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


DOS & DIA REVIEWS  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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## SUMMARY

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**GENERAL**

**1. Indian spokesman denies interest in special UN session on H-bomb:**

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India has not considered requesting a special UN meeting on the H-bomb, according to N. R. Pillai, secretary general of the Foreign Ministry. He told Ambassador Allen that as far as New Delhi is concerned, the question rests with the UN Disarmament Commission.

Pillai added that his government would not be disappointed if the Soviet proposal to make India a member of the subcommittee on atomic control were defeated, since New Delhi does not wish to become further involved in this "contentious" subject.

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Prime Minister Nehru, however, may not share Pillai's views on Indian membership on the UN Disarmament Commission's proposed subcommittee on the control of atomic weapons. On 19 April the Disarmament Commission rejected by a nine-to-one vote a Soviet proposal to include India, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China on this subcommittee.

**SOVIET UNION**

**2. May Day practice fly-by reveals nine possible Type-37's:**

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US officials in Moscow report that practice fly-by's for the May Day air show occurred on 13, 15, and 18 April. The first two demonstrations were of little importance involving only 24 IL-28's each. On 18 April 24 IL-28's and one probable Type-37 were noted flying the regular parade route over Moscow. A second sighting later disclosed 42 IL-28's and 9 probable Type-37's. These aircraft were flying approximately 1/2 mile west of the observers in 3 ship vees in trail with the Type-37's leading.



According to observers, all US officials, the possible Type-37 appeared to be three times longer than an IL-28. The wings were sharply swept back (estimated 35 degrees) and tapered from root to tip. Most prominent part of the aircraft was the very high vertical stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizer was located just above the fuselage. None of the observers reported reciprocating engine noise or saw propellers. All observers believed the aircraft to be jet propelled. Among the US officials sighting these aircraft, there were conflicting views regarding the engine installation -- three indicating the probability that the engines were buried in the wings. One observer believed that he saw one engine nacelle on each wing. Another thought the aircraft looked like a B-52. All, after reviewing the Type-37 photograph, agreed that in all probability the aircraft in question were Type-37's.

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D/I USAF Comment: It is considered probable that as many as nine aircraft, similar to the Type-37 [redacted] were sighted in flight. No information was obtained from these sightings which would alter previous estimates that the Type-37 represents a jet bomber in the heavy class. The existence of as many as nine Type-37 aircraft would indicate that the Soviet heavy jet bomber program is significantly farther advanced than hitherto estimated. The appearance of nine such aircraft in flight indicates that series production of this model must have begun around July 1953 at the latest.

D/I USAF estimates have not considered that series production of the Type-37 would begin before sometime in 1956. While currently held estimates have predicted the introduction of small numbers of turboprop heavy bombers in the Type-31 class in operational units by mid-54, the indicated availability of serially produced Type-37's indicates that bombers of this more advanced type could appear in operational use by mid-54.

In view of the possible availability of these heavy jet bombers a reappraisal of the entire Soviet long range bomber program is being undertaken.

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**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**3. French air effort in Indochina seen inadequate:**

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At the end of his visit to Indochina, General Partridge, US Far East Air Force commander, said the French air force in Indochina is not capable of fulfilling its present or future missions without a basic overhaul of logistics and personnel policies. He believes that even with a drastic increase in funds and personnel, the French, because of their inexperience in modern warfare, would still not be able to attain their maximum capability in this theater.

Partridge stated that the French lack enough aircrews to utilize fully the aircraft now at their disposal. Noting the lack of modern airfields and of any modern flight control or communications systems, he added that a "radical change in the air force picture" will be necessary if any real results are to be obtained.

**4. Report of Chinese Communist army units in Indochina seen false:**


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The Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense asserts that about 5,000 troops of the Chinese Communist 19th and 53rd armies have joined with three Viet Minh divisions in the Dien

Bien Phu area, and that a battalion of heavy artillery from the 10th Artillery Division is now located with a Viet Minh artillery division at Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, 1,420 troops of the 13th Army are alleged to be en route to Indochina through Lao Kay and Lai Chau.

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Current Soviet and Chinese Communist denials of Chinese intervention in Indochina suggest that the Communists are unlikely to introduce Chinese combat forces there on a significant scale at this particular time. Identification of such forces would in their view provide the West with grounds for internationalization of the war, which they apparently hope to avoid. They are thus expected to refrain from provocation until they feel able to estimate the unity and determination of the West.