



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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


# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday*  
*17 March 1979*

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


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
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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.



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
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
NAMIBIA: Truce Talks in New York

*South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha and leaders of the South-West Africa People's Organization have agreed to meet with Western foreign ministers and UN Secretary General Waldheim in New York on Monday in an effort to clear up objections to Waldheim's truce plan that are blocking the UN transitional program for Namibia. Representatives of the five African frontline states and Nigeria also will participate in the talks. Their cooperation is essential to resolving the impasse between South Africa and SWAPO.*




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The South Africans insist that a truce must provide for effective monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and Zambia and must not allow any guerrillas in Namibia to keep their arms or set up bases. SWAPO would adamantly oppose such concessions. The group, moreover, wants the UN peacekeeping force to include a Nigerian battalion, which would be unacceptable to South Africa.




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South African diplomats have suggested that, if the UN truce plan were revised to ban SWAPO bases inside Namibia, the South Africans might not insist that UN troops monitor the SWAPO bases in neighboring countries. Instead, South Africa might accept UN liaison offices that would verify monitoring of SWAPO bases by the host governments. Zambia and Botswana have indicated that they would accept such an arrangement.



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Angolan President Neto, however, has rebuffed this alternative despite encouragement by the other presidents of the frontline states to accept it. Neto also has refused to send a senior representative to the talks, although the other frontline states and Nigeria have said they will send their foreign ministers.



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South Africa's recent attacks on SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia are likely to prejudice the black African participants against accepting any modifications that may benefit South Africa.



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
USSR-INDIA: Results of Kosygin Visit

*The visit of Premier Kosygin to India, which ended Thursday, was a public relations success for the Soviets; it resulted in implicit Indian criticism of the US for its suspension of the Indian Ocean arms control talks and public reaffirmation of India's interest in maintaining close ties with the USSR. The Indians received primarily aid benefits. The talks were not as cordial, however, as those in former Prime Minister Gandhi's time, and Kosygin apparently did not succeed in placing new obstacles to a Sino-Indian rapprochement.*

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The week-long visit was clearly designed to highlight Soviet-Indian relations in the wake of Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee's trip to China last month. Kosygin clearly hoped that China's invasion of Vietnam would be useful in frustrating a Sino-Indian rapprochement.


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India has been using Soviet concerns over Sino-Indian ties to remove some longstanding irritants in its relations with the USSR and to secure new Soviet aid. The Indians apparently did secure additional imports of Soviet-financed oil. The two sides also signed a long-term framework agreement for expanded scientific and technical cooperation, a protocol on equipment for a state farm, a cultural cooperation accord for 1979-1980, and a health cooperation agreement.

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

ARAB STATES: Reactions to Expected Treaty




*Arab denunciation of Egyptian President Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is building. The culmination of the effort will probably be a new conference in Baghdad--possibly timed to open the day a treaty is signed--and a vote to impose sanctions against Egypt. It is likely that the effort by Iraq, Syria, and Libya to stampede the more moderate Arabs into unqualified condemnation of the treaty will be largely successful.*

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Saudi Arabia and Jordan appear to be somewhat ambivalent toward "punishing" Sadat. The full weight of anti-Sadat pressure has not yet been applied, however. That will occur at Baghdad, where there will be few significant countervailing pressures. Given the moderates' reservations about the treaty, we doubt that they have the will or the self-confidence to stand against the hardliners. Jordan certainly would not unless Saudi Arabia took a strong stand against punishing Sadat.

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Foreign Minister Saud told Ambassador West on Wednesday that the immediate and "automatic" consequences of Egypt's signing a treaty would be its ouster from the Arab League and the Arab Mutual Defense Pact and the transfer of League headquarters from Cairo. Participants at the Baghdad summit last November agreed to such measures. On the important question of economic sanctions, Saud said his government would "maintain its economic contacts with Egypt" and continue "current commitments" but ruled out further economic commitments.

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The treaty language is unlikely to affect the attitude of the hardliners. The moderating role played by Syria and Iraq in the recent Yemeni conflict--after Saudi efforts to defuse the crisis floundered--probably gives them added leverage with the Saudis. In the short term, the peace treaty will quicken the pace of Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation, particularly in the area of foreign policy and military cooperation.

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
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Palestinian groups probably will show their anger over a treaty by:

- Attempted acts of terrorism by radical Palestinians against Egyptian, Israeli, and perhaps US targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Israel.
- Encouraging continued protests by Palestinians in the occupied territories and demonstrations by Palestinians in Lebanon.
- Acting to intimidate West Bank and Gaza Palestinians who show any signs of willingness to participate in the negotiating process.




It is possible that Yasir Arafat and the more moderate Palestinians, despite their harsh public statements, will try to maintain some contact with the Egyptians while they examine the terms of the peace for Palestinian gains and assess the reaction of other Arabs.




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Arab support for a treaty is meager. An Omani official reportedly said his government would take a moderate line at any conference on sanctions. Sudan's President Numayri has qualified his support of the current peace move, probably in recognition that his link to Sadat's effort is politically costly at home and in the Arab world. Numayri told the US Ambassador that the key is continued US efforts to work toward peace on the West Bank and Gaza. Numayri hinted that his stand made US support for his regime all the more important. Some smaller Gulf states reportedly have consulted on ways to moderate the backlash against Sadat.



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Tunisia, flanked by rejectionist Algeria and Libya, has withheld official comment [Redacted]

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The Long Term

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The moderate Arab governments might eventually--perhaps in two years--"accommodate" their positions to an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and move to relax the isolation of Sadat and to give some support to the negotiating process on the West Bank and Gaza. The second Sinai disengagement accord of 1975 offers a precedent of sorts. The Arab world denounced Sadat for breaking ranks, yet the Saudis swallowed their anger and continued aid to Egypt.

[Redacted]

A similar adjustment cannot be expected any time soon. It is especially not likely unless specific gains for Palestinians occur on the West Bank and Gaza. Such gains would include a diminished Israeli official presence, a large-scale release of Palestinian political prisoners, and an end to restrictions on political activity in the occupied territories. [Redacted]

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
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
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USSR: Arms Shipments to Cuba


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The USSR has been the chief supplier of military equipment to Cuba since the early 1960s, providing \$1.55 billion worth from 1961 through the end of 1978; equipment valued at about \$150 million came in 1978.

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Emphasis on Modernization


The pace of modernization began to pick up in 1976 and 1977 and accelerated last year. Concurrent with the modernization push, the USSR began to replace military equipment Cuba shipped to Angola.

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Outlook

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The USSR will continue to modernize Cuba's military equipment this year, probably at a pace close to that of 1978.

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Future deliveries are likely to include the type of ground equipment Cuba has been receiving since 1976. If

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

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Belgium-Zaire


Belgium yesterday brought home the first of some 250 of its paratroopers stationed in Zaire since last month; the remainder are scheduled to begin leaving next week. 

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Portugal

The US Embassy in Lisbon reports that the Communist-dominated Workers' Confederation will sponsor antigovernment demonstrations in Lisbon and six other locations today. The demonstration in Lisbon may attract more than 100,000 people, many of whom will be bused into Lisbon to ensure an impressive turnout. The Embassy comments that there is considerable worker discontent, although anger and frustration is general and not specifically directed at the Mota Pinto government. Communist leverage in labor disputes has also been reduced by the quick settlement of potentially serious labor disputes in recent weeks. 

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Chad-France

Ambassador Bradford in Ndjamena believes the French will soon abandon their role as an "honest broker and policeman" in Chad, a move he believes may portend major changes in French policy elsewhere in Africa. The Ambassador interprets recent French actions--an unusually restrained military response to fighting in the capital and continued evacuation of French citizens despite lessening tensions--as signs of a policy switch. Other changes expected by the Ambassador include reductions in economic aid, direct military support, and in political backing on such questions as the Libyan-Chad border dispute. 

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