



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
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
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CYPRUS

Turkey has sent an artillery battalion to Cyprus. The US defense attaché in Ankara reports that some 850 troops in combat gear were loaded on a transport ship in the port of Mersin on Thursday. The reinforcements are about equal in number to the Turkish troops withdrawn from the island last week.

A few days earlier, the attaché observed artillery pieces for a battalion in the railyard at Mersin. The attaché's counterpart in Nicosia reported the arrival of artillery equipment at Famagusta on February 11.

[Redacted]

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On the diplomatic front, all parties involved in the Cyprus problem have indicated that they will not press for a UN Security Council meeting before next week. No resolutions have been submitted.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] The Greeks will probably want something stronger than a mere reaffirmation of previous UN resolutions.

The Chinese ambassador is the council president this month, and he is likely to continue the low profile China adopted during the council debates on Cyprus last summer.

Moscow, on the other hand, will push its demands for unity and integrity of the island and oppose the creation of a separate Turkish Cypriot state. For their part, the West Europeans' reactions have not jelled.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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USSR

In a speech yesterday honoring visiting British Prime Minister Wilson, Soviet party chief Brezhnev spoke positively about detente, but he was critical of Western behavior in many of its components and was relatively cool toward the US.

Brezhnev was transparently critical of US policy in the Middle East. While acknowledging that "partial measures" are useful if they are not merely a delaying tactic, he warned of "some who seem to want to offer the Arab peoples a soporific."

On the other hand, Brezhnev did stress the determination of Soviet leaders to make detente irreversible. He referred to "positive changes that have occurred in relations with the West, but in this context he listed the US after France and West Germany. Brezhnev made no mention of the Vladivostok summit or of SALT, although he spoke of curbing the arms race. On a similar occasion last month during Australian Prime Minister Whitlam's visit, Premier Kosygin went out of his way to stress the importance to detente of the US-Soviet arms limitation agreements.

Brezhnev also referred to the slow pace of CSCE and did not issue the customary call for a rapid conclusion of the present state and movement to a summit-level finale. His remarks on MBFR were limited to criticism of the West for seeking "one-sided advantages." Some of Brezhnev's sharpness was probably directed at the British, who have tended to be resistant in East-West negotiations.

Brezhnev's approach--combining a strong commitment to detente with criticism of some of its specifics--is similar to that taken recently by other influential Soviets. President Podgorny, in an article appearing in Izvestia on February 12, said that the USSR wants to further improve its relations with the US and other Western nations. Podgorny stated that Moscow is willing to take practical new steps to advance military detente as well as economic and political cooperation. He also repeated familiar--occasionally pointed--criticism of the US and its allies.

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WESTERN EUROPE

The four-nation consortium that is to meet in Brussels on Monday is unlikely to make a final recommendation on a replacement for the F-104 aircraft. [redacted]

[redacted]

The consortium's steering committee of military experts will probably be directed to explore whether the US and French manufacturers will give firmer price guarantees for new fighter aircraft.

[redacted]

The question of price guarantees will probably be crucial, given inflation and the fluctuation of currency exchange rates. Aware of budgetary limitations, Dutch Defense Minister Vredeling earlier this week stressed in parliament the need to prevent price escalation. He flatly rejected, however, the suggestion of leftists in his own Labor Party that the Netherlands should purchase a cheaper and less versatile plane--the F-5E produced by Northrop.

[redacted]

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COLOMBIA-CUBA

Colombia apparently is close to a renewal of relations with Cuba. Foreign Minister Lievano recently announced publicly that he would have important news regarding Cuba "soon."

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The Colombian attitude toward Cuba has generally paralleled the Venezuelan view. During mid-1974, both countries considered a joint announcement of relations with Havana, but those plans fell through. On December 29, Caracas moved on its own.

The opposition Conservative Party has launched a campaign in the Colombian press aimed at undermining or at least slowing the overtures to Cuba. President Lopez is unlikely to be deterred, however, and his party's control of congress precludes legislative roadblocks.

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SOUTH KOREA

President Pak has followed up his referendum victory with an announcement that political opponents jailed last year under emergency security decrees will soon be released. More than 150 prisoners may be freed, including two Japanese citizens. Excepted from the wholesale amnesty will be a number of persons accused of being communist agents and sympathizers.

The best known among those scheduled for early release is Roman Catholic Bishop Chi Hak-sun, one of South Korea's leading social activists. There is some government concern that the outspoken bishop will issue a strong public statement following his release.

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FOR THE RECORD

Ecuador: An Ecuadorean appeals court has ratified the penalties imposed on five of the seven US tuna boats currently in detention. Penalties against the other two vessels are also likely to be sustained. Fines and fees levied against the seven boats total nearly \$2 million. The boats' catch, worth just over \$1 million delivered in California, has been confiscated. Five of the boats could have fished legally had they been licensed--at a total cost of about \$140,000--but the other two were ineligible for licenses. The tuna run continues to be excellent within Ecuador's claimed territorial sea. Other boats are reportedly fishing in the area. Most are unlicensed, and more seizures can be expected.

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Japan: Tokyo yesterday announced a modest antirecession program designed to boost the sagging economy. New measures will include additional loans to industries, encouragement of more banking credit for housing construction, and full disbursement of nearly \$5 billion in public works spending over the next two months. The measures come on the heels of a sharp drop in economic activity in the past three months. Unemployment also is at a 20-year high. The moves will help, but the depth of the present slump makes rapid recovery unlikely.

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Israel Believes Risks Serious  
In Any Golan Withdrawal

Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights will become the focus of Middle East peacemaking efforts within the next month or so. The UN mandate to supervise the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement expires on May 30, and it is doubtful that Syria will renew it unless there is progress toward another Israeli withdrawal on the Golan.

A Golan pullback presents Tel Aviv with much greater military and domestic political problems than a similar move in the Sinai where, as Prime Minister Rabin recently said, the size of the area makes it possible for Israel to take risks in the step-by-step process.

In Tel Aviv's view, the risks in the Golan area are all but unacceptable. Even in exchange for a final peace treaty, Tel Aviv is not prepared to return to Syria--which Israel regards as its most implacable foe--all of the territory captured in the 1967 war. To do so would give Damascus control of territory from which Syrian gunners for 18 years fired directly into Israel.

Israel sees the Golan Heights, even though no wider than 12 miles, as a battlefield where the Syrians can be defeated before they reach Israel proper. The Israelis would view even a partial pullback as a threat to their ability to dominate this battlefield.

The Israelis have gone to enormous expense to construct an interlocking set of fortifications along the present disengagement lines. They have built large numbers of heavily fortified strongpoints, minefields, trenches, and anti-tank ditches. The cost involved will be cited by opponents of even a partial pullback to argue that Israel's financially strapped government cannot afford to keep on dismantling and rebuilding these fortifications, and that it must get a full peace agreement with Syria before any withdrawal.

**National Intelligence Bulletin** February 15, 1975Limited Room

Although there appears to be only limited room for compromise on Tel Aviv's part, some Israeli flexibility may remain. Rabin, despite recent unyielding statements on the subject, probably still believes that there is "maneuvering space"--as he put it last September.

As is the case with the Sinai, Israeli policy-makers probably find it easier to visualize in a final peace treaty than in an interim agreement what territory on the Golan might be returned. Their price for a pullback on the Golan will include:

- Syrian political concessions.
- Demilitarization of the area relinquished.
- Interposition of an international supervisory force.
- --A promise of some sort of security guarantee against Syrian attack.

The territory Israel occupies on the Golan is larger than is strictly necessary for Israel's defense. Tel Aviv could give up a good part of it without substantially increasing the risk of Syrian harassing fire into the valley settlements in northern Israel, provided Syrian field artillery is barred from the area.

A partial withdrawal in the area south of Al-Qunaytirah to a point past the Rafid junction would probably be the least objectionable from Tel Aviv's standpoint. There are few settlements in this area, and the government might agree that a pullback there would not unduly risk the security of the remaining settlements or of northern Israel if the vacated area were at least demilitarized.

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The Settlements

The 19 Jewish settlements on the Golan are a complicating factor. Many of them were built to strengthen Israel's claim to the area. Their existence cuts into the government's ability to obtain domestic political support for any withdrawals. Several of these settlements lie almost athwart the present disengagement line. The political influence of these settlers far outweighs their number--fewer than 2,000. All of the settlements are linked in one way or another with Rabin's own Labor Party or with one of his two coalition partners. The settlers, regardless of political affiliation, will oppose any withdrawal on the Golan.

From the standpoint of the settlements, a withdrawal from areas in the southern Golan might be the most difficult. The conservative National Religious Party, Rabin's major coalition partner and a firm opponent of large-scale territorial concessions outside the Sinai, is a sponsor of several southern Golan settlements. Settlements in the northern Golan are affiliated with political parties that have shown a greater disposition toward territorial concessions, but the strip of Israeli-occupied territory bordering on Syria, Lebanon, and Israel is very narrow, and the government will fight hard to keep it.

Political Survival

Rabin recognizes that his political survival could easily be affected by the nature and outcome of an interim settlement with Damascus that required a pullback of Israeli forces. He has powerful domestic political incentives to stall for time before entering into talks with the Syrians and, once talks begin, to maintain a tough negotiating stance.

Flexibility will probably not be introduced into the Israeli bargaining position until there is some assurance of Syrian political concessions.

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