Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300 October 1966 21 TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Copy No. 216



GROUP 1

DOWNGRADING

EXCLUDED FRG

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE **BULLETIN**

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1 Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8



Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8

25X1

27 October 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



25X6			
25X1	3.	Notes:	Congo
		(Kinshasa). (Page 4)	

Approved For Release 2006/07/05 / CIA-RDP79700975A009300190001-8

Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8



25X1

27 Oct 66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Approved For Release 2006/07/05 CIA-RDP79100975A009300190001-8 25X1

Approved Fqr Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8 25x1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 October 1966

*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

South Vietnamese Political Developments: The South Vietnamese constituent assembly yesterday elected former chief of state Phan Khac Suu as its permanent chairman.

Suu, a moderate born in the Mekong delta, should satisfy the southerners who form a regional majority in the assembly. His election will also be acceptable to government leaders.

In a press conference yesterday, following their return from Manila, Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu made it clear that Saigon has not abandoned its stiff terms for an end to the war.

Thieu cited as preconditions for peace the cessation of aggression and terrorism and the withdrawal under international guarantee of all North Vietnamese and hard-core Viet Cong units. Once these conditions have been met, Thieu said he would request withdrawal of allied troops within six months.

Many South Vietnamese are apprehensive of a settlement that could leave the Viet Cong with a potential for significant control and influence among the populace in South Vietnam.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A successful rice harvest security operation has just been concluded in coastal Phu Yen Province. Operation SEWARD, conducted by three US Army battalions, began on 4 September and was responsible for the harvest and shipment to market of a large rice crop. It denied to Communist forces in the area a major source of food supply.

(continued)

Final casualty reports for operation SEWARD show enemy losses of 239 killed and 34 captured, with nearly 900 suspects apprehended. A total of 27 Americans were killed and 173 wounded.

A similar operation--Operation ADAMS-- was initiated in Phu Yen Province on 26 October, in an area where an estimated 9,300 Communist troops reportedly are located. (Map)

North Vietnamese Political Developments: Initial North Vietnamese commentary on the Manila conference communique has been predictably harsh and in keeping with earlier DRV condemnations of the conference. The first Hanoi statement, broadcast on 26 October, set the tone for subsequent DRV pronouncements during the day by claiming that the communique was 'only a plot to enlarge the aggressive war in Vietnam behind a smokescreen of peace negotiations.''

The Hanoi commentary asserted that the Manila communiqué "falsely accused the Vietnamese people of aggression" and derided the joint statement's program for economic assistance and revolutionary development for South Vietnam. Additionally, the Hanoi broadcast termed the call for the preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam an attempt to "transfer the South into a US military base and new type colony of the US" by perpetuating the division of Vietnam.

25X1

27 Oct 66

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/07/05 / CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8

2

25X6 Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8



*Congo (Kinshasa): Former premier Mulamba apparently has decided to go along with President Mobutu's plans to transfer him to the Ministry of Defense. There has been doubt about Mulamba's status, with Mobutu reportedly planning to confine him to quarters for about two weeks and thereafter retire him from the army if he refused the defense portfolio. The extent of Mulamba's support within the army command is not entirely clear, but Mobutu appears to have <u>little doubt</u> about his ability to control the situation.

25X1

25X1



Approved For Release 2006/07/05 CIA-HUP79100975A009300190001-8

5

27 Oct 66

Approved For Release 2006/07/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009300190001-8

TOP SECRET