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
# National Intelligence Bulletin

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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December 5, 1975



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


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
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### USSR

Most of the limited amount of press coverage of President Ford's trip to Peking has been devoted to lambasting the Chinese for their "vicious attacks" on the Soviet Union's policies of detente.

By reporting all US statements emanating from Peking in defense of detente, the Soviets have implicitly indicated satisfaction with the way the President has defended the improvement in US relations with the USSR.

Moscow has prepared its domestic audience to expect some progress on trade and in scientific and cultural exchanges as a result of the trip. It has also reminded the Soviet people that the US and China have common ground on some foreign policy issues like Angola and the Middle East. On the whole, however, most Soviet officials seem to believe—and Soviet media have so indicated—that there will be no significant improvement in Sino-US relations.

So far, Moscow has not expressed its concern to the domestic audience about one particularly sensitive subject—the possibility of military cooperation between China and the US. This theme has appeared in Moscow's overseas propaganda broadcasts ever since the US press raised the possibility earlier this fall.

One such broadcast just prior to the President's departure even implied that military cooperation would be on the agenda during the President's visit. The broadcast, noting that Peking has supported keeping American forces in Asia in the hope of getting something in return, quoted one Western press account that the Chinese were allegedly interested in transport planes, armored carriers, tanks, and fighter planes. [REDACTED]

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**PHILIPPINES**

Activist Catholic priests and nuns, labor union leaders, and members of the pro-Peking Communist Party are planning a protest rally in Manila to coincide with President Ford's visit on December 6. Although the main focus of the rally will be opposition to a recent labor decree by President Marcos, the Communists hope to take advantage of the demonstration to agitate against the US presence in the Philippines.

The church-labor-Communist coalition has organized several successful rallies in the past, the latest a gathering of some 4,000 in late November. The demonstrations have been peaceful, but they are embarrassing to the Marcos regime. The church has been the main center of public opposition to Marcos since he declared martial law in September 1972.

The target of the latest round of rallies is a presidential labor decree of early October that, among other things, imposes a total ban on strikes and prohibits foreigners from engaging in trade union activities. Missionary priests, many of whom are foreigners, are among the most active union organizers and supporters of labor activities. Moreover, some priests fear that the decree may be part of a broader attempt by Marcos to neutralize the church's effectiveness as a means for organizing opposition.

The Communists have had little success since martial law in organizing protests on their own. Arrests and surveillance have seriously disrupted the party's organization and undermined its ability to conduct antigovernment activities. As a result, the Communists have paid increasing attention to cultivating the more radical Catholic activists.

Not all activist priests are comfortable with their new allies, despite a confluence of interests in many areas. It is possible that the moderates within both the church and the labor movement may decide that holding a protest rally during President Ford's visit could do more harm than good. It could precipitate a major government crackdown and might cause Marcos to carry out recent veiled threats that his government is considering new restrictions against foreign priests who work in the Philippines. [REDACTED]

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### PORTUGAL

Portugal's ruling Revolutionary Council yesterday pressed ahead with plans to prosecute those responsible for the paratroop rebellion last week and continued the purge of pro-Communists from its ranks.

The Council named air force Brigadier Luis Araujo to head a commission of inquiry to look into events surrounding the uprising and instructed investigative organs to prepare legal proceedings against the accused.

Approximately 100 soldiers have been arrested, and others are still being sought. All of those implicated have been military personnel, but the government has averred that they were part of a larger plot with broad political implications.

The naval high command announced the arrest yesterday of pro-Communist naval Lieutenant Commander Almada Contreiras, and a warrant has been issued for the arrest of his deputy. Contreiras also was removed from the Revolutionary Council. His departure leaves only one pro-Communist still on the Council—navy Commander Martins Guerreiro.

The military purge—which has now claimed 36 members of Prime Minister Azevedo's personal staff—yesterday prompted an outcry from the Communist Party newspaper *Avante*. In a front-page editorial, the paper appealed for an end to the purges and arrests, charging that they were part of a witch-hunt by reactionary forces.

The Communists have been placed increasingly on the defensive by the sharp reversals in party fortunes, which began in September with the overthrow of pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves. But they still appear unprepared to accept the conditions recently set forth by the Socialists for their continued participation in the cabinet—repudiation of the military uprising and a pledge of loyalty to the Azevedo government.

In rejecting the Socialist demands, *Avante* said yesterday that a capitulation by the party on such a matter of principle was neither viable nor possible.

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### SPAIN

King Juan Carlos does not appear to be having as much success getting a new prime minister as he did in having his candidate installed as president of the parliament.

Juan Carlos probably would like to replace Prime Minister Arias soon. By choosing a new prime minister with a liberal image, the King could emphasize his break with Francoism and signal to the leftist opposition that he is serious about liberalizing the political system.

Adding to the pressures for an early change are reports that the Prime Minister would like to retire now. His personal loyalties lay with Franco, and he would rather end his career as Franco's last prime minister than as Juan Carlos' first. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Arias is physically and emotionally worn out from the stresses of Franco's protracted illness.

There are, on the other hand, several reasons for delaying the choice of a new prime minister:

--Rightists, miffed by their failure to secure the retention of Rodriguez de Valcarcel as president of the parliament, and fearing that Juan Carlos will appoint a liberal prime minister, have apparently stiffened their resistance to changes in the government and thrown their support behind Arias.

--Disagreements among the 17-man Council of the Realm over nominations for the presidency of the parliament may have caused the King to have second thoughts about the Council's readiness to accept his choice for the more important, and more emotionally charged, appointment of a new prime minister. The Council has the statutory power to refuse to place the King's nominee on the slate of three names from which he must choose the new prime minister.

--The tenure of a "transition" prime minister would at best be precarious. It could well last only a few months, or until Juan Carlos has had a better chance to gauge the political temperature of the country.

If the King decides to replace Arias now, he will probably wait a week or so until he and Fernandez-Miranda are assured of enough support from the Council of the Realm. Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Arias for several months—according to press reports, the King has asked Arias to stay on "temporarily"—he will almost certainly go ahead with a major cabinet shuffle, bringing in figures more acceptable to the center-left and the non-Communist opposition.

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
The left, already impatient with the lack of significant liberalization since Juan Carlos took over, is stepping up its protest activity. The Madrid construction workers' strike which took place on December 3 was relatively unsuccessful—partly because of confusion and poor organization—but more serious strikes and demonstrations are scheduled for next week. In Madrid, plans are being made for a Socialist demonstration on December 8, a demonstration by political prisoners in the main prison on December 9, and strikes by construction and metal workers on December 10 and 11. The strikes will initially be confined to the Madrid area, but if successful there they will spread to Barcelona and various Basque cities.

The Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions hope to use these local strikes to build support for their long-standing goal of a paralyzing national strike, perhaps early in the new year. [redacted]

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### SPANISH SAHARA

Morocco is moving rapidly to consolidate its foothold in Spanish Sahara.

Numerous Moroccan officials have traveled to the territorial capital of El Aaiun to participate in the new administration. Postal services, airline connections, and telephone links have been set up. On Monday, Morocco's deputy governor, Ahmed Bensouda, visited the north-central town of Semara, which Moroccan troops occupied on November 27.

Morocco's claim that Saharan views are being taken into account was buttressed on November 29 when the Saharan territorial general assembly formally approved the recent Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement and declared allegiance to King Hassan. A Spanish correspondent reports, however, that fewer than one third of the assembly's members were in attendance at the special meeting. A delegation of representatives of the assembly and tribal chiefs, claiming to represent all Saharans, flew to Rabat on Tuesday to give their allegiance to King Hassan.

Algeria's public reaction to Morocco's growing presence in Sahara has become more acrimonious. The Algerian media have accused Spanish officials of facilitating Rabat's take-over of Semara and some outposts in the northern part of the territory.

The Algerian press and radio are highlighting the activities of the Polisario Front, a Saharan independence movement backed by Algiers. The Front is alleging Moroccan atrocities against civilians in Sahara and says it is fighting fierce battles against invading Moroccan forces. Clashes between Moroccan troops and Polisario guerrillas have been occurring for several weeks in the northeast, but most have probably been small-scale skirmishes contesting control of areas abandoned last month by Spanish forces.

The Algerians reinforced their western borders with Morocco and Spanish Sahara last month and continue to make limited military preparations.

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Algeria has steadfastly maintained that it has no territorial claim to Sahara and is likely to limit its involvement in the dispute to backing the Polisario Front in a sustained insurgency effort. The Algerians, believing that time works in favor of liberation movements, hope the Polisario Front will tie down the Moroccans for a long time.

Algiers is still maneuvering at the UN for a formal disavowal of the tripartite agreement and is unlikely to undertake direct action that would prejudice its case with the same nonaligned nations it needs to support a General Assembly resolution calling for a referendum on self-determination.



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The Spanish seem committed to the recent agreement and are accelerating their withdrawal from the territory to avoid involvement in any hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front or Algeria. Spanish press reports from El Aaiun claim the withdrawal may be completed by the end of this month or in early January—well in advance of the scheduled February deadline.

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### TURKEY

Continuing student unrest and attendant left-right violence are heightening the military's concern over the government's ability to govern.

Turkish General Staff officers reportedly expect General Staff Chief Sancar to relay the military's growing impatience to Prime Minister Demirel in a private meeting today. Sancar's criticism reportedly will focus on the government's failure to make progress on the Cyprus problem and its inability to control student violence, which continues to take lives and disrupt classes on many Turkish university campuses.

The General Staff officers want Sancar again to warn Demirel—as he reportedly did early last month—that the military cannot stand by while the political climate deteriorates to the point that military intervention might be required, as occurred in 1971. Sancar is also expected to advise Demirel to begin preparations for instituting martial law in Istanbul and Ankara provinces as a possible means of controlling the wave of violence.

Perhaps in anticipation of a stern warning from Sancar, Demirel held a lengthy cabinet session yesterday, after which it was announced the government was taking all necessary measures against "those who would provoke anarchy."

Military fears about the student disorders may have been fanned earlier this week by the murder of two students in Istanbul. A wave of sympathy demonstrations followed in Ankara and Izmir as well as in Istanbul.

These incidents provoked another round of bitter recrimination among Turkey's major political parties. Demirel's Justice Party Council accused Ecevit's oppositionists of "moving the political struggle into the streets" in an effort to seize power. The opposition responded by charging that the instigators of the violence were hidden within the government—a reference to Demirel's right-wing coalition partners—and that the disorders were being used to divert public attention from internal divisions in the coalition and from Turkey's increasingly serious economic and social problems.

There is no evidence that the military is preparing to go beyond putting pressure on the government to act, but the increasing violence and the near paralysis of the government brought on by the continual squabbling among politicians are clearly testing the patience of military leaders. Most senior officers appear to have little desire at this time to take on Turkey's seemingly intractable problems, but some of the more enthusiastic junior officers may not have the same reluctance.

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### FRANCE

Paris has acted swiftly against radicals trying to organize unions in French military units stationed in France and West Germany.

The government arrested 15 recruits on charges of "actions detrimental to the national defense." The 15 allegedly were involved with West German and Portuguese extremists, as well as with French opposition parties and labor unions, in efforts to undermine military discipline. Two of the recruits had been members of the Socialist Party. The 15 recruits could be sentenced to five to ten years in jail.

Two regional officers of a Socialist-leaning trade union have been arrested on similar charges. The police have also detained several other union officials for questioning.

French leftists have reacted with restraint, but they continue to insist on improvements in the conditions of military life. Leftists deny they intend to unionize the military. Leftist party and union members charge that the government has overreacted to the recruits' efforts to obtain greater freedom of expression and association and better grievance procedures already available in other West European nations' armed forces.

The issues have been confused by the careless interchange of terms like "military unions," "soldiers' committees," and "military consultative commissions." Unions and committees are opposed by most French political parties, but the opposition and even some government members support consultative commissions.

The arrests may have been in response to growing concern among senior military men. General Bigeard, the number-two man in the Defense Ministry, told a US official on November 26 that neither the defense minister nor the President had been very concerned about the recent activity until he and the chief of the General Staff threatened to resign if strong action was not taken.

Within a week, the arrests had been made, and last week Prime Minister Chirac made a hard-hitting speech to the National Assembly on the issue. Chirac singled out the French Socialists for special attack, accusing them of trying to undermine military discipline.

The Socialists, who strongly oppose extremist activity among the military and unionization in particular, were caught off guard by the arrests. A senior party official now says the two arrested Socialists were being expelled from the party at the time of their arrest.

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Chirac sees the Socialists as a major threat to his Gaullist party, and his words may have been sharpened by concern over the Socialists' increasing popularity among recruits—a reflection of a general trend in French society. So far, the clearest result of the government's actions has been a closing of ranks in the fragmented left.

The French military does have problems. Sheltered from social changes since 1968, the military has resisted modernization. The problem is partly the result of budgetary constraints, but French soldiers are aware that it is not greater financial resources that enables many West European armies to grant more personal and political freedoms to draftees than are available in France.

Attempts have been made over the past year to respond to military discontent, and the government's immediate response to the current unrest reaffirms the thinking of the military leadership that, while only a small minority of its personnel is involved, such activities cannot be ignored. The government will have to undertake additional efforts to create a more flexible military structure attuned to the needs and grievances of the recruits, if unrest is to be dealt with effectively.

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**CUBA**

Havana has announced that a strip of coastal waters approximately 75 nautical miles in length around the Cuban capital will be closed to shipping during darkness hours from December 10 to 28 because of military exercises. No ships will be permitted to enter the zone without prior authorization.

The rationale for this unprecedented closure is questionable; it is much more likely that the action was taken as a security measure against raids by Cuban exiles intent on embarrassing the Castro regime during the first Cuban Communist Party congress, which is scheduled for this month. In the past, exiles using armed launches have staged hit-and-run attacks on the Cuban coast, [redacted]

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There have been unconfirmed reports that General Secretary Brezhnev may attend the congress. His presence would lead the Cubans to undertake extraordinary security precautions. The unusual length of the closure was probably necessary because the specific dates of the congress have not yet been announced—possibly a reflection of uncertainty over attendance by Brezhnev. [redacted]

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**ARGENTINA**

President Peron's inattention to official duties continues to generate political uncertainty.

Despite the impression given by Interior Minister Robledo that relations between President Peron, the cabinet, and Peronist party officials are normal, she remains inaccessible to all but a few. She reportedly has failed to attend two scheduled cabinet meetings and has spent only about five hours in her office since her release from the hospital on November 13.

One of the most respected retired military generals, Alcides Lopez Aufrane, has defended the armed forces' right to intervene when basic liberties seem threatened or when the country is faced with chaos. Although a military move against Peron is still not considered imminent, the general's remarks could be intended to test the public's reaction to such a development and indicate that such currents are still in the air. [redacted]

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
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
VENEZUELA: Caracas' purchase last week of an unusually large quantity of Argentine wheat, yellow corn, and sorghum grains appears to have been motivated in large part by anger over the US Trade Reform Act, which excluded Venezuela and other OPEC members from the generalized system of preferences. President Perez personally intervened in negotiations with Argentine officials and instructed Finance Minister Hector Hurtado to negotiate a large contract, contrary to the advice of senior Venezuelan marketing officials, who normally handle such matters. In the past, nearly all of Venezuela's needs for imported wheat were filled by purchases from the US. The shift in suppliers, in addition to reflecting Venezuela's ire over the trade act, shows Perez' interest in solidifying Argentina's cooperation on hemispheric issues of interest to Venezuela.

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