



5 January 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Indonesia: Djakarta is still abuzz with rumors that Sukarno will soon leave the country.

The President is known to be in need of medical attention and may be planning to go to Switzerland or Austria for treatment of his kidney condition. Ever since the abortive coup of 1 October there have been periodic reports that Sukarno was going abroad. The recent rumors, however, have been unusually persistent and may have more substance to them.

The President is reported to be planning to take a large entourage with him, including a number of political personalities in bad odor with the army. Several of these people would be fearful to remain in Indonesia with Sukarno abroad.

Should Sukarno leave he probably would hope that economic and administrative problems would mount during his absence so that he could return posing as the savior of his country. He has used this tactic in the past. [The army, however, apparently feels that in the present circumstance it can promote the idea that Sukarno himself is to blame for Indonesia's various ills.]

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THAILAND

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Thailand: The Communists appear determined to step up the pace of subversion in the coming year.

A statement by the Peking-based Thai Patriotic Front, marking its first anniversary, specifically calls for an expansion of the "armed struggle" into a "people's war." A Chinese official echoed this theme at a reception in Peking on 1 January. He said that the Patriotic Front would "undoubtedly" make a greater contribution in the new year to the fight against "US imperialism."

Although the Front's statement includes a standard attack on the "Thanom-Praphat lackey" government, it appears to put greater emphasis than usual on the expanding US presence in Thailand, apparently in an effort to portray the Communist movement as a struggle for independence.

A marked increase in the pace of Communist terrorism, training, and recruiting in Thailand has been noted over the past six months, principally in the northeast provinces of Nakhon Phanom and Ubon. The first terrorist attack on a government post was recorded late last month.

[In response to this attack, government police and army elements are currently sweeping an isolated area of Nakhon Phanom Province. Only limited contact with the guerrillas, estimated at between 100 and 200 in the area, has been reported thus far]

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<u>UK-Rhodesia</u>: African leaders are continuing their pressure on Britain's Prime Minister Wilson to use more forceful measures against the Smith government.

[Britain will be on the spot at the Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia now officially called for 11-12 January. Wilson has been unwilling to undermine the position of Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa-already suspect in the eyes of some Africans--by quashing the Nigerian initiative for the conference, but he may still try to get the meeting postponed until February. Wilson hopes he might then be able to point to some success of actions already taken to weaken Rhodesia and strengthen Zambia./

[He also will try to get Balewa to persuade Tanzania and Ghana to reverse their decision not to attend. Tanzania probably is staying out of the conference in order to be free to attack its decisions. Ghana appears to intend to boycott the Commonwealth.]

[Wilson will urge moderate Commonwealth members to send high-ranking representatives. If numerous other prime ministers stay away, he might send Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley and Lord Chancellor Gardiner to represent him.]

[Radical African leaders are campaigning againstthe meeting of OAU heads of state proposed for 19 January in Addis Ababa. Some moderate Africans had hoped that this meeting would ease the pressure on them to break relations with London in accordance with last month's OAU resolution. Only 14 states have accepted the proposal and the necessary twothirds endorsement seems unlikely.]

Ghana has called a meeting of the OAU's military action committee in Accra on 6 January, and

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may urge a campaign of sabotage and terrorism in Rhodesia. The militants hope to make it an effective instrument in forging African policy toward Rhodesia.

[Zambia's lack of confidence in the British determination to crush the Smith government is increasingly evident. Vice President Kamanga reportedly reacted angrily to Smith's weekend offer to ease the way for Zambian procurement of oil and coal. He charged that the offer represented UK-Rhodesian collusion to ease Zambian-Rhodesian tensions so that London could avoid a choice between the Africans and its Rhodesian kith and kin.]

[There are growing indications that British policy makers may be considering that ultimately military intervention may be necessary to bring down the Rhodesian regime and preserve some British influence in Africa. A Commonwealth Relations Office official has informally approached Kenya's President Kenyatta with the suggestion that British troops be stationed in Kenya. Kenyatta replied that this would be politically possible only if he could assure his cabinet that the troops will leave Kenya for action against Rhodesia within a definite time period.]

*Bolivia: Co-President Barrientos' resignation from the military junta may usher in a period of acute political instability.

/Barrientos says he resigned late yesterday in order to comply with the constitutional requirement that presidential candidates must resign from office six months prior to elections. Elections have been set for 3 July; his resignation is effective 3 January. He also told a US Embassy official that, by resigning, he wished to demonstrate to his critics that he is neither overly ambitious nor desires to establish a dictatorship./

There is some evidence, however, that Barrientos' resignation was not entirely voluntary.

[Barrientos plans to depart from Bolivia this morning for Panama and Switzerland, claiming poor health is his reason for leaving. He says he will return in 15 to 20 days and begin his presidential campaign as a civilian.]

General Alfredo Ovando takes over as sole head of the junta and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

[With Barrientos out of the country, it seems likely that the political situation will become highly agitated. Barrientos planned to tour military installations last night to squelch rumors that he is a prisoner and is being shipped out of the country.]

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The junta is	
also reported to be extremely concerned about the high degree of unrest in the tin mines. If Bar- rientos does not leave the country today, but goes	25X1
to his native Cochabamba, an armed showdown with his opponents is possible.	

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*<u>Dominican Republic</u>: [President Garcia Godoy's efforts to ease tensions, heightened by the shooting incident in Santiago last month, are being frustrated.]

In a speech on 3 January Godoy informed the Dominican people that he was going to send selected military personnel overseas on various missions. As vet, none has left;

the leaders of the armed forces have decided not to go. Godoy insisted two days ago that should Rivera Caminero and navy chief Jimenez refuse their support, he would resign and turn the government over to the military.]

[Meanwhile, Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) has reneged on its earlier reported promise to stand aside on the deportation issue, and has withdrawn its support of the provisional government because Garcia Godoy has not removed any high level military chiefs. In addition, rebel leader Caamano's political mentor, Hector Aristy, said in a press conference on 4 January that the "Constitutionalists" would have to renounce the provisional government and called for a rekindling of "peaceful revolution."]

So long as the problem of removing troublesome military personnel continues to be postponed, the situation will remain highly volatile.

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NOTES

<u>Upper Volta</u>: The intervention of Joseph Ouedraogo, who has strong local support in the capital and is a long-term political rival of ousted President Yameogo, may complicate Col. Lamizana's problems in stabilizing the situation following the military takeover on 3 January. Ouedraogo, together with other labor leaders who had spearheaded the revolt, yesterday led an enthusiastic crowd of several thousand in demanding assurances that Lamizana was actually installing a new government. Lamizana's actions this week indicate that he may be susceptible to pressures from civilians who can turn out crowds in the capital.

<u>Central African Republic</u>: The country remains calm in the wake of army chief Bokassa's military coup of 1 January. Army officers and conservative civilian holdovers from the Dacko regime hold key positions in Bokassa's government. The gendarmerie, which had seemed a potential source of trouble, appears mollified by extra rations and promises of promotion. Bokassa continues to appear impulsive and eccentric and is showing signs of becoming a demagogue.

<u>Turkey:</u> [The Turkish Senate debate on Cyprus, which begins tomorrow, may bring on a new outburst of anti-Americanism. The opposition, which last month was silenced by a cloture vote in the National Assembly, will probably renew charges of unwarranted US influence on Turkey's foreign policy. The government lacks the votes to shut off debate in the Senate. Anti-American elements in the press will probably exploit any disclosures of US pressures for Turkish restraint regarding Cyprus.] 25X1

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USSR: A Soviet naval force consisting of two guided-missile destroyers, at least one submarine, and two auxiliaries was sighted in the East China Sea on 3 January apparently headed for the Philippine Sea. For some time the Soviets' policy has been to keep more of their naval forces at sea than formerly. They have engaged in long-range operations in several areas, including this particularly sensitive one. The first deployment of such a force to the East China Sea - Philippine Sea area occurred almost a year ago, and the most recent was concluded in September./

India: The resignation of Finance Minister Krishnamachari and his replacement by Sachindra Chaudhuri brings a political unknown into a vital cabinet post. The 62-year-old Chaudhuri is regarded as a brilliant and personable specialist in corporation law. His lack of high government experience, however, will handicap him at a time when the recent war with Pakistan and the country's worst drought in the twentieth century have sharply intensified India's economic problems. The resignation of the competent but controversial Krishnamachari apparently was triggered by his belief that Prime Minister Shastri had failed to defend him against charges of corruption and nepotism. 25X1

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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director

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