


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
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
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SUDAN: Report of plans for another coup
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
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NOTES

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SUDAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A FORMER SUDANESE OFFICIAL HAS CLAIMED
[REDACTED] THAT THE ROUND OF COUPS IN KHARTOUM IS NOT
AT AN END. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAYS THAT NUMAYRI'S RETURN TO POWER
IS ONLY TEMPORARY AND THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED
"SOON" BY TWO ARMY MAJOR GENERALS, UMAR AL-TAYIB
AND MUZAMIL GHANDUR. NUMAYRI'S PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE
AS PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL
HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING TO THE MORE CONSERVATIVE ELE-
MENTS IN THE SUDAN. HE HAS NOW OPTED FOR A CLOSER
RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA AND EGYPT, AND HAS INDICATED
HIS INTENTION TO JOIN THE FEDERATION OF ARAB REPUB-
LICS. HE HAS BEEN UNDER ATTACK, HOWEVER, FOR HIS
FAILURE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SUDAN'S MOUNTING
ECONOMIC AND INSURGENCY PROBLEMS. NOW THAT HE HAS
RETURNED TO POWER, HIS TENURE WILL DEPEND ON HIS
ABILITY TO DEAL MORE SUCCESSFULLY WITH THESE PROB-
LEMS AND TO ALSO PLACATE THE ESSENTIALLY CONSERVA-
TIVE MILITARY. [REDACTED]

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