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CENTRA INTELLIGENCE

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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the Christian Democrats to support them in a vote in the Chamber of Deputies on state aid to private Catholic schools.

The adverse vote seems to have triggered a sudden decision by Moro to quit rather than continue the frustrating job of trying to reconcile the views of the right and left elements of his coalition.

Moro has heretofore resisted growing conservative pressure, but as the time for the Christian Democrats' 1-3 July congress approached he may have felt the need to show a tougher attitude to convince the many anti-reformists in his party that he was not yielding to Socialist demands.

The Nenni Socialists for their part have deferred pushing for costly reforms in the face of the government's current economic difficulties. However, the Socialists have been worried that they would not get their minimum demand for continued participation in the coalition. This requirement had been early action on agricultural and urban reform in order to have something to show their supporters in the nation-wide fall local elections.

The other coalition partners, the Social Democrats and Republicans, by joining Nenni's party in abstention on the chamber vote, displayed a similar concern over the Christian Democrats' intentions with regard to reforms. The Social Democrats in the Senate had earlier supported the Christian Democrats by voting with them on the school aid measure.

President Segni, who is no friend of the Moro government and is opposed to cooperation with the Socialists, now has several choices: he can ask Moro to try


again; attempt to set up an all-Christian Democratic minority government; or call for general elections. This latter move would be a dangerous tactic in view of the likelihood of Communist gains.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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