
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Communist China - Hong Kong: Peking is maintaining strong pressure on the British over Hong Kong.

On 22 May the British chargé was again summoned to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and handed a strong protest over alleged British "atrocities" in Hong Kong. The Chinese also demanded that the British quickly reply to the Foreign Ministry statement of 15 May.

That statement demanded that the British release arrested demonstrators, punish those guilty of police brutality, make an apology, and guarantee that similar actions will not be repeated. The British have deliberately avoided acknowledging the Chinese demands in the hope that Peking would let the matter slide.

Many of those arrested in the demonstrations have already been tried, convicted, and sentenced. Thus, the British could not release them without suffering the same loss of face the Portuguese accepted in Macao.

Peking's reiteration of its demands suggests an intention to maintain pressure until concessions from the Hong Kong authorities are forthcoming. The renewed diplomatic pressure, together with recent anti-British demonstrations along the Chinese side of the Hong Kong border will probably encourage further leftist violence in the colony.

| In Hong Kong, the Communists' top-level "struggle |
|--|
| committee" met yesterday morning, probably to plan |
| new tactics to counter the strong police action. No se- |
| rious incidents or challenges to the government's ban on |
| demonstrations have been reported yet. |

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Nigeria: Eastern Nigeria's Consultative Assembly, scheduled to meet on 26 May, will probably approve new terms for a loose association with the rest of Nigeria.

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the new terms are based on a "Common-wealth of Nigeria" concept. Each of the four units-presumably the present regions--would have its own "international personality" but would coordinate policies through a secretariat. The units would have common tariffs and services and would share diplomatic representation in minor capitals. Transportation facilities would be separately owned and controlled, but jointly usable upon payment of agreed fees.

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these terms would be presented to the federal government and the other regions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Although there may be some flexibility in the East's position, there is a strong possibility that this is Ojukwu's last offer to negotiate before seceding.

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Brazil: Security officials are concerned over the government's indifference toward a large anti-US demonstration planned for today in Rio de Janeiro.

Radical student leaders are reported to be confident that they can convert the march--planned to protest the closing of a government-subsidized student restaurant--into an antigovernment and anti-US demonstration. Security officials fear that unless the government reacts more firmly than it has to similar agitation in recent weeks, demonstrations may get out of hand and eventually cause the government to react with undue force.

Some responsible military and political figures are increasingly unhappy about Costa e Silva's preoccupation with seeking popularity and his failure to define his policies and provide firm leadership.

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