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29 April 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist Bloc - Africa: The USSR's prompt recognition of Togo, like that accorded Cameroun in January, underscores the bloc campaign to cultivate the new African nations. At least five more countries are scheduled to achieve their independence this year. Moscow's efforts will undoubtedly be furthered by Khrushchev's planned visit to West Africa this fall, as well as through offers to extend economic aid and dispatch diplomatic missions. Since 1958, when the USSR broadcast three hours a week to Black Africa, the bloc's radio propaganda output has climbed to more than 60 hours per week.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: Conservative candidates continue to pile up leads of implausible proportions as returns from the National Assembly elections on 24 April filter in from outlying districts. Negotiations for the new government to be formed after the assembly convenes on 10 May may be protracted and will probably lead to new tension between former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People and the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests.

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South Korea: The students, who have emerged as a significant new force, seem to be exercising restraint and are aiding in quieting demonstrations throughout the country. Lieutenant General Song, the army chief of staff, hopes that conditions will improve sufficiently to permit a quick termination of martial law so that he can return his troops to their primary mission. Pending new elections, political instability probably will require the government to rely on some military control to maintain order.

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Turkey: Martial law has been declared in Istanbul and Ankara following demonstrations by Istanbul University students against recent repressive actions of the Menderes administration. The students, who called for the resignation of Menderes, demonstrated against the powers granted on 28 April to the parliamentary investigation commission. [A split has occurred in the ruling Democratic party ranks over the powers to be granted to the committee, which represents for the most part the extremist wing of the party. About one fourth of the Democratic party deputies do not approve of the wide powers granted the committee, and Menderes' position could be jeopardized if these deputies decide to break party unity.]

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III. THE WEST

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Britain - British Somaliland: London is considering accelerating its timetable for the Somaliland Protectorate in order to grant it independence shortly before 1 July. This would allow a formally sovereign state to negotiate for union with the

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25X1 Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia, which is due for independence on 1 July. London will try to meet anticipated Ethiopian objections by arguing that it is only attempting to assure stability by responding to strong local pressures for union. 25X1

25X1 Venezuela - Cuba - Dominican Republic: Venezuelan President Betancourt has told US Ambassador Sparks that he is completely disenchanted with Fidel Castro and is ready to play a leading role in bringing hemisphere attention to bear on the Cuban situation, provided Dominican dictator Trujillo is ousted beforehand. Betancourt insists, however, that any effort to bring the issue before the Organization of American States prior to Trujillo's elimination would not have the support of more than three Latin American members--Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The Venezuelan President's long-standing hatred of Trujillo has been intensified by Dominican support of the recent abortive military uprising in Venezuela. 25X1 (Page 6)

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

25X1 Outlook for the Dominican Republic. SNIE 86.2-60. 26 April 1960. 25X1

Outlook for the UAR. NIE 36-60. 26 April 1960.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Aftermath of Laotian Elections

Progovernment conservatives continue to pile up a lead of implausible proportions as returns from the elections on 24 April for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly filter in from outlying districts. Apparently only one candidate from the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has been elected, as against 44 conservatives. Runoff elections on 8 May for the remaining 14 seats will probably be necessary, but a leftist is involved in only one of these races. The electoral ordinance specifically tailored for the April elections provided for a second ballot in districts where the leading candidate failed to gain an absolute majority.

The margins amassed by many conservatives support charges of electoral fraud. Rigging was particularly evident in Champassak Province in southern Laos, where all six government candidates won seats by margins of more than 90 percent. Before the election the US Embassy felt that at least three of these candidates might lose.

The divided conservatives may have considerable difficulty in forming a government after the assembly convenes on 10 May. Former Premier Phoui's old-guard Rally of the Lao People (RLP) and the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) will probably be fairly evenly matched in assembly representation, and the search for a premier acceptable to both groups and to the King may reopen the RLP-CDNI split which led to the downfall of the Phoui government late last December. The problem is further complicated by factionalism within the RLP between

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the followers of Phoui and those of another former premier, neutralist-inclined Souvanna Phouma.

While Phoui and Souvanna are the most obvious candidates for premier, the CDNI and the King are reported opposed to both and appear committed to Tiao Somsanith, the widely respected interior minister in the caretaker government. Souvanna and Phoui have thus far shown no sign of willingness to stand aside in favor of Somsanith or any other compromise premier.

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Turkey Imposes Martial Law Following Anti-Menderes Riot

The Turkish Government declared martial law in Istanbul and Ankara on 28 April following riots in Istanbul by students demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Menderes. Five persons reportedly have been killed. The demonstrations, occurring on the eve of the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Ankara, followed action by a parliamentary investigation committee banning political activity for three months. The committee on 28 April was granted authority to prohibit the publication of any news and to seize any publication violating the committee's decrees. The student demonstrators were probably encouraged by the success of the student riots in Korea.

The committee, composed of 15 of the more extreme members of the ruling Democratic party, was formed last week to investigate the "subversive" activities of the opposition Republican People's party, whose leader, Ismet Inonu, has been suspended from the next 12 meetings of the Grand National Assembly.

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[A split reportedly has occurred in the ranks of the Democratic party over the extent of the powers to be granted to the investigating committee; ten to twelve deputies are said to have walked out of a party caucus in protest against the extreme measures. Some 100-150 Democratic party deputies are thought to disapprove of the powers granted to the committee but do not desire to break party unity at this time. Should these deputies decide to split with Menderes, his position would be seriously weakened. There is no indication that the army, whose attitude will be of crucial importance if further repressive measures are required, would revolt or that the RPP intends to call on the military for support.]

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III. THE WEST

Britain May Grant Somaliland Protectorate Independence
Before 1 July

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[London is considering granting its Somaliland Protectorate independence before 1 July, instead of in two or three years as previously contemplated. This timing would make a formally sovereign Somali state rather than the UK responsible for negotiating union with the Italian-administered trust territory of Somalia, which is due for independence on that date. Nationalist leaders of Somalia and the protectorate announced on 22 April their intention to unite the two territories as a Somali Republic on 1 July.]

[Talks between British and Somaliland ministers begin in London on 2 May. The British cabinet has not yet decided Britain's position, but the Foreign Office fears Somali pressure for quick independence will be irresistible despite the technical difficulties of hurriedly arranging such a move. The British gave elected representatives a majority in the Somaliland government only last February.]

[London has long been concerned about UAR and Soviet subversive influence in the Horn of Africa, but it may conclude that acquiescence in independence demands is the most feasible way to obtain a period of calm in view of urgent problems elsewhere in British Africa.]

[London will try to meet anticipated Ethiopian objections by arguing that it is attempting only to assure stability and orderly development by responding to strong local pressures for union. Nevertheless, Ethiopia can be expected to renew charges that Britain is secretly promoting a union of all Somalis--including those in Ethiopia--within the Commonwealth.]

[The Foreign Office envisages a schedule consisting of the following steps: the establishment of a date for]

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[independence, informal talks in Mogadiscio between Somalia and Somaliland on arrangements for union, independence for Somaliland, and independence for Somalia on 1 July, followed immediately by union. Italy's initial reaction to this arrangement has been negative; Rome insists that it must represent Somalia in any such talks before independence, and that Ethiopian reaction would be "disastrous."] [redacted]

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[Venezuelan President Betancourt has told Ambassador Sparks that he is completely disenchanted with Fidel Castro and that he would play a leading role in bringing hemisphere attention to bear on the Cuban problem if Dominican dictator Trujillo were ousted beforehand. Betancourt insists, however, that any effort to present the Cuban problem to the Organization of American States (OAS) before Trujillo's ouster would not have the support of more than three other Latin American countries--Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. He evidently is aware of the charges of Cuban intervention presented to the OAS on 25 April by Guatemala, which has now broken diplomatic relations with Havana. Honduras may also take this action soon for similar reasons.]

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[The question of policy toward Cuba is a potential threat to the viability of the three-party coalition of Betancourt, who has admitted that Castro supporters in Venezuela are causing difficulties for the Caracas government. Among the strong political groups seeking closer Venezuelan-Cuban ties are the dissident leftist wing which recently broke away from Betancourt's own Democratic Action party, the principal Venezuelan labor organization, the Communists, and the Democratic Republican Union, which is a dissatisfied member of the government coalition.]

[Betancourt is a long-standing enemy of Trujillo, and his hatred has been intensified by Dominican support of the 20-21 April uprising of Venezuelan military dissidents and the possibility that Trujillo will soon assist another group of Venezuelan plotters. Trujillo has also alienated Colombia, which is considering breaking diplomatic relations and lodging a formal complaint against Trujillo in the OAS. The complaint would be based on Dominican documentation used by the Venezuelan dissident leaders to enter Colombia before the revolt. Betancourt's regime, which has already lodged charges in the OAS against the Dominican Republic for flagrant violation of human rights, would support Colombia in this move.]

[According to the Venezuelan foreign minister, Ecuador is on the verge of breaking relations with the Dominican Republic and will probably be followed by Peru and later Panama.]

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