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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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
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


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
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
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2. TURKISH MILITARY ALERT MEASURES

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The Turkish government has instituted a series of measures to increase the readiness of its armed forces on the Syrian frontier, according to the American embassy in Ankara. Internal security has also been strengthened.

Leaves for all personnel have been canceled and all training that interferes with operational readiness has been dropped. An armored battalion has been moved to southern Turkey, reinforcing a division stationed near the Syrian border. The Turkish air force is on stand-by alert. The anti-aircraft units, hitherto grouped in gun parks, have moved to assigned sites and are manned on a 24-hour basis.

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4. BOHLEN REPORTS RUMORS THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY BE SHIFTED

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[REDACTED] The American embassy in Moscow reports that it has received rumors during the past few days that Khrushchev is in trouble and may be removed as first secretary of the party. One rumor relayed on 14 November [REDACTED] that "Khrushchev is on his way out" and that "Malenkov's star is rising." On 15 November, an [REDACTED] visiting in Moscow claimed that a member of the Gomulka delegation had informed him that Khrushchev "is stepping down."

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Another rumor is that Khrushchev would be replaced by Molotov as first secretary and that Khrushchev would take charge of agricultural affairs; Malenkov would be reappointed as chairman of the Council of Ministers, replacing Bulganin.

The embassy points out that it has no confirmatory evidence for these rumors and notes that Khrushchev has continued to be much in evidence and was identified as first secretary on 16 November. He met Gomulka on the arrival of the Polish delegation on 15 November and has since headed the Soviet contingent in the negotiations with the Poles.

Comment


The continuing ill effects of Soviet liberalization policy toward the Satellites has probably put the Khrushchev leadership squarely on the defensive and made Khrushchev, as architect of this policy, the most vulnerable to attack. At the same time, other Soviet leaders who may have long favored a tougher line probably now regard their position as vindicated by events in Hungary, and their views may have greater influence in "collective" decisions of the near future. Accordingly, some shift in the balance of power within the party presidium may be taking place, although there are no other indications that Khrushchev is scheduled for quick removal.

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5. USSR SEEKS TO RECOUP PRESTIGE THROUGH NEW
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

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The Soviet statement of 17 November on disarmament and easing international tension is a major propaganda maneuver designed to divert world attention from the setbacks sustained by

Soviet policies and prestige in Eastern Europe and to recapture the diplomatic initiative. It was aimed particularly at reassuring neutralist governments and the USSR's friends throughout the world that Moscow's threatening posture in the Middle East crisis and its suppression of the Hungarian uprising do not foreshadow the abandonment of the "soft" approach in foreign affairs of the past eighteen months.

The Soviet leaders have seized upon the Swiss government's proposal for a five-power conference of heads of government to call for another summit meeting to consider this latest omnibus disarmament plan. They probably believe that new moves in the disarmament field offer the most effective means of exploiting widespread concern over the Middle East conflict and of striking a blow at the NATO alliance.

The statement was intended to show that the USSR is exercising restraint in the Middle East crisis in contrast to the "reckless adventures" of the Western powers. This theme of restraint, however, is accompanied by a pointed reminder of Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet military power. The statement contends that if the USSR had in fact been guided by the aggressive intentions which the West has ascribed to it, it could have used the present situation "for coming out against the armed forces of the Atlantic bloc and could accomplish the military aims with regard to Western Europe ascribed to it, even without the use of up-to-date nuclear and rocket weapons."

The Soviet leaders probably expect this reminder, together with the announcement of the nuclear weapons test, will have an inhibiting effect on the actions of

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Britain and France in the Middle East and promote neutralism in Europe. They were probably encouraged to deliver their implied threat by a belief that the cease-fire in Egypt was the direct result of Bulganin's threatening notes of 5 November to Eden, Mollet and Ben-Gurion.

The only new feature in the statement's disarmament proposals is the expression of Moscow's readiness to "examine" the question of using aerial photography "in the area of Europe where forces of the Atlantic bloc and Warsaw pact member states are stationed to a depth of up to 800 kilometers (about 500 miles) to the west and east from the border line of the above-mentioned forces." This shift on aerial inspection was intended to create the impression that the USSR has made an important concession to the West in an effort to break the deadlock on disarmament, whereas almost no Soviet territory is involved and much of Western Europe is included.


The statement's seven-point program was drawn from various Soviet disarmament plans over the past eighteen months. Unlike the proposals of 10 May 1955 and 27 March 1956, this latest package plan does not offer a logical and coherent disarmament procedure. The seven points selected were those calculated to produce the most favorable immediate impact on world opinion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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
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6. LATEST SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST

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The USSR announced that on 17 November it had conducted a successful nuclear weapon test at great altitude.



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9. STRIKES CONTINUE IN HUNGARY

25X1 [REDACTED] The regime of Janos Kadar has tightened restrictions on the delivery and distribution of food in Budapest in an effort to exert increased pressure on workers, who have apparently largely ignored a call by the Central Workers' Council of Budapest to end the general strike. Only government food trucks are permitted to enter the city and no individuals may go into the country for supplies.

The American legation in Bucharest reported on 16 November [REDACTED] the passage of sealed freight cars loaded with young Hungarians through Cluj, Predeal and Ploesti en route to the Soviet border. The

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25X1 [REDACTED] Budapest legation says Kadar told worker groups on 16 November that he was powerless to stop deportations. The Soviet Military Command has said reports of deportations were "in error."

In an attempt to reorganize the remnants of the army, Minister of Armed Forces Muennich on 16 November ordered all army personnel who were still away from their places of duty to report by 1900 on 18 November or be considered deserters. This move may be a forerunner to a purge of military personnel who supported, and continue to support, the insurgents against the Soviet troops.

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