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10 September 1963




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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
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Cuba: Fidel Castro implied on 7 September that the recent increase in "pirate" raids against Cuba is an important factor in his deliberations about whether to sign the nuclear test ban treaty.

He told a US press correspondent in Havana that his regime is studying the treaty with "extreme care . . . and we are not ready yet to make up our minds." He added that "we are taking into account the current world situation, which of course involves the Caribbean situation, which has been deteriorating due to the piratical attacks by the US against the Cuban people."

Castro was vehement in his comments to the newsman on US policy, clearly implying that the interest he had been expressing early in the summer in improved relations with the US was now at an end. He said that even though the US might be willing to negotiate and reach agreements, it would break these agreements later. The US, he charged, has already broken the "promises made during the October crisis."

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Turkey: (Recent arrests and special alerts indicate that the possibility of disaffection in the armed forces is still worrying Turkish military leaders.)

(There have been rumors that an attempt would be made to release by force Colonel Aydemir and six others who have been sentenced to death for attempting to overthrow the government last May. On 3 September, Aydemir's son, an army lieutenant, was arrested, allegedly for serving as a courier between disaffected army personnel and "high-ranking" officers.)

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(Between 15 and 20 young officers of the First Armored Division in Istanbul have also been arrested for planning a demonstration--with tanks--in support of the 1,400 military academy cadets who still await sentence for their involvement in the Aydemir coup attempt.)

(In late August, the security forces were placed on a special alert in anticipation of possible disturbances during the period of the 30 August national holiday. No disturbances developed, although the demonstration on behalf of the cadets may have been planned for that time. The Martial Law Command in Ankara has also tightened surveillance of military personnel.)

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
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USSR--Military: The Soviet Government may have taken the first step to implement Khrushchev's intention--stated in recent conversations with Western visitors--to reduce military spending. On 4 September, the normal call-up of the class of 1944 for a three-year term of military service was announced but no mention was made of the 1945 class, which had also been registered this year, apparently to offset the low birth rate in 1944. Although the Soviets may be able in part to offset the manpower deficiency by calling up previously deferred personnel, the class of 1944 is so small that a call-up of only this class would almost certainly result in some force reduction.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Yugoslavia-USSR: Yugoslav Defense Minister Gosnjak's visit to the USSR in mid-September will be protocol in nature and will not involve negotiations.

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[redacted] The Yugoslav regime apparently accepted Moscow's invitation to Gosnjak despite reluctance in the Yugoslav military establishment, which has been reported to be anti-Soviet. The absence of Soviet and Yugoslav military leaders at talks during Khrushchev's recent visit suggests that military subjects were not discussed. [redacted]

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Brazil-Yugoslavia: The negative reaction of Brazilian conservative circles has caused President Tito to cut his forthcoming visit, which is to begin on 18 September, from eight days to four. Governors Lacerda and Barros have indicated that they would ignore Tito should he visit their capitals, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The Archbishop of Sao Paulo has recommended that all Catholics refrain from either supporting or attacking the Yugoslav delegation. [redacted]

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Syria-Israel: The Syrians apparently expect further trouble with Israel. Syrian army strength along the border is considerably above normal, with two battalions of reserves reported to have been called up last week. There is no evidence, however, that the Israelis are preparing an aggressive move, and they are not likely to attack unless provoked by some new incident. [redacted]

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