

TOP SECRET



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ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

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2. YEMENIS FEAR CIVIL WAR OVER SUCCESSION

Comment on:

[Redacted]

A widespread acceptance of the probability that civil war may break out over the choice of a successor to the ailing Imam was reported by the American consul in Aden after a recent trip to southern Yemen.

Anticipation of civil war has led to a revival in southern Yemen of separatist leanings, which have been given further impetus by rumors [Redacted]

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The northern tribal chiefs traditionally have elected each new Imam, and refuse to recognize the Imam's designation of his son Badr as crown prince. The consul reports that most members of the Yemeni ruling class with whom he talked believed that Badr could not succeed to the throne without foreign help, and that the tribal leaders favored the Imam's brother, Prince Hassan, who heads the Yemeni delegation to the UN. The consul concludes that some movement undoubtedly is under way to reverse the present extension of Soviet influence in Yemen and to prepare the ground for the succession of Prince Hassan.

The consul also reports a widespread expectation of Egyptian, Soviet, or possibly Saudi intervention in support of Badr, who undoubtedly hopes to support his bid for power with newly received Soviet arms, assisted by Yemen's Soviet advisers. Meanwhile, Egyptian propaganda, portraying the USSR as the supporter of Arab independence, appears increasingly successful in convincing the mass of Yemenis that the Soviet arms and technicians are needed to resist British aggression on the Aden border. [Redacted]

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4. GREECE HOLDING DOOR OPEN TO TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS

Comment on:



Greek Foreign Minister Averoff is holding open the door to a tripartite conference on Cyprus in London next month, but it is unlikely that the Greek govern-

ment will agree to attend without prior assurances which are largely unacceptable to Britain. Britain is, however, now willing to surrender sovereignty over Cyprus except for a small base area. Averoff replied on 7 August to the first British sounding by rejecting the idea of a tripartite conference as "quite inadequate" and involving "serious dangers." However, he hinted that Greece might accept a British invitation if London would support independence for Cyprus with a guarantee against a change in the island's status either for a 20-year period or by the consent of a majority of the UN or of NATO, or continuation of British sovereignty with a plebiscite after ten years.

The initial Turkish reaction to the British proposal was favorable, although the Turks also indicated a desire for a prior understanding with London and have not formally replied pending clarification of the Greek reaction. Ankara remains firmly committed to partition for Cyprus and appears to believe that London is bound to support its view; however, there is some indication that the Turks recognize the general lack of support for partition and are studying alternative solutions, including a three-power condominium and even guaranteed independence. Nevertheless, the Turks are certain to balk at any solution which is intended to leave the way open to the eventual union of Cyprus with Greece.

Despite the questionable prospects for a tripartite conference at present, the three governments appear to be approaching an area of agreement.



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
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ANNEX

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Watch Report 367, 15 August 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.



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