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
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
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1. COMMENT ON RESULTS OF ADENAUER TALKS IN
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The Soviet-West German communiqué published in Moscow on 13 September revealed agreement to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors subject to approval by the Bundestag and the Supreme Soviet. It stated that trade discussions would be started in the near future. The communiqué itself did not refer to the issue of German prisoners in the USSR.

The Soviet Union, by winning its demand for establishment of full diplomatic relations, advanced its drive to win recognition of the existence of two German states. During the talks the Soviet delegation stated more bluntly than ever its insistence that German unity under NATO was impossible, and refused to accept Adenauer's demand that progress toward unity be a prerequisite to establishing relations. The rigid Soviet stand foreshadows a continuing stalemate on unification at the October Geneva foreign ministers' meeting. The agreement to establish relations will be described by Soviet representatives at the Geneva conference as an important stepping-stone toward a European security system.

The final conference agreement will probably be welcomed in West Germany even though Adenauer yielded on his minimum negotiating position to achieve it. Prior to the conference, Adenauer informed Western officials that he wanted only to exchange "diplomatic agents," and not ambassadors, in order to emphasize that normal relations could not exist until his nation was reunited.

Adenauer's yielding on this point and his failure to gain any agreement on unity will not provoke any sharp domestic response. The West Germans generally expected the conference to agree on establishing diplomatic relations without making any real progress on unity. Separate Soviet assurances on the release of German prisoners will be hailed as a personal triumph for the chancellor--this agenda subject being the most important domestically. Bonn will probably delay ratification of the agreement until Moscow has demonstrated its good faith by releasing a substantial number of prisoners at an early date.

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2. NEHRU REPORTED TO PERCEIVE IMPROVEMENT IN US-INDIAN RELATIONS

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	<p>Prime Minister Nehru recently told the Indian UN delegation that relations with the United States have grown much closer in the past six months, according to a statement made to the American</p>
<p>consul general</p>	

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Nehru said that the United States sincerely wants peace, is a true democracy, and is basically anticolonial. Consequently, he said, India must feel closer to the United States and the West than to the Sino-Soviet bloc. He added, however, that New Delhi's policy of non-alignment is not to be abandoned.

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Comment

There have been several reports from prominent Indians of pro-American statements by Nehru since his return from Moscow. Krishna Menon, Nehru's personal adviser on foreign affairs, has also defended the United States in public and private in recent weeks.

A change in India's attitude as suggested by these reports may result from increasing Indian consciousness of Sino-Soviet power in Asia, as well as from India's need for greatly increased foreign economic aid if the goals of its second Five-Year Plan are to be met.

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