Though the exact names of these departments may have changed over time, and reorganizations have no doubt taken place, it is believed that the following sub-departments exist within the GLD:

Political Department -- Responsible for political security and indoctrination within the GLD.



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Ordnance Department (also known as Weapons and Equipment Department or Armaments Department) -- Probably responsible for production, storage, and supply of ordnance for units in the PLA, as well as foreign countries.

Enterprise Department -- (possibly the same as the Quartermaster Department) -- Probably responsible for production and supply of non-ordnance supplies such as clothing, tools, etc.

Transportation Department -- Probably responsible for distribution of military equipment to various PLA components.

Motor Vehicle Control Department -- Probably responsible for allocating military vehicles, inspecting motor pools, etc.


Fuel Department -- Probably responsible for procurement and distribution of POL supplies.

Military Facility Custody Department -- Probably responsible for planning, construction and maintenance of military bases, barracks, offices, etc.

Factory Control Department -- Probably responsible for administration and production control in military-related industrial plants.

Medical Department -- Responsible for administration, supply, training and upkeep of PLA hospitals and medical departments.

Finance Department -- Responsible for the PLA's accounting and pay systems.\*



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The GRSD was organized as a central component of the People's Revolutionary Military Committee in 1949, and has developed in a comparatively orderly manner. Its leadership has been purged and shaken up from time to time, but never to an extent that it would impede the GLD from carrying out its crucial supply responsibilities. Dismissed leaders have generally been quickly replaced. Cultural Revolution purges of the military only brushed lightly on the GLD, with one Political Officer and one Deputy Director being removed.

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
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THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND)

According to the various editions of the Constitution of the PRC, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is the central organ responsible for command and control of the military establishment. Most organizational charts of the PLA place the MND at the top of the hierarchy, at the same level as the MAC, or between the MAC and the General Staff. This is somewhat misleading, for in fact, the role of the MND in the past few years has been quite uncertain. The consensus of opinion is that it is now largely a 'paper' organization, devoid of any substantive power in the decision-making or command structure of the PLA, which are dominated, respectively, by the MAC and the General Staff.

Prior to 1959, when Peng Te-huai was Minister of Defense, it is possible that the MND had a good deal more authority, but with the rise of Lin Piao and heavier Party penetration of the military establishment, it went into a kind of eclipse. Although the Minister himself has had considerable prestige, he has exercised his power through the MAC, rather than the MND. Deputy Ministers of Defense were not included in military policy-making, and were not even replaced when their numbers were depleted by death, demotion or transfer. (No new Vice-Ministers have been appointed since 1959.)



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


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overseas embassies and for performing protocol functions for visiting military delegations and Peking-based foreign attaches. It has been speculated that the MND may perform certain administrative functions for the MAC, such as recruitment and civil defense programs, and may help the State Council coordinate the requirements of the military establishment with the capabilities and priorities of the other ministries. The NDSTC and NDIO are nominally under the control of the State Council, and the MND may act as something of an intermediary between the MAC, which sets the requirements for these bodies, and the State Council, which may help administer them. The MND may also participate in the technical aspects of drawing up the budget requirements for the PLA.



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The Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense

The Foreign Affairs Bureau of the MND is responsible for the appointment and activities of Chinese military attaches in overseas

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embassies. Presumably, the Bureau coordinates intelligence requirements and reports with the Intelligence Department of the GSD.

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In that regard, it is interesting that the current Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau is also believed to be part of the General Staff. Other functions of the bureau include protocol and escort duties for foreign military delegations visiting China.

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NAVY HEADQUARTERS

Established in 1950,

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The Navy may be in for some expansion and improvement in the near future.

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The Navy is organized both geographically and functionally. Its ships and patrol craft are divided among three fleets, the North Sea Fleet headquartered at Tsingtao (Shantung Province), the East Sea Fleet located in Shanghai, and the South Sea Fleet based outside of Canton. At the headquarters level, there are believed to be sections in charge of sea forces, marine forces, naval air forces and coastal artillery, as well as Departments of logistics, political work, shipbuilding and repair, naval schools, surveying, navigation, etc.\*

Command of these various components is centered in Navy Headquarters, Peking, which is directly subordinate to the MAC through the General Staff.

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


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AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

The Air Force (commonly abbreviated CCAF) Headquarters in Peking is responsible for command and control of the world's third-largest air force.

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the Air Force possesses its own command structure, consisting of MR Air Force commanders and staffs, which is subordinate directly to Peking. The primary mission of the CCAF is air defense, but it can also support tactical operations.

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Like all other functional components of the PLA, the CCAF is closely controlled by the central military hierarchy, taking its orders from the MAC (General Office) and the General Staff. Its headquarters consists of a Commander and Political Officer, each with several deputies, and staff officers. There are also believed to be several functional departments concerned with training, communications, meteorology, operations, logistics and aviation engineering. Below these are the 10 MR Air Force Commanders and their staffs.

The CCAF was organized in 1949 with considerable assistance from the Soviet Union, both in terms of materiel and of training. During the 1950s, the Soviets also helped the Chinese develop a large aircraft industry, as well as training procedures. The loss of Soviet assistance has been more damaging to the Air Force than to most other components, since the Chinese lack the technological capability to keep pace with the USSR or the US in aeronautical engineering and armaments. Most of their equipment is now considered obsolescent by Western and Soviet standards.

Given the mobility and destructive firepower that even an obsolescent air force can bring to bear, control of the CCAF at the command-level has been an important consideration in PLA politics.



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
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ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS

The Headquarters of the Artillery Corps of the PLA, which could probably be most accurately described as a sub-component of the General Staff, has overall responsibility for providing conventional artillery support for ground force units.


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Given the scattered deployment of artillery forces, and their subordination to field army and MR command structures, the responsibilities of Artillery Headquarters are primarily administrative. It is probably most occupied with training, planning artillery contributions to army maneuvers and deployment and personnel matters.

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ARMOR HEADQUARTERS

From its rather humble beginning in Yen-an during World War II, when a few Russian-trained officers drilled Red Army troops on three captured Japanese tanks, the PLA Armored Corps has developed into a formidable force supplementing Chinese ground forces.

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[Redacted] Like Artillery Forces, Armored units are assigned to field army and MR commands, and are subordinate to their planning staffs. At the MR level, at least, a qualified Armor officer is usually part of the commander's staff. Armor Headquarters in Peking, then, is responsible for training, personnel assignment, administration, and coordinated planning for all Armored units. It can be considered a staff, rather than a command operation.

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ENGINEER CORPS HEADQUARTERS

The PLA Engineer Corps Headquarters was established in or about 1954 to maintain unitary control over the various engineer units attached to field armies and MR. Since that time, its scope of responsibility has expanded considerably. Like artillery and armored units, some engineer troops are permanently assigned to the various main force units scattered throughout China. They perform standard combat engineer support tasks, such as bridging and road maintenance. Since the early 1950s however, when the PRC set about improving its communications and transportation systems, PLA Engineer Corps units have been specifically assigned to road construction projects,

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RAILWAY CORPS HEADQUARTERS

The PLA Railway Corps (or Railway Engineer Corps) got its start in Northeast China during the Chinese civil war, when Lin Piao's forces were able, for the first time, to make extensive use of the existing rail system to transport troops and materiel. After the establishment of the People's Republic, the Railway regiments were placed under the jurisdiction of the PRMC, but remained a rather small corps with a limited mission. They were instrumental in keeping up the flow of supplies to Chinese troops serving in Korea, despite heavy American bombing. In 1954, when Peking began a program to improve the communications network, the Railway Corps was established under the Ministry of National Defense, and its mission and strength were both considerably expanded. It was then made responsible for the construction, maintenance and security of China's strategic railroads, in addition to its more conventional military duties. The Railway Corps has thus played a key role in the development of China's economy, pushing rail lines through some of the world's most difficult terrain. Its current strength is placed at 13 to 15 divisions, or about 67,000 men

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All Railway Corps units are under the control of the Railway Corps Headquarters in Peking. there are three, and perhaps five regional support headquarters, located in the main areas of rail construction. The nature of their mission requires units to work closely with both military and civilian authorities at the local level (local civilians often are 'volunteered' to augment the labor force on key rail projects).

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it may have five departments: Personnel and administration; track-laying and construction, tunnelling, reconnaissance, planning and geology, and political affairs.

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THE ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE (AMS)

The Academy of Military Science (AMS) was established in March, 1958, for the purpose of studying and using the latest techniques (mostly received from the Soviet Union) of military science for the development of the PLA. Its first Commandant, and concurrently Political Officer, was Yeh Chien-ying.



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there is evidence that it has concentrated most of its attention on military theory and strategy. Its first known work was a thorough report of standard and regularized military doctrine and regulations, which came out in about 1961. As late as 1972, it was known to have a War History Department, which published a study of anti-tank tactics used by the PLA, and it recently drew up regulations for the entire PLA.

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THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACADEMY (MPA)

The PLA's Military and Political Academy (more correctly, Military and Political College) is believed to have been established sometime during the Cultural Revolution, and represented something of a reorganization of the GPD's Military and Political Academy and possibly some other high-level military schools in Peking. It was supposedly patterned after the "Anti-Japanese Military and Political College" of the Yen-an period, and its curriculum was devoted to the study of Mao, Marx and Lenin. It did not emerge in the public media as a recognizable separate entity until just after the Lin Piao affair, when one of its officers was identified for the first time. Since that time, several other officers have been mentioned publicly, and its leadership core has grown and changed.

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The students are drawn from all military components, and apparently are already mid-career officers. Though it is not necessarily a school for political officers only, it would appear that the primary emphasis of its curriculum is toward subjects that would be of most interest and concern to career political officers.

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