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INTRODUCTION: Coincident with the CFM reversion to open sessions, the Soviet radio (and to a lesser extent, its Satellites) returns to voluminous reports on the Conference proceedings, with primary attention given the speeches by Vishinsky. Since Report No. 4 of this series, Radio Moscow and the Soviet-controlled German radios have also issued a number of commentaries on CFM-related subjects. Perhaps the most interesting statements are the several broadcast allusions to the possible Conference outcome--ranging from hopes of at least a limited agreement of some kind to charges that the Western Powers have no intention of reaching an agreement or of compromising in any way. Otherwise, the commentaries generally constitute a recapitulation of previously expressed Soviet positions on such issues as the Berlin question, the unanimity principle, and the Bonn Constitution. Two Soviet commentaries are concerned with the alleged failure of demilitarization in Western Germany, a subject that has been generally slighted throughout the course of this Conference. References to the need for German unity continue to appear, but--except for one review of the German Peoples Congress' "struggle for unity and a just peace"--not in concentrated form. The claim that because of the economic slump the Western delegates are only interested in a limited trade agreement--as reported by Yuri Zhukov in PRAVDA a few days ago--is not pursued; but in other contexts, Moscow repeats the statement about desirability of East-West trade and accuses the Western Powers of "ousting" Western German products from the markets of the world.

LIMITED AGREEMENT; FUTURE CONTACTS: The most unusual statements regarding the possible outcome of the Conference are broadcast not by Soviet or Soviet-controlled radios but by the U.S.-licensed and British-licensed press services in Germany. Because they are attributed to official Soviet sources, however, they appear to be worth reporting here. The dispatch by the U.S.-licensed agency reports:

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Major General Tulpanov, Soviet Military Administration Information Chief, told representatives of the Soviet-licensed press in Berlin yesterday that the Soviet delegation ~~sanctioned the Eastern Ministers Conference in 1955, which had earlier achieved any positive results.~~ According to German articles close to the Soviet Military Administration, Tulpanov also announced that the Soviet delegation would ~~now try to obtain a short-term trade agreement to restore the free exchange of goods between Eastern and Western Germany and between Eastern and Western Berlin.~~ (3 June)

According to the dispatch by the British-licensed agency:

"It is said that members of the Soviet delegation who had already returned to Krasnodar stated that the end of the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference did not mean the end of the recently renewed contact between the Four Big Powers. The end of the Paris Conference would mean the beginning of a series of conferences from which Moscow would still expect success." (3 June)

And Schnitzler, Soviet-controlled German commentator, says that although German demands "go further than Vishinsky's proposals" the Germans "wholeheartedly welcome even the most modest agreements."

THE "ACCOMMODATING" SOVIET ATTITUDE: At least one Soviet commentary and two Soviet-controlled German commentaries go out of their way to portray the Soviet position as one that is characterized by good will, a willingness to compromise, and a desire to arrive at a reasonable agreement. At the end of discussion of the Berlin question, Soviet commentator Lenin, adding a "few words about good will and an uncompromising attitude," contends that "the Soviet proposals reflect a desire to cooperate with the Western Powers. The USSR does not seek to secure any privileges for itself, and does not intend to place itself in a special position." Dziwislawski, Soviet-controlled Leipzig commentator, claims that there is no question about "which party has favored conciliation in these discussions. ... Vishinsky had never claimed that his proposals were the Soviets' last word. ... In view of this accommodating attitude, it is really difficult to find a concrete reason for a negative conclusion of the Conference." And Schnitzler, advising that "compromise proposals are necessary," observes that "the USSR's proposals...are going to the limit of a possible compromise without leaving the principles laid down at the Warsaw conference."

WESTERN EDUCATION: "SINISTERLY PATTERN, SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED": Conciliatory statements, such as the above, however, are not permitted to stand by themselves. Each of them is followed by a comparison with the Western delegates' "dictatorial attitude," with "Acheson's arrogant demands," with the alleged Western plan to oppose uncompromisingly "anything which Vishinsky might submit." The latter charges are much more frequent than protestations of Soviet willingness to agree; and Soviet commentators even pick up the thesis, first voiced by Budapest, that the Western proposals were presented with the deliberate intention of being rejected by the USSR. Commentator Izakov, for example, says that "in submitting their obviously unacceptable proposals, the Western Powers did not at all believe that they would be adopted." And another Soviet commentator, attacking the Voice of America and the Western press for trying to convince their audiences that the success of the Conference depends on the attitude of the Soviet delegation, repeats essentially the same contention—which is said to have clearly revealed the hypocrisy of the Western proposals and propaganda about a united Germany. In addition to the usual motives ascribed to Western attempts at "dictation," the Soviet-controlled German radios add a new one. Reporting an article in TAGEBLICKE KUNSTGRABU (Soviet Military Administration organ), Soviet-controlled Berlin claims that "Secretary Connally stated... that a breakdown of the Foreign Ministers Conference would lead to a speeding up of the decision on the U.S. military aid program for Europe amounting to 1.5 billion dollars. This is the crux of the matter. The U.S. is looking for markets and commodities in Europe, but not for peace and understanding." And a Soviet-controlled Leipzig commentator charges that the Western attitude is motivated by a desire to preserve an atmosphere of conflict—"because the beginning of a slump in the Western world, and especially the U.S., makes it ever more necessary to grant financial aid to the U.S. armament kings by giving them orders for new arms; and the climate most conducive to... the armaments industry is the usual atmosphere of conflict."

* The most outright Soviet-controlled German statement to this effect that has been monitored to date.

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