

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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**Secret** 

26 April 1968

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#### **NOTE**

This is a new Secret daily publication, the <u>Central Intelligence Bulletin</u>. It replaces the <u>Current Intelligence Digest</u>, which no longer is being published.

The new publication is prepared in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. It should provide the readership with more timely treatment of relevant intelligence than its predecessor.

Any comments on the new daily will be welcomed at the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

No. 0140/68 26 April 1968

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

#### **CONTENTS**

Situation report. (Page 1) South Vietnam: Czechoslovakia-USSR: Governmental relations are deteriorating. (Page 2) Poland: Possible new student demonstrations may result in violence and benefit extremist factions of the party. (Page 3) West Germany: Government leaders are concerned over the impact of East German moves on West Berlin but have not decided how to respond. (Page 4) Communist China - UK: Peking has made minor concessions to conciliatory gestures by London. (Page 6) USSR: Crude-oil exchange (Page 7) (Page 7) Algeria: Assassination attempt Jordan-Israel: Agriculture damaged (Page 8) Sierra Leone: Civilian rule (Page 8) Dominican Republic: Possible disorders (Page 8)

25X6

25X6

Venezuela: Cabinet reorganization (Page 9)

[[ South Vietnam: The Communists are unfolding the organizational apparatus and program of their new puppet "National Alliance."

A communiqué of 24 April broadcast by the Communist radio named a full slate of central committee members for the alliance. Included were a number of semiprominent personalities in Saigon intellectual circles. Several of the members apparently defected to the enemy following the Tet offensive, and it is possible that they had been in contact with the Communists beforehand.

The program of the alliance announced in the broadcast tries to make the alliance appear distinct from and independent of the National Liberation Front, which has long been clearly tagged as a Communist instrument. The goals of the alliance, however, closely parallel those of the front. According to the broadcast, the alliance was founded to "overthrow the Thieu-Ky regime," to set up a national coalition government, and to struggle against "foreign" aggression.

\* \* \* \*

Various sources continue to report that the Communists will soon resume the offensive. A high-ranking Viet Cong defector recently stated, for example, that the enemy will launch another nationwide attack no later than 1 May. He said that the main thrust of the offensive will be directed against Saigon.

Although the precise timing of major new Communist military initiatives is unclear, they may come soon in an effort to offset the image of allied momentum built up during the past few weeks. A wave of mortar and rocket assaults might be the feature of such actions, perhaps combined with a few selective ground attacks.

### SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011000230001-3

Poland: Student demonstrations may resume early next week, resulting in violence and benefiting the extremist factions of the party.

A youth claiming to be a Warsaw University student leader has informed the US Embassy that coordinated demonstrations are planned in all major university cities on 29 April. The students say they expect severe police repression, and hope that the public reaction will be one of strong support. Demonstrations apparently are to continue during the regime's May Day celebrations, which will include a major speech by party leader Gomulka.

The students hope to gain broadened support among the workers by shifting the focus of their demands from academic to economic issues.

If they carry out their plans, the students will encounter strong regime countermeasures. Many of last month's demonstrators have been drafted, others have been expelled from their schools, and most of the leaders have been arrested.

The regime may be aware of the students' intentions, as it was during previous demonstrations. The hard-line faction of the party, which controls the police, is likely to seize on any new unrest as an opportunity to strike against moderate elements in the party. The latter have been attempting to restore a measure of stability by deliberately paced changes at the top.

West Germany: Government leaders are studying possible countermeasures to the East German ban on the travel of West German officials to and from West Berlin.

West German officials are seriously concerned over the impact of the East German moves on West Berlin, but are uncertain as to the appropriate response. Foreign Ministry officials warn that nothing should be done that might "escalate" the situation. This reflects their caution about actions that might undermine efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR.

These officials have concluded that some of the measures considered during the 1958-63 crisis are no longer feasible. For example, they tend to rule out any action against interzonal West-East German trade, because this trade is already declining. They favor, however, tightening Allied controls over the travel of East Germans to NATO countries. They also have specifically urged a demarche in Moscow emphasizing the USSR's responsibility to assure access.

US officials in West Germany believe that failure to respond would encourage the East Germans to undertake further moves curtailing Berlin access.

Communist China - UK: Peking has made some minor concessions in response to conciliatory gestures by London.

On 22 April, the Chinese allowed the British chargé in Peking to visit Anthony Grey, a British Reuters correspondent who has been held under house arrest since July 1967.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry official also informed the chargé on 21 April that the Chinese henceforth "would do their best" to expedite visas. He granted six visas for new UK personnel due to arrive in Peking.

These developments follow British attempts to ease an impasse caused mainly by Peking's insistence on including Hong Kong issues in any discussion of "normalization" of relations.

Colonial authorities in Hong Kong have allowed representatives of the local NCNA office to visit Communist newspaper employees detained in prison. The British Foreign Office also has relaxed all restrictions on travel and exit visas for members of the Chinese diplomatic mission in London.

Peking's latest moves also underscore Communist China's concern over the situation in Hong Kong. Protracted strikes, which have resulted in the dismissal of many Communist workers, have damaged the morale of the local Communist trade organizations there. Peking may feel that its shift will induce the colonial authorities to be more forthcoming in working for reinstatement of the strikers.

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#### NOTES

USSR: Moscow, in its first crude oil exchange with a Western oil company, will export to Japan Middle East crude supplied by British Petroleum and will deliver Black Sea crude to the Western firm's customers in Europe. The deliveries to Japan, which will total one-half to one-million tons over an 8- to 12- month period, are scheduled to start in July. Additional swaps under discussion would bolster the USSR's lag-
ging petroleum sales east of Suez.

Algeria: Premier Boumediene escaped an assassination attempt yesterday afternoon virtually unscathed. Early reports have not linked the would-be assassins with any of the opposition leaders. Last January, the Algerian security service arrested several persons allegedly involved in a plot instigated by opposition leader Belkacem Krim to assassinate top Algerian officials.

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26 Apr 68

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Jordan-Israel: Recent Israeli artillery attacks could have serious consequences for Jordanian agriculture. The shelling in one of Jordan's most important agricultural areas has damaged a key segment of the East Ghor irrigation canal and has discouraged farmers from working their fields. If water from the canal is withheld for more than three weeks, crops in the area could be lost and the banana and citrus groves permanently destroyed. This would place an additional strain on Jordan's already depressed economy.

Sierra Leone: Under a procedural compromise hammered out between the country's two tribally based political factions and the new military junta, the parliamentarians elected last year will convene in Freetown today to begin consultations aimed at restoring civilian rule. Efforts are apparently being made to form a coalition government, but tribal tensions remain high and neither power group now appears willing to accept second place. If a workable solution is not found fairly quickly, the prospect of intertribal violence will increase, especially as the army is itself deeply divided along lines of tribe and rank.

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Dominican Republic: The third anniversary of the "constitutionalist" uprising on 24 April passed with only minor clashes between leftist demonstrators and the heavily reinforced security forces.

Although the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party has accepted the government's proscription of the rally it planned for 28 April to protest the landing of US troops in 1965, disorders are still possible. Party Secretary General Pena used the occasion of the government ban to reiterate his warning that if President Balaguer continues to "disrespect" political freedon, the party "will be forced" to conspire against his government.

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26 Apr 68

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Venezuela: President Leoni has reorganized his cabinet following the withdrawal of the Democratic Republican Union from the government to prepare for the presidential candidacy of its leader, Jovito Villalba. The new appointees, including Venezuela's first woman cabinet member, are technocrats rather than political leaders. The cabinet now appears to be a caretaker body that probably will make few changes in government policies until after the presidential election in December.