



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4

Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON

HK

Africa Review

22 December 1978

Secret

RP AR 78-021
22 December 1978

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
Copy 239

Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

**National Security
Information** Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Dissemination Control Abbreviations	NOFORN (NF)	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
	PROPIN (PP)	Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
	NFIBONLY (NO)	NFIB Departments Only
	ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
	REL...	This Information has been Authorized for Release to...
	FGI	Foreign Government Information
	This publication is available on microfiche. To get a microfiche copy of this publication call [redacted] (OCR/DSB); for future issuances in addition to or in lieu of hard copies, call [redacted] (PPG/RD).	Derivative Classification by 006266 Review 20 years from date Derived from multiple

STATOTHR
STATOTHR

All material on this page is unclassified.

AFRICA REVIEW (U)

22 December 1978

CONTENTS

Israel-Kenya: The Continuing Relationship (S NF) 1

Since 1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli rescue raid on Entebbe, Israeli military assistance to Nairobi has grown, and Tel Aviv now plays an important role in the development of the Kenyan armed forces.
(S NF NC OC)

Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties (C) 5

The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty may be signed within the next few months is causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to reassess their country's continued participation in the informal alliance of Arab and black African states that crystallized during and after the Middle East war in 1973. (C)

Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Horn of Africa (U) 9

The Somalis continue to support the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ethiopian-Somali border issue remains as alive as ever.
(S NF)

NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.

Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S) 15

Senior military officers in Upper Volta's
armed forces have become disaffected over
President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to
abide by the constitution and resign his
military commission. (S NF NC OC)

FOR THE RECORD. 17

25X1A



Israel-Kenya: The Continuing Relationship (S NF)

25X1C

Kenya's commanding general and chief of staff is planning a visit to Israel early next month, [REDACTED]. The general and several junior staff officers will tour Israeli military facilities, observe weapons demonstrations, and discuss future Israeli military assistance to Kenya. (S NF NC OC)

25X1C

The move underscores the growing importance of the military relationship between the two countries. Since mid-1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli rescue raid on Entebbe, Israeli military assistance to Nairobi has grown and Tel Aviv now plays an important role in the development of the Kenyan armed forces. (S NF NC OC)

Limited Israeli military aid to Kenya began in the early 1970s. The nature of the relationship changed markedly after Entebbe. Israel, to repay Nairobi for its help, responded to what the Kenyans saw as the growing isolation by antagonistic neighbors, such as Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania. (S NF NC OC)

Shortly after the raid, the Israelis began providing small arms and ammunition and conducted a survey of Kenyan intelligence requirements. They agreed to help the Kenyans establish three intercept sites on the Ugandan border and subsequently three additional sites on Kenya's border with Somalia. (S NF NC OC)

Last fall, the two countries signed their first major arms deal--a \$50 million agreement under which Israel was to provide Gabriel naval surface-to-surface missiles for four Kenyan patrol boats, anti-aircraft guns, and ammunition. (S NF NC OC)

Early this year, the relationship expanded when Israel agreed to train more than 90 Kenyan Air Force personnel. In June, five Israelis traveled to Kenya to survey the country's logistics needs. (S NF NC OC)

22 December 1978

SECRET

Israeli technicians currently are directing Kenyan workers in Mombasa in refitting patrol boats with Gabriel missiles. A course on 20 mm antiaircraft guns for Kenyans has recently been completed, and an Israeli helicopter pilot is on a one-year contract to provide instruction in Kenya. (S NF NC OC)

25X1B of [REDACTED] Future arms deals apparently will include the sale of [REDACTED] Israeli-built 155 mm howitzers and possibly more small arms. In addition, the two countries reportedly are discussing the possibility of establishing an Air Force technical training school in Kenya staffed by Israeli instructors and a combat engineering training program to be conducted in Israel and Kenya. Nairobi may also request a modest course on armor and mechanized tactics. (S NF NC OC)

Why the Israelis?

The Kenyans have been carrying out a long-term military modernization and expansion program since 1975, when the growing strength of their neighbors finally jostled them into paying more attention to their security needs. Tension with Uganda's unpredictable President Amin after Entebbe spurred additional measures, as did the Somali incursion into Ethiopia last year. (S)

Nairobi turned to the West for military assistance and the West responded. Eager to anchor Kenya at a time when most of her neighbors were moving leftward, the West conducted surveys, signed agreements for equipment, and promised training programs. As a result, Kenya has begun to receive supersonic fighters, helicopters, artillery, tanks, and antimissiles. (S)

Like many other Third World countries, however, the Kenyans have shown dissatisfaction with the cumbersome machinery of the West's various military assistance apparatus. To some in Nairobi, the West has been insensitive to the urgencies of Kenya's situation. Despite Kenyan pleas, for example, the British were unable to establish an air route to deliver a load of ammunition in the wake of the Entebbe operation that Kenya would have needed to withstand an Ugandan attack. Moreover, the Kenyans like so many other Third World buyers, cannot understand what they see as a discrepancy between

22 December 1978

SECRET

attestations from Washington of their importance and the failure to make promised weapons available more quickly. (S)

Israel is limited in what it can offer, and the Kenyans probably have more reasonable expectations of Israel than they do of others. Nonetheless, the Israelis have generally followed through quickly convincing Kenyan leaders that Tel Aviv has a better understanding of their problems. There are similarities between the two countries' situations--both have found themselves at one time or another relatively underarmed and surrounded by potentially hostile countries. (S)

The Israel military also lends "more relevant" experience to Kenya's situation. Climate and geographical conditions are similar. In addition, both countries' adversaries are primarily armed with Soviet equipment. These factors may lead to a further strengthening of the military relationship between the two countries. (S)

The Israelis apparently are not training Kenyan pilots, but the introduction this year of Kenyan maintenance and ground crew personnel to Israeli methods could help lay the ground work in the small Kenyan Air Force for the kind of professionalism and efficiency it will need to be effective against more heavily armed opponents. The same could hold true for any Kenyan ground force units trained by the Israelis. (S NF NC OC)

The Israelis are not likely to be able to offer Kenya large quantities of major end items unless the United States approves transfer. If Washington grants permission, however, Kenya could become a candidate in the 1980s for some of Israel's US-built fighters as well as some artillery and armored personnel carriers. (S)

The Future

The gains for Israel are primarily political, though Kenya is not likely to risk getting out in front of other African states by becoming the first to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. (S)

22 December 1978

SECRET

Tel Aviv will usually pursue any reasonable prospects for arms sales and, because of its relative state of underdevelopment, the Kenyan military has good potential as a future customer, both for small arms and other basic needs as well as larger items that have become obsolete for the Israelis. (S)

Although the relationship is of growing importance to both countries, it could easily be severed by a change in the political climate. Kenya broke relations with Israel during the 1973 Middle East war and has generally assumed a low political profile vis-a-vis Tel Aviv since, despite the growing military ties. Kenya's role in the Israeli raid on Entebbe cost it some standing in the Third World and prompted many African nations to distance themselves from Nairobi when President Amin threatened revenge. (S)

Nonetheless, as long as it remains discreet, the military relationship between the two countries may well be able to weather all but the most critical developments. The Israelis have long been able to keep their relationships with various African countries fairly quiet. In one case--Ethiopia--they were even able to maintain military ties for several years after a radical change of government. (S) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

22 December 1978

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A

Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties (C)

The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty may be signed within the next few months is causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to reassess their country's continued participation in the informal alliance of Arab and black African states that crystallized during and after the Middle East war in 1973. There appears to be growing sentiment within both the military government and the emergent political parties to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. The key obstacle to resumed ties is Israel's cooperation with South Africa, which conflicts with Nigeria's key foreign policy objective of eliminating white minority rule and apartheid. (C)

The Afro-Arab relationship rests primarily on a trade-off of support on Middle East and southern Africa issues. An Egyptian-Israeli treaty would erase the need for such an arrangement in the eyes of the Nigerians. The Nigerians have for some time privately criticized the Arab states for not extending as much support to the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa as black Africa has for the Arab cause in the Middle East. They point to the paucity of material aid from the Arabs and charge that the majority of poorer African states have not received adequate economic compensation from the Arabs for severing their ties with Tel Aviv five years ago. The Nigerians are also sensitive to often heavy-handed attempts by the Arabs to expand their influence in Africa--particularly those by Libya and Algeria, which are regarded by the Lagos government as competitors for leadership in Africa. Nigeria, which itself is not dependent on Arab assistance, has always insisted that Afro-Arab cooperation must be mutually beneficial and based on mutual respect for sovereignty. (S)

Should Egypt and Israel reach an agreement in the near future, it is possible that Nigeria's present military government could normalize relations with Israel before the scheduled changeover to civilian rule in

22 December 1978

SECRET

October 1979. Head of State General Obasanjo recently told visiting Egyptian presidential aide Salem that Nigeria could not reestablish relations with Tel Aviv while Israel denies the Palestinians their right to self-determination and continues to occupy part of African land (the Egyptian Sinai). This formulation suggests that Nigeria would be prepared to consider renewed relations with Tel Aviv if an Egyptian-Israeli treaty contained guarantees for Palestinians acceptable to the Egyptians and resulted in Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. (C)

If the military regime does not act, Nigeria's future civilian government (assuming the transition to civilian rule occurs) might do so. The US Embassy in Lagos has reported that recent conversations with some influential members of two of the three major political parties that will contest elections next year indicate there is considerable sentiment for the reestablishment of relations with Israel. This includes the northern Muslim-oriented party, which reportedly is taking clandestine campaign funds from Libya. The US Embassy suspects that pro-Israeli sentiment also exists in the third major party. (C)

Any initiative by Lagos toward Israel will be heavily dependent on Nigeria's perception of Tel Aviv's relationship with South Africa, given the Obasanjo regime's preoccupation with southern Africa, which we believe a civilian government is likely to share. A rapprochement with Israel is potentially threatened by the present government's acute sensitivity to reported Israeli arms sales and alleged nuclear cooperation with Pretoria. There are signs, however, that Nigerian concern over Israeli ties with South Africa may be easing. Nigerian Foreign Minister Adefope recently told a US official that his government has received assurances from the Israelis that Tel Aviv will end its arms sales and curtail trade with South Africa. We cannot confirm that the Israeli Government has in fact made such a decision. (C)


Should Nigeria resume relations with Israel, several other moderate African states which have benefited little from Arab aid would quickly follow suit. Indeed, they may well take the initiative if Nigeria does not. These

22 December 1978

countries, including Ghana, Zaire, Zambia, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Central African Empire, and Kenya, were among the last to break with Tel Aviv in 1973. In the past, they have expressed varying degrees of interest in renewing ties with Israel, although none has so far been willing to take the lead. (S)

For some other African states, particularly the poorer predominantly Muslim countries, the choice would be far more painful, and an early wholesale African desertion of the Arabs should not be expected. Despite their frustrations with the Arabs, approximately a dozen African states are in fact receiving from the Arabs important development aid and credit loans that are used to offset the increased cost of oil imports that they cannot realistically expect to receive from Israel. They also must consider the unstated threat of an oil boycott. Most African countries would find it difficult to secure non-Arab oil suitable for their refineries. (S)
(SECRET)

22 December 1978



22 December 1978

25X1A

[REDACTED] /OGCR

25X1A

Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
in Horn of Africa (U)

The high point of the Ogaden fighting that involved some 30,000 Somali regular forces ended in March 1978, but the Somalis continue to support the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ethiopian-Somali border issue remains as alive as ever. There may be as many as 50,000 guerrillas in southeastern Ethiopia with the majority of them in Harerge Province and an undetermined number of personnel from the Somali regular Army serving as a leadership cadre for this force. (S NF)

The Root of the Problem

Hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia are rooted in intense nationalism based on each side's interpretation of history and age-old religious and ethnic rivalries that took a more tangible form during the last century when Ethiopia acquired vast new territories--including the Ogaden--from the former colonial powers in the Horn. The conflict is further complicated by each country's concept of "nation." The Ethiopians base their definition on territory, considering ethnicity to be mere tribalism that impedes nation building. The Somalis base theirs on ethnic common feelings, to which territorial considerations are secondary. These definitions collide in the case of the Ogaden and surrounding areas. (U)

Somalia refuses to budge from its claim that "the people of the Ogaden and adjacent regions, which were annexed by Ethiopia in the late 19th century, have a right to self-determination." Actually, there were no international frontiers in the Horn of Africa prior to the 1880s. From the fourth to the seventh century, Ethiopia was a small, powerful Christian empire--the Axumite kingdom--that was centered on the provinces of Tigre, Begemder, Welo, Shoa, and Gojam in the Ethiopian highlands. It was dominated by the Amhara and Tigray peoples whose influence by the seventh century extended from the Nile valley northeastward as far as Mecca in

22 December 1978

SECRET

Saudi Arabia. Until the mid-1880s, the territory east of the Ethiopian highlands was known only as the Somali coast. The region was inhabited by the nomadic Afars, Gallas, and Somalis, who migrated throughout this unclaimed desolate territory. (U)

The Early Inhabitants

The Afars moved into the Danakil (west of Djibouti in the Rift Valley), southern Eritrea, and the Djibouti area in the seventh century A.D. and have remained there to this day. Early in the 10th century, the Galla (or Oromo) people settled on lands east of the Afars and dominated the Ogaden region in the south, or parts of it, for the next 500 years. The Somalis who already were Islamized by the 9th century, started migrating in small irregular groups in the latter part of the 10th century; within 200 years they occupied most of present-day Somalia, and the Issas (ethnically related to the Somalis) from the northern coastal region had displaced the Gallas in the areas adjacent to the Afars. In the 11th century the Darod Somalis started their trek southward from the northeast coast of Somalia. It took them roughly 500 years to drive out or subjugate the Galla and gain control over most of the Ogaden region and another 300 years to reach the Giuba river (near the present Kenya border), finally stopping at the Tana river in Kenya by 1909. Thus, the Somalis have had an expanding presence in this region for nearly 1,000 years. (U)

Although it is impossible to be precise about the population in Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo Provinces, ethnic Somalis make up the majority of the estimated five to six million inhabitants. Organized along kinship lines, the Somalis are divided into six clan families. The largest of these is the Darod which consists of several clans; the most important ones include the Ogaden, Migertein, and Marehan (President Siad's clan). The Ogaden clan is divided into some 17 subgroups that are located mainly in the area of the same name.* These people also constitute the core of the Western Somalia Liberation Front's insurgency against the Mengistu regime. (U)

*There is uncertainty about whether the Ogaden was named after the Ogaden clan or vice versa, but it is a common practice throughout Africa to identify an area or locality by the ethnic name of the inhabitants.

22 December 1978

The advent of Islam provided another source of tension in the Horn. During the seventh century A.D., the Muslims challenged the power of the Ethiopians and cut their empire off from the rest of the Christian world. This ushered in a long period of sporadic "Jihads" (religious wars) that reached their zenith in the 1540s when Somali Muslims overran this mountain kingdom. Periodic retaliatory forays against the Muslims brought the Ethiopians into limited contact with the lands east of the highlands. These actions over the centuries developed into a religious power struggle for control of the Horn that still hovers around the current conflicts. (U)

Ethiopia's first real involvement with the Ogaden and vicinity coincides with Emperor Menelik II's territorial expansions to create modern Ethiopia in the 1880s, at the same time that Britain, France, and Italy were dividing up the rest of the Horn of Africa. Menelik's objectives were to take control of the neighboring lands to establish a buffer against European encroachment and to "redeem all territories that once were a part of the empire," according to Ethiopian tradition.* He conquered the Harer and Jijiga areas in 1889, imposed his rule over the Afars to the north, and in 1891 moved southward into the Ogaden, Bale, and Sidamo regions. Effective Ethiopian control over the Ogaden was really never established, nor has there ever been a substantial presence of the Ethiopian people among the inhabitants—even today. (U)

The Boundary Question

France and Britain established the boundary between French Somaliland and the British Somaliland protectorate in 1888, and in 1894 the British and Italians fixed the frontiers between their respective Somaliland protectorates. Establishment of these borders around the areas under European administrative control was an alien procedure to Menelik and his predecessors who traditionally

*Menelik's concepts of Ethiopia's former frontiers extended to Khartoum, Sudan; Nyanza Province in Kenya; and included all Galla country (southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya).

22 December 1978

annexed territory in name only, without benefit of boundaries, treaties, or even a presence. Thus Ethiopia was forced to define its borders, especially in the east, for the first time in its long history. The boundaries between Ethiopia and the French and British Somalilands were settled in 1897, but only after the Europeans gave up much of their territorial claims and Britain obtained guarantees for Somali herdsmen on both sides of the border the right to move freely across the line for grazing and water. The first (1897) treaty between Italy and Ethiopia on the boundary with Italian Somalia did not agree with the map, so it was never signed by either party. The second agreement in 1908 was just as vague as the first, but it was signed after Italy compensated Ethiopia for a 49,210-square kilometer (19,000-square mile) tract of land and ceded all of the Ogaden and its people to Menelik. This treaty was still disputed in 1960 when Somalia became independent and voided all prior boundary agreements. The existing frontier between Ethiopia and the former Italian colony is still just a UN-imposed provisional administrative line of uncertain legality. (U)

The often repeated accusation about Somalia's obsession with territorial expansion obscures some basic issues concerning the treaties that created Ethiopia's eastern frontiers. The Somalis claim that the British and Italian agreements with Menelik violated prior treaties with the various Somali clan families. The 1884 and 1886 treaties with five Somali clan families provided for British protection of the Somalis and their territory from increasing Ethiopian encroachment and administration of the British Somaliland protectorate in return for Somali logistical support for Aden. These treaties also denied both parties the right to unilaterally cede Somali territory. To get Ethiopian recognition of the border with its protectorate, however, the British abandoned their claim to most of the Haud region and allowed Menelik to annex it. This, in effect, was an abrogation of British obligations to the Somalis. (U)

A similar treaty between the Italians and Somalis in 1889 placed southern Somalia under Italy's administration and protection from Ethiopian encroachment in return for a substantial annuity. Following their defeat at Adowa by the Ethiopians in 1895, the Italians

22 December 1978

withdrew their claim to most of the Ogaden in return for control of Eritrea; the 1908 treaty not only ceded the rest of the Ogaden to Ethiopia, but identified the Somali "tribes" that went with it. (U)

The government of Ethiopia claims that the British agreement of 1897 is valid and that the Somalis must recognize this border; but the 1908 treaty with the Italians still requires an interpretation before any settlement on the frontier with this former colony can be made. Ethiopia also argues that the 1950 provisional administrative line deprives Ethiopia of a large portion of its territory, but Addis Ababa would consider renouncing this claim if Somalia recognizes the line as the de jure boundary. Although Ethiopia's claim to Somalia was rejected by the UN, it still maintains that much of the Somali-inhabited area of the Horn was formerly part of the Ethiopian empire. (U)

Outlook

The prospects for a peaceful settlement of Ethiopian-Somali differences over the Ogaden are not promising. Indeed, the Ethiopians--emboldened by the recent success of their hardline military policy toward secessionist guerrillas in Eritrea--will probably be more determined than ever to crush the Somali-supported guerrilla movement in the Ogaden by force. Tactical success in Eritrea--if it can be sustained--will, additionally, enable the Ethiopians eventually to redeploy some of their veteran combat units back to their original base of operations in the Ogaden, thus increasing pressure on the Ogadeni insurgents. The Somalis, for their part, appear equally determined to upgrade dramatically guerrilla force levels in the Ogaden and to encourage increasingly aggressive insurgent operations there. (S)

Moreover, before any negotiations--even of an exploratory nature--to resolve the Ogaden dispute can begin, Ethiopia demands that Somalia cease its support for guerrilla activities, publicly and formally renounce all irredentist ambitions in the Horn, and pay reparations for war damages in the Ogaden. The Somalis, on the other hand, continue to demand autonomy for all inhabitants

22 December 1978

of the Ogaden and show no willingness to abandon their official or covert support for the guerrillas. Indeed, to do otherwise would be politically risky, if not fatal, for Siad or any other Somali leader-given the continuing strong national commitment to the "Greater Somalia" concept.
(S) (SECRET NOFORN)

22 December 1978

25X1A



Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S)

25X1C Senior military officers in Upper Volta's armed forces, [REDACTED] have become disaffected over President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to abide by the constitution and resign his military commission. Lamizana, a four-star general who assumed leadership of Upper Volta's civilian government last May, relies on the Voltan military for his principal source of political power and is reluctant to sever this relationship, at least until he is certain that he has established a secure civilian power base. (S NF NC OC)

The senior officers have also grown dissatisfied with Chief of Staff Baba Sy, who has constitutional authority to force the President's resignation but refuses to do so. Baba Sy cannot ask for the President's resignation, however, without jeopardizing his own position--he is past the mandatory retirement age and in an effort to cushion military pressure for his resignation, the President has requested Baba Sy to stay. (S NF NC OC)

Although Lamizana may be aware of the growing disension among his military officers, it is highly unlikely that the President will resign his military commission in the immediate future. Lamizana has also had to face a series of minor incidents of civilian unrest--a student demonstration during Upper Volta's national day celebration and a threatened air controllers' strike last October. His continued failure to comply with the constitution will, however, exacerbate the disaffection his senior military officers already harbor against him. (S NF NC OC)

The military is intent on ensuring that the civilian government runs legally and could feel obligated to act if Lamizana does not resign his commission in a reasonable amount of time. The military could also force Bab a Sy into retirement--the officers are concerned with advancement possibilities and probably feel a

22 December 1978

~~SECRET~~

peaceful purging of these senior officers is desirable--
and replace him with a military leader who would be
more forceful in demanding Lamizana's resignation. (S
NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

22 December 1978

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

FOR THE RECORD

South Africa: The frequency of urban terrorist acts and sabotage has increased noticeably in the Johannesburg area during the past three weeks. While there is no indication that widespread urban violence is imminent in South Africa, this flurry of low-level incidents indicates a pattern of urban violence that is slowly increasing, despite extensive government security precautions. (C)

Last year there was a spate of urban bombings during the Christmas season: a large shopping center in Johannesburg and several police stations were damaged. This year's incidents appear to be targeted more toward deliberate sabotage rather than acts of wanton terrorism that produce backlashes from both the white and black communities. Thus far, the Soweto Community Council building, a symbol to many urban blacks of government authority, has been bombed. Also, a depot supplying government-owned black beer halls was set afire and a large dynamite factory near Johannesburg was extensively damaged. (C)

In October, the Minister of Justice, warned the white population to expect increased terrorism, particularly from the African National Congress, the largest of the exiled liberation organizations. During November, the government publicly acknowledged on two occasions that trained guerrillas were infiltrating South Africa from neighboring black states. The police have begun a series of arrests of urban blacks that may be related to underground terrorist activities and they can be expected to mount larger security crackdowns if the sabotage continues. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL) [REDACTED] /ORPA,

25X1A

25X1A

22 December 1978

SECRET

Secret

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4

Secret

Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4