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2 October 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOE review completed.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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2 October 1955

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Heavy fighting was reported on 30 September between a 10-battalion government task force and an estimated two Viet Cong battalions in Dinh Tuong Province, 50 miles southwest of Saigon. Sixty-eight Viet Cong were reported killed, six captured, and 30 suspects detained, as against friendly casualties of 24 killed (1 US) and 43 wounded (4 US). Four helicopters supporting the operation were damaged by intensive enemy ground fire; one Vietnamese river assault craft was sunk and another damaged.

Enemy resistance to sweep operations by a battalion of US Marines, part of the amphibious assault operation launched on 30 September by US Seventh Fleet surface and air forces 40 miles south of Quang Ngai City, has thus far been limited to sporadic small-arms and automatic weapons fire.

Viet Cong losses in the operation to date stand at 25 captured; no US combat casualties have been reported.

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In Binh Dinh Province, nine Vietnamese Army battalions are continuing a search-and-destroy operation near the Phu Cu pass, with only light enemy contact thus far although three Viet Cong regiments are reported in the area. Meanwhile, northwest of Saigon, ground follow-up operations to the 29 September B-52 Stratofortress-strike in Tay Tinh Province continue, but without significant results.

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Political Developments in South Vietnam: Premier Ky, in a major press conference yesterday, announced several previously anticipated military and cabinet changes emphasizing in particular the replacement of General Nguyen Huu Co as chief of the Joint General Staff and Co's elevation to the rank of deputy premier with added responsibilities as minister of war and reconstruction. The appointment of a military officer, former armed forces chief of operations General Nguyen Duc Thang, as secretary of rural construction, rather than an earlier designated civilian, may reflect last-minute urgings from Ky's military colleagues.

The major theme of Ky's hour-long report on his first 100 days in office was one of confidence in blunting the Viet Cong drive and in improved social and economic conditions to be promoted in the "next 1,000 days." As evidence of his government's intention to revitalize the civil side of its struggle against the Communists, Ky recently outlined to US officials plans for a pacification program concentrating on three or four selected areas of the country and on improved quality of pacification workers and lines of authority.

Military Developments In North Vietnam: [At least eight SAM missile transporters were noted [redacted] [redacted] at an army barracks in the Hanoi area. It is possible that this area may be serving as a SAM support facility which is a necessary component of SAM defenses for sustained missile operations.]

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*India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Charges of violations of the UN-sponsored India-Pakistan cease-fire are continuing.

Throughout yesterday Radio Karachi reported heavy fighting in progress in the Chhamb area of southern Kashmir where Indian troops allegedly were attempting to dislodge the Pakistanis from territory seized before the cease-fire. Spokesmen in New Delhi, however, denied any knowledge of hostilities in the Chhamb sector but accused Pakistan of committing violations at numerous other points along the cease-fire line.

Last night, the Pakistani representative to the United Nations delivered a letter to Secretary General Thant protesting what was termed India's "clear violation" of the cease-fire agreement and requesting U Thant to inform the Security Council. In the UN Wednesday, Pakistan charged that India had issued an ultimatum demanding Pakistan withdraw from the Chhamb area within 24 hours, or face an Indian attack.

[] the Pakistani general staff feels that the cease-fire merely gave the Indians time to regroup forces and that the only alternative to renewed all-out warfare is occupation of Kashmir by a UN peace force.]

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[The British Government is instructing its UN delegation that the situation is too unstable to permit further progress toward settling the India-Pakistan dispute until a troop withdrawal is achieved. The British believe that the Security Council should insist on a withdrawal, setting a time limit backed up by sanctions if necessary.]

As of 30 September, 31 of the expected 117 UNIPOM observers--responsible for the India-Pakistan border, and 40 of the 79 observers pledged to UNMOGIP--responsible for the Kashmir cease-fire line, had arrived.

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[The USSR is giving ostensible support for UN efforts to alleviate the crisis in South Asia. In a 28 September conversation with UN Secretary General Thant, however, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko reportedly responded somewhat negatively to the proposed four-power Security Council committee to assist U Thant in implementing the resolutions concerning India and Pakistan. Instead, he advocated acceptance of the previously reported Soviet offer for Kosygin's good offices.]

[The Deputy Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission reportedly stated yesterday that if US wheat aid under PL-480 is not available to India in sufficient quantities, India may be forced to impose further rationing. New Delhi, thus, appears to be preparing the Indian public for possible US pressure to force India toward a settlement of the Kashmir question.]

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
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2 OCT 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map



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*Indonesia: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Counter-coup forces under Major General Suharto appear to have seized the initiative from Lieutenant Colonel Untung's "30 September Movement," although the situation remains unclear.

Within hours after Untung created a Revolutionary Council, the Djakarta Domestic Radio announced that the radio station had been retaken and that forces under General Suharto, who had assumed command of the Indonesian Army, were in the process of subduing the rebels and reestablishing the President's authority. Suharto's troops now appear to have virtual control of Djakarta, but sporadic fighting has erupted and a major clash may be imminent. [Large elements of the pro-Suharto Siliwangi Division of West Java are reportedly moving toward the capital to link up with troops of the Greater Djakarta Military Command.]

In the Untung coup, a number of senior officers, including Army Commander Yani, were kidnapped. One was killed outright and another died shortly afterward of wounds. Defense Minister Nasution apparently was wounded but escaped; his present location is unknown. [Redacted] Sukarno has been evacuated to Bogor Palace, and both Untung and Suharto have announced continued loyalty to him. However, Sukarno has issued no statement and his exact status remains in doubt.]

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[Foreign Minister Subandrio, who allegedly helped to mastermind the coup, is reported to be in Medan.]

The present alignment of forces is unclear. It appears that the supporters of the Untung coup are the air force, under Air Marshal Omar Dani; at least one battalion of the presidential guard regiment, and elements of the Central Java Diponegoro Division, some of which had moved to Djakarta preparatory to the 5 October Armed Forces Day celebration. In addition, in

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[redacted]

Central Java itself, a Colonel Suherman of the Diponegoro Division has ordered his troops into action in support of the "30 September Movement" and is defying Suharto.

Suharto appears to have the support of the naval forces of Admiral Martadinata, the police forces of Police General Sudjipto, and the bulk of the army. The Interregional Command of Medan has pledged its support, in addition to the West Java Siliwangi Division and the Greater Djakarta Command of General Umar. The loyalty of other army commands in Indonesia is not clearly established.

[The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has not openly disclosed its position, although several Communists were included in Untung's Revolutionary Council. [redacted] some PKI and youth front members have received military training from the air force and have been issued arms. It is possible that these paramilitary forces may join the pro-Untung forces in Central Java and elsewhere.] [redacted]

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Tanzania: President Nyerere has tightened his control of the Tanzanian Government in the wake of last week's national elections and appears ready to guide his country along a somewhat more moderate course.

Nyerere's overwhelming personal victory has given him freedom to make extensive government changes. His reorganized cabinet reflects his determination to concentrate on internal development. During the past year the emphasis on supporting Congolese rebels and other "liberation" movements has drained the country's resources, jeopardized its security, and strained relations with the US.

Nyerere has assumed the External Affairs portfolio and transferred his radical nationalist foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, to the Ministry of Regional Administration. Nyerere is not likely to abandon his policy of nonalignment or his strong sympathy for southern African liberation, but he may try to curb his more radical countrymen in order to improve Tanzania's image in the West, particularly the US. Nyerere's expectations of Communist economic aid have not been fulfilled, and he has become increasingly aware that only the major Western powers can provide the bulk of the aid he needs.

The removal of Kambona's closest cohort from Home Affairs, which controls police, refugee movements, and clandestine arms, strengthens the president's control of security. The new finance minister is an able, long-time confidant of Nyerere.

The four Zanzibari ministers remain in the cabinet for the time being. Nyerere received 99 percent of the presidential vote on Zanzibar, with the aid of some intimidation, and can be expected to use this mandate to reduce the power of the island's extremists.

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***Congo (Leopoldville):** The first open political challenge to Premier Tshombé has been made in Leopoldville.

Minister of Interior Nendaka, probably at Kasavubu's behest, announced yesterday the formation of a political alliance to oppose Tshombé in Parliament. Nendaka says his group would demand the resignation of the Tshombé government and the creation of a new government of "national union."

Kasavubu probably does not yet feel strong enough to replace Tshombé, and undoubtedly hopes that Nendaka's new "alliance" can be built into a formidable machine. In the meantime, Kasavubu may well ask Tshombé to form an interim government, which he would attempt to pack with his own supporters.

Tshombé almost certainly would resist any demand that he form a new government, and is likely to try, by bribery and other means, to win over those who support or show signs of supporting Nendaka. If he thought it necessary, he might bring mercenaries to Leopoldville to back him in case of a serious confrontation with the president.

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[REDACTED]

[* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]

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
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NOTES



Egypt: The new cabinet under Prime Minister Zakariya Muhieddin appears mainly designed to cope with Egypt's mounting internal problems. The appointments, particularly in the economic field, indicate an intention to emphasize efficiency. The left-leaning former prime minister Ali Sabry has been assigned the task of reviving Egypt's faltering single political party, the Arab Socialist Union. Nasir may also hope the changes will lessen US concern over Cairo's leftward trend and improve Egypt's chances for US aid.

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Cuba: The Swiss ambassador in Havana believes that upwards of 50,000 Cubans might be interested in taking up Castro's offer to join relatives in the US. This estimate could prove conservative in view of press reports that Castro has dropped the requirement that would-be refugees have relatives in the US. The ambassador suggests that the majority of potential emigres are older persons who do not contribute to the economy, and that relatively few young people would be interested in leaving Cuba.

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Bolivia: [In negotiations with government officials, the miners have asked for removal of all troops from the mines and a return to salary scales in force prior to May 1965. The government, [redacted] will not accede to these terms as that would amount to abandonment of its gains to date. Renewed agitation can be expected if some compromise is not worked out in the next few days.] [redacted]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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