


Top Secret 217
(Security Classification)

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.		DATE	

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday March 1, 1977 CG NIDC 77-048C



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, March 1, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

25X1

CONTENTS

UGANDA: Situation Report Page 1

CUBA-UGANDA: Cubans Allegedly in Uganda Page 3

CHINA-USSR: Ilichev Goes Home Page 4

INTERNATIONAL: Eurocommunism Page 5

SOUTH KOREA: Anticipating Dissidence Page 7

JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Relations Page 9

EL SALVADOR: Post-Election Trouble Page 10

ANGOLA-ZAIRE: Relations Page 11

MOROCCO-OAU: Relations Page 12

25X1

UGANDA: Situation Report

25X1 [redacted] According to Radio Uganda, President Amin asserted today that the Americans are free to go anywhere they like, inside or outside Uganda.

25X1 [redacted] The Ugandan charge in Washington, who has taken a relaxed position throughout the affair, also has asserted that US citizens in Uganda were free to leave the country whenever they wished.

25X1 [redacted] Amin's second postponement of his meeting with the Americans may be the result of problems in organizing the meeting, a further effort by Amin to garner more international attention for the session, or Amin's growing preoccupation with his own internal troubles.

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] Amin, who repeatedly links the US and Israel in his bombastic speeches, has publicly drawn a connection between the invasion he alleges the US is planning and the Israeli rescue operation.

25X1

[Redacted] On the other hand, Amin, citing similar meetings he has had with other expatriate communities, has publicly reiterated assurances that the US citizens are in no danger and that he only wants to express his gratitude for their service in Uganda. Amin met with several US employees of Ugandan airlines yesterday and praised them for their contribution to Uganda. Amin has also acknowledged receipt of messages from several African and Arab heads of state by assuring them of the safety of the US citizens.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] A Tass broadcast criticizing the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean alleges that the US fleet is threatening East African countries, including Uganda. This is the first public Soviet comment on the current situation in Uganda, but it appears to have been added to the article as an afterthought. The brief comment stops short of defending Amin's action against Americans in Uganda but it does imply that they are not being detained.

25X1

[Redacted] More authoritative Soviet comment may not be forthcoming until either the OAU or the African states being courted by the USSR take a public stand. The Soviets themselves have been the victim of Amin's erratic behavior and almost certainly do not want to take the lead in defending Amin's latest adventure.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

CUBA-UGANDA: Cubans Allegedly in Uganda

[REDACTED]

25X6

[REDACTED] //If Cuban military personnel are in Kampala, their duties are likely to include flying and maintaining Soviet-supplied fighter aircraft and setting up and manning an air defense system. Setting up an air defense system was also one of the first activities the Cubans undertook in Angola. The Ugandans already have some antiaircraft artillery.//

[REDACTED] Since opening an embassy in Kampala a little over a year ago, Cuba has demonstrated mounting interest in Uganda. The Cubans probably hope to establish a broad range of contacts in the Ugandan military, which would leave them in a good position regardless of Amin's tenure in office.

[REDACTED] //The first sign of possible military cooperation between the two countries came in late January--before the current ferment in Uganda. The Cubans sent an unusually high-ranking military officer--Deputy Armed Forces Minister Francisco Cabrera--to head the delegation to the sixth anniversary of the Uganda military government. [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

[REDACTED] According to a press report, another Cuban military delegation visited Uganda early last week. We cannot confirm this visit, but a Cuban delegation led by Division General Arnaldo Ochoa--who heads Cuba's Western Army--arrived in Ethiopia on February 23 and may have been proceeding from Uganda. Ochoa has been used by the Cubans in the past to arrange military aid to several African countries.

[REDACTED]




CHINA-USSR: Ilichev Goes Home


25X1 [redacted] The chief Soviet negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev, left China for home yesterday following three months of apparently fruitless talks. He was seen off by his Chinese counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan.

25X1 [redacted] There had been speculation in Peking for several weeks that Ilichev would leave soon because of the lack of progress in the talks. He is scheduled to accompany Soviet President Podgorny on a visit to Africa in mid-March.

25X1 [redacted] Ilichev arrived in Peking last November after an absence of 18 months, the longest since the talks began in October 1969. The Soviets seemed pleased with widespread press speculation that his return to Peking signaled imminent progress in the long-stalemated border issue. The speculation was based largely on the fact that Ilichev's return came soon after Mao Tse-tung's death and the purge of China's leading leftists.

25X1 [redacted] The Chinese, on the other hand, were quick to point out that they expected little from Ilichev's return. They frequently reiterated their major foreign policy objectives, one of which is firm opposition to what they see as Soviet "expansionism." Privately, the Chinese told foreign officials in Peking that the Soviet negotiator brought no meaningful new proposals to the table and that Chinese attitudes on the border issue remained as firm as ever. China also asserted that the USSR's positive characterizations of the talks were intended for Washington's benefit. [redacted]





INTERNATIONAL: Eurocommunism

Leaders of three "Eurocommunist" parties--Berlinguer of Italy, Marchais of France, and Carrillo of Spain--are planning a two-day summit meeting in Madrid beginning Wednesday. Their intention apparently is to meet privately and then hold a press conference. They have not asked the Spanish government's permission, and Madrid may still try to prevent the meeting.

The main purpose of the meeting is to highlight the position of the Spanish party, which is waiting for the supreme court to rule on its legal status before the legislative election this spring. In addition, the three leaders almost certainly will discuss dissidence and political repression in the USSR and Eastern Europe. They may not take a public stand on this issue. If they do, none seems likely to diverge much from the positions he has taken in the past.

25X1 [redacted] //The Soviet and Czechoslovak regimes are already annoyed by persistent criticism from the West European communist parties. The Soviets may fear that the summit will strengthen the concept of Eurocommunism and that it will give dissidents the idea that their struggle is backed by a regional center of Western communists. [redacted] the Soviets are trying hard to prevent the Western parties from adopting stronger positions against political repression by the Soviet and East European regimes.//

25X1 [redacted] Each of the three parties has some compelling domestic reasons for repeating their past criticisms of the USSR. The Spanish party wants to remind the supreme court both that it has no formal ties to the USSR and that it has long been the most outspoken Western party in criticizing the Soviets. The French party, facing a crucial election next year, is trying hard to erase its reputation as the most pro-Soviet party in the West. The Italian party is under constant challenge from Christian Democrats and Socialists to prove that it has also broken its ties with Moscow.

25X1 [redacted] //At the same time, the Italians have no intention of courting trouble either with Moscow or with the minority of Italian Communists who are still uncritically pro-Soviet. Top party leaders draw a careful distinction between individual instances of repression and the Eastern brand of communism, refusing to admit that repression is a product of the system. Gianni Cervetti, a Berlinguer lieutenant, recently promised Soviet leaders that Italian party handling of the civil liberties question would be restrained.//

25X1 [redacted] Although Marchais has been making headlines by criticizing Prague's handling of the Charter 77 human rights advocates, the French party leadership has also clearly underlined the distinction between single cases of repression and the system.

25X1 [redacted] Both Italian and French communists admit that they cannot give up the idea that the establishment of the Soviet state and system was a landmark in history. They are likely to hold to this line, whatever problems it may cause. Indeed, despite their immediate problems with Soviet policy, they consider that Soviet power is a long-range factor working in their favor. It is not certain that Carrillo shares this view.

25X1 [redacted] Carrillo, in fact, is under intense domestic pressure to demonstrate his party's independence from the Soviets with a strong condemnation of Soviet and East European repression.

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Carrillo has admitted that he cannot predict what Marchais and Berlinguer will agree to put into the communique, but by making his own views clear in advance he probably hopes to gain credit even if the other leaders soft-pedal the issue. Other Spanish communists have also reportedly been making it a point to speak harshly of the USSR and even to question whether the Soviet system can be described as socialist.

25X1 [redacted] Thus the Madrid summit can be expected to produce a restatement of views already set down at bilateral meetings of party leaders. It will exploit the symbolism of Eurocommunism, an appellation that the Western parties evidently find useful and that disturbs the Soviets. Beyond this, no challenge to Moscow is likely.

25X1 [redacted] For their part, the Soviets clearly would prefer not to aggravate their quarrel with the Western parties and are unlikely to pick a fight so long as the latter avoid direct criticism of Moscow. [redacted] 25X1

SOUTH KOREA: Anticipating Dissidence

25X1 [redacted] //The South Korean government will probably soon face the delicate problem of how to respond to a renewal of protest activity by political dissidents.//


25X1 [redacted] //Today is the anniversary of the founding of the Korean independence movement against the Japanese occupation and of the protest in Myongdong Cathedral last year. Early

this month the university students return to the campuses after a long winter vacation. In the past, the return of the students has often meant political ferment in South Korea.//


25X1




25X1

 //In an apparent effort to head off any significant resumption of protest activity, the Pak government is now backing off from the selective relaxation of political controls it began late last year. Pak's tougher stance recently appears to be a warning to dissidents that turmoil will not be tolerated during the spring months.//

25X1

 //Actions the government has taken to warn potential demonstrators include a series of tough law-and-order statements by top officials, some by Pak himself; several fairly harsh court sentences for violators of Emergency Measure 9, the 1975 law that includes bans against the spreading of "false" rumors and criticism of the present constitution;

25X1



25X1 [redacted] //In general, Pak's somewhat harder line now does not preclude additional easing of controls if the situation remains fairly calm over the next two months or so. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Relations

25X1 [redacted] The South Korean government seems convinced that the high officials it sent to Japan in February helped to shore up Japanese support for South Korea.

25X1 [redacted] South Korea's major objective in sending the foreign minister, the speaker of the National Assembly, and former prime minister Kim Chong-pil to Japan apparently was to obtain more forthright assurances from the Japanese that Tokyo is opposed to early US troop withdrawals from Korea. The South Koreans were dissatisfied with diffident Japanese public statements on the issue during Vice President Mondale's visit to Tokyo.

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The South Koreans were also pleased with the generally supportive approach taken by Japanese members of the South Korea - Japan Parliamentarians Association and by what they see as an improvement in the tone of Tokyo's press coverage of Korea.

[redacted] Neither South Korea nor Japan has illusions about the prospects for smooth relations in the future. Many problems remain; they include Tokyo's slowness in ratifying the South Korea - Japan Continental Shelf Agreement, [redacted]

[redacted] and Seoul's wariness of Japanese gestures toward North Korea. [redacted]

EL SALVADOR: Post-Election Trouble

[redacted] Violence broke out early yesterday when Salvadoran army troops and police cleared demonstrators out of San Salvador's main plaza. Three youths were killed and several persons injured.

[redacted] The demonstrators, mostly youths, were protesting the outcome of the presidential election of February 20. They had occupied the plaza since Thursday, and at one time attracted a crowd of 50,000 people.

[redacted] Supporters of the defeated candidate, Colonel Ernesto Claramount, charge that the government rigged the election by padding the voter rolls and stuffing ballot boxes. The government did in fact tamper with the election results, but probably would have won anyway.

[redacted] General Carlos Romero, the candidate of the ruling conservative National Conciliation Party, was declared the winner with some 68 percent of the vote. Claramount, who had been leading the demonstrations--vowing at one point to continue until the government met his demand for a new election--left the country for Costa Rica yesterday.

[redacted] The government declared a 30-day state of siege yesterday, which limits political meetings and rallies. The declaration, and recent actions by the army and police, will

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8

probably put an end to further large demonstrations, but lingering unrest aggravated by the three killings could spark more trouble. There is virtually no chance that the government will accede to demands for a new election. [REDACTED]

25X1

ANGOLA-ZAIRE: Relations

25X1

[REDACTED] President Neto of Angola appears to have no intention of improving relations with Zaire as long as he is faced with a serious insurgency.

25X1

[REDACTED] Despite President Mobutu's announcement in early January that he was recognizing Neto's government, and despite Zairian steps to reduce support sharply for Angolan dissident groups, both Neto and his foreign minister have in the past two weeks criticized Zaire for permitting Angola's enemies to operate from bases inside Zaire. Neto recently accused the US of sending soldiers to Zaire to prepare for a military attack on Angola.

25X1

[REDACTED] While Mobutu says he is not worried, Neto's strong antipathy for him, stemming from the Angolan civil war, remains a barrier to better relations. In addition, relations will be strained by the insurgency in Angola, which will continue for some time, no matter what Mobutu does to prevent help from reaching the insurgents from Zaire.

25X1

[REDACTED] All three insurgent groups, the Cabindan guerrillas, Holden Roberto's National Front, and Jonas Savimbi's National Union, could probably continue their present levels of activity. Savimbi's group in particular has recently enhanced its effectiveness at shutting down the Benguela railroad.

25X1

[REDACTED] Neto may believe he has to accuse Zaire of backing the guerrillas in order to avoid acknowledging his inability to put down the insurgency. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8

MOROCCO-OAU: Relations

25X1 [redacted] Morocco's decision to suspend participation in all the activities of the Organization of African Unity will hamper its efforts to prevent OAU consideration of the Western Sahara problem.

25X1 [redacted] Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki declared on Friday that Rabat's action was a protest against the dissemination by the OAU of a report charging Morocco and Gabon with complicity in the abortive coup in Benin on January 16. Morocco was also protesting the attendance at a recent OAU ministerial meeting of representatives of the Polisario Front, the group that is carrying on insurgency against Moroccan and Mauritanian control in Western Sahara.

25X1 [redacted] The Benin report was the principal reason for the Moroccan action. A senior Foreign Ministry official privately told US diplomats that Morocco had been prepared to limit its protest of Polisario presence at the meeting to boycotting the opening session. He emphasized that the Moroccan action does not constitute withdrawal from the OAU.

25X1 [redacted] The Moroccans apparently believe that neither their action nor the Benin report will have much effect on Algeria's effort to win sympathy on the Western Sahara issue. The official noted that Mauritania would defend Moroccan interests with regard to Western Sahara in the OAU.

25X1 [redacted] The Moroccans probably are over-optimistic. Algeria will certainly exploit the Benin report in its efforts to press its case on the Western Sahara and to portray Morocco as linked to "imperialism." While Algeria has been unable to promote much enthusiasm for the Polisario cause among the Black African states, sensitivity to outside interference in African affairs could lead some states to reassess their positions on the Western Sahara. [redacted]

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8
Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

(Security Classification) Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8