


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[JORDAN: Army and fedayeen elements were said to be disengaging in north Jordan in the wake of a new truce agreement reached there yesterday.

Arab cease-fire observers led by a Sudanese colonel opened talks in Ramtha with Jordanian and guerrilla officers following Wednesday's heavy fighting in the north. The resulting agreement provides that armored units of both sides will pull out of the Ramtha-Irbid-Jarash triangle under the supervision of Jordanian police and the fedayeen command. Fedayeen must not carry their weapons in the streets pending their withdrawal to their bases, which is to be arranged by the three-man follow-up committee scheduled to arrive in the north today. Jordanian tanks must pull back two and one-half miles from either side of the main road from Syria to permit the movement of fedayeen supplies, but all other military movements are to be frozen for 48 hours. During the same period, all armed commandos who wish to go to Syria will be allowed to do so; unarmed commandos will be allowed to go to towns in the south. Jordanian officials and civil and military police are to return to their posts.

Newspaper accounts indicate that the agreement was being put into effect, at least in the Ramtha area. Jordanian security officials were said to have reoccupied the border post, tanks were apparently pulling back from the road, and commandos were reported to be handing in their guns and defusing their mines. The number of carloads of armed fedayeen in the streets fell off rapidly. These reports of fedayeen compliance are surprising; the fedayeen had seemed strongly entrenched in the north, and radicals among them had appeared determined to fight on. There are no reports, however, of the agreement being observed in Irbid, the major fedayeen stronghold.]

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
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In Amman, meanwhile, armed fedayeen were observed manning at least one checkpoint, although they may have been working with the army. Jordanian authorities have reported that "nearly 200" commandos moved out Wednesday--little more than a drop in the bucket.



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While the future of the fedayeen movement in Jordan is anything but clear, the commandos, at least, do not seem to consider themselves defeated. Many are said to regard their performance against the Jordanian Army as a victory, and their morale apparently remains high.

[REDACTED]

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
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SOUTH VIETNAM: [The aggressive new commander in South Vietnam's delta region hopes to take advantage of the enemy's weakened condition there to clear out the last major enemy base areas.]

[Major General Truong, who formerly led the respected South Vietnamese 1st Division in Military Region (MR)-1, plans to try the same tactics he used in the northern provinces, hitting the enemy's main strength whenever possible. He sees the situation in the delta as less serious than in MR-1, and believes aggressive pursuit of weakened Communist major units and local forces in the delta over the next two years can destroy most of the enemy's remaining strength.]

[General Truong gives first priority to penetrating Communist base areas, including the Seven Mountains and U Minh Forest strongholds. He plans to construct fire support bases there, and eventually clear these areas of enemy forces. While acknowledging that such tactics will be difficult and costly in lives, he believes it is essential to deprive the enemy of their strongholds.]

[General Truong gives second priority to rooting out as many members as possible of the enemy's network of local cadre throughout MR-4. He admits that there are many old Viet Minh families who give the Communists a basic strength in the countryside there, but he points out that this situation is no longer as serious in MR-4 as it still is in MR-1. Truong also intends to take a more direct hand than his predecessors in MR-4 in running the Regional Forces and Popular Forces in order to improve protection of transportation arteries and of towns and villages.]

[It is almost a tradition in South Vietnam for new military region commanders to introduce broad new programs and reforms, but what progress is

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made comes slowly. Other South Vietnamese commanders before Truong have tried to drive the enemy from the Seven Mountains area, for example, but it is still a Communist stronghold. Nevertheless, General Truong's effective performance in the past lends some credibility to his plans and to his appreciation of the delta situation.]

Enemy Supplies by Sea

The Communists may be intensifying efforts to resupply their forces in the delta by sea as a result of the disruption of supply lines through Cambodia. According to a Communist defector, a steel-hulled trawler unloaded a small amount of possible high-priority cargo along the shore of An Xuyen Province in late August. Spotters in surveillance aircraft saw a similar vessel approaching some 200 miles off the coast at about the same time, thus lending some credence to the statement.

Communist units live off the land in the delta more than any other region of South Vietnam, but, as government control improves there, the Communists are increasingly dependent on North Vietnam for replacement personnel and supplies. Requirements for priority supplies from outside may be causing the Communists to try the sea route more often, despite the effective allied blockade along the coast. Of the 22 detections of enemy trawlers trying to land supplies since 1965, eight have occurred since April 1970, when the enemy's previously secure supply routes through Cambodia came under attack.

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COMMUNIST CHINA: The leadership turnout for the National Day celebrations in Peking yesterday offered further evidence that a break in ranks has occurred within the ruling hierarchy.

The failure of Hsieh Fu-chih, the public security minister and boss of the Peking municipal government, to accompany the other top leaders who appeared with Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao confirms that he has become the first high-ranking purge victim since acting army chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu fell in 1968. The regime has provided no explanation for Hsieh's absence from public view since last March and has been careful not to reveal any shifts in the balance of forces within the politburo that may have been occasioned by Hsieh's fall.

Another notable absentee at yesterday's celebrations was politburo standing committee member Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's long-time personal secretary. Ch'en's close association with Mao makes it difficult to believe that he too has been victimized in some muted behind-the-scenes squabbling, but he has been out of sight for two months. In addition, Peking's insistence on publishing the namelist of those leaders who did attend the celebrations in alphabetical, rather than rank, order suggests that jockeying for position at the top is continuing.



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
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Current Situation



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CAMBODIA: [Communist pressure along Route 5 has intensified, and traffic between Phnom Penh and the west has come under increasing enemy harassment. [redacted]

[redacted] substantial numbers of Communist troops have been sighted between Kompong Chhnang and Oudong, and several government positions along the roadway were hit by enemy attacks on 30 September. The Communists are also stopping trucks farther west along the road.]

[Harassment of the government column on Route 6, still positioned at Tang Kouk, continues. FANK officers are concerned that the Communists are still building up their forces in the area, and report that enemy troops are digging in further up Route 6 at Kompong Thma.]

[For the first time in the six-month war, Battambang city, the hub of Cambodia's main food-producing area, was harassed on the evening of 30 September; no information on casualties or damage is available. The Communists had earlier spread leaflets stating they would attack the city at the end of September, a psychological ploy which had created some concern among the city's residents.)

[The Communists again struck close to Phnom Penh when they fired on South Vietnamese gunboats on the Mekong a few miles east of the capital on 1 October. Cambodian air strikes and counterfire by the gunboats on the enemy elements positioned in the village of Moat Krasas brought a quick end to the attack. The village was the scene of some heavy fighting early last month.] [redacted]

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
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LAOS: Current Situation



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LAOS: Government forces are having only limited success in improving their tactical position before the rainy season ends this month.

In the north, the drive to take Ban Na appears to have been turned back again and the parallel push toward Muong Pot is making little headway. On the western edge of the Plaine des Jarres, a 1,200-man irregular force is stalled outside Muong Soui. A new operation to the east of the Plaine, however, has had some success in harassing enemy movements on Route 4 and destroying small ammunition caches.

In the south, at least three government battalions continue to push north of Toumlane on Route 23 against little enemy resistance. Heavy rains have slowed two battalions moving west on Route 9 toward Muong Phine.

On the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau, government irregulars are maintaining their hold on the recently recaptured Site 26, but the Communists can be expected to challenge their control of this and other sites near Routes 23 and 16 as the enemy's dry season logistic push begins later this month.



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SOUTH KOREA: The opposition New Democratic Party, overcoming strong factional differences, has nominated a credible candidate to oppose President Pak Chong-hui next year.

He is Kim Tae-chung, probably the most attractive of the contenders for the job. Kim's chance came when party chairman Yu Chin-san, the day before the nominating convention on 30 September, withdrew from the race by throwing his support to a political protégé. Yu was generally regarded as having covert financial backing from the government for his candidacy, and his nomination threatened to split the party and make a farce of the presidential race.

As a respected long-time member of the National Assembly and present leader of the wing of the New Democratic Party that was ousted from power by Pak in a near bloodless coup in 1961, Kim's "democratic" credentials are impeccable. His candidacy will appeal most strongly to those minority elements--students, intellectuals, and some members of the country's new middle class--that are critical of government authoritarianism. Pak, who is regarded as a sure winner next year, can take satisfaction that his opponent is likely to conduct the type of dignified campaign that will give an air of authenticity to the presidential contest.



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
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
CHILE: [Salvador Allende's refusal to meet the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) demands for "democratic guarantees" has increased strains within the party.]

[The PDC council announced on 30 September that Allende's response to its demands was unsatisfactory and that the guarantees now must be incorporated into the constitution by legislative action. This position probably is not acceptable to the left wing of the party, and its publication increases the likelihood of a divisive struggle at the PDC National Congress this weekend.]



[Other developments have strengthened Allende's position. The Roman Catholic bishops of Chile have issued a formal statement that in effect counsels "Christian acquiescence" in his victory in the popular election. The Marxist-controlled media have praised the statement effusively, and on 29 September presented a television program designed to demonstrate the "compatibility of Christianity and Marxism."]

[In the economic field, French and British interests have signaled--probably with their governments' approval--their intention to conduct business under Allende by firming up pending financial plans before the congressional runoff. Two French automotive firms will proceed with a \$2.2-million minority investment in a new assembly plant, and British banking interests will go ahead with a \$10-million long-term loan to finance imports by the Chilean Government development corporation.]



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
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
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YUGOSLAVIA-CHINA: Yugoslavia has established a special section in its Federal Economic Chamber to handle trade with Communist China, which this year is expected to be more than double last year's low level of \$2 million. China recently contracted for six marine diesel engines that could be worth over \$1 million. And for the first time in ten years Chinese traders visited the Zagreb trade fair where they discussed a purchase of freighters and tankers ranging in size from 15,000 to 70,000 tons. The expansion of regular freighter service, first established this spring, will further facilitate trade between the two countries.



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
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French AMX-13 Light Tank



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ECUADOR: The government has authorized \$15 million for the purchase of approximately 50 French AMX-13 light tanks, according to the US defense attaché. Military leaders, arguing that Ecuador's newly discovered oil fields must be protected from encroachment by Colombia or Peru, apparently have overcome objections from civilian officials that the national budget could not support such expenditures because of an acute fiscal crisis. These officials successfully thwarted purchases of similar tanks late last year and of jet bombers this August.



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