

SECRET

FOREIGN DISSEM

Current Support Brief

CONTINUED MOMENTUM
OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN 1963



CIA/RR CB 64-14

February 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification


WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTINUED MOMENTUM
OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN 1963

Soviet military aid and technical assistance programs in underdeveloped countries* in 1963 remained at a high level, notwithstanding some decline from the record pace of 1961-62. Advanced weapons systems, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), Komar-class guided-missile boats, and MIG-21 jet fighters, were delivered in increasing numbers, with Syria and India receiving such equipment for the first time. Negotiations for new military aid contracts were undertaken with at least 10 underdeveloped countries, suggesting a continued high level of Soviet military aid in 1964.

25X1B



25X1B

The burden of repayments and pressure to extend maturities will increase during 1964 as both the rate and the level of maturities continue to rise and additional equipment purchases persist.


25X1B

1. Military Assistance Agreements and Deliveries

As of 31 December 1963 the approximate value of Soviet military assistance agreements with underdeveloped countries reached a cumulative total of \$2.7 billion, and actual deliveries under these agreements stood at about \$2.5 billion.*** The extensions and drawings cumulated


25X1B

* Cuba as a recipient of Soviet military aid is not included in this publication.




25X1B

by year are shown in the chart. As reflected in the chart, extensions increased gradually until 1960-61, when they rose sharply -- largely as a result of the Soviet-Indonesian agreements signed in those years.



The reduction in new extensions in 1962-63 reflects in part the time needed by recipients to assimilate equipment that was ordered previously. Drawings rose gradually until 1962, when they swung sharply upward to an unprecedented zenith as equipment was delivered under the agreements reached in 1960-61. Shipments during the first half of 1963 declined from the pace of 1962, but deliveries from October until the present have gained in momentum. At least 15 ships loaded with Soviet military equipment arrived in the United Arab Republic (UAR) in the period October-December 1963 compared with an average of 1 per month in 3 months preceding October. In the same period, other ships with military cargoes went to Algeria, Guinea, India, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. By the end of 1963 the value for the year of all military deliveries to the underdeveloped countries had reached approximately \$560 million.

25X1B



2. Military Technical Assistance and Training

Another factor evidencing the momentum of the Soviet military aid program in 1963 is the sustained impetus of the military technical assistance and training activities for personnel of the underdeveloped countries provided both in the USSR and in recipient countries. The number of Soviet technicians resident in underdeveloped countries and the number of trainees from recipient countries departing for training in the USSR fell slightly below the peak levels of 1962, but they exceeded the numbers engaged in these activities in other years, as shown in Table 1. It may be

Table 1

Military Trainees Departing for the USSR
and Soviet Military Technicians in Underdeveloped Countries a/
1955-63

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u> <u>b/</u>
Military trainees departing for the USSR	190	15	315	590	905	705	3,340	3,960	3,600
Soviet military technicians in underdeveloped countries <u>c/</u>	0	200	380	835	995	1,010	1,520	3,500	3,000

- a. Data are rounded to the nearest five.
b. Preliminary estimate.
c. The estimated number present for 1 month or more.

expected that as the ability of the recipient countries to assemble, maintain, deploy, and operate this equipment increases, some diminution in training activity will occur. In fact, the level of assimilation in the recipient countries has already increased, although no great decline in the numbers of personnel involved in technical assistance and training has yet been observed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

3. Advanced Weapons Systems

Deliveries in 1963 continued to include the more advanced weapons systems introduced initially in 1960-61. Surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) were earmarked for the first time to India, and there have been large deliveries of SAM equipment to the UAR, particularly in the last 3 months of 1963. Additional Komar-class guided-missile patrol boats were delivered to the UAR and Indonesia and for the first time to Syria. The UAR and Iraq received more MIG-21 jet fighters, and Syria and India received them for the first time. Several large shipments of these fighters noted in the last weeks of 1963 went to Syria and the UAR. Of total Soviet deliveries of these three weapons systems to the European Satellites and to underdeveloped countries (excluding Cuba), the underdeveloped nations received about 10 percent of the SAM sites, at least 75 percent of the Komar-class boats, and 40 percent of the MIG-21's.

4. Repayments for Military Aid

Known repayments on military aid indebtedness rose to a new high of \$126 million in 1963. Because payments are for indebtedness incurred from past arms deliveries, they are no gauge of current activity. In spite of generous terms provided by the USSR, * its military assistance has taxed the fiscal ability of many of the recipient underdeveloped countries. This situation has led to a continual process of renegotiation, which usually has resulted in a further easing of the terms. In some cases the USSR has written off parts of the indebtedness, and in others it has eased repayment schedules. A prime example of the latter occurred in June 1963 when the USSR and Indonesia signed a protocol substantially reducing the latter's annual repayment obligations for military aid by extending the repayment period. Drawings (after applicable discounts**) and repayments made thus far on Soviet military aid are shown in Table 2.

25X1B

** That is, the amount that must be repaid by recipient countries.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 2

Payments by Underdeveloped Countries
on Drawings of Military Equipment
1956-63

Million US \$

<u>Year</u>	<u>Discounted Drawings</u>	<u>Repayments</u>
1956	11	a/
1957	77	a/
1958	82	a/
1959	35	26
1960	89	30
1961	156	65
1962	482	75
1963	314	126
Total	<u>1,246</u>	<u>322</u>

a. Less than US \$1 million.

About one-fourth of total indebtedness has been paid, but as grace periods run out and obligations enter periods of high annual repayment, the burden on recipients will become more onerous.* For example,

25X1C

25X1C

25X1C [REDACTED] Moreover, as the recipients purchase additional equipment, this burden continues to grow. There is no evidence, however, that any prime recipient of Soviet military aid will discontinue purchases in the next few years. The UAR, for example, which may have ordered as much as \$100 million worth of arms in 1963, must assimilate this weaponry, knowing that repayment, under present schedules, would be progressively more burdensome and that it would coincide with repayment of economic aid obligations which will begin to mount more rapidly in 1965.

25X1B

S-E-C-R-E-T

5. Prospects

In spite of some decline in new military aid extensions in the past 2 years -- not unusual for a program so responsive to exploitable opportunities and subject to the assimilative abilities of recipients -- the substantial value and volume of agreements and deliveries, the continued pace of the technical assistance and training programs, and the increased deliveries of advanced weapons systems, all presage a continued high level of Soviet military aid during 1964. The problem of repayments, however, will loom larger for recipient countries. Indeed, the over-all prospect is bleak for on-time future payments of military aid debts to the USSR, and the USSR will be required increasingly to renegotiate terms and schedules for major recipients.

It is unlikely, however, that increasing problems of indebtedness will prevent the expansion of the Soviet military aid program in the next few years. Continuing deliveries of ammunition and spare and replacement parts will be required by recipient countries to service and maintain Soviet equipment already delivered. Negotiations for new agreements in 1963 between the USSR and Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, the UAR, and Yemen indicate undiminished willingness on the part of the underdeveloped countries to receive Soviet military assistance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1A

Analysts:



Coord:

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1

Analysts: [REDACTED]

(Project 41.5094)

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1 25X1A

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

Control Section

Control Sheet

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-14

Classification _____

Date of Document February 1964

Number of Copies 230

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Returned</u>
33	AD/RR	12 Feb 64	
34	DAD/RR	"	28 Apr 64
82	[REDACTED]	14 Feb 64	
163 - 166	[REDACTED] 25X1A	13 Feb 64	
167	[REDACTED]	14 Feb 64	
169	St/P/A	18 Feb 64	
170	[REDACTED] OCR 25X1A	"	
171	[REDACTED] St/P	"	
172	[REDACTED]	"	
173	[REDACTED] 25X1C	"	
174	[REDACTED]	"	
175	OB/HRG/CGS, 3F30 Hq.	"	26 Jul 64
176 - 200	Filed in St/P/C	"	
176-191	DPI - [REDACTED] 25X1A	18 Feb 64	
201-212	Rec'd from Records Center	26 Feb 64	
201-212	See attached memo	26 Feb 64	
76 + 77	Rec'd from RID	27 Feb 64	
175 25X1A	[REDACTED] DDP/SR/CEM	27 Mar 64	
63 25X1A	Rec'd via St/P/C	9 Mar 64	
192	[REDACTED] ONAD	10 Mar 64	
193	Marty Aldridge, 15th Air Force Defense	13 Mar 64	
77	Rfmm	16 Mar 64	23 Mar 64
51	Rec'd in St/P/C	18 Mar 64	
51	[REDACTED] A/U 25X1A	8 Apr 64	
76	[REDACTED] A/U	8 Apr 64	
1 + 22 + 191	RT'd by O/OOI	28 Apr 64	
34, 1, 22, 63, 77, 199-300	Records Center	7 Aug 64	
194	(1) Rec'd to [REDACTED] via SR/RR	22 Aug 64	16 Oct 64
194	[REDACTED] I/F/P 25X1A	7 Nov 64	
191	[REDACTED] I/T/F	20 Oct 64	
198	[REDACTED]	5 Oct 65	
196, 197	OC 25X1A	4 Aug 66	

SECRET

SUBJECT: Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-14, Continued

Momentum of Soviet Military Assistance in 1963 --- February 1964

(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM).

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
1	O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hdqtrs.
2 - 3	NIC
4 - 12	OCI Internal
13 - 15	ONE
16 - 21	St/CS/RR
22	O/DDI - Chester Cooper
23 - 31	NSA C312
32	NSAL
33 - 230	ORR Distribution, St/A/Document Support Section, Room GH0915, Hdqtrs. (sent direct to St/A/DSS, 18 Feb 64).

OCR

(Distributed by ~~████~~)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1

St/A/DSS Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-14, Continued

Momentum of Soviet Military Assistance in 1963 --- February 1964

(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM).

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
32	AD/BR
33	DD/CR
34 168	Ch/E
35	St/PR
36 - 40	D/A (1 each branch)
41 - 46	D/MS (1 each branch)
47 - 52	D/R (1 each branch)
53 - 60	D/M (1 each branch)
61 - 69	D/I (1 each branch)
70 - 71	D/GG
72 - 73	D/GC
74	D/GC/X
75 - 80	RID/AN, Unit 4, Room 1B4004, Hq.
81	St/FM
82	Analysis/xxxxxx(Support/xxxxxx/xx)
83	GR/CR
84	BR/CR
85	FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq.
86	Library/CR
87	IPI/CR
88	VMR, A-18
89	AD/OO
90	Chief, FDD
91	CD/OO
92	OCI/RP/PS, Room 7G15, Hq.
93	DDI/CGS, Room 7F35, Hq.
94	DDI/CGS/HR, Room 3F30, Hq.
95 - 97	OSI
98	OBI
99 - 100	OTR/IS/IP, Room 532, Broyhill Bldg. (1 - OTR/SIC)
101	NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 1S518, Bldg. 213
102	Commandant Nat'l. War College, Ft. Leslie McNair, Attn: Classified Records Section, Rm. 26, Nat'l. War College Bldg., Wash., 25, D. C.
103 - 113	ACSI/Army, Room 1C460, Pentagon
114 - 127	Navy, Director, ONI, Room 5B659, Pentagon
128 - 137	HQ. USAF, Attn: AFNIN-3D1, Room 4B137, Pentagon
138 - 139	Ass't. Secretary of Defense, ISA, Room 4D825, Pentagon
140 - 143	USIA, Warren Phelps, IRR/D, Room 701, Walker Johnson Building, 1734 New York Avenue, N. W.
144 - 155	State, INR Communications Center, Room 7818, State Dept. Bldg.
156 - 159	DIA, DIASA-2C, Room 2D233, Pentagon
160 - 161	Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC, Room 365, Executive Office Building
162	Frank M. Charrette, Agency for International Development, Chief, Statistics and Reports Division, Room 302, State Annex No. 1
169 - 200	Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1
201 - 230	Records Center

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

26 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
FROM : Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Material

It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CB 64-14, Continued Momentum of Soviet Military Assistance in 1963, February 1964, Secret/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, be forwarded as follows:

State, INR Communications Center,
Room 7818, State Dept. Bldg.
For Embassies in Moscow, Frankfurt, London,
Djakarta, Cairo, Damascus, Kabul, New
Delhi, Baghdad, Accra, Rabat, and Algiers

25X1A



Attachments:

Copies #201 - #212 of CB 64-14


cc: CGS/RB

ACTION COMPLETED

The dissemination requested by
this memorandum has been completed.

BY: *NDB*
Date: *27 Feb 64*

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1

12

Project No. 41.5094 Report Series CIA/RR CB 64-14

Title Continued Momentum of Soviet Military Assistance in 1963
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Responsible Analyst and Branch [REDACTED] I/PO 25X1A

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION TO STATE POSTS

<u>Loc</u>	<u>Far East</u>	<u>ARA</u>
Berlin, Germany	Bangkok, Thailand	Mexico
Bucharest, Romania	Djakarta, Indonesia	Guatemala
Budapest, Hungary	Hong Kong	Panama
Moscow, USSR	Rangoon, Burma	Brazillia, Brazil
Prague, Czechoslovakia	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Buenos Aires, Argentina
Sofia, Bulgaria	Saigon, Vietnam	Bogota, Colombia
Warsaw, Poland	Seoul, Korea	Santiago, Chile
	Singapore, British Malaya	La Paz, Bolivia
<u>Europe</u>	Taipei, Formosa	Montevideo, Uruguay
Belgrade, Yugoslavia	Tokyo, Japan	Caracas, Venezuela
Bern, Switzerland	Vientiane, Laos	
Bonn, Germany	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	<u>Africa</u>
Brussels, Belgium	Colombo, Ceylon	Yaonde, Cameroun
Copenhagen, Denmark		Leopoldville, Congo
Frankfurt, Germany	<u>Near East & South Asia</u>	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Geneva, Switzerland	Ankara, Turkey	Accra, Ghana
Helsinki, Finland	Athens, Greece	Abidjan, Ivory Coast
The Hague, Netherlands	Gairo, Egypt	Nairobi, Kenya
Lisbon, Portugal	Damascus, Syria	Monrovia, Liberia
London, England	Kabul, Afghanistan	Tripoli, Libya
Luxembourg, Luxembourg	Karachi, Pakistan	Rabat, Morocco
Madrid, Spain	New Delhi, India	Lagos, Nigeria
Oslo, Norway	Nicosia, Cyprus	Mogadiscio, Somal
Paris, France	Tehran, Iran	Khartoum, Sudan
Rome, Italy	Baghdad, Iraq	Tunis, Tunisia
Stockholm, Sweden	Tel Aviv, Israel	Pretoria, South Africa
Vienna, Austria	Beirut, Lebanon	Algiers, Algeria
	Amman, Jordon	Cotonou, Dahomey
<u>Pacific</u>	Jidda, Saudi Arabia	Dakar, Senegal
Wellington, New Zealand		Bamako, Mali
Manila, Philippines	<u>Ottawa, Canada</u>	
Canberra, Australia		
Melbourne, Australia		

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001900090001-1
ORR PUBLICATIONS CONTROL PROCESSING SHEET

Subject ^{25X1A} CIA/RECB 64-14 (41.5094)
Analyst and Branch [REDACTED] - I/PO

Date Initials Remarks

SECURITY

Unedited draft
Edited draft
Other

18 Feb 64 *WAS* *No effort will be made to clear this report. per [signature]*

- a. Text check
- b. Source check
- c. Releasable to:

25X1C	Yes	No
[REDACTED]	<i>NO</i>	
[REDACTED]	<i>NO</i>	
[REDACTED]	<i>NO</i>	
[REDACTED]	<i>NO</i>	
Other		

DISTRIBUTION

#1 sent to AD/RR
#2 sent to DDI
#3 checked for release

OL/PSD notified to Disseminate

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T