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6 October 1959



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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

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
### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*ND*  
Communist China - Guinea: Communist China, pressing to expand its influence in tropical Africa, has obtained its first formal diplomatic representation in the area with an agreement to exchange ambassadors with Guinea. The agreement with Conakry, where the USSR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia already maintain embassies, was signed in Peiping on 4 October by Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Guinea's Minister of Education Barry Diawandou. Peiping is likely to cite the agreement with Guinea in its efforts to convince Ghana that it too should exchange formal representation.

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA



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*ND*  
**Iraq:** Two daily newspapers and a weekly in Baghdad, all outspokenly anti-Communist, have been closed down and the editor of another paper has been arrested. These actions were ordered by the Communist-controlled Iraqi Journalists Association,

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which Qasim is permitting to exercise virtual control over the Iraqi press. Communist domination of the association was achieved in September with the aid of the socialistic National Democratic party.

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Morocco: The crown prince is reported to be displeased with the size of the initial American arms shipment scheduled to reach Morocco for display during the mid-November national holiday. He characterized the proposed shipment as "ridiculously small and entirely inadequate" for the spectacular demonstration he wants of American support for the palace and Royal Army. This adverse reaction appears to be a gambit to obtain a larger shipment. Meanwhile, the Moroccans seem to be resisting French pressure to fill Royal Army requirements for the November parade, and the USSR and Czechoslovakia are reported to be offering "everything and anything" the Moroccan Government wants.

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Indonesia: Rumors of an impending army coup appear to arise in part from general apprehension over increased army influence in the government. The Indonesian Communist party may be exploiting such rumors in an effort to aggravate President Sukarno's apparently growing uneasiness over the army's political role.

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Moroccan Chief of Staff Reported Dissatisfied With American Arms Aid

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[Moroccan Crown Prince and Chief of Staff Moulay Hassan is reported displeased with the size of the token American shipment of materiel scheduled for display during the mid-November national holiday. Some 26 items of mobile artillery and transport vehicles compose the initial shipment under a \$500,000 military aid grant which the prince expects to use to equip five units of shock troops. These he envisages as an elite force to be used for the protection of the monarchy should internal stability deteriorate markedly. Moulay Hassan is said to have characterized the projected shipment as "ridiculously small and entirely inadequate" for a spectacular demonstration of American support for the palace and army.]

[Moulay Hassan hopes to modernize, if not completely re-equip, the 31,000-man Moroccan Army, and his adverse reaction may be a gambit to obtain a much larger shipment of American materiel. Despite the French claim that the Moroccan Army has adequate supplies of small arms, a Moroccan general has indicated a need for some 36,000 items, considered by the American Embassy in Rabat to be more than enough to re-equip the army, irregular forces, and gendarmerie combined. The King is said to desire an additional 18,000 items of small arms and equipment for storage at the palace should the need arise to arm persons loyal to the crown.]

[The French, opposing much of the projected American military aid to Morocco, are reported to have pressed during the past month for a list of Moroccan military requirements, particularly those items which Morocco might wish to exhibit in November. Not wishing to be " beholden to the French in this matter," the Moroccans apparently are resisting these pressures. Meanwhile, the USSR and Czechoslovakia are reported to be "offering everything and anything" the Moroccan Government wants in the way of military equipment.]

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Coup Rumors Circulate in Djakarta

Numerous rumors of an impending army coup which have circulated in Djakarta for the past few weeks appear to be part of the general atmosphere of uneasiness in the Indonesian Government. This uneasiness seems to pertain particularly to President Sukarno's attitude toward the army. His suspicion of army power, although typical of his attitude toward any element which might threaten his position, apparently has been deliberately aggravated by the Communist party in its effort to create dissension between the President and the army.

Since mid-September, President Sukarno has demonstrated a renewed interest in balancing the army's influence in government by concessions to leftist elements. These include his decision to speak at the Communist party's sixth national congress, despite the army's attempts to minimize attention to the meeting, and his creation of a West Irian Committee weighted with extreme nationalists and leftists which is likely to obstruct the army's anti-Communist efforts. A reorganization of administrative machinery governing implementation of prevailing martial law seems likely to decrease the powers of Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister General Nasution. The former army intelligence chief has implied that antiarmy elements are getting closer to the President.

An army coup directed at replacing President Sukarno or reducing his power appears unlikely at this time, however, unless there is extreme provocation. The army itself would be sharply divided on anti-Sukarno action, and army leaders in Djakarta are aware that an unsuccessful coup might turn Sukarno almost exclusively toward Communist support.

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