



**Foreign
Assessment
Center**

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Latin America Review

21 December 1978

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
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
LATIN AMERICA REVIEW



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Bolivia: Problems for President Padilla



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After less than a month in office, Bolivia's conservative President Padilla faces serious labor unrest and growing disaffection within the highly politicized military establishment. So far, he has not asserted authority over his administration, which is dominated by a loosely knit group of junior officers pushing for national elections early next year. It is unlikely that Padilla will last until then. He has not shown that he has the skills needed to cope with deepening economic problems and the highly conspiratorial political environment. Rumors of coup plotting are already widespread and a move against the government could come at any time.




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Late last month, the government reached a wage agreement with the state-owned mining confederation, but negotiations with unions in the private sector have been complicated by mineowners' claims that they cannot afford to grant major salary increases. If a general accord is not reached in the near future, the mining confederation threatens to initiate an industry-wide solidarity strike.



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Transportation, telephone, and public utility workers earlier this week called a general strike to force the government to grant salary increases and more union autonomy, and to meet its financial obligations to the national railway enterprise. Padilla has not indicated how he intends to deal with labor's demands, but the nation cannot afford to lose its rail service to key mining areas for any length of time.



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Both Finance Minister Alba and Lt. Colonel Gary Prado--who as Minister of Planning and Coordination has emerged as the strongest and most outspoken member of this government--have promised to implement unpopular austerity measures recommended by the International Monetary Fund to ease Bolivia's balance of payments difficulties, but their ability and willingness to follow through

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is probably limited. [redacted] prices of petroleum products will almost certainly increase this month or next and a devaluation of the Bolivian peso is under review. Both measures would reduce the already shaky confidence of the local business community in the administration. Devaluation could also play into the hands of the military and civilian groups who are already conspiring to overthrow Padilla. [redacted]

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Military opposition to Padilla's government, and especially to his cabinet, is also keeping the situation unstable. Conservative officers fear that a rush to elections will allow former President Siles Zuazo, who has extensive leftist connections, to gain power--an intolerable development for them. The brunt of their criticism is directed against Interior Minister Raul Lopez, who was in close contact with Siles Zuazo during Padilla's coup. Earlier this month, officers in Cochabamba sent a letter to Army headquarters in La Paz requesting that Lopez and three other military officers who occupy high government posts be dismissed for corruption, incompetence, and leftist affiliations. [redacted]

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Officers of the Bolivian armed forces are deeply divided between those who believe that they should revitalize their professionalism by retiring from politics and those who fear that elections will breed more political instability by bringing a leftist or Marxist government to power. These tensions worked to undermine President Pereda's government and have not been resolved by Padilla's seizure of power. [redacted]

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The situation has been further complicated by the Padilla government's shoddy treatment of former President Banzer, who provided Bolivia with the longest period of political and economic stability the country has known. Late last month, for example, Banzer was reconfirmed as Ambassador to Argentina only to be abruptly dismissed two days later. Several of the junior officers who now wield power were sent into exile during Banzer's administration and have grievances against him. Their anti-Banzer sentiment is not at all pervasive in the armed forces, however, and efforts to discredit him could backfire. [redacted]

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
If a coup is mounted against President Padilla, the US Defense Attache in La Paz believes that Army Commander General Azero is the most likely to lead it. Although Azero appears to be loyal to Padilla's government and is publicly supporting elections, he shows signs of being an opportunist and could betray Padilla as he did Banzer and Pereda. [REDACTED]

With all these factors in play, the situation is highly unstable. The fragile military unity that Banzer was able to sustain as the mainstay of his lengthy tenure is rapidly disintegrating as both active-duty and retired officers maneuver behind the scenes. Bolivia once again appears to be sliding toward the political chaos that has inhibited policy formulation and economic growth for most of its history. [REDACTED]

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Cuba: Evolving Energy Policy

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Cuba's severely limited domestic energy resources and a shrinking Soviet oil surplus are forcing Havana to adopt a long-term policy centered on nuclear energy. Imported petroleum now accounts for over two-thirds of Cuba's total energy needs, compared to about 45 percent in 1957. Growing demand will further increase Cuba's dependence on foreign energy sources in the coming years, with imported uranium complementing petroleum in the mid-to-late 1980s when Cuba's first nuclear power plant is scheduled to come on line. Plans for two power stations suggest that the USSR is encouraging Havana to proceed with the development of nuclear energy because of the rising cost of imported petroleum and the strain on Soviet oil supplies.

Cuba's Nuclear Program

2
1
The Soviet-sponsored nuclear power program in Cuba has been in the planning stage for several years. Cuban Vice President Jose Fernandez, who chaired a CEMA commission meeting on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Havana from 21 to 24 November, has outlined Cuba's ambitious program:

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-- The first nuclear power station--scheduled to begin partial operation by 1985--will be located near the industrialized and heavily populated city of Cienfuegos.
-- Studies are under way to pick a location for a second power station nearby.
-- The Cienfuegos plant will house two 440 MWe pressurized water reactors similar to those installed in Finland and various East European (CEMA) countries.

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2 -- The Cuban Government has decided that nuclear
power plants will be the principal source of
1 future electrical generation (suggesting a nu-
clear program expanded beyond current plans).

-- Cuba has decided to construct a modern nuclear
research center. [redacted]

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1 The Soviets have provided Cuba with scientists,
engineers and survey teams for the construction of the
power plant. They are also training Cuban technicians
and engineers in the Soviet Union to install, operate,
2 and maintain the equipment. These trainees are from the
Cuban Institute of Nuclear Research, a part of the Aca-
demy of Sciences. This institute headed by Raimundo
Franco since 1974, will be responsible for bringing Cuba
into the nuclear age. It has 160 employees, only 75 of
whom are university graduates. [redacted]

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1 When the first stage of Cuba's nuclear program is
complete and both of the Cienfuegos reactors are opera-
tional in the mid-to-late 1980s, nuclear power will ac-
count for about 25 percent of Cuba's total electrical
generating capacity. [redacted]

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Petroleum

2 Petroleum is Cuba's present major source of energy,
providing over two-thirds of total requirements. Virtu-
ally all of Cuba's needs--120,000 barrels per day of
crude and 70,000 barrels per day of products--are obtained
from the Soviet Union at about four-fifths of the world
market price. Despite extensive exploration in recent
years with Soviet and Romanian assistance, Cuban domestic
crude production is minimal and accounts for only about
2 percent of needed supplies. Moscow has agreed to pro-
vide all of Havana's petroleum requirements through 1980
and will link the prices it charges to the price it pays
4 for Cuban sugar. [redacted]

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Earlier this year, Castro called Cuba's dependence
on oil "a tragedy," indicating his awareness of the
energy crunch that is coming. Last year, the Soviets
negotiated an arrangement with the Venezuelans whereby
Caracas ships 10,000 barrels of crude per day to Cuba,
and the Soviets provide a like amount to Spain, thereby

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25X1 saving transportation costs. The arrangement, which ran into some initial difficulties, now seems to be working smoothly, although prospects for the long term are uncertain. [redacted]

2 In the fall of 1974 Castro may have tried to ingratiate himself with the OPEC countries in the hope of broadening his oil supply. Commenting that "OPEC was a just reaction" to the exploitative methods of large transnational companies, he was critical of "US threats" against OPEC's pricing policies. When Castro's call for OPEC support to developing nations went unanswered, however, his public posture changed. He complained that while the developing countries had given "solidarity" support to OPEC, they had not received the expected investment of oil revenues in their countries. In the fall of 1976 Castro noted that while sugar prices had dropped dramatically, oil-producing countries "have a monopoly that allows them to set the price they so desire." [redacted] 25X1

Other Sources

2 Cuba's second most important fuel is bagasse--the fibrous pulp byproduct of the sugarcane milling process. It is used primarily in the sugar industry because of prohibitive handling and transportation costs. In 1957, bagasse provided about half of Cuba's total energy requirements, but since the revolution its contribution has declined to about 25 percent because of greater reliance on petroleum and the increased use of bagasse as a raw material for paper and wall board. [redacted] 25X1

2 Cuba has virtually no other domestic energy sources. It has no known deposits of coal. Deposits of lignite are small and remote, and peat deposits, although widespread, are not economically exploitable. Hydroelectric power is limited because Cuba's rivers are mostly short and shallow and prone to wide seasonal variations in flow. Although some wood and charcoal are used in homes and small commercial establishments, their contribution to the energy supply is very small and has no potential. 3 In limited contacts with US businessmen, the Cubans have expressed interest in solar energy technology. This technology however, so far has only marginal potential for Cuba's industrial needs, while the island's home heating requirements are minimal. [redacted] 25X1

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Energy Shortage

2
3
Cuba's present electrical power supply is inadequate. Both industrial and residential demands have increased and brownouts occur frequently. Most of the old, inefficient plants--which account for about one-fifth of installed capacity--cannot operate at full capacity. For example, some plants contain components manufactured in the US up to 50 years ago, making spare parts virtually unobtainable and creating severe maintenance problems. The Cubans have recently completed a national grid system designed to enable one locality to shift power to an area that is experiencing a shortage. [redacted]

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2
Castro gave a detailed speech earlier this year on the subject of Cuba's growing electrical needs and its plans for the future. Noting that by the end of this year Cuba will have five times the generating capacity it had before the revolution, he added that "by 1980 Cuba will double the 1975 electricity producing potential." Castro commented that investment in an electrical system can never stop and that it must move ahead of the rest of the country's economic development. He also pointed out that since 1958 the demand for residential electricity has doubled and made a plea for conservation. [redacted]

25X1

2
Cuba's energy policymakers are faced with the same dilemma that has sent the economies of many developing countries plummeting since the oil embargo of 1973. They must try to meet growing industrial and residential demand for energy, but have an almost total lack of indigenous energy sources to build on. Complicating these conditions in Cuba's case is its unique relationship with and dependence upon the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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2
Castro must feel he is being backed into a corner by a combination of international economic pressures and accidents of Cuban geology, neither of which he can control. He knows that if the USSR cuts off his oil supply, about two-thirds of Cuba's foreign exchange would be consumed by oil purchases bringing serious consequences for Cuba's already bleak economic prospects. Castro must also be aware that the Soviets are worried about their own shrinking oil supply, which adds more pressure on Cuba to develop independent energy sources. As a result,

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
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the Cuban leader has little choice but to follow the
Soviets' advice and attempt to make nuclear power Cuba's
major source of energy in the future.

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The North-South Dialogue and US-Jamaican Relations



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1, 2

Jamaican political leaders believe that the North-South dialogue has significant long-range importance for their country, but they place a much higher priority on bilateral relations with the United States. The Jamaican Government will not allow North-South disagreements to weaken these relations so long as the United States supports the dialogue in principle.



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3

Prime Minister Michael Manley, the chief architect of Jamaica's foreign policy, has been in the forefront of the demand by developing countries (LDCs) for a New International Economic Order (NIEO); he will host a seven-nation minisummit on North-South issues late this month. His views have been backed strongly by his influential Foreign Minister, by Jamaica's highly respected permanent representative to the United Nations, and by the country's moderately inclined opposition leaders. Virtually all informed Jamaicans instinctively approve of the NIEO because of its apparent benefits for their nation.



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2

Most Jamaicans, however, are far more concerned with the country's serious economic decline under Manley. Because he believes that his best hope for help in shoring up the Jamaican economy lies with the West, Manley has been working energetically to improve relations with the United States, the largest potential source of bilateral aid. Manley is unlikely to jeopardize that relationship through bilateral actions or moves in other international forums because of lack of progress or even stagnation in the North-South dialogue.



* * *

The NIEO and Jamaican Foreign Policy

3

Support for the NIEO is a logical outgrowth of the development of Jamaican foreign policy since independence

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in 1962. The small nation has developed an increasingly independent foreign policy that aims to diversify trade ties and sources of foreign investment in local enterprises. While national leaders generally have been friendly toward Washington, they have long tried--with little success--to lessen Jamaica's primary dependence on US trade and investment. [redacted]

25X1

3 Jamaican leaders have allied their nation with the Third World because they believe Jamaica has economic problems common to LDCs. Jamaicans are actually better off than most people of the Third World, and their economy has a relatively diversified base in bauxite mining, tourism, manufacturing, and agriculture. Nevertheless, economic development has been hampered by a small domestic market, by extreme dependence on outside economic forces, and by the absence of natural resources besides bauxite. After 16 years of independence, Jamaica is still characterized by high unemployment--currently about 30 percent of the labor force--and by a severe maldistribution of income. [redacted]

25X1

3 Since 1972 Jamaica's nonaligned foreign policy has been more precisely defined by Manley. He has been particularly effective as an LDC spokesman, and his eloquently expressed views draw on his assessment of recent Jamaican history. He has enjoined the LDCs to band together in the UN and to strengthen their economic ties as essential steps in overcoming their disadvantage in the world economy. He has been a vigorous supporter of LDC proposals on the Common Fund, debt relief, commodity agreements, technology transfer, and foreign investment codes. [redacted]

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The Architects of Foreign Policy

3 Manley is unquestionably the country's chief architect of foreign policy and its dominant voice in the North-South dialogue. He has tried to make Jamaica a respected influence among both developed and developing countries and has succeeded to a considerable extent. [redacted]

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3 Manley has made Jamaica a prominent member of the nonaligned movement, and his nation has recently completed a year as chairman of the Group of 77 at the UN in New York. In October, the Prime Minister made a widely


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acclaimed address to the UN General Assembly, where he had come to receive a special award for his eloquent opposition to apartheid. In November Jamaica was elected to the UN Security Council for a term beginning next January. Since February Manley has met with at least 16 heads of government from five continents and a vice premier from a sixth. [redacted]

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Manley delivering stirring anti-apartheid speech at UN last October. [redacted]

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3 Manley's positions in the North-South dialogue have universal support at home. Foreign Minister P. J. Patterson, a leading politician frequently mentioned as Manley's likely successor, is a strong nationalist who has probably advocated most LDC stands before the Prime Minister. Jamaica's permanent representative to the United Nations since 1973, Donald O. Mills, is a political moderate and a highly competent diplomat whose

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commitment to the NIEO stems as much from personal conviction as from Manley's direction. [redacted]

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3 Although the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) has been bitterly critical of Manley's economic mismanagement, it has readily endorsed his foreign policy. Under the JLP's leadership the government in the first decade of independence brought Jamaica into the non-aligned movement and launched the country's orientation toward the Third World. [redacted]

25X1

3 The present leader of the JLP, Edward Seaga, is personally more cautious than Manley as well as the head of the more conservative major party in Jamaica. Nevertheless, Seaga supported nonalignment and was one of the first prominent politicians to evoke the economic nationalism that is now central to Jamaica's political culture. [redacted]

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Manley's Minisummit

3 Manley is playing on his international reputation to convene in Jamaica on 28-29 December a multilateral conference on North-South issues. The top leaders of six other nations--Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Norway, Venezuela, and West Germany--have accepted Manley's invitation to meet informally to discuss various issues, including commodity earnings stabilization, energy problems, technology transfer, international monetary reform, and Third World debt relief. [redacted]

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2 The minisummit will be historic for Jamaica and politically enhancing for Manley, although it will probably have little impact on the North-South dialogue. The Prime Minister's political boost, moreover, is likely to be short-lived, since the worsening economic hardship that most Jamaicans attribute to Manley's mistakes is certain to continue long after the world leaders have gone home. [redacted]

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The Domestic Situation

1, 2 Jamaicans are highly concerned by the country's serious economic decline during Manley's seven-year rule. Reliable polls show that they blame government mismanagement for their worsening plight, and they apparently have

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little faith that the North-South dialogue can solve their problems. Although Manley is closely identified with the LDC demand for the NIEO, the issue has had little discernible impact on domestic politics. [redacted]

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3 Committed to achieving economic diversification, alleviating high unemployment, and redistributing extremely uneven incomes, the Manley government in 1972 embarked on a program that called for much greater government participation in the economy. In 1974, Manley imposed a 600 percent tax hike on bauxite production and has since then partially nationalized the local holdings of four North American bauxite companies. [redacted]

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3 Manley's nationalistic policies, however, have not achieved the intended results. Since the 1973-74 world oil crisis, the Jamaican economy has experienced one of the sharpest sustained declines of any developing country. The stage for this downturn, however, was set even before the oil shock. Heavily dependent on private capital inflows, the economy began to slip following completion of major foreign investments in bauxite/alumina and tourism in the early 1970s. The pace of decline quickened with the erosion in investor confidence induced by the Manley government's leftward drift and the sharply higher oil import costs. Since 1972 real GNP has dropped at least 16 percent, and unemployment has risen from 21 percent to 30 percent. [redacted]

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2 By early 1977 Manley apparently became convinced that considerable long-term foreign assistance would be needed to shore up the rapidly deteriorating economy and that his request for aid from the Soviet bloc had fallen on deaf ears. He backtracked, therefore, on an earlier pledge to his leftist supporters and turned to the US and the International Monetary Fund for help. The United States last year agreed to a \$63 million aid package, and the IMF agreed to a two-year credit contingent on adherence to six performance tests, half of which the government had failed by last December. The IMF nevertheless agreed to a new three-year loan last May that has again bailed out Manley's government. The Prime Minister is now dependent on this loan and on additional aid from the United States, Venezuela, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other Western sources. [redacted]

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3
 After pledging last year never to cut back his social programs or to devalue further the Jamaican dollar, the Prime Minister has since been forced to do both. The devaluation last May was the fourth in 15 months and the sixth since 1973, when Manley imposed Jamaica's first unilateral devaluation. The IMF package also calls for a wage ceiling that is almost certain to hurt Manley's relationship with his trade union power base and to spark labor unrest. [redacted]



"HERO FIDDLES WHILE HOME BURNS!"

Jamaica's independent *Daily Gleaner* spoofs Manley [redacted]

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3
 Manley's political stock has consequently declined, and there is now little chance that he can recover the stature he had through the 1976 election. Polls indicate that his popularity is at its lowest point since he came to power in 1972. Moreover, voter surveys confirm that his People's National Party (PNP) has steadily lost the wide margin of support with which it routed the opposition almost two years ago. In July the opposition JLP came out ahead in a poll for the first time since Manley

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25X1 took office. The PNP's labor union arm, which is essential to winning elections, has recently experienced significant defections to the union affiliate of the opposition party. [redacted]

3 Manley is increasingly on the defensive with politically sophisticated union members, businessmen, small farmers, and the mass of unorganized but pragmatically inclined urban and rural workers who will elect a new government by 1981. If present trends continue, local pressure groups within Jamaica's traditional two-party system are likely to defeat Manley--despite his achievements as an LDC leader or the promise of the NIEO. [redacted] 25X1

2 It also appears that Manley's domestic failings are gradually hurting his international reputation. Some Caribbean leaders such as Prime Ministers Tom Adams of Barbados and Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago have rejected Manley's bid for regional leadership because of the gap between his domestic and international achievements. They believe that his rhetoric of cooperation disguises the damage he has done to smaller scale integration efforts within the English-speaking Caribbean. In June Venezuelan President Perez returned from his visit to Jamaica reportedly unimpressed with Manley, privately charging that he lacked ideological integrity and was mismanaging the Jamaican economy. [redacted] 25X1

US-Jamaican Relations

2 US-Jamaican relations have never been significantly affected by the North-South dialogue. Bilateral relations became tense briefly in 1973 after Manley expelled the US Ambassador, but the precipitating incident involved a personal conflict and not conflicting national interests. Bilateral relations sank to their lowest point in 1976 because Manley came to believe--as he still does--that the CIA had tried to destabilize his government. These incidents, however, have been the only important departures from the long tradition of friendly relations between the two countries. [redacted] 25X1

2 Ironically, as Manley has become increasingly disappointed with the progress of the North-South dialogue, he has tried harder to improve bilateral relations with the US--which he sees as Jamaica's best hope for aid.

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1 He apparently believes that the present US administration is more sympathetic than previous ones to Jamaica's problems and less likely to intervene in the island's internal affairs. Manley was reportedly elated by the multilateral discussion with President Carter in Panama on 17 June. He stated that the President showed great understanding of Third World problems and that there is now new hope for the North-South dialogue and for "more meaningful" US-Jamaican relations. [redacted]

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2 The Prime Minister has undoubtedly been angered by some US positions in the North-South dialogue, but he has never allowed his displeasure to hurt improving bilateral relations. Manley invited President Carter to attend the abortive minisummit last May and sent an even warmer invitation for December. The Prime Minister has probably been disappointed by successive turndowns and annoyed by President Carter's agreement to participate in the recently announced four-nation Guadeloupe conference, so close in time and distance to the Jamaican minisummit. Nevertheless, Manley apparently continues to believe that the President is sympathetic to the North-South dialogue. [redacted]

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Prospects

2 There is likely to be little significant spillover from the North-South dialogue into US-Jamaican relations so long as the US maintains its present cautious but friendly posture. Manley's political survival does not depend on the NIEO or any North-South issue, and he will almost certainly avoid bilateral confrontations over them. [redacted]

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2 Bilateral and multilateral aid, on the other hand, will be required for Manley's political survival for at least the next three years. Jamaica will require balance-of-payments support in addition to the IMF loan at a time when the country's credit rating abroad remains poor. The US-sponsored Caribbean Development Facility, a multilateral aid fund established earlier this year, will help with a \$50 million pledge from the US, Venezuela, Canada, the UK, and other Western donors. The crisis will revive by mid-1979, however, unless new donors of much larger donations arrive in time. [redacted]

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3
Manley's bid for a third successive term as Prime Minister would be unpromising even in better times. Neither union-based party has ever accomplished it, primarily because their near-even balance in popular support requires only a slight swing to change governments, and the island's limited resources give the party in power inadequate funds to deal with high voter expectations. The PNP's unprecedentedly wide reelection margin in 1976--57 percent of the vote--has apparently vanished in less than two years. [redacted]

3
Without US bilateral aid, moreover, Manley would almost certainly be forced to call early elections within the next year. This overriding fact points up what has always been self-evident to most Jamaican leaders: bilateral relations with developed countries have priority over LDC "solidarity." As Manley struggles to prevent his return to the opposition benches, there is no apparent reason to believe that this situation will change. [redacted]

[redacted]

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FOR THE RECORD

CHILE: The Pinochet government's thoroughgoing economic reform program has reversed Allende's socialist revolution and transformed Chile into a market-oriented, free-trade economy. Santiago has restored economic growth, broken hyperinflation, and at least temporarily eliminated payments problems. Industry and agriculture are becoming more internationally competitive, the country is now living within its means, and overriding dependence on copper exports has been greatly reduced. With US bankers and businessmen in the vanguard, growing international business confidence in the junta's program has paved the way for new loans and new direct investment, enabling the junta to relax austerity policies that have hit hard at the poor. The US Letelier investigation, possible armed conflict with Argentina, and/or the Regional Inter-American Labor Organization's planned boycott of Chilean products could trigger international payments problems in 1979. Nonetheless, we expect the economic gains and structural improvements of the reform program to continue apace. To maintain economic growth in the 6-percent to 7-percent range beyond next year the Chilean junta must take steps to boost domestic savings and investment from their still relatively low levels.

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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY



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For November 1978

- 1 November Levi Farah, Minister of Construction, meets with Iraqi construction delegation in Havana.
- 1-4 November Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca pays official visit to Madagascar. Communique issued 5 November stresses support for nonaligned movement.
- 2 November Cuba and Guyana sign fishing cooperation agreement in Georgetown.
- 4 November Cuba commemorates 61st anniversary of USSR Revolution at Karl Marx Theater. Members of Cuban Communist Party Politburo preside.
- Vilma Espin, head of the Cuban Women's Federation signs cooperation agreements with Congolese, Mozambique women's organizations.
- Head of Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Sanchez Parodi, says there are 3,000 political prisoners in Cuba, most of whom will be eligible for emigration to the US.
- 4-8 November Cuban Foreign Minister pays official visit to Tanzania.
- 7 November Fidel Castro attends party at Soviet Embassy marking 61st anniversary of Soviet Revolution.

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- 7 November Lionel Soto, Central Committee member, heads Cuban delegation to Portugal for meetings with Portuguese Communist Party.
- 8 November Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca pays official visit to Mozambique.
- Sao Tome President Manuel Pinto da Costa arrives in Cuba. Castro meets him at airport and presents him with the Jose Marti order.
- Vladimir Promyslov, mayor of Moscow, arrives in Havana at invitation of People's Government.
- 11 November Sugar harvest begins.
- 13 November Iraqi Health Minister Riyad Ibrahim Husayn arrives in Cuba to study Cuban public health system.
- Cuban Government allows 36 US citizens and 99 of their dependents to leave Cuba. This is the third group of dual citizens to leave and brings total to 404.
- 14 November Cuba and Guyana sign several cooperation agreements including scientific, technical, and trade.
- Japanese economic delegation arrives in Havana.
- 14-18 November Cuban Foreign Minister, visiting Sri Lanka, accuses China and US of leading a campaign to weaken the nonaligned movement.
- An earth tremor registering 4.6 on the Richter scale hits Santiago, Cuba's second largest city.

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- 14-18 November Cuba's Foreign Trade Vice Minister, German Amado Blanco, arrives in Peking to sign 1979 trade protocol.
- 16 November Cuba and Austria sign economic, industrial, and scientific cooperation agreement.
- Head of Cuban medical team in Angola, Dr. Narey Ramos, says there are more than 800 Cuban health technicians working in Angola.
- Saul Robinson, Deputy Secretary General of Jamaican People's National Party, arrives in Cuba.
- Havana domestic service carries report stating Cuba has granted 600 scholarships to Namibian students.
- 16-18 November Joshua Nkomo, chief of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, visits Cuba. Meets with Fidel Castro, foreign policy adviser Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Politburo member Raul Valdes Vivo.
- 17 November Cuba and Bulgaria sign trade protocol.
- 18-20 November Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca visits India.
- In Cuba, Iraqi Health Minister states that there are more than 300 Cuban doctors, nurses, and technicians serving in his country.
- 20 November Talks between representatives of Cuban Community Abroad and Cuban authorities begin in Havana. Fidel Castro meets with the two groups.
- 20-30 November Delegation from Turkish Communist Party visits Cuba.

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- 21 November Havana hosts 25th session of CEMA commission on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- Armed forces radio commentary stresses importance of upcoming nonaligned summit.
- Cuban Foreign Ministry issues declaration on Tanzania-Uganda conflict. Calls Uganda the aggressor. Says no Cuban troops in Tanzania.
- 21-27 November Cuban Foreign Minister visits Afghanistan.
- 22 November Fidel Castro, responding to stories in US press, says at press conference that Cuba has had MIG-23 for a year, and that they are for defensive purposes.
- Fidel Castro holds press conference at conclusion of meetings with representatives of Cuban Community Abroad. He says Cuba will release 3,600 political prisoners.
- 23 November Bulgarian Politburo member Pencho Kubadinski visits Cuba, and signs cooperation agreement between Bulgarian Fatherland Front and Cuban Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. Meets with Fidel Castro 25 November.
- Cuba and the Philippines sign fishing assistance agreement.
- 24 November Cuba and Romania sign cooperation agreement in science, education, and culture for 1979 and 1980.
- 25 November Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa makes statement in support of the Polisario struggle of the Western Sahara people.

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27 November Col. Richard Rodriguez, Chief of Staff of the Benin National Defense Force, arrives for visit at invitation of Armed Forces Ministry.

Jamaican Information Minister, Arnold Bertram arrives in Cuba.

28 November Cape Verde Minister of Transportation and Telecommunication Herculano Vieira arrives in Cuba.

29 November -
2 December Fourteenth Congress of Central Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC) held in Havana. Fidel Castro presides over last session.

30 November Beninese defense force delegation visits the Isle of Youth.

Cuban Politburo member Ramiro Valdes and Angolan Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rocha Dilolua sign 35 new cooperation agreements in the economic, technical, and scientific fields at the conclusion of joint commission meeting in Luanda. Agreements call for stationing of some 10,700 Cuban advisers in Angola in 1979.

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