

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



CIA/RR CB 65-59
October 1965

Copy No. 195

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

STATUS OF SOVIET ARMS AID TO CYPRUS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Research and Reports

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

STATUS OF SOVIET ARMS AID TO CYPRUS

In mid-August the USSR reportedly rejected a request from Cyprus for additional arms aid, ostensibly because the Greek Cypriots still had not assimilated the Soviet equipment -- valued at more than \$10 million -- already delivered. The weapons included medium tanks, artillery, motor torpedo boats, and personnel carriers. Support equipment for surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) has also been delivered to the island in spite of NATO pressures in early 1965 to halt such deliveries. Although Moscow has been willing to provide arms aid in an effort to exploit Turkish-Greek differences over the Cyprus issue, it has attempted to minimize public reaction to its role in the supply of weapons to Cyprus by transshipping the equipment through the United Arab Republic (UAR). Only the actual SAM's and some associated gear remain to be delivered from the UAR. Currently, most of the Soviet weapons are being operated by Greek personnel (described by Athens as army veterans hired by the Greek Cypriots), and training in the operation of Soviet weapons is continuing in the UAR and on Cyprus.

1. Background of Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus


Following the outbreak of hostilities between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus in late 1963, Archbishop Makarios sought sources for arms aid. After his requests were rejected by Western suppliers, he turned to the USSR in March 1964. Despite initial objections to the introduction of Soviet weapons on the island expressed by the Greek government to Nicosia and an attempted veto of the agreement by the Turkish Cypriot Vice President of Cyprus, an agreement for arms aid was signed in Moscow by representatives of the Soviet and Cypriot governments on 30 September 1964.

Soviet policy in the northeastern Mediterranean area has aimed primarily at disrupting the southern flank of NATO. In an effort to exploit differences between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue and to complicate relations with their NATO allies, Moscow injected itself into the dispute by providing arms aid to the Greek Cypriots. The USSR has attempted to minimize public reaction to its role in this arms supply, however, by using the UAR as an intermediary.

2. Arms Agreement of September 1964

A. Value and Terms


25X1B Although few details of the 1964 agreement have been published, the overall value of the agreement (based on the cost of equipment) is estimated at about \$14 million and the credit at \$7 million (assuming a discount of 50 percent from list prices). The credit probably was for a period of at least 15 years at an annual rate of interest of 2 percent.

25X1B  Repayment presumably will be made in hard currency or in commodities at the option of Nicosia. Technical assistance -- the training of Greek and Greek Cypriot personnel in the UAR under Soviet or Egyptian instructors -- probably also was included in the agreement.

B. Equipment

Most of the equipment under the 1964 agreement is believed to have been delivered and deployed on Cyprus. The equipment included the following items:

25X1B



The SAM equipment provided to Cyprus by the USSR is the most advanced item in the aid package. Deliveries of SAM equipment began in late February 1965, and by the middle of March three Greek ships carrying SAM components, but no missiles, had unloaded at Cyprus ports. Diplomatic reaction by Greece's NATO allies caused the deliveries to stop abruptly in mid-March, and some Greek ships destined for Cyprus returned to Alexandria and unloaded SAM equipment. Subsequently, a group of 30 Greek SAM personnel (reportedly only one of three such Greek groups) returned from Cyprus to Greece. Cypriot Minister of Interior Georkadjis reportedly stated that if Greece refused to send SAM crews Cyprus would get them from the UAR or the USSR.

Early in April 1965, Nicosia stated that in the absence of a UN or NATO guarantee against a Turkish attack it intended to proceed with plans to make its SAM system operational. Greece apparently relented, and the 30-man group en route to the UAR for training returned to Cyprus. Shortly thereafter, deliveries of military equipment were again started. Greek freighters delivered five military cargoes -- reportedly including SAM gear -- during the period mid-April through early June. If these reports are accurate, most of the SAM equipment reportedly scheduled for delivery to Cyprus is probably now on the island. To date, however, there is no reliable information indicating that any of the actual missiles are on Cyprus or that SAM sites are under construction.

3. Conclusions

The Soviet policy of offering arms aid to Cyprus has served Communist objectives well. The introduction of Soviet arms has made the USSR a significant factor in the Cyprus dispute; it has decreased the likelihood of immediate "enosis" (the union of Cyprus with Greece, to which the USSR has always objected); and perhaps most important, it has served to weaken the southern flank of NATO.

25X1A

Analyst:

Coord:

OCI
ORR
OCI

Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5
SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5

St/A/DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 65-59, Status of
Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus --- October 1965 (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	
1 - 5	O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hq.	
6	O/DDI, [REDACTED]	25X1A
7	DD/CR	
8	DD/CR	
9	DD/CR	
10	Ch/E	
11 - 13	D/ONE	
14 - 19	St/CS	
20	St/PR	
21 - 27	D/T (1 each branch)	
28 - 34	D/R (1 each branch)	
35	MRA	
36 - 40	D/P (1 each branch)	
41 - 46	D/F (1 each branch)	
47	St/PS	
48 - 53	D/I (1 each branch)	
54 - 58	D/A (1 each branch)	
59 - 60	GD/OBI	
61 - 62	CD/OBI	
63	CD/X/OBI	
64 - 69	RID/SS/DS, Unit 4, Room 1B4004, Hq.	25X1A
70	St/P/A	
71	St/FM	
72	Analyst/Branch [REDACTED]	T/PO
73	GR/CR	
74	BR/CR	
75	FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq.	
76	Library/CR	
77	IPI/CR	
78	Archival File - Records Center	
79	Chief, OCR/FDD	
80	DCS/SD	
81	OCL/SA/R, Room 5G19, Hq.	
82	DDI/CGS, Room 7G00, Hq.	
83 - 84	DDI/CGS/HR, Room 7G00, Hq.	
85	DDI/RS, Room 4G39, Hq.	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5

SECRET

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	
86 - 88	D/OSI	
89	D/OBI	
90	DD/S&T/SpINT	25X1A
91 - 92	OTR/IS/IP, Room 532, 1000 Glebe (1 - OTR/SIC)	
93	NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 1S518, [REDACTED]	
94	NSAL, Room 3W136, Ft. Meade (via GB31, Hq.)	
95 - 103	OCI Internal (via [REDACTED] SDS/DD/OCR)	25X1A
25X1A 104 - 112	NSA [REDACTED] (via GB31, Hq.)	
113 - 114	National Indications Center, Room 1E821, Pentagon	
115 - 126	State, INR Communications Center, Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.	
127 - 130	USIA, IRS/A, Room 1002, 1750 - Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Attn: Warren Phelps	
131 - 175	Defense Intelligence Agency, DIAAQ-3, A Building, Arlington Hall Station	
176 - 240	St/P/C/RR, Room 4F41, Hq. (held in St/P/C, 15 Oct 65).	
241 - 290	Records Center	

SECRET

SECRET

21 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
FROM : Acting Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Material

It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CB 65-59, Status of Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus, October 1965, Secret/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, be forwarded as follows:


State, INR Communications Center,
Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.
Suggested distribution for
Embassies in Moscow, London, Paris,
Ankara, Athens, Cairo, and Nicosia

ACTION COMPLETED

The dissemination requested by
this memorandum has been completed.

BY: *ry*
Date: *22 Oct. 65*

25X1A



Attachments:
Copies #186 - #192 of CB 65-59

cc: CGS/RB

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

⑦

Project No. 35.5277 Report Series CIA/RR CB 65-59

Title: Status of Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus --- October 1965 (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Responsible Analyst and Branch [REDACTED] T/PO 25X1A

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION TO STATE POSTS

<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Far East</u>	<u>ARA</u>
Berlin, Germany	Bangkok, Thailand	Mexico
Bucharest, Romania	Djakarta, Indonesia	Guatemala
Budapest, Hungary	Hong Kong	Panama
✓Moscow, USSR	Rangoon, Burma	Brazillia, Brazil
Prague, Czechoslovakia	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Buenos Aires, Argentina
Sofia, Bulgaria	Saigon, Vietnam	Bogota, Colombia
Warsaw, Poland	Seoul, Korea	Santigao, Chile
	Singapore, British Malaya	La Paz, Bolivia
	Taipei, Formosa	Montevideo, Uruguay
	Tokyo, Japan	Caracas, Venezuela
	Vientiane, Laos	
	Colombo, Ceylon	<u>Africa</u>
<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East & South Asia</u>	Yaounde, Cameroun
Belgrade, Yugoslavia	✓Ankara, Turkey	Leopoldville, Congo
Bern, Switzerland	✓Athens, Greece	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Bonn, Germany	✓Cairo, Egypt	Accra, Ghana
Brussels, Belgium	Damascus, Syria	Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Copenhagen, Denmark	Kabul, Afghanistan	Nairobi, Kenya
Geneva, Switzerland	Karachi, Pakistan	Monrovia, Liberia
Helsinki, Finland	New Delhi, India	Tripoli, Libya
The Hague, Netherlands	✓Nicosia, Cyprus	Rabat, Morocco
Lisbon, Portugal	Tehran, Iran	Lagos, Nigeria
✓London, England	Baghdad, Iraq	Mogadiscio, Somal
Luxembourg, Luxembourg	Tel Aviv, Israel	Khartoum, Sudan
Madrid, Spain	Beirut, Lebanon	Tunis, Tunisia
Oslo, Norway	Amman, Jordon	Pretoria, South Africa
✓Paris, France	Jidda, Saudi Arabia	Algiers, Algeria
Rome, Italy		Cotonou, Dahomey
Stockholm, Sweden		Dakar, Senegal
Vienna, Austria		Bamako, Mali
<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Ottawa, Canada</u>	
Wellington, New Zealand		
Manila, Philippines		
Canberra, Australia		
Melbourne, Australia		

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
declassification