


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9 March 1962



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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9 March 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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- 2. South Vietnam: Marked increase in aggressiveness of Viet Cong operations. *(Page ii)*




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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR-Berlin: Moscow has in effect moved to pre-empt a block of airspace in the northern corridor to Berlin. The timing of this new form of pressure suggests that in the coming informal talks on Berlin between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva the USSR will point to the present situation in the corridors as a demonstration of the necessity to renegotiate the air access agreements. The Soviet representative to the Berlin Air Safety Center has announced plans for 24 Soviet flights in the northern corridor for 9 March extending over a six-hour period--the greatest number of such flights to date. There will be 12 outbound and 12 inbound flights, varying in altitude from 2,500 to 6,500 feet from 0352 to 0951 EST. For the first time, inbound and outbound flights will overlap for a period of about two hours.


These moves follow 10 flights on 7 March and suggest that the Soviets are gradually moving toward flooding one corridor with their aircraft. In addition, there has been a gradual advance in the timing of the Soviet announcements. Whereas the Soviets had usually given notice of their flight plan closer to flight time, they have now filed a flight plan almost 20 hours in advance in an effort to force the West to begin giving at least 24 hours' advance notice, as consistently proposed by the Soviets since 15 February. Extending the notification period closer to 24 hours and gradually increasing the number of Soviet flights are aimed at creating a situation in which the Western powers will appear to be seeking prior Soviet permission to use the corridors or endangering air safety.

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South Vietnam: During the past two weeks the Viet Cong have become more aggressive, especially in the southern military zone. While the number of attacks has increased only slightly, larger Communist forces, numbering between 200 and 300, have reappeared and the government has suffered heavy casualties. The main Communist targets continue to be Civil Guard and Self Defense troops manning remote outposts where the Viet Cong may be trying to consolidate or link up base areas. Government counteroperations are in process in several provinces, including areas where units have recently been wiped out or posts overrun, but appear to have achieved little significant effect with the exception of some successful air strikes.

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Over the past few weeks Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow have sought to stir international apprehension by charging that the situation in South Vietnam imperils peace. The recent Viet Cong combat operations may be intended to underscore this point while at the same time attempting to counter the impact of expanded US military aid.

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Congo: [Tshombé left Elisabethville for Jadotville and Kolwezi on 7 March, reportedly "to prepare the population" for his meeting with Adoula. Ambassador Gullion reports that Adoula expects that Tshombé will come to Leopoldville, but he still doubts whether Tshombé intends to negotiate a settlement. The US Consulate reports the situation in Elisabethville is "increasingly unnerving" as extremist elements in Katanga seek to block Tshombé's meeting with Adoula.]

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[Adoula, meanwhile, reportedly has become increasingly annoyed by the unwillingness of Gbenye, a Gizenga supporter, to accept a proffered vice-premiership, and now plans to appoint another member of Gbenye's National Congo Movement (MNC) party to the vacant post. Such a move would probably be supported by moderate elements within the MNC, but might force Gbenye and other radicals into formal opposition to Adoula's coalition government.]

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[redacted]

Communist China: [Communist China has recently bought 50,000 tons of maize and at least 100,000 tons of wheat from Argentina, financed through credits from a Hong Kong bank and a Soviet-controlled bank in Paris. According to speculations in London trade circles the wheat sales may rise to as much as 600,000 tons, which would bring total Chinese grain purchases for 1962 to more than 3,000,000 tons--about half the amount purchased last year. The Chinese have also recently bought some 50,000 tons of West German wheat flour and are seeking much larger amounts in France. Peiping also requested]

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450,000 tons of Burmese rice, which would have been in addition to the 200,000 tons already contracted for 1962; however, all of Burma's rice had already been sold. The bulk of the grain purchases will be delivered during the first half of the year and Peiping will probably attempt to negotiate large additional orders for the second half, although the reduction of exportable surpluses in Canada and Western Europe may hamper these efforts.

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Somali Republic - USSR: Somali President Aden on 7 March told the American ambassador that the Soviet gift, offered last October, of a 50-kilowatt radio station had been accepted. He emphasized that Somali government leaders would have preferred to accept a comparable Western offer, but felt they could no longer wait in view of growing Somali political pressure to accept the Soviet grant aid worth some \$1,000,000. However, Italian diplomatic sources believe that the Somalis acted largely out of concern that the USSR's total promised economic aid of about \$51,000,000 was dependent on acceptance of the proffered radio installation. The Sino-Soviet bloc, particularly the USSR, appears to have selected communications, education, and mineral exploration as key fields for penetration of the Somali Republic.

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Somalis Accept Soviet Radio Offer

The USSR will provide the technicians necessary to construct and maintain a 50-kilowatt transmitter capable of broadcasting to eastern Africa and the Mediterranean littoral. Somalis will also be trained in the USSR. Both sides agreed that the survey and design work was to be completed in 1962 and the construction by 1964.

US Embassy officials in Mogadiscio believe that as long as the present moderate government is in power, Moscow will have to play its hand carefully and slowly and not attempt to interfere directly with the broadcast programming. The embassy considers, however, that Somali Minister of Information Ali would be susceptible to bribery.

At the time Somalia became independent in mid-1960, it accepted bloc offers of economic aid--the USSR \$51,000,000 and Czechoslovakia \$4,000,000. There has since been some annoyance with the bloc's delay in implementing assistance under these earlier credits, but Mogadiscio's main disappointment has been with Peiping, which reportedly has not made an attractive offer of aid.

Soviet penetration efforts have been concentrated in the politically vulnerable northern region (the former British Somaliland) which is a stronghold of tribal and political opposition to the government in Mogadiscio.

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
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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

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The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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