

Current Support Brief

CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM



CIA/RR CB 64-58

September 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM

A large number of Czechoslovak economists have been urging publicly replacement of the Soviet type of command economy in Czechoslovakia by a form of market socialism. This proposal, the most radical in the Bloc, is the focus of a general debate over economic reform conducted under Party auspices since last fall in the hope of finding solutions to some of the country's severe and deep-seated economic difficulties. The proposed economic system has much in common with the actual system in Yugoslavia. It provides for: a devolution of authority to individual enterprises, excluding decisions for key investments and foreign trade, the basing of enterprise incentives on current income instead of the fulfillment of plan assignments, the formation of prices reflecting supply and demand, and the exercise of state controls mainly through financial regulations rather than through plan directives. The liberal proposal has been criticized by some economists who believe that Czechoslovak economic conditions are inappropriate for market socialism. Other economists have emphasized reforms that could be used to make a command economy work better, especially through improvements in planning involving mathematical techniques or through management procedures similar to those of US corporations.

The regime is proceeding slowly and cautiously in changing planning and management. Some reforms, such as a thorough, but on the whole orthodox, revision of wholesale prices, have been implemented, and a simplification of plan directives for 1965 has been announced. An increase in the authority of enterprises and other changes desired by the liberals are to be introduced in 1965, but these changes probably will fall far short of market socialism because of vested interests and the concern of the present leadership with retaining close control over the economy.

1. Economic Reform -- a Bloc-Wide Issue

All the countries of the Soviet Bloc are experimenting with methods of economic planning and management, and in most of them the ideological restraints on economic reform have been loosened greatly. In the USSR, two years ago Liberman urged the use of profit incentives to regulate enterprise behavior in a decentralized manner, and the subject was reopened in mid-August 1964 when Pravda published an article by Academician V. A. Trapeznikov that proposes even more liberal economic reforms. In addition, mathematical economists, such as Kantorovich, have been pressing for the formation of rational prices

by means of linear programming techniques. Hungary has introduced such innovations as an interest charge on fixed capital. In Bulgaria the authority of some enterprises (mainly local and construction enterprises) has been increased greatly, and some basic questions of socialist economics are being debated. In no other country of the Bloc, however, has the discussion gone so far as in Czechoslovakia, where a large group of economists has proposed a complete overhaul of the present economic system. Moreover, in no other country of the Bloc is the issue of economic reform as pressing and as politically acute as in Czechoslovakia.

2. Development of the Issue in Czechoslovakia

Basically the serious concern with economic reform and the radical nature of some of the proposals being entertained in Czechoslovakia stem from the near absence of economic growth during the past 2-1/2 years. As early as 1962, Czechoslovak economists were pressing for reforms, and the need to improve techniques of planning and management was emphasized at the Party Congress in December 1962. Party leader Novotny, however, continued to blame some of the country's economic difficulties on the partial decentralization of 1958-60 and called for a tightening of central controls.

In 1963, as the economic situation deteriorated further and cultural ferment accompanied a new wave of "destalinization," criticism of the regime's policies increased greatly, and some of the critics argued -- in direct contradiction of Novotny -- that the error in 1958-60 had been in decentralizing too little. Novotny and his followers were forced to admit that planning had been overambitious, that serious mistakes had been made in the allocation of investments, and that incentives did not give enough stimulus to technical progress and improvement in the quality of output.* Then, in the wake of a Party and government shakeup of September 1963, which replaced some of the dogmatic officials (especially Vilem Siroky) by more pragmatic men such as Jozef Lenart and Drahomir Kolder, the Party gave official blessing to a thoroughgoing debate on the economic system. A group of economists, headed by Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and Chief of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, was charged with an intensive study of possible reforms and asked to present its recommendations to the leadership through the newly organized Economic Commission of the Party. Sik told a Central Committee Plenum in December 1963 that the traditional Soviet forms of socialist management no longer worked in Czechoslovakia, because there were no more

* For more detailed information on the economic difficulties, see source 1/.

reserves which could be mobilized and with which inefficiency could be covered up. A large number of proposals and counterproposals on economic reforms began to appear in late 1963 and continue to appear in the Party press and technical journals.

3. The Liberal Proposal

The essence of the liberal proposal, first presented in an article published in the Party journal by Sik in November 1963 and developed by many other economists, * is to replace the Soviet type of command economy in Czechoslovakia by a form of controlled market socialism resembling in many respects that of Yugoslavia. Although the liberals do not agree on all points and some aspects of the proposal are unclear, there appears to be a consensus of liberal opinion on most of its basic features.

a. Planning

Although central planning would continue, it would be attenuated and focused on long-term development. Long-term plans would be worked out by careful economic analysis of alternative means of achieving national objectives. As in Yugoslavia, central economic plans would provide guidelines for decisions at lower levels but would not have the force of law. Enterprises would establish their own operational plans.

b. Control

The state would retain direct control over key investments and foreign trade but otherwise would rely on indirect controls over enterprises to implement its policies. As in Yugoslavia, the indirect controls would be achieved through financial means such as taxes, the charging of interest on fixed and working capital, the regulation of prices and wages, and the extension of bank credits. In contrast to Yugoslavia, control organs other than banks would be organized mainly on an industry and branch basis rather than on a regional and local basis.

* For a listing of liberal economists, see the Appendix, and for some of their articles, see source 2/.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Management

The enterprises themselves would decide what and how to produce and with whom to do business within the limits imposed by state regulations and the direct controls in investment and foreign trade. There is no suggestion of giving workers' organizations authority in enterprise management comparable to that of the Yugoslav workers' councils.

d. Incentives

Enterprises no longer would be ordered to fulfill particular plan tasks assigned by higher authority but rather would maximize current income. Some of the liberals are in favor of using enterprise profits as a standard, but the majority of them prefer "gross income" (hruby duchod) -- what remains of the receipts from sales after deducting purchases from other enterprises and depreciation. As in Yugoslavia, interest on capital, taxes, and wages would be paid from gross income. Minimum wages would be guaranteed by the state and wage scales for different occupations would have to be observed, but additional payments to workers and managers would depend on what remained of gross income after all the above expenses had been paid.

e. Prices

In accordance with the reliance on incentives based on current values and on financial controls, prices would correspond approximately to the relative scarcities of goods and services rather than merely reflecting the prevailing conventions of cost accounting as at present. Except for relatively few consumer goods, prices would not be determined freely in the market. The state would continue to fix the prices of industrial materials, public utility services, and consumer staples, such as bread and sugar, and would establish limits for price bargaining among buyers and sellers in the case of many manufactured goods. These fixed or controlled prices, however, would not be allowed to deviate markedly or for long from the levels called for by supply and demand.

The proposal is intentionally vague because of the political sensitivity of the question on the extent and manner of direct state control over investments and foreign trade and dodges crucial questions on the relation of domestic to world market prices and the use of differential

taxes, tariffs, and subsidies to protect or encourage producers. There also are allusions to possible direct intervention by the state in other areas "if absolutely necessary." The proposal, moreover, is being sold to the regime as a means of improving the real authority of the Party and government over the economy -- by comparison with the past system when many state directives were not observed or even had perverse effects on the implementation of national policies. It is very doubtful, however, that the liberal economists really believe that state and Party control would be unimpaired -- rather they probably expect that the state apparatus would be greatly curtailed and that the Party would have to make basic changes in its methods of operation.

4. Criticisms and Alternative Proposals

Because economic reform is a proclaimed goal of the regime's policy and because dogmatism is out of fashion, it is difficult to find any staunch supporters of the status quo in the Czechoslovak economic press, although opposition to change is certainly widespread, not only among the state bureaucracy but also in faculties of economics, where sinecures are being threatened. 3/ A number of economists, however, have taken issue in the press with the liberal proposal or with aspects of it, although they too favor (or claim to favor) reforms of the economic system. Their criticisms range from the simple assertion that the liberal proposal verges perilously close to bringing back "capitalism without the capitalist" 4/ to sophisticated reservations about the possibility of creating an efficient form of market socialism. 5/ It is alleged, for example, that a system like that of Yugoslavia would not work well in Czechoslovakia, because of the tightness of the supply of labor and the favorable conditions for monopolistic practices in many branches of heavy industry, especially heavy machine building.

Many economists have emphasized changes in planning and management that could be used to make a command economy work better, although they also are advocated by some of the liberals. One group of economists, for example, is concerned mainly with improving economic planning through modern mathematical techniques, such as input-output and linear programming. 6/ Another group of economists, concerned mostly with industrial management, takes its inspiration from large Western corporations, arguing that the combining of enterprises into branch-wide economic units with broad authority would facilitate technical progress and bring a businesslike approach to management without much sacrifice of central controls. 7/ In regard to incentives,

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

there is general agreement that the old system gives too much weight to gross value of production, but some economists reject the liberals' proposal for introducing a single indicator of enterprise performance, such as gross income or profits, and propose instead the establishment of a variety of plan indicators, differing among branches in accord with the conditions of the branch and priorities of the regime. 8/ Taken together, these proposals on "scientific planning," "businesslike" management, and selected incentives present a possible alternative line for reform to that desired by the liberal economists. This alternative, which would salvage the essential features of the command economy, apparently is being adopted by the regimes in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

5. Position of the Leadership

As might be expected, the regime wants to have its cake and eat it too -- it wants to reform planning and management so as to improve economic performance without relinquishing any important controls. According to top Czechoslovak leaders, 9/ "the government must be freed from part of the operational tasks and must concentrate on fundamental problems of economic policy," "economic instruments" rather than orders must be widely used to implement policies, and prices should reflect supply and demand. On the other hand, the same leaders want to "strengthen the authority of the plan, which is the most important instrument of management," and also "continue to strengthen the leading role of the Party."

A few changes already have been introduced in planning and management. For 1965, there will be a reduction of 14 percent in the number of centrally planned and rationed commodities and of 53 percent in the number of directives given to enterprises. 10/ There also has been an announcement that no quantitative production assignments will be given to enterprises for 1965. 11/ There are no details, however, and it is not clear whether the change refers to only one of the stages in planning for 1965 or to all the stages. Various measures of net output are being used instead of gross output to evaluate performance by an enterprise. 12/ A general revision of wholesale prices was introduced in April 1964, following 2 years of intensive work. 13/ The new prices differentiate among a much more precise assortment of products than the old prices and reflect costs more closely. The new prices also reflect demand in the case of some close substitutes; goods in unusually short supply;

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

or certain byproducts, such as steel scrap. In general, however, the revision follows the conventional Bloc practice of basing prices on average costs of production in each branch of industry. The regime has promised to introduce additional reforms in the latter part of 1964 and in 1965. 14/ Premier Lenart in May and the Party's First Secretary, Novotny, during Khrushchev's recent visit to Czechoslovakia spoke of introducing many of the specific proposals of the liberals, including increased flexibility for prices, the use of gross income to evaluate enterprise performance and as a basis for paying bonuses, the charging of interest on fixed assets, and a greatly increased use of bank credit for the allocation of investment funds. 15/ Statements by the regime, however, also have emphasized "scientific" planning (including the use of mathematical tools), the grouping of enterprises on a branch basis, and the application of selected incentives.

6. Prospects for Reforms

The prospects for economic reform in Czechoslovakia remain highly uncertain. There is no doubt that many changes in the system of planning and management, including some of those proposed by the liberals, will be introduced over the next year or two. The continued poor performance of the economy is a powerful incentive to making such changes, and part of the Czechoslovak leadership consists of men who are not dogmatic Communists. However, fear by the Party of a loss of control and vested interests are powerful conservative forces that probably predispose the regime to prefer modifications in familiar methods to more fundamental changes that could be risky. Last March the Party Presidium rejected a proposal of the Economic Commission, presumably because it was too liberal. 16/

It seems unlikely that the present leadership will give enterprises anywhere near the amount of authority desired by the liberals or allow market forces to determine output except within narrow limits. According to Novotny, reforms will be introduced "step by step . . . with much prudence" and "without upsetting upheavals." This cautious approach gives the conservative forces every opportunity to prevent fundamental changes -- as such forces did so successfully in Poland after the promising beginning of the "new economic model" in 1956-57. Even if there is a substantial devolution of authority to enterprises, it remains to be seen whether the regime will be willing to reduce the central state apparatus correspondingly. And if the apparatus remains largely intact, it will have the possibility as well as the incentive of reimposing controls whenever economic problems develop (as in Poland during 1959-60). As long as there appears to be a pressing economic need, however, economic reform will remain a major issue in Czechoslovakia, and basic changes in the system will be possible.

APPENDIX

LIBERAL CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMISTS

<u>Economist</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>
Bohumil Komenda	Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague
Cestmir Kozusnik	Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague
Ota Sik	Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague
Hruby*	University of Economics, Prague
Benedikt Korda	University of Economics, Prague
Frantisek Valenta	University of Economics, Prague
Vladimir Kadera	Research Institute of Economic Planning,** Prague
Bohumil Krejcar	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Rudolf Kocanda	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Ladislav Matejka	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Pavel Pelikan	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Zdenek Vergner	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Eduard Vopicka	Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Antonin Cervinka	Party University, Prague
Zdenek Kodet	Party University, Prague
Hvezdon Koctuch	University of Economics, Bratislava
Viktor Pavlenda	University of Economics, Bratislava

* First name unknown.

** Subordinated to State Planning Commission.

<u>Economist</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>
O. Kyn	Komensky University, Faculty of Law, Bratislava
Radoslav Selucky	Department of Political Economics, Czechoslovak Institute of Technology, Prague
Julius Branik	Research Institute of Ministry of Finance, Prague
Rudolf Rohlicek	Worker on staff of Central Committee of KSC and/or KSS
Eugen Loebel	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sources:


1. CIA. CIA/RR EM 64-3, Czechoslovakia in 1963: the Year the Economy Stood Still, Feb 64. C.
2. Sik, Ota. "Improvement of Planned System of Management," Rude pravo, p. 3-6, 22 Nov 63. U. (Cited in JPRS. 26256, 3 Sep 64. U.)
Vergner, Zdenek. "Problems of Planned Management of the National Economy," Hospodarske noviny, 3, 17 Jan 64, p. 6-7. U.
Komenda, Bohumil and Cestmir Kozusnik. "Simplified System or Simplified Interpretation," Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar 64. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 402, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 211, 27 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Komenda, Bohumil and Cestmir Kozusnik. "Some Fundamental Problems of Improving the Management System in the National Economy and Panel Discussion on Management," Politka ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 219-272. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 383, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 206, p. 12-41 and 67-118, 11 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Kozusnik, Cestmir. "Flexible Prices and Planned Management of the Economy," Planovane hospodarstvi, no 6, 1964, p. 25-33. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 377, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 204, p. 81-91, 5 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Komenda, Bohumil. "Conditions for Working of the Market Mechanism in Socialist Economics," Planovane hospodarstvi, no 7, 1964, p. 28-38. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 398, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 210, p. 48-63, 24 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Kodet, Zdenek. "Gross Income or Profit," Hospodarske noviny, no 23, 5 Jun 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 391, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 208, 18 Aug 64, p. 1-9. OFF USE.)
Matejka, Ladislav. "Binding Nature of the Plan and Economic Management," Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 31-37. U.
Kocanda, Rudolf. "Economic Conditions of Planned Administration," Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 23-30. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 302, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 170, 19 Mar 64. OFF USE.)
"Political Organization and Law as Applicable to the Management of the National Economy, and Enquiry," Pravnik, no 6 and 7, 1964. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Survey, no 1511, 25 Jul 64, p. 1-32. U.)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3. State, Prague. Airgram A 410, 21 Feb 64, p. 3. OFF USE.
4. Vlcek, J. "Views Are Sorted Out," Hospodarske noviny, no 10, 6 Mar 64, p. 1. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Summary, no 1438, 20 Mar 64, p. 7. U.)
 FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jan 64, p. gg 8. U.
 Selucky, R. "Economic Views Becoming More Closely Defined," Veda a zivot, Mar 64. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Survey, no 1442, 1 Apr 64, p. 13. U.)
5. Sokol, Miroslav. "Application of Commodity Relationships in Management," Planovane hospodarstvi, no 5, 1964, p. 31-44. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 202, 16 Jul 64, p. 1-18. OFF USE.)
 Tucek, Miroslav, "Planned Management of National Economy and Finance," Finance a uver, no 4, 1964, p. 199-208. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 202, 16 Jul 64, p. 33-48. OFF USE.)
6. Klas, Anton. "Economic and Administrative Management," Hospodarske noviny, 19, 8 May 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 397, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 209, 21 Aug 64, p. 1-10. OFF USE.)
 Kadlec, Vladimir, "Computers in the Industrial Enterprises," Hospodarske noviny, 2, 10 Jan 64, p. 5. U.
7. Hospodarske noviny, 10, 6 Mar 64, p. 12. U.
Ibid., 11, 13 Mar 64, p. 10. U.
Politika ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 268. U.
8. Prochazka, Karel and Milos Ruzicka. "Prices Pro and Con," Hospodarske noviny, 20, 15 May 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 391, Translations on Czechoslovakia 208, 18 Aug 64, p. 23-28. OFF USE.)
 Dittert, Josef. "The Key Lies in Departmental Management," Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar 64, p. 4, 10. U.
 Filip, Vaclav. "Directive Plan and Monetary Relationship," Hospodarske noviny, no 12, 20 Mar 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 398, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 210, 24 Aug 64, p. 31. OFF USE.)
9. Rude pravo, 6 Apr 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 16 Apr 64, p. gg 12. U.)
Ibid., 29 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 9 Jun 64, p. 7, 8. U.)
Ibid., 30 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. gg 5. U.)
Ibid., 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 14 Jul 64, p. gg 28. U.)

10. Hospodarske noviny, 7 Aug 64, p. 4. U.
11. Rude pravo, 30 May 64, p. 2. U.
12. Planovane hospodarstvi, no 7, 1963, p. 7-9. U.
13. Finance a uver, no 3, 1964, p. 129-138. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 313, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 27 May 64. OFF USE.)
Ibid., no 2, 1964, p. 1. U.
14. Rude pravo, 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 24 Jun 64, p. gg 3. U.)
Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 28 Aug 64, p. gg 2. U.)
15. Ibid., 30 May 64. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. gg 7, 8. U.)
Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 1 Sep 64, p. gg 7, 8. U.)
Ibid., 30 Aug 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 3 Sep 64, p. gg 15. U.)
16. Ibid., 4 Apr 64, p. 2. U.

Analysts:



25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

25X1A

St/P/RR - Control Section

Control Sheet

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-58
Date of Document September 1964

Classification _____
Number of Copies 280

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Returned</u>
172 - 229	Rec'd in St/P/C	24 Sep 64	
172 25X1A	[REDACTED] St/P	29 Sep 64	
173	[REDACTED] OCR	"	
174	HR/Ops, 1G81, Hq.	"	
175	[REDACTED]	2 Oct 64	
176 - 179	[REDACTED]	"	
180	[REDACTED]	"	
181 25X1C	[REDACTED]	"	
182 - 184	[REDACTED]	"	
185	[REDACTED]	"	
186	[REDACTED]	10 Nov 64	
187 - 189	[REDACTED]	"	
190 - 229	Filed in St/P/C	29 Sep 64	
190 25X1A	[REDACTED] LS/CR for Leon Lewins, Bureau of International Programs, Room 2314, Main Commerce	29 Sep 64	
191	A/E	30 Sep 64	
69	Rec'd in St/P/C	1 Oct 64	
192-194	see attached memo	2 Oct 64	
195-199	[REDACTED]		25X1A
204-213	[REDACTED] Room 3E04, Hq	7 Oct 64	
34	Rec'd in St/P/C	8 Oct 64	25X1A
37	MS/IN Div	13 Oct 64	
201	[REDACTED] All	14 Oct 64	
202	[REDACTED] All	"	25X1A
203	[REDACTED] All	"	
33	Rec'd from A.D/RR	16 Oct 64	
69, 200, 33, 214-215, 228-229	Records Center	27 Oct 64	
25X1A 216	[REDACTED] DPP/WR via St/P/R	30 Oct 64	
217	[REDACTED]	27 Nov 64	
222-227	Records Center	17 Nov 64	25X1A
218	[REDACTED]	23 Nov 64	
219	M. Siballa, Comms, via OCR	11 Dec 64	25X1A
221	RC	3 Feb 67	

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

SUBJECT: Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-58,
Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- September 1964 (Confidential)

Copy No.

1	O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hdqtrs.
2 - 3	NIC
4 - 12	OCI Internal
13 - 15	ONE
16 - 21	St/CS/RR 25X1A
22	O/DDI - [REDACTED]
23 - 31	NSA/[REDACTED] 25X1A
32	NSAL
33 - 279 280	ORR Distribution, St/A/Document Support Section, Room GH0915, Hdqtrs.

(Distributed by OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-58, Czechoslovakia
Debates Market Socialism --- September 1964 (Confidential)


<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
33	AD/RR
34	DAD/RR
35	Ch/E
36	St/PR
37 - 41	D/A (1 each branch)
42 - 47	D/MS (1 each branch)
48 - 53	D/R (1 each branch)
54	MRA
55 - 59	D/P (1 each branch)
60 - 65	D/F (1 each branch)
66	St/PS
67 - 75	D/I (1 each branch)
76 - 77	D/GG
78 - 79	D/GC
80	D/GC/X
81 - 86	RID/AN, Unit 4, Room 1B4004, Hq.
87	St/P/A
88	St/FM
89	Analyst/Branch [REDACTED] A/E)
90	GR/CR
91	BR/CR
92	FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq.
93	Library/CR
94	IPI/CR
95	VMR, A-18
96	AD/OO
97	Chief, FDD
98	CD/OO
99	OCI/SA/R, Room 5G19, Hq.
100	DDI/CGS, Room 7F35, Hq.
101 - 102	DDI/CGS/HR, Room 1G81, Hq.
103 - 105	OSI
106	OBI
107 - 108	OTR/IS/IP, Room 532, Broyhill Bldg. (1 - OTR/SIC)
109	NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 1S518, [REDACTED]
110	Commandant National War College, Ft. Leslie McNair, Attn: Classified Records Section, Rm. 26, National War College Building, Wash., D. C.
111 - 112	Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Room 4D825, Pentagon
113 - 151	Defense Intelligence Agency, DIAAQ-3, Room 2D233, Pentagon
152 - 155	USIA, Warren Phelps, IRR/D, Room 807, Walker Johnson Building, 1734 New York Avenue, N. W. 812,
156 - 167	State, INR Communications Center, Room 7318, State Dept. Bldg.
168 - 169	Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC, Room 365, Executive Office Building
170 - 171	Frank M. Charrette, Agency for International Development, Chief, Statistics and Reports Division, Room A-204, State Annex #10
172 - 212 229	St/P/C/RR, Room 4F41, Hq.
220-228	Records Center
230 - 280	

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3


2 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
FROM : Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Material

It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CB 64-58,
Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism, September 1964, Confidential,
be forwarded as follows:

State, INR Communications Center,
Room 7818, State Dept. Bldg.
Suggested distribution for
Embassies in Moscow, Prague
and London

25X1A



Attachments:
Copies #192 - #194 of CB 64-58

cc: CGS/RB

ACTION COMPLETED

The dissemination requested by
this memorandum has been completed.

BY: *NOB*

Date: *5 Oct 64*

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

Project No 16.5169

CIA/RR CB 64-58

Title Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- September 1964
(CONFIDENTIAL)

25X1A

Responsible Analyst and Branch [REDACTED] A/E

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION TO STATE POSTS

West

Berlin, Germany
Bucharest, Romania
Budapest, Hungary
Moscow, USSR
Prague, Czechoslovakia
Sofia, Bulgaria
Warsaw, Poland

Europe

Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Bern, Switzerland
Bonn, Germany
Brussels, Belgium
Copenhagen, Denmark
Frankfurt, Germany
Geneva, Switzerland
Helsinki, Finland
The Hague, Netherlands
Lisbon, Portugal
London, England
Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Madrid, Spain
Oslo, Norway
Paris, France
Rome, Italy
Stockholm, Sweden
Vienna, Austria

Pacific

Wellington, New Zealand
Manila, Philippines
Canberra, Australia
Melbourne, Australia

Far East

Bangkok, Thailand
Djakarta, Indonesia
Hong Kong
Rangoon, Burma
Kuala Lumpur, Malaya
Saigon, Vietnam
Seoul, Korea
Singapore, British Malaya
Taipei, Formosa
Tokyo, Japan
Vientiane, Laos
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Colombo, Ceylon

Near East & South Asia

Ankara, Turkey
Athens, Greece
Cairo, Egypt
Damascus, Syria
Kabul, Afghanistan
Karachi, Pakistan
New Delhi, India
Nicosia, Cyprus
Tehran, Iran
Baghdad, Iraq
Tel Aviv, Israel
Beirut, Lebanon
Amman, Jordan
Ridda, Saudi Arabia

ARA

Mexico
Guatemala
Panama
Brazillia, Brazil
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Bogota, Colombia
Santiago, Chile
La Paz, Bolivia
Montevideo, Uruguay
Caracas, Venezuela

Africa

Yaounde, Cameroun
Leopoldville, Congo
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Accra, Ghana
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Nairobi, Kenya
Monrovia, Liberia
Tripoli, Libya
Rabat, Morocco
Lagos, Nigeria
Mogadiscio, Somal
Khartoum, Sudan
Tunis, Tunisia
Pretoria, South Africa
Algiers, Algeria
Cotonou, Dahomey
Dakar, Senegal
Bamako, Mali

Ottawa, Canada

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ORR PUBLICATIONS CONTROL PROCESSING SHEET

Subject CIA/RR CB 64-58 (16,5169)
Analyst and Branch [redacted] - A/E

25X1A

Date Initials

Remarks


SECURITY

Unedited draft
Edited draft
Other

- a. Text check
- b. Source check
- c. Releasable to:

25X1C

Yes No



1 Oct 64 WB

Deletions [redacted]

25X1C

Remove pages 11-13.
Pg 2, grease pencil footnote.
Pg 3, in footnote, grease pencil
"and for --- 21."

Retype cover - omit all but
title, classification, date, &
copy #.
Pg 2, delete footnote.
Pg 3, delete in footnote, "and
for --- 21."
Remove pages 11-13

DISTRIBUTION

- #1 sent to AD/RR
- #2 sent to DDI
- #3 checked for release

OL/PSD notified to Disseminate