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
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
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
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*There is no phase in the intelligence business which is more
important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself
and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this
relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automati-
cally, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal
of persistent conscious effort, and is likely to disappear when the
effort is relaxed.*

> *Sherman Kent*, Strategic Intelligence
> for American World Policy

ASSESSING DDO HUMAN SOURCE REPORTING

Fenton Babcock

Sherman Kent's call for close and continuing contact between intelligence producers and consumers came in the CIA's formative years. It is appropriate to sound it again as centralized management of the intelligence community takes on new form and importance and new life. In recent years, the Directorate of Operations (DO) has been making a particularly conscious effort to get closer to the people who use its products, as it seeks to produce better intelligence, on a wider variety of subjects, with fewer resources. The DO has gotten direct payoff from this development; hundreds of consumers and users of DO reporting have found benefit in responding to the DO's techniques for getting their evaluative feedback; and closer communication has brought some problems and solutions that could well have relevance at the intelligence community level.

This is a record of producer-consumer contacts that have settled into a well-defined relationship that is, in Sherman Kent's terms, both proper and effective. As a result, progress has been made toward the goal of producing valuable reporting from economical exploitation of resources. Much remains to be done, however, in relating collection results to resources in a systematic way. Human source reporting does not defy centralized management; it simply requires that the development of systems for this purpose proceed with extra care and attention to the human and security factors involved. This applies to the collection and production of HUMINT as well as the assessment of its effect, impact, and value. The DO record of improvement in its evaluation system is one of careful pioneering. It has involved:

> a. increasing the field collector's responsibility for pre-selection of intelligence information according to its projected value;

> b. shifting emphasis in the headquarters reports officer's role from that of intelligence processor to that of quality control specialist responsible for providing reliable value readings and projections to the field; and

> c. developing communication with consumers and users so as to increase the regularity, scope, and depth of evaluative feedback for collection guidance, resource allocation, and budgetary purposes.

Value Assessment in the Field

Historically and typically, the DO reports evaluation process begins in the field with the quality control applied by the individual case officer overseas, or the Domestic Collection Division (DCD) intelligence officer in the United States, under the supervision of their chiefs. The important task of the field collector has already been well described in terms of fundamental responsibility and technique by Bruce L. Pechan in "The Collector's Role in Evaluation."[1] In brief, the case officer must provide up-to-date evaluation of his source's reliability, and as collector he is also responsible for giving a current account of changeable circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the information being reported. In addition to these evaluative inputs, the field collector must also apply his judgment on the relevance, importance, and timeliness of the information obtained. If he kills his own draft report, his judgment is usually final, and his right to do so is virtually uncontested. Indeed, he is enjoined not to process information that he confidently judges to be marginal.

In recent years there has been fairly steady increase in the percentage of the DO's overseas field reports that are received in cable form for dissemination. Much of that reporting is held briefly (at the field's request) for special review by the controlling area division, but it arrives in finished form designed for consumer use in response to expressed requirements. Headquarters evaluation may result in stopping dissemination or adding commentary which is clearly labelled as such and differentiated from any field comment or source comment the report may contain. Field comment rarely addresses the basic value of the information reported, for that is implicit in the finished form of the report. Determination of the value of a disseminated report is properly left to headquarters, where a good basis for comparison with other information exists and direct reading from Washington consumers can be obtained. Intelligence information of a largely tactical nature is frequently passed by the field collector to the U.S. mission directly concerned without formal dissemination. In those cases, the local consumers of such "actionable intelligence," on narcotics for example, are obviously most accessible to the field collector for his evaluation purposes.

Field evaluation as a basic responsibility is similar in the case of DCD's domestic voluntary collection.[2] Only a small percentage of DCD's reporting is processed in cable form, but it is nevertheless prepared by the field intelligence officers in finished form, ready, in their judgment, for dissemination in response to legitimate need. Again, the individual collector is acting as initial evaluator and is expected to equip himself constantly through the reading of available collection guidance, standing and spot requirements, and collateral material such as finished intelligence.

In recent years, the DO has been pushing and improving its training courses on reporting for both clandestine and DCD collection officers in order to sharpen not only their processing capabilities but also their evaluative skills and judgment. There has been direct payoff in terms of quality control exercised by the field collector on his own and his responsiveness to the headquarters quality control measures described below. The best evidence of this is the substantial decline recorded in the Directorate's total volume of reporting over the past few years and the assessed general increase in quality relative to the total number of reports produced. What makes this assessment possible is the advent of truly systematic collection of consumer feedback by a Directorate-level evaluation staff.

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[1] *Studies* V/3, pp. 37-47.

[2] The term "domestic voluntary collection" is introduced here as a substitute for the misleading expression "overt collection," as applied to the Domestic Collection Division of the DO.

Value Assessment in the Headquarters Divisions

Evaluative comment to the field collector is routinely made by the operating area divisions on nearly all clandestine reports that are published. DCD similarly sends comments to the domestic field offices concerned on most of the reports they produce. In both cases the comment made and the grade given each report are supposed to be, and often are, directly reflective of consumer evaluation obtained by the headquarters reports or desk officers. In general, such contacts are limited to obtaining timely feedback on current reporting. Most such comment is obtained by telephone, but often the desk-level officers consult directly with one or more analyst consumers of the report. Consistency in this desk contact procedure is spotty, however, and increasingly so as it extends to the analyst consumers outside the CIA headquarters building and to the users at the policy and program level.

The grades given to DO reports by headquarters are weighted to reward quality and discourage reporting that is of minor value. In 1974 the criteria for grading reports were standardized throughout the Directorate. By 1978, however, it had become clear that the area divisions were applying the "standardized" grades with different degrees of strictness, while DCD had developed its own quite different set of grades. In general, grade Category V, for reports that "contribute substantially to an identified national intelligence need," has been overused. In part, this is because the next lower grade available under the existing system is Category I, for reports that "fall near the lower limit of acceptability." The result has been inflated use of the V grade. This, combined with the differing standards of application among the divisions, prevents use of grading results for central management purposes.

Within the various divisions, the grading of reports has generally served its original purpose of improving quality relative to quantity. Judicious use by the divisions of the higher grades, on the whole, has contributed to this pattern of improvement; the grade X (10) is applied to reports making a "major contribution to a national level need," and XX (20) to a report that is "outstanding in its significance to the well-being of the U.S." It is on the assignment of these higher grades that consumer influence often is brought directly to bear. The bi-weekly grading sessions on China reporting, for example, are regularly attended by NFAC analysts who comment specifically on the grades being assigned.

Value Assessment at the Directorate Level

Complementing and following up on this *ad hoc* communication with consumers of the Directorate's human source reporting is the systematic process carried out by the Evaluation Group, a direct staff element of the Deputy Director for Operations. This group makes regular, personal contact with a cross-section of key consumers and users of the DO reporting throughout the intelligence community and beyond. The immediate Washington customers for both the DO's foreign clandestine and DCD collection products range from specialized analysts in NFAC, State/INR, and DIA to departmental policy action officers. The ultimate users of the DO's intelligence information are the policymakers of the Cabinet and the National Security Council, the heads of U.S. missions and military commands, and the U.S. military R&D project managers throughout the country.

The 500 key Washington consumers and users who are interviewed quarterly by members of the Evaluation Group have been remarkably responsive to this evaluation effort, many of them recognizing that regular, active and responsible participation in the process pays them direct dividends. In anticipation of the Evaluation Group's

direct periodic contact, many of the analyst consumers and policy-level users not only read the DO reporting with a somewhat different perspective, but many save up specific comment in mental or written note form. In the interviews they are called upon to react to monthly computer listings of the reports by title. In this way, memory of a certain report often serves as an initial indicator of effect.

The interview becomes successful, however, only when the customer spells out his actual use, or non-use, of an individual report or the reports in an identifiable stream. When circumstances call for it, he or she will be asked to explain as exactly as possible how a certain report affected the writing of an item of finished intelligence or a U.S. policy action, or how it may have frustrated the customer, or failed to meet requirements. In the interviewing, the Evaluation Group contact specialists have been successful in getting a mix of candidly critical and complimentary feedback because of the personal, substantive nature of the dialogues they sustain with the customers. Thorough preparation for the interviews is made through prior reading of all the reports being evaluated along with the pertinent operational messages, plus other agency reporting, finished intelligence on the subjects being pursued, and open-source information that bears on them. The subjects covered in interviews are: the "hard targets" (USSR, PRC, Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, Indochina); some 50 non-Communist world countries; and international functional topics, including economics, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics.

Significant comments on individual reports, critical or complimentary, are passed on to the collecting divisions to complement the results of their own earlier *ad hoc* contact with some of the same customers on some of the reports. Usually, the source of a particularly candid comment made to the Evaluation Group officer on a report, or a collection effort, is not revealed to the division. The retrospective evaluation obtained by the Evaluation Group is frequently passed on farther by the operating desks and reports officers to the collector in the field. The independent character of the Evaluation Group's feedback from customers often complements very effectively the earlier feedback obtained by the division at the time of a report's dissemination. In a significant number of instances the value of a report will have risen or fallen substantially since it was assessed by a consumer on a current basis.

It is the continuum of feedback and its cumulative weight that contribute so effectively to desk-level or field decisions on reward or termination of a reporting source and to their review of progress and direction in individual collection operations. The customers appreciate this pattern of discreet and effective use of their comments, and many have come to feel personally involved in an evaluation process that they like and respect. They and their supervisors judge their time to be well spent in responding to requests for current evaluation, and they value and use the privileged channel to the Deputy for Operations and his collection managers that the Evaluation group provides.

The results of the Evaluation Group's interviews have other uses after they are compiled and synthesized in narrative form every six months. Combined with statistics prepared by the Group, the customer commentary provides the DDO with a semi-annual independent evaluation of the Directorate's foreign intelligence production. The DDO uses portions of this material frequently in responding to oversight inquiries, and a significant portion of it feeds into the human source collection part of the CIA's annual budget presentation. The narratives are sent to the collecting divisions, which use them in overall collection guidance and send specific extracts to the field stations concerned.

A Careful Approach to Quantification of Value

The feedback achieved through personal contact with consumers and users of DO reporting stands in sharp contrast to the unsuccessful use of cover sheet questionnaires in the past, which were designed to bring a degree of quantification to the evaluation process. Quantification of the unquantifiable in human source reporting is not now being attempted by the DO. The use of cover sheet questionnaires on approximately one-third of the clandestine reports disseminated came to an end in the mid-1970's. By then, many analyst consumers had been turned off by that mechanistic technique for obtaining evaluation, and the unreliable results had fallen into disuse within the DO. The Domestic Collection Division still uses such forms for some of its S&T reporting but mainly for obtaining follow-up requirements and direct collection guidance, as opposed to evaluation.

The Evaluation Group's system of direct, personal contact with customers has, however, been used in a measured approach to value quantification. In 1976 the Evaluation Group's personalized approach brought consumer identification of certain streams of DO reporting that pointed toward dollar value impact among the ultimate users of the intelligence information in the U.S. military R&D community. From DIA and the service command intelligence staffs, the trail led to many U.S. military sub-commands, their foreign intelligence officers, and on to individual R&D project managers in a variety of military and civilian installations and institutions throughout the country. Tracing the reporting through its use in finished intelligence proved to be no problem, for the same warm response was encountered among the ultimate users of the DO human source information as had been the case in the Washington community of customers. Most quickly came to recognize that the DO needed to include in its budget preparation and resource allocation processes what *evidence* it could of actual effect, impact, and value in its reporting product. The tangible benefit feedback thus obtained by the Evaluation Group over the past two years has identified utility gains associated with certain disseminated information, including beneficial redirection of some U.S. funds in very large amounts and some actual dollar savings. In many cases, the evidence of impact has included information on certain U.S. military vulnerabilities and capabilities that carried an obligation for the Evaluation Group to give it the most careful protection.

A few examples will indicate the scope and magnitude of human source report impact that has been certified under the Evaluation Group's tangible benefit feedback program. In the course of several years, DO reports provided information on Soviet electronics countermeasure capabilities and tactics that transformed the U.S. perception of that threat and led to very extensive beneficial change in certain U.S. equipment and troop training procedures. In other instances, the DO's human source reporting has combined critically with the results of technical collection, often providing the confidence factor required by analysts before publishing their findings in vital areas of research and development. This has been the case in many fields including naval weaponry, electronic warfare, aircraft, and missiles. In most cases, very large amounts of R&D funds have been involved, with the cumulative total related directly to DO intelligence information running into billions of dollars. Specific correlation between this human source reporting and dollar value impact has not been pressed by the Evaluation Group in most instances during its personal contacts throughout the U.S. military R&D community. This is because the direct nature of the impact has been so readily certified by nearly all of the key customers involved, and because of methodological difficulties that are encountered in moving the last mile toward quantification of value.[3]

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[3] Max S. Oldham, "A Value for Information," *Studies*, XII/2, p. 29.

Conscious of the fundamental difficulty in quantifying the value of human source reporting, the Evaluation Group has moved carefully in extending its effort in this regard beyond the tangible benefit feedback program. At one extreme the Group highlights for the DDO many instances of reporting where intangible benefit of considerable significance has been identified by policy users. A good example here is frequent reporting on bilateral or multilateral negotiations involving the United States. Cabinet-level officials have been quick to certify direct, heavy impact of DO intelligence upon negotiations they have conducted, particularly in the field of international economics. Similar hard evidence of impact, however intangible, has been readily forthcoming with regard to nuclear proliferation. Here, policy users have several times been able to trace for us the connection betwen the DO intelligence they received—often a combination of clandestine and DCD reporting—and successful U.S. diplomatic demarches made to foreign governments.

At the other end of the Evaluation Group's quantification spectrum lie the tentative steps taken so far toward possible scalar valuation of the Directorate's human source reporting. So far, this has involved learning about the efforts made under professional guidance at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for example, in placing numerical values on the intangible results of some of its programs.[4]

The Evaluation Group's contact specialists have undertaken some systematic use of specific value criteria in their interviews on an experimental basis. This has been done with a view to bringing outside methodological expertise to bear in analyzing the results, for possible use in moving toward limited quantification where it is feasible. The Evaluation Group's approach to the quantification of value in its human source reporting has been one of alert carefulness, and the appropriateness of this approach has been confirmed by the experience of other collection managers in the intelligence community.

Along with its narrative accounts of key customer feedback in synthesized form, and the certifiable evidence of impact and benefit noted above, the Evaluation Group's comprehensive semi-annual production reviews have included various statistical arrays designed to give the DDO semi-quantitative evaluation of the DO reporting product. These have included recorded use of reports in finished intelligence; responsiveness to Key Intelligence Questions; and responsiveness to those national-level information needs identified in the course of FOCUS reviews (carried out by the National Intelligence Officers and the DCI's Human Resources Committee), which have been accepted by the DO as suitable for clandestine collection and levied as requirements on the field. In addition, the Evaluation Group has tracked reporting responsiveness to portions of DCID 1/2 and some of the draft National Intelligence Topics, on an experimental basis.

Relevance at the Intelligence Community Level

Many of the Evaluation Group's regular contacts have sought to use it as a channel for levying requirements and giving collection guidance. Although generally discouraged by the interviewers, this type of customer feedback is recorded by the Group when it is evaluative in nature. Most of the consumer analysts know well that other, regular channels exist for requirements and guidance, but a dismaying number simply don't know exactly what those channels are or how to use them. A substantial number of customers have felt frustrated in their use of regular, formal channels over

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[4] See "Effectiveness Assessment in Government," by Lynn P. Madden (Management Sciences Training Center, U.S. Civil Service Commission).

the years, and have overloaded the informal channels that exist or stopped using either effectively.

The Evaluation Group's experience over several years has shown, for example, that the present system of communication between some U.S. military end-users and CIA's collectors of human source intelligence is not adequate. In many instances, the fact that certain human source information, if collected within a certain time frame, could have tremendous impact on very high-cost U.S. military programs has just not found its way through the existing communication circuit. That circuit contains various filters that serve the good purpose of preventing tasking overload, but they are counterproductive when they stop the kind of directional feedback cited above from reaching critical points. The present system for U.S. military tasking of human source collection lacks a reliable, centralized tuning capability. Clear beneficial results have come from careful correlation between HUMINT collection effort and ultimate potential yield in this realm of very large U.S. military payoff; but they have often stemmed only from special task force approaches or crusades carried out by individual users.

This tasking-type feedback on relative priority among customers' needs for information from human source collection has made up an integral part of the semi-annual production reviews prepared by the Evaluation Group for the DDO. For the division reports officer, who may upon occasion get too close to the intelligence information he is processing, and the operations officer who may get overly bound up in his particular collection effort, this type of directional feedback from key customers can be very useful. This is particularly true, of course, where all-source comparison by the customers brings out undesirable duplication of collection effort and helps to identify those areas of intelligence need where human source collection can contribute best, if not uniquely.

Reliability in consumer and end-user feedback on the effect, impact, and relative value of intelligence information depends much upon the nature of the relationship between the collector and these customers. If it is a proper relationship, both systematic and personalized, then built-in dangers such as human error and bias can be dealt with professionally.[5] Statistical support to evaluation and the goal of quantification can, as a result, be kept on the right perspective. With the array of techniques now in use, and direct customer participation steadily adding scope and depth to evaluation, the DO can proceed with some confidence in matching its shrinking resources to the increasing demands of our time.

Could other intelligence agencies and the community as a whole benefit from the DO's experience? Several agencies have been interested enough to request detailed briefings on the DO system, and a community seminar is being organized on the problem of quantification in assessing human source reporting.

As the DO has found, close consumer contact, with evidence of results obtained therefrom, is the best way to make intelligence consumers and users clear on both the potentialities and the limitations of human source collection, as compared to other forms. Good, regular communication on through to the field, by extension, has also helped many customers better assess, sort out, and articulate their intelligence needs and priorities. Such, then, can be the mutually beneficial results of the proper, effective relationship between intelligence and its users that Sherman Kent called for some thirty years ago.

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[5] See Richards J. Heuer, Jr. "Cognitive Biases: Problems in Hindsight Analysis," *Studies XXII/2.*

One more round with espionage
by Moses and Joshua

A BIBLE LESSON ON SPYING

John M. Cardwell

For the past few years the Central Intelligence Agency has come under considerable scrutiny. Major issues have been raised regarding oversight and control, the intent being to insure accountability and legality. With the advent of the Carter administration, the issue of morality has also been made a major concern. Today the CIA and the nation are confronted with a perplexing situation: how can we engage in secret operations with oversight of these operations lying essentially in the public domain (Congress) and conduct inherently insidious spying activities that must also conform to traditional non-spying standards of ethical conduct and morality.

In an effort to seek some solutions to these problems, it is natural that we should explore historical precedents to determine what lessons and insights the past might offer. One rich source of information that should not be overlooked is the Holy Bible. The purpose therefore of this discussion is to explore the issue of spying as it occurs in the Bible and examine the lessons it might offer. Perhaps new perspectives can be found that will offer guidance regarding how ". . . one Nation, under God . . ." should go about the business of spying.

The subject of spying appears in numerous places throughout the Old and New Testament.[1] Spies were used by the Israelites against their adversaries, and on occasion various factions within the tribes of Israel used spies against each other. In the New Testament, spies were used by the political forces opposed to the emerging Christian movement and by members of the early Christian church to protect itself. There are many additional incidents in which individuals clearly engaged in espionage activities but are not normally referenced using those terms. For example, Judas could be described as having been a secret agent for the Sanhedrin because of his role in the betrayal of Jesus.

Spying as an activity is not treated as an issue in either the Old or the New Testaments and is discussed or mentioned only as an event worth reporting. As a consequence, the lessons to be learned from examining the Scriptures must be inferred in the context of narrative experiences. Guidance to be derived from the study of biblical spying events is therefore subjective and dependent upon the approach and depth from which inferences are drawn. In this discussion, however, the objective has been to emphasize the facts and keep interpretations to a minimum.

The earliest mention of spying in the Old Testament occurs in the story of Joseph.[2] After Joseph had been sold by his brothers into bondage and had later maneuvered himself into a position of influence in the Egyptian government, his

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[1] All references cited in this article can be found in the *Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York, 1959.

[2] Genesis 42:6-17

brothers came to Egypt to buy food during a famine. They were brought before Joseph but did not recognize him. Joseph, however, did recognize them, and in an effort to hide his recognition, accused them of coming to Egypt not to buy food but to spy. Evidently spying was an established fact of life, well familiar to Joseph.

There are only two spying incidents in the Bible in which methods and sources are discussed in any detail, and both occur in the Old Testament. The first incident occurred under the direction of Moses shortly after he led the Israelites out of Egypt.[3] They had camped in the wilderness of Paran near the boundary of the Promised Land, and Moses used spies to determine what the Promised Land was like. The second occurred approximately 40 years later under the direction of Joshua.[4] At that time, the Israelites had completed their sojourn in the desert and were again about to enter the Promised Land. There is a remarkable contrast not only in terms of methods and sources used by these two outstanding biblical leaders, but also in the different administrative procedures governing these two operations and the kinds of people involved. From an analysis of these two operations, biblical experience and perspectives with respect to spying are revealed.[5]

The children of Israel were divided into 12 tribes, or family groups, each tribe having its own leaders and hierarchy. The society was predominantly patriarchal in nature with the leader of each tribe acting as a kind of benevolent dictator or governor over his group. In him was vested the responsibility for providing administrative, legal, military, social, economic, and religious guidance and leadership. Moses was the overall leader and spokesman of the tribes but he exercised final authority only upon the consensus of the people and the leaders of the 12 tribes. Forty years later Joshua occupied roughly the same position as Moses. Both men, therefore, were not absolute rulers of the tribes of Israel. The people could, and occasionally did, reject their leadership.

Moses conducted the earliest spying operation recorded in the Bible. As previously mentioned, the purpose of this operation was to "spy out" Canaan.[6] He chose 12 prominent individuals, one from each of the 12 tribes, to be his spies and instructed them to go into the Promised Land and learn what the land was like. To provide proof that indeed it was a "land flowing with milk and honey," he instructed his spies to return with samples of fruit. These spies spent 40 days in the Promised Land, returned as instructed with information regarding the cities and the population, and delivered samples of fruit. Upon their return, they reported their findings publicly to Moses and the 12 tribes. They brought back a uniform opinion regarding the cities, number of people, lay of the land, and the fact that the countryside was indeed "flowing with milk and honey." Ten of the spies, however, reported that the people were so physically large and well organized that if an invasion was attempted, the Israelites would be destroyed. Only two of the spies reported that they were confident that they could succeed and argued strenuously to go forward with the invasion. In the ensuing public debate, the Israelites became frightened by the negative report of the 10 spies and lost confidence that they could succeed in an invasion. They advocated stoning the two spies who said that an invasion should be attempted.

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[3] Numbers 13-14

[4] Joshua 2

[5] Intelligence operations by Moses and Joshua have previously figured in "Decision Trees" by Dr. Edwin G. Sapp, *Studies XVIII/4*, and "Scientific and Technical Intelligence" by Robert M. Clark, *Studies XIX/1*, pp. 46-47.

[6] The complete story of the espionage mission can be found in Numbers 13 and Numbers 14:1-10. The consequences are described in Numbers 14:10-34.

Moses was distraught at the loss of confidence by the Israelites, especially after they had been safely delivered out of Egypt and had successfully crossed the Red Sea. Their attitude brought them dangerously close to losing their status as God's chosen people, but Moses argued successfully on their behalf. They were nevertheless severely punished for their failure. They were told that they would be required to remain in the wilderness one year for every day the spies spent in the Promised Land, that is, 40 years for the 40 days spent spying. They were furthermore told that everyone over the age of 20 would be denied entry into the Promised Land, and that the only exceptions would be the two spies who maintained their faith. Even Moses was told he would not enter the Promised Land, and he did not.[7] Thus the first spying operation discussed in the Bible ended in failure and had disastrous consequences for the population.

Forty years later the Israelites found themselves again preparing to enter the Promised Land, this time under the leadership of Joshua.[8] Joshua was, by the way, one of the two surviving spies who had participated in the operation conducted under Moses.[9] As before, there was a need to send spies into the Promised Land to get intelligence to support the invasion. Joshua, however, went about things quite differently. He chose two young men whose names are not recorded and instructed them to go into Canaan and to reconnoiter the city of Jericho.[10] The spies went to Jericho and visited a harlot named Rahab. Although the presence of the spies was reported to the local authorities, Rahab hid the spies and kept them from being captured. She told the two spies that the people had been expecting an Israelite invasion for some time. She reported that—despite the fact that the city was well fortified and the army well trained—the people were frightened of the Israelites and had lost the courage to stand up to them. The escape of the Israelites from the Egyptians, their successful crossing of the Red Sea, the subsequent destruction of Pharaoh and his armies, and their exploits during their 40 years of wandering in the desert were well known to the people and had convinced them of the Israelites' superiority. Rahab likewise was convinced the city would fall and made an agreement with the spies that she would help them leave the city and not reveal what she had told them if in return they would spare her and her family during the attack. The spies agreed and with Rahab's help they successfully escaped capture and eventually made their way back to their own people. The spies reported to Joshua everything that had happened, especially the information given to them by the harlot regarding the fear of the people.

Using this information, Joshua made plans for the invasion and reported his plan to the 12 tribes. The plan was approved, the invasion proceeded, and the attack, capture, and subsequent destruction of the city of Jericho was successful.[11] Rahab and her family were, as agreed, spared by Joshua during the battle of Jericho.[12]

The contrast between these two incidents is significant. Moses used 12 people, all amateurs, each with both political and military responsibilities in his own tribe. Each was a prominent individual who is named in the Bible. On the other hand, Joshua apparently used two professional (throughout they were referred to only as "spies") anonymous (their names are not given) people to conduct his mission. Moses' spies brought back reports only of the physical characteristics of the land, whereas Joshua's also reported the attitude of the people. The spies Moses sent made their report

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[7] Deuteronomy 1:37
[8] Joshua 1:1-2
[9] Deuteronomy 1:38
[10] The mission into Jericho is described in Joshua 2.
[11] Joshua 3, 4, 5, and 6:1-21
[12] Joshua 6:22-25

openly, and the discussion that followed was conducted in public. Joshua's spies, by contrast, reported only to Joshua, who then made the necessary decisions. Moses' spies, who also would have been principals in any military actions to be taken, participated in the decision-making process. Joshua's spies neither had leadership responsibilities nor did they participate in the policy-making decision process. The consequences of these two operations are significantly different. Moses' operation, conducted by amateurs more or less in the public domain, resulted in a weakening of Moses' position of authority, led to a loss of the people's confidence in themselves, and precipitated an extended period of severe national punishment. Joshua's operation, conducted in private by professionals, led to an achievement of national destiny.

An implicit point is made regarding the procedures used during these two spying operations. It is not specifically stated, but one is left with the impression that the 12 spies sent by Moses more or less went about their business as tourists, and the report they brought back is typical of the kind of thing that a tourist would report. The information reported to Moses consisted both of facts and conclusions drawn by the spies. The negative report given by the majority of the spies, for example, reflected their perception regarding the consequences of military actions, which, if taken, they would be called upon to lead. The people agreed with the negative position, not because of facts reported, but because of the negative interpretation given these facts by individuals of prominence.

Joshua's spies, on the other hand, went in secret (although they were discovered) and visited a harlot who gave them valuable information regarding the attitude of her people. The spies did not interpret this information but simply reported to Joshua what they had been told. No moral judgment was made regarding the fact that Joshua's spies visited a harlot, nor is the information provided by her judged to be of questionable validity.

The relationship between Rahab and the spies was evidently amoral. No conditions of "conversion" were imposed in the recruitment, but merely an agreement for conspiratorial silence in exchange for a harlot's life. Joshua made no recorded comment or judgment regarding his spies' recruitment of or the agreement with the harlot. He did, however, honor the agreement, despite the fact that he had not given his prior approval and took no part in making it. After the Battle of Jericho, Rahab joined the Israelites and lived with them. No mention is made of whether or not she continued to practice her old profession. All references to her, in both the Old and the New Testament, refer to her only as "Rahab the harlot."

If there is a lesson to be learned, it would appear that a strong case is made for the conduct of spying activities in secret by professionals, unencumbered by other political or military responsibilities, and that these professionals should report in secret to higher authority who would make policy decisions without debate. Spies should definitely not participate in the policy-decision-making process, nor should they take their cases to the public. When that occurs, although stoning is passé, the people are likely to throw figurative rocks at the wrong people for the wrong reasons.

It can be argued that the Moses operation suffered from complications that arose because of oversight and political issues. The selection of twelve spies, one from each of the twelve tribes, was probably motivated by political considerations, and the very specific instructions given by Moses to the spies were probably necessary in order to define the specific objectives and procedures in order to obtain approval from the twelve tribes. All the Israelites knew that the operation was to occur, who was going, and what they were to accomplish on the mission. When they returned, their report

was likewise made in public, the results of which have been noted earlier. It is noteworthy that the spies successfully accomplished all mission objectives. The point at which the Moses operation actually failed can be traced to the negative comments made during the public "mission debriefing." Taken overall, it can be argued that the negative report of the spies and the loss of control over the situation was actually stimulated because of too much oversight and the tightly controlled administrative procedures used. In summary, this episode is a classic example of an operation that was successful, but in which the "patient" died.

The contrasts offered by the Joshua operation are startling. Joshua certainly did not have an oversight problem, nor did he worry about defining a politically acceptable mission scenario. His spies were sent in secret, were given absolutely minimal instructions, "Go, view the land, especially Jericho," and reported back only to Joshua. The operational scenario could hardly have been predicted, and if it could, it is questionable that it would have been met with approval. Joshua handled all administrative matters alone, provided flexible and responsive support to his spies by keeping their bargain, and made the necessary judgments required to successfully lead his people to victory. From a purely administrative point of view, the Joshua mission was a nightmare; nevertheless, the operation can only be judged as an unqualified success.

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