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Foreign  
Assessment  
Center**



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# Latin America Review

**19 October 1978**

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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

19 October 1978

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Argentina-Chile: New Tensions in the Beagle Channel

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Recent troop movements by Argentina and Chile are the latest in a series of military actions that have increased concern about chances for a peaceful resolution of the century-old Beagle Channel dispute. The latest negotiating round is scheduled to end on 2 November, probably without an agreement, and no decision has been made to extend the talks. Although major spokesmen for both sides insist they want a peaceful settlement, there is always the possibility that Argentina may resort to military action against Chile.

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In the negotiations, which began last February, the bilateral commission has made substantial progress in the area of economic integration and possible exploitation of maritime resources in the disputed region. But there remains the major issue of drawing a demarcation line beyond the islands awarded to Chile last year by international arbitration. A complicating factor is the lack of agreement among Argentine military and government leaders over what terms they will accept.

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Although recent official communiqués speak optimistically of an agreement being reached by 2 November, both sides may be considering other initiatives in the event of an impasse. Peaceful options may include a limited extension of the negotiating deadline, a moratorium, or an effort to find some new form of international arbitration. Meanwhile, however, both nations continue to reinforce their southern military commands, a development that has not gone unnoticed in the opposing capital.

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Other nations are beginning to regard the situation with increasing concern. In South America, both Peru and Bolivia have indicated that they take the possibility of military action seriously, and are watching developments closely. Brazil is reportedly sufficiently worried

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
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6 about a possible outbreak of hostilities to begin making  
7 its own defense preparations. A leading Brazilian news-  
8 paper said recently that international reaction must be  
9 one of "stupefaction" in the face of the assorted bel-  
10 licose preparations of Argentina, which it listed as:  
11 troop concentrations, movements of heavy equipment, mili-  
tary exercises, mobilization, civil defense preparations,  
emotional appeals to patriotism, parades, and a special  
"war course of instruction." [redacted]

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Nicaragua: "Tachito" Will Benefit From National Guard  
Buildup

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2 In response to the continuing guerrilla threat, the Somoza government has set in motion longstanding plans to nearly double the size of the 8,200-man National Guard by the end of next year. The President's son, Major Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza, who commands the Infantry Basic Training School and directed the counteroffensive against the guerrillas in September, will probably increase his personal power base as a result of the buildup.

1 In overall capability or man-for-man, the Guard has always militarily outclassed the guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. During the FSLN offensive in September, however, the Guard was stretched so thin that it had to concede temporary control of several provincial cities until it could systematically recapture them over a two-week period. With the guerrillas gaining in numbers and popularity and receiving increased support from abroad, President Somoza sees a clear need to maintain his advantage by building up his mainstay.

1  
2 Despite its recent widespread censure by the international press, the Guard seems to be having little trouble finding the recruits it needs to increase its size to 15,000. The Guard's public image--which had not been good for years--was thought to have reached rock bottom because of the harsh methods it reportedly used to recapture the provincial cities. Nevertheless, according to the US Defense Attache, the Guard still enjoys some prestige in rural areas. Illiterate peasants, who generally fill the enlisted ranks, evidently continue to welcome the opportunity for upward mobility that Guard service offers.

1 The Guard's haste to increase its numbers is evident. The senior class of the Military Academy was recently graduated nine months early, skipping most of its fourth year, in order to provide 28 new officers. Some

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1,500 new recruits have been enlisted in the past month, and another 3,000 applications are being processed. Illiterate recruits, who are probably in the majority, will continue to go through the regular five-month training cycle, but enlistees who are literate will be rushed through a new, special two-month basic infantry combat training course.

2  
The buildup will be coupled with an internal reorganization of the Guard. Somoza has finally approved a plan to establish a professional police force separate from the purely military elements. In addition, the "Becat" counterterrorist jeep patrols will be removed from the 1st Armored Battalion to permit it to concentrate on its role as a heavy weapons unit.

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The Guard will encounter some difficulties in rapidly increasing its size. The Somoza family has historically ensured the loyalty of the Guard through a range of controls and patron-client techniques, including careful screening of applicants. Some officers are concerned that the rapid buildup will lead to less stringent security investigations, enabling guerrillas or their sympathizers to infiltrate the Guard. In addition, the Infantry Basic Training School cannot accommodate all of the expected new recruits, so training facilities will have to be set up elsewhere, perhaps at Puerto Somoza on the Pacific coast. Although the Guard has sufficient weapons for the enlistees, it is short of uniforms, C-rations, and other equipment. The government is currently trying to make commercial purchases in the US to overcome these shortages.


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Major "Tachito" Somoza, who has established a significant personal power base in the Guard over the past two years, will most clearly benefit from the buildup. In the past, he has succeeded in winning the personal loyalty of new recruits, all of whom go through his Infantry Basic Training School. Moreover, the top officer graduates of the Military Academy serve as his training school cadre, and he has become influential with them as well. "Tachito" will also be in charge of the special basic training for the new police force, for which he will be receiving the better enlisted men from the departmental commands.

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It is still debatable whether the 26-year-old son of the President could take control of the Guard if his father were to leave the scene unexpectedly, but that is the trend and apparently the intent. The President's aging and unhealthy half-brother, Jose R., is technically second in command, but during the guerrilla offensive last month, "Tachito" personally directed most of the Guard's counter-attack. Troops from his school bore almost the full brunt of the fighting in recapturing the five provincial cities. Despite occasional protestations that he prefers a business career, the young major enjoys leading the troops and recognizes that a Guard



Major Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza

career and business pursuits usually go hand-in-hand in Nicaragua. He is an intelligent, decisive officer, and the longer his father remains in power, the more assured becomes the eventual ascendancy of "Tachito" to the command of the Guard.

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Panama: Policy Continuity Under  
New Government

Panama's new government headed by President Aristides Royo contains familiar faces, suggesting that the center-left diplomatic tack and center-right domestic course of recent years will be little altered. General Omar Torrijos, former Chief of Government and now simply commandant of the National Guard, sincerely wants to restore civilian government, but his brand of democracy has definite limits. Torrijos has continued to make the major decisions, at least through Royo's election and installation, but he seems unsure how he will define his future policymaking role. For now, despite Royo's ambition and talent, the new President is a creature of Torrijos and will follow past guidelines closely.

The principal people in the new administration include many of the same people Torrijos has had clustered around him for years. The new faces reflect the same left-right balancing that has come to characterize Torrijos' cabinet-level appointments. The General's continuing control was manifested in Royo's uncontested election on 11 October by the 505-member legislative assembly.

Royo's acceptance speech stuck to the same moderate theme he has been emphasizing since Torrijos first "proposed" him last month. Royo announced, for example, the formation of a National Economic Council from the private sector to assist the government in policymaking. For the past three years, the administration has been tilting to the right in an effort to bolster business confidence and overcome economic stagnation.

Although Royo has a leftist background that includes cooperation with the Communist Party, he is--like Torrijos--a capable, dynamic opportunist who will shift with the political winds. As Minister of Education since 1973, he first supported leftist reform measures but quickly abandoned them in the face of a popular backlash. The moderate tone of his acceptance speech is typical of his recent efforts to establish himself as a middle-of-the-road pragmatist.

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Foreign affairs ostensibly will be in the hands of Carlos Ozores who has been Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations since 1970. Not a major figure in the administration, he seems nonetheless very much at ease with Torrijos' independent policies oriented toward the Third World. In any case, wide-ranging general principles, which were laid down by the Foreign Ministry in July, effectively institutionalize present policy directions.

In domestic affairs, Torrijos' political reform package will soon be ratified by the newly elected legislative assembly in what is likely to be a pro forma exercise. Major changes provide for direct election of the next president in 1984 and the legalization of certain political parties.

Although the legislative assembly will continue to function, a smaller National Legislative Council will be established, purportedly with real lawmaking powers. One-third of this Council will be directly elected in 1980, but a comfortable two-thirds majority will be drawn from the present, Torrijos-controlled assembly.

This package falls well short of opposition demands for proportional representation and early, direct elections for the presidency and other public offices. In protest, the leader of the major opposition Liberal Party may withdraw from his working relationship with the government to join forces with the Panamenista Party of former President Arnulfo Arias and work for the government's overthrow. Even together, however, these opposition groups are no match for the government.

Torrijos seems quite pleased by having surprised many observers with his decision to step back from total control. He was partly motivated by personal reasons; he chafed under the bureaucratic demands and ceremonial trappings of office. The General, however, also views himself as one of a new breed of enlightened Latin American military leaders who advocate increased participation and control by "responsible" civilians. Torrijos opposes a return to Panama's traditional political systems, leaders, and spoils system.

In practice, President Royo's total loyalty means that Torrijos can retain as much or as little power as

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he wishes. The General certainly continues to make major  
policy decisions. Torrijos may have moved back from the  
limelight, but he is still firmly in control.

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Panama: Torrijos Turns His Attention  
to The Guard

1 The forced resignation last week of Colonel Rodrigo  
2 Garcia, the deputy commandant of the National Guard,  
was the culmination of a long series of policy disagree-  
ments between General Torrijos and the staunchly conserv-  
ative number-two man in the military. Panama's prolific  
rumor mill ground out stories of a coup plot, but what  
stands out is the General's apparent continued control.

1 Deputy Commandant Garcia--second in rank to Torri-  
jos as the only full colonel in the Guard--has disagreed  
with Torrijos over policies toward Cuba and leftist in-  
fluence on the government in general. Anti-Communist  
and conservative to the core, Garcia was the military  
counterpart to former President Lakas--similarly a strong  
conservative who had frequent reservations about policy  
and an occasional falling out with Torrijos but who re-  
mained personally loyal to the General and his revolu-  
tion. In recent years, however, both Lakas and Garcia  
had less and less influence on Torrijos' policy deci-  
sions.

4 Most recently, Garcia disagreed with Panama's  
3 moral and material support for the Nicaraguan guerril-  
las. Garcia, like other conservatives, was also dis-  
quieted by Torrijos' choice of left-leaning Aristides  
Royo for the presidency and the selection of former  
Labor Minister Ahumada as the new Minister of Govern-  
ment. Ahumada, a past member of the Panamanian Communist  
Party, has long been regarded by both Garcia and Lakas  
as an irritating symbol of leftist inroads into the gov-  
ernment. Personal frustrations may have helped fuel  
Garcia's most recent dissatisfaction; he was one of  
those pushing for Torrijos to assume the presidency so  
he, in turn, could head the Guard.

1 For his part, Torrijos may have been irritated  
with Garcia over a diplomatic gaffe in August when Tor-  
rijos attended the inauguration of the Dominican Presi-  
dent and transported several Dominican exiles back to

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Santo Domingo with him in his plane. To Torrijos public embarrassment, one of the exiles was refused permission to enter the Dominican Republic, and Torrijos held Garcia personally responsible for the mixup.

Although forcing Garcia's resignation was a telling demonstration of the General's power--after Torrijos, he was one of the three most powerful men in the Guard--it does not appear to have been the result of any serious personal challenge to Torrijos. Like the other members of the Guard hierarchy, Garcia held his position because of his demonstrated loyalty. During a short-lived coup attempt against Torrijos in 1969, Garcia fled the country rather than accept an offer to serve as Chief of Staff. In 1976, Garcia was almost wholly in charge of suppressing serious student disorders. Over the last few years, moreover, the Guard was frequently left in Garcia's hands when Torrijos, drumming up support for the canal treaties, was absent from the country.

Garcia may have grumbled, especially over contacts with Cuba, but there has been no hint of serious coup plotting.

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though Garcia was personally frustrated and unhappy, he did not have sufficient influence to organize a serious challenge to Torrijos on his own.

Al-

The sidelining of Garcia was not totally unexpected, since he was due to retire next January, and some change in the top echelon of the Guard was forecast. More interesting developments may come with whatever additional re-alignment emerges within the Guard. According to press reports, G-1 Lieutenant Colonel Paredes is to serve concurrently as assistant Chief of Staff, and the deputy commandant position has been abolished. This is perhaps an indication that even Torrijos, whose word has been law for 10 years, is taking no chances of kindling the ambitions of a potential successor.

Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Florencio Florez becomes second in command in the Guard, but his position is a bureaucratic one that does not provide a viable power base. Florez has generally appeared quite loyal

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to Torrijos although on a few occasions his name was associated with reported intrigue within the Guard. In any event, he has not exercised a great deal of authority in his post, and he is a relative short-timer, due to retire in early 1980.

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Having relinquished his Chief of Government post last week, Torrijos will now be free to devote more time and attention to the Guard, which will be expanding as it assumes a greater role in canal defense. If Torrijos' decisions on reassignments and promotions stick close to the seniority list, as Panamanian military tradition dictates, and he also opens up the full colonel rank to more officers, he will probably further strengthen his position. In any case, Torrijos hardly seems worried by Garcia's disgruntlement with his Nicaraguan policies.

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Cuba: Whither Raul Garcia Pelaez?

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The appointment last week of Raul Garcia Pelaez as the new Cuban Ambassador to Afghanistan raises questions about the political future of an important figure in Cuba's party hierarchy. While other party Secretariat officials named to high posts abroad--for example, Jorge Risquet in Angola and Raul Valdes Vivo in Ethiopia--have retained their membership in that key office, Garcia Pelaez reportedly lost his Secretariat seat when appointed to open the embassy in Kabul.

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The Cuban press no longer describes Garcia Pelaez as a Secretariat official, which lends credence to the private reports, but no explanation has been offered for the loss of his prestigious party post. It therefore seems likely that he has suffered a serious political reverse.

1  
Garcia Pelaez, who received his doctorate in law and diplomacy from Havana University in the mid-1940s, is not new to diplomatic life. After several years in party organizational and supervisory work, he was sent to Moscow as Ambassador in October 1967. At that time, a purge of pre-1958 Communists was in progress in Cuba, and the Castro regime's relations with the USSR were nearing an unprecedented low due to sharp policy differences. Garcia Pelaez stayed in the Soviet capital for over five years, during which time the negative trend in Cuban-Soviet ties was completely reversed.

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2  
On finishing his tour in Moscow in early 1973, Garcia Pelaez was again given a party post, being named to the Secretariat when that body--which had been largely a paper organization--was given new life and expanded from six to 10 members. Judging from his activities as reported in the Cuban press, he worked primarily in the field of interparty relations. Later, he was made responsible for the Central Committee's Economic Department, an office charged with formulating economic policy for the Political Bureau's consideration. In this new

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role, he frequently presided at important meetings in the economic sector at home and, in the international sphere, represented Cuba at several meetings of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He worked in this capacity until receiving his assignment to Kabul.

While the loss of his Secretariat post represents a personal setback for Garcia Pelaez, it does not dilute the international significance of Havana's intention to upgrade its relations with what it views as a promising and exploitable new regime in Kabul. Garcia Pelaez' predecessor, Jose Lopez Sanchez, was a political non-entity who was not even assigned as a resident ambassador. In contrast, Havana is now sending to reside in Kabul a diplomat who has served for years in Moscow, Cuba's most important diplomatic post, and has also spent a lengthy term in one of Cuba's top party posts, so that he presumably has good access to the inner circle of the leadership.

Moreover, the Cubans probably anticipate great interest on the part of the USSR in expanding its influence in Afghanistan, and hope to take advantage of Garcia Pelaez' good rapport with the Soviets. Last year, for example, a Soviet diplomat in Havana spoke highly of Garcia Pelaez--who presumably speaks Russian--and described him as a highly influential person close to Moscow.

The Cubans are also eager to take advantage of Afghanistan's standing in the nonaligned movement, in which it is presently a member of the Coordinating Bureau. In addition, the Cubans may be hoping to ingratiate themselves by responding favorably to the Afghan Foreign Minister's request of last May for economic assistance. Havana may intend to provide public health personnel, construction brigades, and other technical assistance, such as it has already supplied to more than a dozen other countries. A Cuban official of Garcia Pelaez' stature would be required to oversee such an effort if it were substantial.

The "why" of Garcia Pelaez' removal from the Secretariat is not known. Posting him to Kabul implies that his physical health was not a factor. Neither does he seem to be in disgrace, for if he had run afoul of either

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Fidel or Raul Castro, he would not have been given an assignment of such high visibility and importance. Cuban officials guilty of political indiscretions usually disappear from view in some minor administrative post.

On the other hand, Garcia Pelaez may have been a source of friction to someone high enough in the leadership to influence Fidel. Political Bureau member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, for example, may have been dissatisfied with Garcia Pelaez' performance in his economic duties and could have urged that his talents would be better utilized elsewhere. Such maneuvering by Rodriguez is not unprecedented; for instance, when Isidoro Malmierca was unable to carry out his duties as party organizing secretary, Rodriguez used his influence to have him named to the post of Foreign Minister after he was removed from the Secretariat.

Whatever the reason for his removal, Garcia Pelaez' career seems to have peaked, he is not likely to regain such privileged status in the party once having lost it. Ironically, his brother Pedro, one of only about a dozen division-level generals in the Cuban military establishment, was not long ago given command of the Western Army, the most important of Cuba's ground forces units.

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Chile-China: Relations Being Strengthened

On 16 October, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos left for China on a two-week official visit intended to foster closer economic and political ties. He carries an invitation to Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to visit Chile and hopes that President Pinochet will be invited to China; the Chinese will handle these issues very cautiously.

Relations between the two ideologically disparate governments have been correct and improving for some time. The Chinese Ambassador in Santiago recently obtained Cubillos' partial endorsement of his denunciation of "USSR and US intervention and hegemonic ambitions."

Improving ties with a leading Communist power gives substance to Chile's announced pragmatic, nonideological foreign policy. Chile is also working to improve relations with other Third World nations to reduce US leverage and to end international isolation.

On China's part, the cultivation of closer political and economic relations with Chile accords with its desire to form as broad an anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban front as possible, as well as with its policy of diversifying foreign trade. Although relations with the Pinochet regime have cost China some support in Latin American "leftist" circles and have evoked Soviet and Cuban diatribes, Chinese leaders seem determined to ignore ideological labels in their drive to expand relations with Latin American governments.

Aside from the political overtones of Cubillos' trip, Chilean officials point out that economic and trade issues will be high on the agenda. They believe that Peking's search for more copper, iron, steel, and fertilizer will lead to further trade agreements and improvement of the already favorable Chilean balance of trade.

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Jamaica: Manley Embroiled in Political Scandals

1,6,7 Prime Minister Michael Manley's declining political stock is being further weakened by a number of current scandals. Although Manley has managed so far to deflect the sensational allegations now before the courts, he could be ousted if the main charges are substantiated.

Background

2,6,7 The past year has not been a good one for the Prime Minister, who has been forced to cope with the fallout from a series of highly dubious actions by various elements of his government.

2,6,7 In January, the military illegally executed five alleged opposition gunmen after luring them to an isolated site on the Green Bay Army base outside Kingston. Despite Manley's frantic coverup efforts, relentless press investigations and the probing of the opposition party exposed the incident.


2,6,7 In July, the government yielded to opposition pressure and released a judicial commission's report accusing Manley's radical Housing Minister of using his office to victimize political opponents and of associating with gunmen. Manley, who probably has reason to be wary of his unsavory minister, has defended him by questioning the findings of the commission.

2,6,7 In August, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Lloyd, once a rival for the top spot in the Army, claimed that he was sacked last year after he informed the "political directorate" of various irregularities in the military, including the use of torture. Four army enlisted men, in press statements, have corroborated the accusations of torture.

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6 In August, an exconvict and former government worker, Albert "Spy" Robinson, charged that Manley and other high government officials had hired him in 1976 to carry out political "dirty tricks" that included spying on the opposition party, the US Embassy, and the Canadian High Commission.



Albert "Spy" Robinson, who has been testifying before the Corruption Commission this month

In September, Manley ordered another coverup after the police ambushed a "revolutionary guerrilla camp" in the hills outside Kingston. The constabulary force killed four of the estimated 15-member terrorist group that police believe is connected with Jamaica's leading independent radical, Trevor Munroe--who has close links with the left wing of the ruling party. Although the alleged intermediary between Munroe and the terrorist group was mysteriously assassinated late last month, many details of the incident have leaked to the anti-government press. Munroe, a "critical" supporter of Manley, has suggested publicly that the CIA planted the Communist literature found at the site.

Manley, for his part, reportedly ordered the police to remove Soviet and Cuban flags from the cache uncovered at the camp and to report the raid strictly as a criminal matter. Probably impelled by a desire to avoid public criticism of his longstanding patronage of radical causes, the Prime Minister probably also wanted to prevent an embarrassing open confrontation with other pro-Cuban leftists.

#### The Scandals Facing Manley

6,7 The Green Bay massacre has provided headlines damaging to Manley for nine months, and more revelations are likely.

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	An eight-week
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coroner's inquest resulted in the arrest last July of 10 military personnel, including several middle-level officers whose impending trials will ensure more disclosures. The scandal has apparently already demoralized the military and further lowered Manley's esteem among the security forces.

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Although we have no evidence to implicate Manley directly in planning or ordering the executions, he is highly vulnerable because of his role in the abortive coverup and because of his direct responsibility for the military as Minister of Defense. In an unprecedented action, all opposition senators boycotted the upper chamber from late June to early September after the senate president, a member of Manley's party, refused to authorize an investigation of the military intelligence unit that staged the killings.

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Manley's problem with his Housing Minister dates from February 1977, when the hard-fisted minister ordered the forced eviction of over a thousand opposition party supporters from a public housing project in a Kingston ghetto. Apparently to prevent a rift with the radical faction of his party, the Prime Minister refused to discipline the minister and instead referred the charges to a one-judge commission of inquiry in the hope that the storm would blow over.

6,7

The release of the judge's report in July, however, reopened the issue at a time of greater vulnerability for Manley. The Prime Minister's rejection of the findings has again shown his overriding determination to preserve the unity of his troubled party. At the same time, he has taken a serious political risk by repudiating significant groups such as the Jamaica Bar Association and the independent press, which have demanded disciplinary action against the controversial minister.

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9,10

Over the past month, another judicial commission has been hearing sensational and widely publicized testimony from "Spy" Robinson, who has testified that Manley and some advisers used him to entrap the opposition party and the US Embassy in a fake antigovernment plot during 1976. The police intelligence head, who has readily

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altered other police reports on orders from Manley, appeared before the commission last week and reportedly withheld evidence supporting Robinson's claim that he was working for Manley's party and not for the CIA or the opposition party--as some leftists, including Munroe, now contend.

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It is too early to assess the impact of only partially credible testimony from a disreputable witness, but the Prime Minister--whose contact with Robinson in 1976 has been clearly established--cannot be helped politically by the outcome. Moreover, the commission will soon turn its attention to Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd's accusations of military improprieties, and details of the September raid on the guerrilla camp will probably continue to leak to the press.

3, 6, 7

Manley is a shrewd tactician who has consistently undercut promising opposition maneuvers, but he is struggling in a political climate that is increasingly turning against him. Largely because of Jamaica's serious economic downturn, Manley's popularity is at its lowest point since he came to power in 1972. Since last May, when he acceded to stiff International Monetary Fund austerity measures, his problems have grown even within the ruling party. In June, for the first time since Manley's election, the opposition came out ahead of the ruling party in a voters' preference poll. The poll claimed that a majority of Jamaicans believes that Manley should resign. Even if he survives the present spate of scandals--which is impossible to predict at this time--he will undoubtedly lose more ground with Jamaica's conservative electorate.

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South America: Changing Patterns of Drug Smuggling

In the past, Ecuador has been a primary transit point for narcotics trafficking between Peru and Colombia--the principal South American drug growing and processing countries, respectively. Over the past year, however, Ecuador's role has changed somewhat as increasing numbers of Colombian drug manufacturers have begun to buy coca paste directly from Peruvian suppliers.


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Ecuadorean narcotics police officials estimate that the number of known Colombian traffickers entering Ecuador to conduct drug transactions has declined 20 percent over the last eight months. According to these officials, the remote border cities of Iquitos, in Peru, and Leticia, in Colombia, now serve as direct links between the two countries.

The main reason the Colombians have begun to bypass traditional smuggling routes through Ecuador is to increase the security and efficiency of their narcotics transactions. Inspections along the Ecuadorean-Peruvian border are more frequent and may be strict at times, depending on political tensions between Lima and Quito. In addition, larger quantities of coca paste can be transported from Iquitos to Leticia using clandestine airstrips and jungle rivers than Ecuadorean highways.

To say that South American drug smuggling patterns are changing is not to imply that narcotics trafficking in Ecuador will cease altogether. Established networks are still active in Guayaquil and have not been affected by the increased direct connections between Colombians and Peruvians. Eventually, the level of drug activity in Ecuador will probably diminish--particularly if the direct Colombia-Peru link is sustained and the promising steps toward improved drug enforcement in Ecuador are continued.

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


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Colombian authorities have recently made record multiton seizures of marijuana because some networks have concentrated their activities in a single region. There may also be a concomitant rise in multikilo cocaine seizures if other Colombian traffickers persist in dealing directly with Peruvians.

In the short run, most of the trafficking networks in South America can use their resiliency and ingenuity to foil the authorities. In the longer run, however, persistent enforcement efforts will at least reduce the possibilities and options available to the traffickers.

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FOR THE RECORD

ECUADOR: The government has announced that the second round of the presidential election, coupled with a legislative election, will be held on 8 April 1979. The transfer of power to a civilian government is scheduled for the following August. A new electoral tribunal was named on 5 October to complete a review of returns from the initial round of the presidential balloting held on 16 July and to supervise the runoff election. Some top military leaders were thwarted last month in their attempt to annul the first round election results. The long delay before the April elections, however, provides ample time for further plotting.

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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY  
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- 1 September      Angolan Construction Minister Rezende de Oliveira and delegation arrive in Cuba.
- Fidel Castro meets visiting Mozambican Deputy Defense Minister Manuel Emitio Guebuza, who is visiting Cuba.
- Cuban Government offers to release between 500 and 1,000 political prisoners and allow them to come to the US.
- 2 September      Havana television carries commentary scoring colonial status of Puerto Rico.
- Three Cuban war prisoners are freed by South Africa in exchange for South African soldiers held by Angola.
- 4 September      Division General Senen Casas Regueiro opens military training school on the Isle of Youth.
- Fidel Castro speech opening new school year. Castro says, "The export of technical services has become an important factor of this country's economic development."
- 6 September      Local authorities in Havana deny reports of Cubans infiltrating Nicaragua or taking part in any FSLN actions.
- Foreign Minister Malmierca opens annual Foreign Ministry seminar for Cuban Ambassadors in Havana.

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- 7 September Commander Antonio dos Santos, member of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Politburo, arrives in Cuba at invitation of Raul Castro.
- 8 September Raul Castro meets Cuban prisoners recently exchanged for South Africans.
- Fidel Castro grants lengthy interview to expatriate Cuban journalists.
- 9 September Ugandan President Idi Amin denies published reports of presence of Cuban soldiers in Kampala.
- Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez arrives in Cuba. Meets Fidel and Raul Castro.
- Cuban Government issues statement expressing its militant solidarity with Nicaraguan people. Rejects Somoza's accusations of Cuban involvement.
- Cuban UN mission in New York is bombed. US State Department condemns bombing on 12 September.
- Fidel Castro meets MPLA Politburo member Dos Santos. Also present are Raul Castro and Juan Almeida.
- 10 September Raul Castro meets Mozambican military delegation visiting Cuba.
- Fidel Castro and Spanish Prime Minister Suarez hold press conference in Havana. Castro says he will visit Spain.
- 11 September Fidel Castro stops in Moscow en route to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to attend revolution anniversary ceremonies. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is with Castro group.

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Havana AFP says Cuba will receive 500,000 tons of Venezuelan oil this year. Agreement involves swaps with Spain, USSR, Venezuela, and Cuba.

- 12 September Raul Castro meets Guinea-Bissau National Assembly President and Armed Forces Minister Joao Bernado Vieira in Havana.
- Fidel Castro and delegation arrive in Addis Ababa. Attend rally in Revolution Square. Receives Ethiopia's highest decoration from Chairman Mengistu.
- 13 September UN special committee on decolonization approves Cuban-sponsored resolution on Puerto Rico.
- Meeting of chiefs of economic offices abroad opens in Havana. Isidoro Malmierca and Hector Rodriguez Llopart preside.
- 14 September Ivan Arkhipov, Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, meets Joel Domenech, Vice President Council of Ministers, in Moscow.
- Fidel Castro speaks at opening session of Conference of Afro-Arab Peoples Against Imperialism in Ethiopia.
- The governments of Cuba and Angola sign 1979 construction cooperation protocol.
- 18 September In Ethiopia, Fidel Castro meets Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe Patriotic Front leaders.
- Transportation Minister Antonio Enrique Lusson signs air and maritime cooperation agreement in Aden, South Yemen.
- 19 September Fidel Castro makes stop in Tripoli, Libya. Meets Colonel Qadhafi.

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- Fidel Castro arrives in Algiers. Meets President Boumediene. He states at press conference that the Camp David agreement is "the consummation of treachery." He leaves for Cuba.
- 20 September Division General Rigoberto Garcia heads Cuban delegation to Mexican independence celebration.
- 21 September Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Moscow from Algiers.
- Transportation Minister Lusson signs several agreements in Baghdad, Iraq.
- Cuban medical team returns from service in Guyana. Another group of 22 doctors replaces these returnees.
- 22 September Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets Politburo member Suslov in Moscow.
- 23 September Tanzanian Public Health Ministry delegation arrives in Cuba.
- 24 September Foreign Minister Malmierca meets separately with Liberia's Foreign Minister Cecil Dennis and SWAPO head Nujoma in New York.
- 25 September Foreign Minister Malmierca speaks to UN General Assembly. Condemns Somoza regime, attacks Camp David meeting, and supports Puerto Rican independence.
- 26 September Tomas Borges, founder of th FSLN, arrives in Havana. Met by Ulises Estrada. Meets Fidel Castro on 27 September.
- Fidel Castro meets Gus Hall, Secretary General of the US Communist Party.
- 27 September Transportation Minister Lusson signs co-operation agreement with Algeria.

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- 29 September Cuba and Ethiopia sign economic cooperation protocol.
- 30 September Cuba and Tanzania sign scientific and technical cooperation agreement that will apply until 1980.
- Cuban party delegation headed by Alfredo Menendez Cruz leaves for Peru to attend 50th anniversary of founding of Peruvian Communist Party.

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