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2 August 1962

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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2 August 1962

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DAILY BRIEF

USSR-Berlin: Publicity given the visit of East German party leader Ulbricht and Acting Premier Willi Stoph to the USSR may be designed to increase apprehension in the West concerning the Berlin situation. Khrushchev, who is en route to Sochi for a month's vacation, will probably review with the East Germans the character and timing of the bloc's next moves on Berlin. In his recent conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev indicated that the USSR might introduce the Berlin issue at the UN. Moscow may think it can win UN support for an end to Western occupation rights in Berlin and the substitution of some form of UN supervision, limited in duration, involving Warsaw Pact, neutral, and Western forces.

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Finland: President Kekkonen has decided to withdraw Finland's application to the Soviet Union for the purchase of guided missiles. The decision was in large part motivated by concern over the adverse reaction of the United States to the application. Acquisition of missiles would have required revision or reinterpretation of the 1947 peace treaty forbidding Finland to acquire such weapons. Britain and the Soviet Union are the most important among the signatories.

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Kekkonen apparently was particularly worried about the effect on Finland's international position of US suspicions that the Soviet Union was pressing Helsinki to seek missiles in order to gain certain military advantages. By withdrawing the request, he probably hopes to demonstrate that Finland made the request freely and is free to withdraw it.

The Finnish military have been the major proponents of the effort to acquire a missile capability. They have long felt that Finland's small military establishment must be modernized if it is to be effective in protecting Finland's neutrality. The US Embassy in Helsinki believes the military leaders will not accept an indefinite delay in their modernization program and are likely to press the government to reopen this question.

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Western Europe: //The foreign ministers of the Common Market (EEC) countries, who are presently in Brussels in connection with the UK-EEC talks, are expected to consider once more the prospects for early resumption of negotiations on the deadlocked European political union treaty. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who has been pushing his plan for the establishment of a European political commission as the focal point for political integration, has picked up some support for the idea in The Hague and in Bonn, but De Gaulle's attitude is not yet clear. Although Spaak has attempted to reassure De Gaulle in recent correspondence that the creation of a supranational union is not his object at present, a French Foreign Ministry official nevertheless anticipates that De Gaulle's reaction will be negative.

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The problem of how to include Britain in any resumption of talks also remains to be resolved, with Adenauer and De Gaulle both believing that direct British participation could make London the "arbiter" of European political integration. A British Foreign Office official told an American Embassy officer on 30 July that London "looks favorably" on Spaak's new plan, but wishes to take part in any discussions of it before final agreement is reached. He implied, however, that if these discussions were dragged out it would ease Macmillan's problems in selling UK accession to the EEC to the House of Commons.

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Shah has apparently made little headway in his effort to mediate the Afghan-Pakistani dispute. The communique on his official visit to Kabul issued on 1 August stated merely that he would continue his efforts to help restore normal relations.

The Shah had returned to Kabul from a quick flight to Rawalpindi on 31 July with a draft statement approved by Ayub noting the willingness of both governments to restore normal diplomatic and trade relations "after due negotiations," and to cease propaganda and "unfriendly activity" against each other. The Afghans were unwilling to accept this formula. They apparently felt that acceptance would have been widely interpreted as an indication that they had abandoned their Pushtoonistan campaign before achieving their immediate objective—the reopening of Afghan consulates and trade offices in Pakistan.

Kabul has been careful to leave the door open to further efforts by the Shah, since it has been seeking a face-saving end to the impasse and had encouraged the Shah's initiative. The Afghans may hope that further pressure on Ayub will produce a formula they can accept.

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
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Kenya-Somalia: Somalia's hopes to negotiate a settlement of its territorial demands in northern Kenya appear to have been frustrated by the strong opposition of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's foremost African leader. During his recent visit to Mogadiscio, Kenyatta rejected any consideration of self-determination for Somalis in Kenya's Northern Frontier District. Earlier London had refused to accede to Somali requests for a discussion of the territorial question, but Colonial Secretary Maudling did announce that a commission would be set up to ascertain public opinion in the area.

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The Somali Government went all-out to impress Kenyatta and may have been momentarily encouraged by his remarks on 26 July advocating the dissolution of the "artificial boundary" between Kenya and Somalia within the context of a wide East African Federation. This was offset when Kenyatta expressed admiration for Emperor Haile Selassie, whom Somalia considers its main enemy. At the end of his visit Kenyatta sharply reminded his hosts that the Northern Frontier District was part of Kenya, that Somalis residing there were Kenyan citizens, and that the district's affairs were the internal business of Kenya.

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Chile: Delegations from Bulgaria, Communist China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea and North Vietnam have joined delegates of several Latin American countries in participating in the third national congress of the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh), which opened in Santiago on 1 August. The congress will attempt to strengthen this Communist-dominated organization, which is now weak and ineffective, and will also seek to further the organization of a new Latin American branch of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

A similar meeting was held in Santiago in February, largely at the insistence of the Cubans, in an effort to create a pro-Cuban labor organization. The February meeting was inconclusive, but the current meeting is expected to reflect better planning. Although the meeting now being held is referred to generally as a national congress, the inclusion of many Europeans and Asians who were also delegates to the WFTU congresses held in Moscow in December 1961 and Peiping in June 1960 indicates that this congress is of considerable importance to the world Communist labor apparatus as well as to the Chilean movement.

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