
Approved For Release 200 P. C. SECRIE 75A004900330001-1 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 10 February 1960 DECLASSIFIED AUTH: HR 70-2 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWER Copy No. 25X1 25X1 INTELLIGEN BULLETI

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 February 1960

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Premier Khrushchev's travel plans--his 20-day Asian trip beginning today, French trip in March, and the summit in May--offer ample opportunity for the personal diplomacy which has characterized the Soviet leader's conduct of foreign policy. Khrushchev also has accepted an invitation to visit Guinea, and probably would like to extend this trip, which is unlikely to take place before midsummer, to include Ghana, Ethiopia, and some of the newly independent African states. He may well include at least stopovers in Cairo and Baghdad. While these visits are designed to expand foreign contacts and project a favorable image of the USSR in these areas, Moscow probably also hopes partially to offset the impact of President Eisenhower's recent trips.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

India: The Indian Government has been negotiating with British firms for the purchase of "Bloodhound" ground-to-air guided missiles and long-range radar equipment. Indian defense officials, who reportedly set aside funds for such equipment last year, evidently feel that as a result of the increased Chinese Communist military threat along the northern frontier India's air-defense capabilities must be strengthened. Nehru told Congress party legislators on 8 February that more would have to be spent on defense because of the Sino-Indian dispute, and was quoted by party sources as saying the government could no longer afford to postpone purchase of certain defense equipment.

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Indonesia: Several reports are circulating in Indonesia of growing differences between President Sukarno and Army Chief of Staff General Nasution. Sukarno is said to be considering further steps, including cabinet changes, to diminish the army's political influence, possibly by granting a few more concessions to the Communists. Such developments would be in line with Sukarno's usual tactics aimed at preventing either the army or the Communists from becoming too powerful. These reports apparently stem both from Sukarno's recent moves to re-emphasize the civilian role in government and from the continuing efforts of Communists and possibly other leftists to prejudice Sukarno against the chief of staff.

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Burma: U Nu, the prospective premier, has stated that he plans to maintain the Ne Win government's domestic and international policies. Although his party's popular and parliamentary majority is overwhelming, he says that he favors two-party democracy in Burma and that the "Stable" party opposition provides a non-Communist alternative to the Communist-dominated National United Front, which won almost one third of the popular vote in 1956 but has made an inconsequential showing thus far in the current balloting. U Nu plans to continue the American aid projects in Burma, but prefers loans to grants. Recognizing General Ne Win's supra-political stature, U Nu notes that, should his government again become inefficient and corrupt, "there is the possibility of the army's taking over again."

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Iraq: The "orthodox" faction of the Iraqi Communist party has suffered a setback in its efforts to achieve legal status as a political party. The party's application was not accepted by the Interior Ministry, probably at Qasim's orders, ostensibly because of objections to the phraseology in the application form. After complying with the ministry's objections, the party resubmitted its application. However, the Qasim regime may interpose further objections in an effort to give a boost to the Communist splinter faction led by Daud Sayigh, whose application, along with those of the National Democratic and Kurdish parties, reportedly has been approved.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Approved For Release 2002/1 25X1 III. THE WEST Cyprus: The 8 February announcement of the indefinite postponement of Cypriot independence, which had been sched-25X1 uled for 19 March, follows a breakdown in negotiations between British and Cypriot representatives. The major stumbling block is the question of size of the two bases Britain wishes to retain. Archbishop Makarios apparently feels he can win further concessions which he believes are needed to pacify his critics on Cyprus. There is little likelihood of a renewal of widespread violence, but a prolonged stalemate will result in new bitterness toward Britain by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and possibly in occasional acts of violence. 25X1 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Serious Differences	Reported	Between	Sukarno	and	<u>Indonesian</u>
Chief of Staff					

	Reports have circulated in Indonesia for several weeks	
	that there are growing differences between President Sukarno	
	and Army Chief of Staff Nasution. Sukarno is said to be con-	
	sidering cabinet changes, to be effected some time after early	
	March, which would diminish the army's political influence	
	March, which would diffinish the at my s pointed in the	
	and reduce the power of General Nasution, who is also min-	
25X1	ister of defense. Sukarno may	
	be planning the inclusion of Communists in his cabinet.	

These reports apparently stem both from Sukarno's recent moves to re-emphasize the civilian role in government and from the persistent efforts of Communists and possibly other leftists to prejudice Sukarno against Nasution. Other contributing factors are Sukarno's recent appointments of Communists to regional posts and his long-standing policy of keeping any one element from becoming powerful enough to challenge his own position.

First Minister Djuanda told the American ambassador in late January that cabinet shifts are expected in the near future, but that there was "absolutely nothing" to press stories of disagreement between Sukarno and Nasution. Colonel Sukendro, deputy army chief of staff for special affairs, told the American army attaché on 4 February that although Sukarno and Nasution disagreed on major issues, he did not feel their differences were serious.

	Although firm evidence is lacking to support or refute the reports, Sukarno clearly is emphasizing a gradual return to civilian authority from Indonesia's three-year "state of war" as well as occasional political concessions to the Communist which will probably include attempts to bring them into the cabinet. Regardless of Sukarno's motives, his actions prob-	25X1 s,
25X1	ably will diminish the influence of the anti-Communist Indo-	1
	nesian Army.	

U Nu Plans Continuation of Current Burmese Policies

Former Premier Nu says that when he resumes the premiership in April he plans to continue the domestic and foreign policies of Premier Ne Win. He has stated that he will continue the American grant-aid projects for university and highway construction, although he believes that grants undermine, rather than build, relations between recipient and donor. He says he approves Ne Win's border agreement and friendship treaty with Communist China and expects no difficulty in completing the final boundary treaty.

Nu plans to continue Ne Win's domestic reforms and intends no negotiations or new amnesty offers to the Communists or ethnic insurgent groups. He plans no coalition with his former deputies in the "Stable" party but hopes, instead, that it will become the loyal opposition in parliament. However, it has elected none of its leaders and is expected to have a maximum of only 30 members in the 250-seat lower house of parliament, while the "Clean" party and affiliates will have about 200 seats. Before the Antifascist People's Freedom League split into "Clean" and "Stable" factions, the Communist-dominated National United Front, which drew one third of the popular vote in 1956, was the only alternative, but in these elections it has made an inconsequential showing.

In the past, Nu's frequently expressed good intentions were not matched by his government's performance, and he proved himself an inefficient administrator who failed to check corruption in his regime. In addition, Nu has been less wary of relations with the bloc than is Ne Win. He concedes that if this government has faults of his last one, "there is the possibility that the army may take over again."

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Iraqi Political Parties

The Iraqi Interior Ministry has reportedly accepted the applications for legal status of three political parties, including a Communist splinter faction led by Daud Sayigh, but has sent back the original application of the orthodox Iraqi Communist party for revision.

Rejection of the orthodox Communists' application, probably on Qasim's orders, was based on use of the word "revolutionary" to describe the party; the ministry also demanded an explanation of the term "Marxism-Leninism." The application has now been resubmitted, omitting the word "revolutionary" --now apparently pre-empted by Qasim to describe his own regime--and describing Marxism-Leninism not as a dogma but a scientific theory guiding the party.

Iraqi law gives the Ministry of Interior another 30 days to accept or reject the revised application, and in any event, parties do not attain full legal status until their programs have been published in the official gazette. The Qasim regime may continue to interpose obstacles to discredit the orthodox faction and thus boost the faction led by Sayigh, who has a long record of deviation from the party and has been preaching an Iraqi brand of Communism much closer to Qasim's view of what the Iraqi Communists should be.

Applications for licenses by the socialistic National Demo-

met with no objection dur Sayigh's splinter group, ing members, has called Communists eventually a take over the Sayigh fact:	ed Democratic party of Kurdistan have ring the 30 days since they were made. despite the withdrawal of several found- for a "National Front." If the orthodox are denied a license they may attempt to ion, which has little organization or fol- a Iraqi Communists cannot be considered
as seriously weakened.	

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III. THE WEST

Cyprus	25X1
Britain's termination on 8 February of talks in Nicosia with Cypriot officials and its unilateral postponement of independence for Cyprus for an indefinite period beyond 19 March have been criticized by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. Greek Cypriots continue to back Archbishop Makarios on the size of the military bases to be retained by Britain after independence. Turkish Cypriot newspapers have expressed considerable apprehension of a return to violence on the island.	
While the latest postponement will create new bitterness on Cyprus, it is unlikely to lead to widespread unrest unless the British fire Cypriot laborers working on British bases or apply other economic pressure. If the deadlock is protracted, however, individual acts of violence cannot be precluded.	
Except for the extent of the bases, recent negotiations have largely resolved outstanding problemssuch as administration of the base areas and financial aid to Cyprus from Britain. On these issues, London has made substantial concessions since mid-January.	
Makarios apparently hopes that the difficulties created for the local British administration by changes in the timetable for independence will help him obtain further concessions. British officials, however, particularly military leaders, have refused to consider a further reduction in the total of about 120 square miles they demand for the bases.	25X1
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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

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