

**Top Secret**




DIRECTORATE OF  
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
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**INDOCHINA:** The North Vietnamese are moving very large quantities of military supplies south as the new dry season resupply campaign is about to begin.

More civilian labor and vehicles are being used in this transportation effort in the North Vietnamese panhandle than have been observed since 1968.



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This increased vehicle activity in southern Laos has been corroborated by airborne observers, and it follows several weeks of maintenance and repair work on major roads leading into and through southern Laos. The present good condition of the Laotian roadnet and the apparent availability of supplies in southern North Vietnam could portend an early start of the new supply push toward South Vietnam and Cambodia. 

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**EGYPT:** The surprise resignation of War Minister Sadiq is a further reflection of the domestic crosscurrents presently troubling President Sadat.

Sadiq, who was generally considered loyal to Sadat, concurrently held the key posts of deputy prime minister, war minister, minister of war production, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Recently reported feuding between Sadiq and two other high Egyptian officials may have figured in his resignation, although other factors probably were also influential. Sadiq had quarreled frequently with Soviet officials and he may have been considered an impediment to a more rapid thaw in relations with Moscow.

Whether Sadiq resigned freely or was forced to do so, Sadat must have carefully weighed the consequences of alienating so formidable a figure. Although the extent of Sadiq's popularity in the armed forces is not clear, he undoubtedly has some supporters, if only because of his outspoken attitude toward the Soviet Union. Another point of concern for Sadat will be the reaction of Chief of Staff Shazli, reputedly a highly ambitious figure who may resent not being given the top spot.

Named to replace Sadiq as war minister and commander in chief of the armed forces is the chief of Egypt's General Intelligence organization, General Ahmad Ismail Ali. Ali is considered to be one of Sadat's close advisers and was a classmate of the president in military school.

his loyalty to Sadat, plus his ties to Egypt's intelligence mechanism, will serve to aid the president in dealing with future domestic threats.

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CHILE: President Allende has gained tactical advantages as a result of his handling of the waning protest movement, although negotiations with the strike leaders on a "truce" have hit a snag.

During the strike, Allende's selective responses to the shutdowns, his delegation to the military of responsibility for maintaining order and minimizing economic disruptions, and his restraint of extreme leftists strengthened his authority. For the present, he is in a stronger position to deal with the rivalries within his own coalition. He has laid the groundwork for blaming his opponents for the inevitable long-term damage to the already battered economy. Moreover, the prolonged shutdowns have allowed the administration to take over commercial, distributive, transport, and industrial activities--some of which may be retained--in a pattern already established under Allende. Consonant with his style of appearing to compromise, he will probably avoid obviously punitive measures except against those protestors charged with criminal acts.

A key element for Allende during the protest was his confidence that he could rely on the armed services to carry out their responsibilities under the state of emergency that he promptly declared. This response by the military reaffirms their commitment to support the constitutional government. Although some officers were sympathetic to the opposition movement, there is no evidence that any of them dragged their feet in containing the shutdowns and the attempts to incite violence. They appear to agree with Allende's charges that many of the disturbances were aimed at discrediting the military as well as at weakening the government.

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