Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975 ROUTING E AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS TOP	-00.00
	Classification)
(Security (viassiiivaliVII)
HR.	
DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY	
DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION	
FILE RETURN INFORMATION SIGNATURE	
1 Intermediate Intermediate	
ME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE	
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:	
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE Saturday 15 April 1978 CG NIDC 78/088C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE Saturday 15 April 1978 CG NIDC 78/088C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Top S	




National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 15	April 1978.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of senior US officials.	of informing
CONTENTS	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissident Actions	Page 3
IRAQ: Support for Eritreans	Page 5
UK: Current Account Again in the Red	Page 6
AFGHANISTAN: Poppy Cultivation	Page 7
BRIEFS	Page 8
Turkey India-Pakistan	
South Korea	
<u> </u>	

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

•	
	,
	CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissident Actions
	Spokesmen for the Czechoslovak dissident movement Charter 77 have charged in an "open letter" to party and state leader Gustav Husak that Prague has "intensified repressions" since the conclusion of the European security review conference. To substantiate their allegations, they detail actions taken by the government since early March against six dissidents, including two Catholic priests.
	The dissidents, whose letter was published in the West German press on Tuesday, apparently hoped to embarrass Husak during his visit this week to West Germany. Husak encountered considerable criticism about Czechoslovakia's violations of human rights from the West German media.
	There is no evidence to substantiate the dissidents' contention that Prague, never light-handed in its treatment of

Decla	ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/13 : CIA-RDP79100975A030600010080-	ZoX1
25X1	dissenters, has inaugurated a new crackdown. If it has, the government is probably moving first against lesser known people whose cases do not command immediate Western attention. The "open letter" confirmed that long-time Charter 77 spokesman Jiri Hajek has stepped down; his loss could easily drain the movement of vitality. Hajek's replacement is Jaroslav Sabata, a reformist party functionary in 1968, who was given a six-and-one-half year prison sentence in August 1972 for disseminating leaflets reminding voters of their electoral rights. Sabata may be vulnerable to legal reprisals for his dissident activity because he is still on parole.	25X1
	F.	25X1
	4	25X1

IRAQ: Support for Eritreans
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Day of annian to in the Horn of Africa and com-
Developments in the Horn of Africa are complicating Iraq's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Developments in the Horn of Africa are complicating Iraq's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Developments in the Horn of Africa are complicating Iraq's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Developments in the Horn of Africa are complicating Iraq's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
plicating Iraq's relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean in-
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences.
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in improving bilateral relations, direct contacts have been es-
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in improving bilateral relations, direct contacts have been established between the Cuban Communist Party and Iraq's Baath Party, and Cubans are in Iraq training the Baath Party's para-
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in improving bilateral relations, direct contacts have been established between the Cuban Communist Party and Iraq's Baath
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in improving bilateral relations, direct contacts have been established between the Cuban Communist Party and Iraq's Baath Party, and Cubans are in Iraq training the Baath Party's para-
Baghdad is apprehensive that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia will be used in a campaign against the Eritrean insurgents, who have received military and financial aid from Iraq for at least six years. Iraq probably pressed the issue during the visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca to Baghdad last month. The final communique did not include any statement on the Horn of Africa, a clear indication that the two sides could not resolve their differences. The strain in Iraqi-Cuban relations, however, is probably limited and temporary. Both sides are interested in improving bilateral relations, direct contacts have been established between the Cuban Communist Party and Iraq's Baath Party, and Cubans are in Iraq training the Baath Party's para-

		•
I	An Iraqi diplomat in Moscow told a US Embassy official last week that the Soviets had pressed Iraq to end its aid to the Eritreans; the Iraqi said the Soviets did not press the point to the extent of harming their relations.	·
I	press the point to the extent of narming one in	2
I		
	UK: Current Account Again in the Red //Britain recorded a sizable current account deficit in March that brought the first quarter shortfall to \$400 million, compared with a \$600 million surplus in fourth quarter 1977. The swing is especially disturbing in light of the fiscal	
	stimulation package announced on Tuesday that will give further impetus to imports. London has halved its projected surplus for 1978 to \$1.4 billion.//	
	//The turnaround stems primarily from a sharp rise in imports. Imports rose more than 10 percent in volume from fourth quarter 1977 to first quarter 1978; the rise in part reflected the \$1.7 billion fiscal stimulus introduced in October. Purchases of finished manufactures have risen in particular after declining throughout the second half of 1977.//	
	//The return of the current account to deficit has been accompanied by a decline in the value of the pound.	
	6	
		2

•		
	Sterling has fallen from a high of \$1.96 in January to \$1.86 yesterday against a weakening dollar. The Bank of England apparently stepped in to support the pound after announcement of the unexpectedly large deficit in March.	25X1
25X1		
	AFGHANISTAN: Poppy Cultivation	
25X1	According to a senior UN narcotics official, opium poppy growing has increased markedly in at least one remote area of eastern Afghanistan. Afghan opiates so far have not been a significant problem for the US and Western Europe but, as efforts to control production in Mexico and the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia become more effective, international drug traffickers are almost certain to turn to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area.	
25X1	During a trip near the border, the official had difficulty finding any wheat, the traditional crop, but in one area there were poppies "as far as the eye could see." He was told that poppy acreage has more than doubled in the past year and that improved technology has resulted in substantially increased yields. The farmers are using large amounts of commercial fertilizer and are staggering planting to allow a more efficient use of labor during the harvest.	
25X1	The Afghan Government's claim that it is unable to administer an efficient anti-poppy campaign in remote areas has some validity. The government's argument that only impoverished small farmers are involved in opium production, however, seems specious if the UN official's report of vast irrigated poppy fields is accurate.	
25X1	The picture is considerably better in another part of the country where the government, in a better position to enforce its laws and spurred on by the prospect that US funds for local development projects would be withheld, has already plowed under a third of an extensive opium poppy crop.	25.74
25X1	prowed under a chird of an excensive opidm poppy crop.	25X1
		25X1
	7	
		25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010080-3 3X1

		BRIEFS			
police wil	According to t l be hard-pres he capital tod	ssed to conti	rol a righti	st political	

Declassified in	Part - Sanitized Copy App	proved for Release 2012/06/13 :	CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010080	-3 _{_3X1}
				ř
	today and at a let the police forces-	an attempt to cope wit ftist rally scheduled f which the Embassy say ieswill be augmented cademy.	for 1 May in Istanbul, vs are suffering from	
25X1	and right has been The Embassy also be property; incident the totals for 19	has expressed concern f ts against Americans th	the country for months. For US personnel and his year already surpass ster Ecevit has resisted	25X1
	India-Pakistan			
25X1	old dispute over a interest by both ences. The terms of compromise under	an Indian hydroelectric India and Pakistan in r of the agreement are es	1976 when talks lapsed,	
25X1	built were alloca from 1960. The Pardesign for the darwater and that In terms of the comp than originally p	kistanis claimed that to m would allow India to dia therefore violated romise, the dam will be roposed. Pakistan will le India will be able	an agreement that dates the original Indian interrupt the flow of the 1960 treaty. Under	25X1
	Nigeria			
25X1	that the Nigerian rity Council reso	s hope will form the ballution condemning Southing an end to internation	h African nuclear ac-	
25X1	and plan to submi	erians have shown a dratit to the UN African e African states suppo	contact group for con-	
		0		
		9		25X1

Declas	sified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010080-
	a formal Security Council session on South African nuclear
1	activities could be called in the next week or so.
4	South Korea
1	//Some 60 members of the Korean Anti-Communist Youth Association forced their way into the lobby of the US Em- bassy in Seoul Friday morning, shouting slogans and throwing leaflets denouncing the alleged US wiretapping of the South
	Korean presidential mansion in the 1960s.
I	Police arrived on the scene within 15 minutes and removed the demonstrators, and no casualties or property damage were reported.//
I	//South Korean officials said other groups were planning to hold demonstrations at the Embassy later in the day, and some 200 police have been stationed outside the Embassy compound.
	,
	10
1	

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010080-3 **Top Secret** (Security Classification) **Top Secret** (Security Classification)