



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

**Secret**

51

25 November 1969

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6

No. 0282/69  
25 November 1969

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS

Cambodia: Sihanouk is still allowing only limited arms shipments to go to the Viet Cong. (Page 1)

Japan: Sato may seek a mandate on his Okinawa agreement by calling national elections soon. (Page 2)

USSR: Moscow may intend to commemorate Stalin's 90th birthday. (Page 3)

Bulgaria: Restrictions have been imposed on foreign trade enterprises. (Page 4)

Chile: The Communist Party national congress is being held this week. (Page 5)

NPT: Entry into force is still some time off. (Page 6)

India: Congress Party split (Page 7)

Libya: Political opposition (Page 7)

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6

SECRET

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk appears to be sticking to his policy of allowing only limited arms shipments to go to the Vietnamese Communists.

[redacted] Sihanouk has given instructions to continue the arms shipments, but in limited amounts. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

The arms question has become a major problem in Sihanouk's relations with the Vietnamese Communists and is not likely to be resolved soon. Sihanouk has publicly condemned Communist pledges regarding Cambodian sovereignty, the quid pro quo for the transshipment of supplies. He clearly views the arms issue as his strongest bargaining point in getting the Communists to reduce their activities in Cambodia. So far he has resisted Communist pressures to release the large stocks of arms he holds and has given no indication that his policy of releasing only token shipments will change.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

Japan: Prime Minister Sato may seek a popular mandate on his Okinawa agreement by calling national elections soon.

[redacted]  
[redacted] Sato may dissolve the Diet in early December and call for general elections later in the month, if the Diet debate over the Okinawa agreement goes satisfactorily. This timetable would be intended to take maximum advantage of the favorable public reaction to the settlement, as well as the "law and order" mood prevalent in Japan as a result of recent leftist student excesses.

Aside from expected opposition carping, popular reaction has been largely approving. The information media, which are usually critical of government policies, have taken a surprisingly positive editorial view of the agreement. The press commended Sato for his apparent success in avoiding a trade of economic concessions in return for a satisfactory reversion agreement, but criticized the "overemphasis" on military matters in the joint communiqué. Some concern was expressed over the "ambiguity" in the communiqué about possible redeployment of nuclear weapons to Okinawa, as well as Japan's "implicit assumption" of increased responsibility for security of the Far East in the reversion agreement.

Opposition elements, in an effort to cast doubts on the government's handling of the Okinawa issue, will probably subject Sato to close questioning during the extraordinary Diet session that begins on 29 November. Sato, however, has shown himself to be very adept at handling opposition interpellations in the past, and with popular opinion generally behind him should have little difficulty deflecting leftist criticism.

25 Nov 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

SECRET

USSR: As the 90th anniversary of Stalin's birth approaches, there is evidence that the regime intends to commemorate the event for the first time since Khrushchev denounced him in 1956.

Reports circulating in Moscow suggest that the actual birthdate, 21 December, will be officially recognized for the first time since 1955.

One of the reports says that plans for it are to include newspaper and television coverage and the release of a new edition of some of Stalin's works, and that the impetus for official recognition is coming from Brezhnev and others in the Central Committee. It was Brezhnev to whom a group of Soviet intellectuals addressed a letter in 1966 warning against a similarly rumored plan to rehabilitate Stalin.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] do not think it means the regime is planning a return to the terror and repression associated with Stalin, but rather is consistent with the recent emphasis on the positive aspects of his activities. Most notable of these is his war record. The negative aspects of Stalin's rule, especially the purges, are being de-emphasized. An official birthday commemoration, however, could be construed as a warning, reinforced by Solzhenitsyn's recent expulsion from the Writers' Union, that the USSR's liberal intellectual community should desist from its efforts to keep alive the anti-Stalin line in literature and scholarship.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

SECRET

Bulgaria: Economic liberalization, which has made little progress in Bulgaria, will be further retarded with the passage of a law restricting the independent activities of foreign trade enterprises.

The enterprises, although loosely tied to a ministry, for the past few years had been permitted to conclude agreements without going through the Foreign Trade Ministry. Henceforth they will be required to obtain ministry approval before completing any trade contracts. The flexibility of enterprise officials in negotiating the terms of trade arrangements, particularly with Western companies, is likely to be reduced by the need to satisfy the requirements of central government officials.

This action may have been decided upon after the exposure of several recent scandals, apparently involving the embezzlement of several million dollars. The incidents in some cases were blamed on officials who took advantage of the provisions of the economic reform program. Some managers, unused to the independence they were permitted by the reform, squandered capital on unsound deals, while others probably enriched themselves with the funds for which they no longer had to provide such careful accounting.



25X1

25X1

SECRET


SECRET

Chile: The fourteenth national congress of the Communist Party, which is being held this week, is highlighted by the presence of several ranking foreign delegates and tension over fears of a military coup.

Leaders of the party, which is Latin America's best-organized and most influential outside Cuba, have made elaborate plans for their first congress in four years. The opening ceremonies were held at the legislative palace. About 30 high-ranking delegates from most Eastern European countries, including East Germany and Yugoslavia, are on hand. The Soviet delegation is led by a Secretary of the party's central committee.

Until recently, Chilean Communist leaders were confident that next year's presidential election would be won by the far-leftist coalition in which their party plays the leading role. Last month's army uprising, however, and a fear that a military coup is imminent have so alarmed party leaders that they drew up plans to operate on a clandestine basis for self-protection.

An additional problem became evident during preliminary local meetings of Communist Party members earlier this month. Many of the rank and file expressed discontent with their leaders' lack of an aggressive, militant attitude toward other political groups and toward the presidential candidacy of Communist poet Pablo Neruda.



25X1  
25X1

SECRET



SECRET

NPT: (The outlook for the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was given a big boost yesterday when it was ratified by the US and the USSR, but its entry into force is still some time off.)

(Twenty-four countries have now completed ratification of the document, which was opened for signature in July, 1968. A total of 66 other nations have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. The treaty will enter into force when 19 of these states finish the ratification process. Several of them have indicated that they would probably act following ratification by the superpowers.)

(The process of signature-ratification is certain to focus over the coming months on the so-called threshold nuclear countries and on the members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Sweden and Japan, both threshold nations, have indicated that they will be acting shortly-- Sweden to ratify and Japan to sign. Among the other near-nuclear states, Israel and India have substantial reservations and will not even sign in the near future.)

(The Soviets have heretofore resisted US urging to ratify jointly on grounds that they first wanted West German signature. The reversal of that stand probably reflects growing confidence in Moscow that Bonn will do so. The West Germans appear certain to sign soon, as the Brandt government has decided that Bonn's primary concerns have been satisfied sufficiently.)

(Like the other EURATOM countries, however, Bonn will not ratify the document until EURATOM has worked out an acceptable agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency on safeguards against the diversion of nuclear fuels to weapons use. Japan is also likely to delay ratification during these negotiations, since it is worried that the resulting agreement may give the EURATOM countries a favored position regarding inspection arrangements.)

25 NOV 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

6

SECRET

25X1

25X1

SECRET

NOTES

India: Two rival Congress Party organizations now exist, following the decision over the weekend by Prime Minister Gandhi's faction to formally depose old-guard president Nijalingappa. Her group selected an interim president to serve until elections can be held at the next regularly scheduled meeting of the party's governing All-India Congress Committee in December in Bombay. Mrs. Gandhi's faction has already begun to set up administrative units duplicating those in Nijalingappa's so-called "Organization Congress Party." The prime minister commands a majority of the party's leadership in parliament and in the organization, but bitter infighting will continue as the rival factions compete for control of funds, records, and the vote-getting election symbol--two yoked oxen.

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

\* \* \* \*

Libya: Further signs of opposition to President Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council have appeared. [Redacted] some Libyan Army units are in a near-mutinous state as a result of their disenchantment with the military junta. In addition, the civilian prime minister and foreign minister have become more outspoken in their opposition, as have many Cyrenaican politicians. To further compound Qaddafi's problems, the ministers of defense and interior, both of whom are members of the military junta, may swing their support behind the civilians. Even if Qaddafi is eventually forced out, however, it is unlikely that his successor would follow any radically different policy.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6  
**Secret**

**Secret**

Approved For Release 2003/06/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015000080001-6