



DIRECTORATE OF
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State Department review completed

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
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
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Arab States - Israel: Efforts to obtain the release of the 50 or so hostages still in fedayeen hands are continuing.

US Embassy officials in Amman believe that the remaining hostages have been split into at least two groups. There are signs that some of the hostages are being held in a large refugee camp on the outskirts of the capital. [redacted] released yesterday said that he and about 20 others had been confined in a house in Amman. There is no precise information on the number or location of the groups, however.

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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is holding the hostages, seems to be concentrating on trying to conclude separate deals with the British, Germans, and Swiss. The Europeans are so far holding to a multinational approach, but the British and the Germans are apparently wavering. Meanwhile, the role of the Red Cross is not entirely clear. Red Cross Vice President Freymond told British, German, and US representatives on Saturday that the Red Cross was withdrawing from its negotiating role, because it would not be party to blackmail or serve as intermediary for deals with separate countries. In a statement to the press this morning, however, Red Cross President Naville denied that talks had been broken off. Switzerland, meanwhile, possibly in an attempt to open an alternate negotiating channel, has asked the Arab League to use its good offices with the PFLP to obtain the release of the hostages.

Israel remains strongly opposed to the principle of exchanging fedayeen it holds for the hostages in Amman. Nevertheless, the Israelis officially announced yesterday that they had rounded up 450 Arabs--including 80 women--from the occupied territories; all were suspected of belonging to or aiding the PFLP, and two were said to be uncles of PFLP chief George Habbash. There are]

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Press reports that the Arabs will be held as counter-hostages for the detained airline passengers. In London the unofficial Jewish Defense League announced Saturday that it had seized three Arabs employed at the Egyptian Embassy. Claiming that the three were fedayeen, the league said that they would be held until the hostages in Jordan are released.

The blowing up of the hijacked planes has precipitated a quarrel between the PFLP and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO announced Saturday that it had suspended the PFLP's membership in the PLO central committee for defying the committee's resolutions on handling the planes and the passengers. Last night, the PFLP threatened that if its membership were not restored, it would not observe the agreements to which it was presently committed--apparently a reference to the truce reached last Thursday between the Jordanian authorities and the PLO.


Meanwhile, the relative quiet in Jordan was broken yesterday by fighting in the Irbid area in north Jordan, in which Jordanian Army troops clashed with members of the Palestine Liberation Army, the regular force of the PLO. Fedayeen sources charged that army units opened up with artillery on two commando jeeps, and that the bodies of some of the fedayeen were mutilated by army troops. Jordanian officials have expressed regret for the incident, which has so far not led to a general breakdown of the cease-fire.

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
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Cambodia:



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Fighting Slows

In addition to routine harassments of Siem Reap and Kompong Thom cities and other locations in the countryside, the Communists killed 27 South Vietnamese troops in two sharp attacks over the weekend.

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Meanwhile, the Route 6 convoy is still stalled 15 miles north of Skoun. Cambodian troops are attempting to clear entrenched Communist elements from the area. Villagers report that Communist reinforcements are moving into the area from the north, suggesting that the convoy, which has been on the road for a week and is still 35 miles from Kompong Thom, is in for more trouble.

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Chile: President Frei's Christian Democrats are attempting to close ranks in order to reassert their political influence, but prospects for blocking Allende's succession to the presidency are not good.

As the Christian Democrats become increasingly aware of the threat that would be posed by an Allende government, there is a growing move to resist the chronic indulgence in internal differences that has marked the party's six years in power. Its members seem tardily to realize that they must stick together if they are to salvage any influence as the largest political party with the strongest representation in Congress. Most of them were initially disconcerted by Allende's victory in last week's popular election. Their defeated candidate, Radomiro Tomic, and some of his leftist supporters hastily tried to ingratiate themselves with Allende. The exodus of large numbers of influential Chileans, the rapidly spreading economic dislocations, and the Allende forces' heavy-handed grab for power, however, have spurred the party to the realization of its own poor prospects and the need to act while it can.

The direction and efficacy of this emerging cohesion are not yet clear. Many party leaders dislike the plan to elect runner-up presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri in Congress next month in return for his promise to resign and bring about new elections. The guarantees that they have publicly demanded of Allende would not be difficult for Allende to circumvent by maneuver or timing. President Frei's leadership and popularity are essential to the success of the Christian Democrats, but Frei's commitment to his constitutional responsibilities outweighs his own fear of what Allende will do to Chile and limits his exercise of influence on party strategy.

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Meanwhile, Allende's public claims of assassination plans against him and his supporters' threat of a strike are merely conspicuous examples of the strong pressures being applied at many points to ensure his accession to the presidency.

The chance of action against Allende by military leaders, never strong, seems to be dwindling as they, too, seek assurances from Allende that he may or may not choose to honor. [redacted]

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Korea: Pyongyang may gain substantial diplomatic benefits if Salvador Allende becomes president of Chile.

Allende has made it clear that he intends to recognize the Communist governments of the divided countries, including Korea. Such action would probably lead the South Koreans to close their embassy in Santiago. But more disturbing for the South Koreans is the possibility that Allende will pull Chile out of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Although UNCURK's only important function in recent years has been the preparation of an annual report to the General Assembly, it is valued by the South Koreans as a symbol of UN support for their country and the peaceful unification of the peninsula on non-Communist terms.

UNCURK, along with the UN Command in Korea, has been under increasing attack by Pyongyang's friends in the UN. Chile's withdrawal would encourage like action by the Pakistanis, whose membership in UNCURK is an embarrassment to their relations with Peking and Pyongyang. The withdrawal of one or both of these countries could throw the very existence of UNCURK into question with serious ramifications for the whole range of Korean-related problems in the UN.

Although the usual Communist resolution to dissolve UNCURK probably will again be defeated by a wide margin, this year's debate, if complicated by Chile's resignation from UNCURK, is likely to add to South Korean feelings of insecurity, which have been heightened by the scheduled cut-back of US forces in Korea.

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