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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

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
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Independence is unlikely to rescue these microstates from a bleak economic future and a decline in democracy.

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Brazil: New Measures Shape Political Changes

1,2 The government's new--and notably less severe--national security law will almost certainly receive pro forma legislative approval by the end of this month. The new measure, along with other recently promulgated reforms, will form the basis for much of the political change that is expected under President-elect Figueiredo. Ironically, the reforms are being handed down in an authoritarian fashion that contradicts the professed liberalizing aims of both the incumbent President and his successor. Still, the new measures eliminate, or at least moderate, much of the sweeping authority and arbitrariness with which the military has governed over the years.

National Security Law

Among the major features of the new security law are provisions that:

- Eliminate the death penalty and life imprisonment.
- Reduce substantially the penalties for a large number of offenses.
- 1,2 -- Transfer investigatory responsibility from the military to civilian authorities.
- Require the police to report immediately to the judiciary the arrest of "national security" suspects.

1, 2, 3 The law is significantly more lenient than the one it replaces, which was enacted during a time of serious political tensions and active subversion. Nevertheless, some aspects have drawn serious criticisms from opposition politicians, journalists, and the church. They point out, for example, that there is still a provision for holding suspects incommunicado, which clearly conflicts with other laws reestablishing habeas corpus. Cynics also question

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whether giving prisoners the right to have a physical examination while in custody will prevent abuse, since security authorities determine who will administer the examination.

1, 2, 3
A leading Rio de Janeiro daily has called the new security law a contradiction of the political reforms the regime claims to be making. The National Council of Brazilian Bishops has criticized the government's haste in ramming through Congress a measure that conflicts with the "demands of justice and the common good." Unhappy congressmen have proposed at least 150 amendments, but the government has made clear that it will accept no more than cosmetic changes. In the end, the administration will probably have its way since it has a majority in Congress and is still operating with the sweeping decree powers its reforms will replace.

Political Reform Package

Last month the administration pushed through Congress a "political reform package" that, beginning in January 1979, will revoke the chief executive's ability to:

- Close Congress and rule by decree.
- Deprive elected officials of their mandates or political rights.
- Intervene in states or municipalities without respect to the constitution.

2
Moreover, the reforms establish the right of habeas corpus in political cases and protect the independence of the judiciary. At the same time, however, all actions taken under earlier decree laws will remain in effect and will be exempt from judicial review. Thus, there is no provision for amnesty, nor are the persons who have lost their political rights aided by the reforms.

2
The reform package, like the security laws, evoked significant--but ineffective--criticism from opposition congressmen and others who felt it did not go far enough and failed to address grievances such as the indirect election of governors and of one-third of the national senators.

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Standby Safeguards

Instead of the former decrees, the President will have three levels of standby "safeguards" whose use will involve the legislative branch. Under each level of "safeguard," the Chief Executive will have the power to:

- Order detentions of individuals.
- Order searches and confiscations.
- Suspend the right of assembly.
- Intervene in labor unions.
- Censor the media.
- Temporarily occupy state agencies and public corporations.

The three levels of "safeguards" are defined as:

- A "state of siege," which can be declared in case of war or a serious subversive threat. It must be approved by Congress and cannot initially exceed 180 days, but can be extended.
- A "state of emergency," which can be declared under less threatening circumstances. It does not need congressional approval, but the President must communicate his intentions to Congress. This cannot initially exceed 90 days, but may be extended.
- "Measures of emergency," which can be applied in specific locations "threatened by calamities or disturbances" not warranting declaration of a nationwide state of siege or emergency. Congress must be informed within 48 hours of the issuance of orders under this provision.

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Outlook

3

The political reform package constitutes a significant departure from the unilateral, virtually unlimited authority the regime has exercised until now. Even so, it is still decidedly authoritarian in that the government will have considerable latitude to determine what kind of measure is warranted by conditions. Moreover, it is not at all clear whether the new Congress--which was elected this week--will be permitted or inclined to have a will of its own or will remain a rubber stamp as in the past.

With the expected approval of the security legislation, the basic rules defining presidential authority will be in place, laying the foundation for Figueiredo's administration. The next--and probably last--major undertaking before the transition next March will be the modification of the present government-created party system. The results of this week's congressional balloting will most likely determine how drastic a revision of the party system the government deems necessary.

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Brazil: Short-Term Prospects for the New Administration*

We expect the administration of President Joao Baptista Figueiredo to continue the effort begun by President Geisel to open the political system to greater civilian participation. Figueiredo could even be the last strictly military president.

This "liberalization" process, though, will be subject to setbacks, and its ultimate success is by no means guaranteed. There are still, for example, important military officers who oppose liberalization; moreover, civilian pressures for further progress could eventually unnerve either Figueiredo or the military establishment as a whole and lead to a conservative backlash.

We expect the new government to continue the policy of export-led economic growth that has characterized recent years, and there could be new emphasis on developing Brazil's agricultural sector. The Brazilians will remain highly dependent on and receptive to foreign investment.

We also expect the new administration to scale down--but by no means abandon--Brazil's massive nuclear development program, whose centerpiece is the 1975 deal with West Germany. Financial problems will probably force the Brazilians to cut back, but their determination to master nuclear technology is in no way diminished.

Finally, we believe Figueiredo has an open mind with regard to relations with the United States and clearly hopes that recent tensions between the countries over nuclear nonproliferation and human rights can be overcome. Nonetheless, the new governing team will be very wary of US intentions in these areas, which will continue to be seen in Brasilia as potential stumbling blocks.

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Argentina: Criticism of Videla

6, 8
Argentina and Chile have agreed to continue diplomatic efforts to resolve the Beagle Channel dispute, but the prospects for a negotiated settlement seem as remote as ever. Both nations are maintaining their military forces in a high state of readiness.

1, 8
While no hostile moves have occurred in the past few days, the possibility of an armed confrontation is still taken seriously in both capitals. Most Argentines realize that the nation cannot be maintained indefinitely on a war footing, given the high costs involved and the rampant inflation--which has already produced grumbling among lower ranking officers over the failure of their wages to keep pace with the cost of living. Some hard-line generals and admirals in Argentina reportedly are making plans for a show of force in the next few months if further negotiations prove unproductive.

4, 5, 8
Regardless of how the Argentine Government deals with Chile in the negotiations, official embarrassment over the handling of the Beagle Channel affair--which has kept Argentina in a state of constant agitation for months--has increasingly divided the government and left it unsure of what its next move should be. Moreover, the issue has focused attention in Buenos Aires on the inefficiency of President Videla's rule by consensus. Conservative military leaders, critical of the apparent indecisiveness of Videla's conciliatory style, now seem to be gaining ground at the President's expense.

7
Many senior officers see the present system of government--in which Videla is supposed to share power with the military junta--as unworkable. They believe that Videla is doing the best job he can but are disturbed by his insistence on sharing key responsibilities with the three services. While Videla claims to be maintaining military unity in this manner, his critics believe that authority at the top has been overly diluted, that no one is really in charge, and that military unity is disintegrating.

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2,3,8
The recent Cabinet shuffle--in which Videla failed to make good on his promise to name prominent civilians to head the Justice and Education Ministries--provides fresh evidence of his inability to assert his authority. The armed services also reportedly rejected the President's first choices of retired military officers to head the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Social Welfare.

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1, 8
[redacted] some nationalistic officers are talking about replacing Videla, we have no firm evidence of serious coup plotting or of wide military support for such a move. The possibility of a coup seems remote so long as the dispute with Chile remains Argentina's primary policy concern.

1,6,7,8
At this point, however, the disarray in Buenos Aires is seriously complicating the development of a politically acceptable compromise to the Beagle Channel dispute. Even though both governments agreed late last week to continue negotiations, the long-term prospects for resolution of the basic differences remain poor. No Argentine leader seems willing to take full responsibility for the diplomatic compromises necessary to meet the Chileans' position. Meanwhile, officials in Santiago see further talks as a useful mechanism for wearing down the Argentines. Last week the Chilean Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador that Chile would continue to fence with Argentina over procedural modalities in the belief that time favors Chile.

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Chile: Labor Elections--Toward a New Labor Relations System

On 31 October about a third of Chile's 1 million union members voted for new leaders in about 2,000 locals in the private sector. This election ended a five-year ban on union activity with a step toward a new labor relations system and represents a building block in the Pinochet government's new economic and political design for Chile.

The elections were hurriedly called in response to an AFL-CIO threat of a trade boycott, but the push for a new labor union framework was homegrown. The government envisions a labor movement restricted to economic activity and insulated from political influence. The government's goals are the productive working of Chile's free market economic system and the elimination of a base of political opposition. The regime will further spell out its labor policy early next year in a new collective bargaining law.

Some Aspects of the Regime's Plan

The Chilean military regime explicitly supports the principle of freely functioning economic associations, including unions. The principle, written into the regime's draft constitution, was reiterated by the Labor Minister in his 27 October speech announcing the union elections. He also stated a key qualification, that ". . . union liberty, which is a projection of the natural right to associate . . . can be restricted only by clear reasons of the common good. . . ." The undefined "common good" implies a prohibition of labor involvement in political activity. The regime has constantly asserted that unions must be "depoliticized," and the rules of the recent elections make this very clear.

The Apolitical Union Elections

The elections covered all private sector unions except those in agriculture and the maritime industry.

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Both white- and blue-collar workers were to vote for officers of a single union in each economic unit.

Any Chilean who participated in political activity in the last 10 years was ineligible for labor leadership. In addition, upon election, new local officers had to swear they had not participated in politics and would not use union office for political purposes.

In a further attempt to separate labor from politics, the regime declared ineligible all incumbent officers, including some appointed by the government and some in office since the coup. It thus removed all well known labor leaders as well as numerous figures opposing the regime.

Limiting the time available for campaigning was a tactic employed by the government in the 4 January 1978 plebiscite and was used again last month; this time only two or three days were given for election preparations. In addition, sanctions were authorized against anyone who criticized the election process, publicly suggested candidates, or propagandized a position or recommendation with respect to the election. The effect of the rules was that the elections were conducted without nominations, campaigning, or discussion of issues or personalities, making difficult the election of even covert candidates of political parties and removing conditions that usually enable organized minorities to structure and dominate election outcomes.

Three leaders were chosen for each local. Members of each local--checked from government lists--were to write the names of two candidates, each of whom had to be affiliated with the union for five years. The three candidates obtaining the largest number of votes were elected for four years, dividing among themselves the posts of president, secretary, and treasurer.

The Election

According to preliminary reports voter turnout was high, and the elections were conducted honestly and without incident. All interested groups doubtless did their best to elect sympathetic leaders within the terms of the election rules. The regime has since announced that

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it has no grounds to disqualify any of the some 6,000 union leaders elected, though there may be some weeding out in the future.

Postelection Unions

There are undoubtedly political party "sleepers" among the newly elected leaders. One criticism of the election rules was that--contrary to their intention--they gave power to clandestine minorities. How many Trojan horses were selected is a very important question, but one which is not immediately answerable. On the other hand, there were unquestionably leaders elected--how many is impossible to say--who sympathize with aspects of the regime's projected labor relations system and who want to work within it.

In the short term, all elected leaders, whatever their beliefs, will keep the unions politically neutral and concentrate their energies on economic issues. Since Chile is now entering a period when its workers believe they should be rewarded for their voluntary economic restraint during the last five years, satisfying workers' economic demands will be the supreme test for the new union leadership.

The Rest of the System


Although the regime permitted union elections, it has not restored union liberties. Workers cannot meet freely, cannot bargain collectively, and do not have the right to strike. Apparently the right to meet freely and to bargain collectively will be granted in new labor legislation in the first quarter of 1979. The right to strike--though abolished for public sector unions--will probably not be denied, but it will be highly qualified. Undoubtedly it will become a legal last resort after unions have exhausted alternatives. The power of labor unionism in Chile may also be diminished by eliminating the dues checkoff and by limiting the financing of federations and confederations to voluntary contributions from union members rather than from affiliated local organizations. In general, the power of local unions to form larger organizations still seems undecided; the opposition charges that the new system seeks to "atomize" the labor movement.

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The Eastern Caribbean



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The Opposition and the Future

Even in its embryonic form, the new system has aroused considerable opposition from political party leaders and labor officials who held office before the coup. Most of the latter, as well as many of their allies, now find themselves disbarred from union office. Their loss of personal power as well as their beliefs motivate them to work against the new labor relations system. The target of their efforts will be the Chilean workers themselves, for what matters ultimately is whether Chilean rank-and-file workers affirm or reject the regime's new labor unionism. The outcome of this struggle is by no means a foregone conclusion. It cannot be assumed that the opposition labor elites speak for ordinary workers. The regime hopes they do not, and it will seek to persuade workers in the coming months that their best interests will lie with the new system.

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Emerging Island States in the Eastern Caribbean

1, 2, 6
When the island of Dominica became independent early this month, it began a movement that is almost certain to result in independence before 1981 for four other aid-hungry microstates of the eastern Caribbean--Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Antigua, and Saint Kitts-Nevis. These predominantly black, impoverished islands--whose total population is under a half million people--face severe economic problems and a growing potential for political instability.

The Failure of Regional Integration

6
The apparently irreversible course toward independence ends a century of unsuccessful efforts by the United Kingdom to bring about a federation of its many Caribbean territories. Saint Kitts-Nevis, Antigua, and Dominica were members of the Leeward Islands Federation formed in 1871, and all five island groups have enthusiastically supported various integration schemes since the end of World War II. They belonged to the Federation of the West Indies (1958-62), which tried to impose political unification on 10 English-speaking territories, and in 1973 were among the founders of its less ambitious economic successor, the Caribbean Community.

6
After the breakup of the West Indies Federation, the small islands tried to form a "rump" federation and came close to agreement on the establishment of common services and a unified system of taxation. The negotiators, however, could not overcome traditional obstacles such as leadership rivalries, competitive economies, and political insularity. In the late 1960s, the five became separate home-rule states "associated" with the UK, which has since provided budgetary support for their weak, agricultural economies.

The trend toward fragmentation has affected even the least populated island group of Saint Kitts-Nevis.

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
John Compton
Premier of Saint Lucia



C. A. Paul Southwell
Premier of Saint Kitts-Nevis



Vere C. Bird
Premier of Antigua



Milton Cato
Premier of Saint Vincent



Patrick John
Prime Minister of Dominica

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3, 6
For a century the British administered the two neighboring islands along with Anguilla, 70 miles to the northwest, as a three-island unit, which today has a combined population under 60,000. In 1967, however, Anguilla rebelled against the Saint Kitts - based government--British paratroopers and marines put down the rebellion in 1969--and eventually reverted to colonial status in 1971. Last year Nevis voted overwhelmingly to follow suit rather than become formally independent in association with Saint Kitts, but chances have since improved for resolving this conflict.

6
Independence, which has had little apparent mass support on any of the islands, has been encouraged by political leaders who believe it will boost their domestic political positions and make international aid more accessible. The UK wanting relief from its aid burden, favors the movement. Integration remains the universally acknowledged wiser but unachievable course.

Economic Prospects

1, 2, 6
The economic outlook for all the islands is bleak, although Saint Lucia and Antigua have better managed and relatively diversified economies. Although the two islands have per capita incomes under \$700, this is more than double the amount for each of the others. Unemployment ranges from about 20 percent of the labor force in Antigua to about 60 percent in Saint Vincent. Unemployment and underemployment are especially acute among young people, a demographic majority in all five states. While the islands have few exploitable resources and only limited hope for diversifying their one or two-crop economies, their labor forces will probably double within the next decade.

(
A top priority, but a probably elusive goal as the islands become independent will be to attract foreign aid and investment. Keeping what little capital and foreign investment they already have is likely to be difficult enough. Local political conditions will discourage new investors, and finding aid donors to replace the UK's traditional budgetary assistance will not be easy.

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Political Prospects

4,6 The five governments, all based on moderate labor movements, are still democratic but are becoming increasingly authoritarian in the face of seemingly insurmountable economic problems. This trend is even stronger among the emerging generation of national leaders whose leftist views will encounter decreasing opposition in the wake of a middle-class "brain drain" that has accelerated in the 1970s.

4,6 The leaders of Saint Kitts and Dominica have in the past expressed admiration for the "socialist" development strategies of Guyana and Jamaica, and small but growing pro-Cuban radical movements exist in at least three of the islands. Jamaica and Guyana, now in obvious economic decline, have decreased in appeal, however, and a turn to socialist models has been further slowed by the Western countries' involvement in a multilateral development fund for the Caribbean. At least one of the island leaders, Patrick John of Dominica, seems to have altered his political orientation accordingly, abandoning his earlier decision to accept Cuban technical assistance and taking instead a strong public stand against Communism.

4,6 Nevertheless, political development in the region does not favor democracy. Political leaders are typically heavyhanded, and local democratic structures are extremely weak. Cabinets are generally inexperienced and often staffed with incompetent and corrupt ministers, the direct result of the flight of better educated people. Parliaments and political parties seem to be influenced by autocratic leaders rather than responsive to the popular will. Electoral systems are increasingly susceptible to manipulation by ruling parties, and young people are apparently becoming more impatient with "ineffective" democratic procedures. Unless the grim economic picture improves dramatically, the gradual decline of democracy--probably hastened by labor unrest--will probably continue.

Foreign Policy

6 The five countries will base foreign policy on an aggressive search for aid directed primarily at Western

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
sources. Although they will remain friendly toward the US, they will generally support Third World positions in international forums and will probably establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

6
3 Since 1976 Cuba has offered aid to the governments of Antigua, Dominica, and Saint Vincent, and Havana has links with radical movements on all three islands. Cuba, however, is not likely to gain significant influence over any Eastern Caribbean government in the near future. The moderate leaders of Barbados and "oil-rich" Trinidad-and-Tobago, which has already launched an aid program for the islands, will carry much greater weight than the Cubans.

6 The increase in the number of small English-speaking states in the Caribbean will undoubtedly present some early problems for international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). Statehood for the small islands could eventually place a decisive English-speaking voting bloc in the OAS. The potential international influence of the islands is limited, however, by their extreme dependence on outside economic assistance and by their historical tendency to act independently of one another.

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Cuba-Mozambique: Increased Cooperation

"It is an international duty, the duty of social-ists and the duty of revolutionaries--to cooperate, however modestly, with other countries that are poorer than we. Africa is the weakest link in the chain of imperialism."

Fidel Castro, April 1977

2 Public Health Minister Jose Gutierrez announced at a press conference that Cuba has 1,300 doctors assist-
ing 20 countries of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

Prensa Latina, 5 August 1978

"The export of technical services has become an important factor of this country's economic develop-
ment."

Fidel Castro, 4 September 1978

* * *

1,2 On 21 October Havana and Maputo signed an agree-
ment by which Cuba will provide Mozambique the services
of more than 600 Cuban technicians. The Cuban civilian
presence will double, coinciding with the recent in-
crease of Cuban military in Mozambique.

1 Cuban assistance has grown apace since Havana and
Maputo established diplomatic relations in August 1975.
In November of that year a Cuban delegation was sent
to survey Mozambique's needs. A group from the Cuban
Communist Youth League visited the following February
to "exchange experiences" with local youth organizations.
In the summer of 1976, Cuban agricultural advisers began
to arrive in Mozambique. The civilian presence grew
more rapidly after Fidel Castro visited President Machel
in March 1977. At that point Cuban technicians in
Mozambique numbered approximately 300-350.

Cuba's assistance projects in Mozambique are typical
of its civilian efforts elsewhere in Africa, especially

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Angola. The technicians in Mozambique will be primarily involved in rural development projects, public health and housing programs, and in advising the Mozambican sugar industry--areas in which Cuba has been successful at home.

1 The Cuban "technicians" and "doctors" are not really that in the Western sense. Many of the sugar "technicians" have been trained to operate the mechanical harvesting and processing equipment, but do not have years of technical training. Many of the teachers have just graduated from high school. Some of the medical personnel are actually medical corpsmen or nurses, while the doctors are recent medical school graduates who will serve their internships in Mozambique. Nevertheless, most of the Cubans are well educated by Third World standards and are generally able to help meet the needs of the countries where they are stationed.

2
3
1 Fidel Castro probably has several motives for expanding his civilian assistance program in Mozambique, one of which is to help the Cuban economy at little cost. The new agreement gives Cuba access to Mozambique's lobster fishing grounds. Cuba has used fishing cooperation agreements with several less developed nations, particularly Angola and Guyana, to offset at least in part the cost of its technical assistance programs in these countries. If the Cubans follow this pattern, the Cuban fishing fleet will operate off Mozambique's coast, process the catch, and sell the lobsters on the West European market for badly needed hard currency.

2
3 Another part of the agreement provides scholarships for 1,700 Mozambican workers to go to Cuba for "training." Cuba already offers such on-the-job training to Jamaican and Angolan construction workers. Given the seasonal shortages of construction manpower, especially during the sugar harvest season (November-June), the Mozambicans can be of use to the Cubans. A small portion of these workers may attend trade schools or go on to the university.

2 In addition to the workers, the new agreement calls for 1,200 more Mozambican secondary school children to study in Cuba; about 1,000 are already there. They will probably go to the Isle of Youth where over 4,200 African

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3 students attend school for up to two years. This program includes part-time labor in Cuba's rapidly expanding citrus industry.

/ Because many of the Cuban technicians sent abroad are recent graduates, Castro probably believes that service in less developed countries is good training. Many of the students/technicians are instilled with a high degree of nationalism and consider African service career-enhancing. Moreover, because of the modest prospects for Cuban economic expansion over the next few years, Havana will probably be glad to postpone their entry into the Cuban labor force.

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
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FOR THE RECORD

CUBA*: Havana is undertaking a massive expansion of its infant citrus industry aimed, at least initially, at boosting earnings from exports to the CEMA countries. Realization of production goals would enable Cuba by the mid-1980s to capture at least half of the rapidly growing CEMA market for fresh citrus. This market, which takes nearly one-sixth of the \$2 billion in world exports, is now supplied mainly by Mediterranean countries. As Cuban shipments gain ground in CEMA, the Mediterranean suppliers will probably focus on Western Europe, increasing the difficulties for US growers in this latter market.



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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY

For October 1978

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- 2 October The third Cuba-Japan economic conference is held in Tokyo. Hector Rodriguez Llompart, chief of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation, is the Cuban representative.
- 3 October Granma editorial appears entitled "Camp David Agreements, Consummation of Betrayal."
- 4 October Rodriguez Llompart meets Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, and Finance in Tokyo.
- 5 October Dora Carcano, secretary general of Cuban Women's Federation, visits Saharan refugee camps in the Algerian desert built by Saharan Women's Organization.
- Raul Garcia Pelaez is named Ambassador to Afghanistan.
- 6 October Fidel Castro meets Paul Bergs, secretary general of the Communist Party of the Island of Reunion.
- 7 October Guyana's Ambassador to Cuba praises Cuban aid at reception for Cuban medical brigade returning from Guyana.
- 9 October Alfonso Herrera Perdomo is named Ambassador to Sierra Leone.

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- 11 October Delegation headed by Guillermo Garcia Frias attends inauguration of Panamanian President Lakas in Panama City.
- 12 October Council of State relieves Belarmino Castilla Mas of his Council of Ministers and Secretariat positions for health reasons. He is replaced by Jose Ramon Fernandez.
- Marcelo Fernandez Font, Minister of Foreign Trade, meets his Soviet counterpart, Nikolay Patolichev, in Moscow.
- 13 October Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets British Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Mary Lackey in Havana.
- Fidel Castro tells the Spanish Ambassador that the only Spanish political prisoner left in Cuba will be released before Christmas.
- Domestic Trade Minister Serafin Fernandez and Sugar Industry Vice Minister Enrique Gonzalez arrive in Maputo, Mozambique, on working visit.
- 14 October In Tripoli, Hector Rodriguez Llompart chairs first meeting with Libyan Trade Minister Abu Bakr Ali al-Sharif to create a Cuba-Libya mixed commission.
- Foreign Trade Minister Fernandez Font meets Ivan Arkhipov, deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, in Moscow.
- In Bombay, Amado Blanco states that "Cuba is interested in diversifying its trade with that country." Signs trade agreement calling for increased trade in 1979.

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- 17 October Fidel Castro presides over closing session of National Preparatory Seminar on Drafting Economic Development Plans for Cuba.
- Libyan Trade Minister Sharif arrives in Cuba. Met by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Meets Fidel Castro.
- 18 October Hector Rodriguez Llompart signs cooperation protocol with Libya.
- 19 October Central Planning Board president Humberto Perez says, "Cuba has not reached the rate of economic growth allowing it to emerge from underdevelopment."
- Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meet Sergio Vieira, head of Bank of Mozambique and Frelimo Politburo member.
- 20 October Cuban UN representative announces that in 1979 Cuba will be the first country in Latin America to participate in a Soviet space flight.
- Hector Rodriguez Llompart signs cooperation protocol with Czechoslovakia.
- Havana press reports serious flooding in north-central Cuba which destroyed many crops.
- 21 October At news conference with Cuban exile newsmen, Fidel Castro states, "We are not only Marxists-Leninists, we are also nationalists and patriots."
- Turkish press announced that Cuba and Turkey will establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

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Fidel Castro meets with six representatives of the Miami Cuban community. They accompany a group of prisoners recently released by Castro.

Cuba and Mozambique sign cooperation agreement providing for 600 Cuban technicians for Mozambique, 1,700 Mozambican workers for training in Cuba, and 1,200 more intermediate students.

Foreign Trade Minister Fernandez Font visits Bulgaria. Meets Stanko Todorov on 21 October. Cooperation agreement signed by subordinate on 28 October.

24 October

Foreign Trade Minister Fernandez Font visits Belgium.

25 October

Council of Ministers decrees that an islandwide census of population and housing will be conducted in 1981.

28 October

In Havana, official sources reject reports of a Cuban attack on Uganda from Tanzania.

31 October

Foreign Minister Malmierca meets French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud in Paris.

Fidel Castro chairs meeting to examine the preparations and plans for the next sugar harvest, which will begin in November.

16 November 1978

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